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Abstract
This thesis will examine the ideas on the mind and its disorders in
British medicine from around 1660 to about 1780, corresponding roughly
to 'the long eighteenth century' of Roy Porter or 'l'âge classique' of Michel
Foucault. The period starts with the medicine of the Scientific Revolution,
and ends just before the 'Psychiatric Revolution' started. It is concerned
with the pre-history of British psychiatry during the Enlightenment.
Psychiatry was not an independent discipline during this period, so
medical ideas about the human mind and madness will be considered in
the schemes of general medicine. Changes in the understanding of
madness will be traced with reference to those in general physiology and
pathology. Major medical writers to be examined include: Thomas Willis,
Archibald Pitcairn, Richard Mead, Nicholas Robinson, George Cheyne,
William Battie, John Monro, and William Cullen.
The interplay between medical ideas on the mind and madness, and
contemporary philosophical and religious thinkings will also be examined.
The influence of the philosophies of Descartes, Locke, Hume and some
others upon psychiatric thinking will be looked at. Here the relation was
often delicate. Medical writers did not simply adopt philosophical and
religious frameworks of the mind, but more often tried to differentiate the
scope of medicine from that of metaphysics, especially in the earlier part
of the eighteenth century. As the century went on, there was a shift
toward fusing philosophical discourse on the mind and medical discourse
on the body, and hence a shift toward psychological understanding of
madness. David Hartley and William Cullen represented the trends.
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To Mika
Introduction
Historiography of Eighteenth-century Psychiatry
Roy Porter has rightly assessed that the British history of psychiatry
has been transformed over the last decade.' Since the late 1970s, medical,
social, legal, cultural, and sociological historians have produced a fast-
growing body of studies on psychiatry and madness, partly in response to
the stimulations and provocations given by so-called anti-psychiatry and the
late Michel Foucault. 2 Without underestimating the contributions of the
previous generations, one can say that recent works on the history of
psychiatry have achieved a remarkably higher standard of historical
scholarship in a very short space of time. 3 They have sifted a vast amount
of hitherto neglected or little-read manuscripts and published materials,
and have examined their contents in a more detailed way. Departing from
the former 'in-house' approach, they have related psychiatry in the past
1. Roy Porter, 'History of Psychiatry in Britain,' History of Ps ychiatry, 1991,
2: 271-79, esp., 271. Here I am not going to present a through
historiographical assessment of the recent scholarship in the history of
British psychiatry. For the studies on the nineteenth century, my
knowledge in the present literature is limited, and as for the eighteenth
century, I will be highly selective.
2. For anti-psychiatry, see, for instance, Thomas Szasz, The Myth of
Mental Illness (London: Granada, 1972). As for the work of Foucault, I
have used the French original, Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie a l'áge
classigue, 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1972). There exists a
violently abridged and seriously misleading English translation, Madness
and Civilization (1965).
3. For the contributions before the historiographical revolution, see, inter
QUa, Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine, Three Hundred Years of
Psychiatry 1535-1860 (London: Oxford U.P., 1963; rept. New York:
Carlisle, 1982); idem., George III and the Mad-Business (London: Allen
Lane, 1969; London: Pimlico, 1991).
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with much broader issues, and have put it in the contexts of social,
political, economical, and ideological milieu.4
The majority of book-length studies have examined the period after
around 1800, with the exceptions of the works by Foucault, Porter, and
Michael MacDonald. This is fairly understandable if one considers drastic
changes in psychiatry which took place from the early nineteenth century.
The problem of pauper lunatics was discussed at Westminster in the
special committees established for the purpose, such as the Select
Committee of the House of Commons 'to investigate the state of the
criminal and pauper lunatics' in 1807. The debates at the Parliaments
culminated in the Lunatics Act of 1845, which made it compulsory to build
a county asylum.5 The public asylums created a new landscape of lunacy,
and the number of institutionalized lunatics soared from about 10,000 in
1800 to around 100,000 in 1900.6 Also the private sector of psychiatric
treatment played a significant role in changing the outlook and the content
of psychiatry in the nineteenth century. The York Retreat, the private
Quaker institution initially established in protest against abuse in the
public asylum in the city, provided the reformers with a paradigm to
4. To name only a few of the studies: Michael MacDonald, Mystical
Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in Seventeenth-Century England
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1981); Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles:
a History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the Regency
(London: the Athione Press, 1987); Andrew Scull, Museums of Madness:
the Social Organization of Insanity in Nineteenth-Century England
(London: Allen Lane, 1979; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982); idem, ed.,
Madhouses. Mad-Doctors, and Madmen: the Social History of Psychiatry
in the Victorian Era (London: Athlone Press, 1981). Anatomy of
Madness: Essays in the History of Ps ychiatry, eds. by W.F. Bynum et al.,
3 vols. (London: Tavistock, 1985-88). Porter, 'History of Psychiatry in
Britain' includes an excellent assessment of the recent British literature on
the topic.
5. Scull, Museums of Madness, pp.50-124.
6. Scull, Museums of Madness, pp.l8'7-220; Kathleen Jones, Lunacy, Law,
and Conscience (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), p.116; Roy
Porter, 'Madness and Its Institutions,' in Medicine in Society: Historical
Essays, ed. by Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1992), 277-301.
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follow. Especially, many reformers tried to adopt its 'moral treatment,'
which replaced former physical restraint and medications with the
emphasis on intimate and benevolent familial environment to help the
patients' mind to restore sanity.7 The interplay between the public and
private institutions gave further impetus to the reform in lunacy. Many of
these institutions have left relatively rich and detailed diagnostic and
administrative records, which are necessary for a solid historical study.
Largely based on these institutions, the new profession of mad-
doctors and the new specialized branch of psychiatry were emerging.
During the nineteenth century, they were establishing their own technical,
intellectual, professional, and ideological concerns, sometimes including
fundamental differences among the newly-created 'psychiatrists.'8
Accordingly, the amount of medical writings dedicated to the topic of
madness drastically increased in the course of the nineteenth century. This
is exemplified by the number of entries in Hunter and Macalpine's Three
Hundred Years of Psychiatry 1535-1860: the book spends almost one-half
of its entire pages on the period from 1800 to 1860, one-fifth of the time-
span it covers.
Historians' concentration on these reforms and revolutions,
however, has created a historiographical bias and sometimes over-emphasis
on the gap between the nineteenth century and the period before. Serious
7. The York Retreat and its 'moral treatment' has been one of the foci of
the research and the debate. The relevant literature includes: Michel
Foucault, Histoire de la folie; Michael Donnelly, Managing the Mind
(London: Tavistock, 1983); Anne Digby, Madness. Morality and Medicine:
a Study of the York Retreat 1796-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.,
1985). For the private madhouse at Ticehurst, see Charlotte MacKenzie,
'A Family Asylum: a History of the Private Madhouse at Ticehurst in
Sussex, 1792-1917,' University of London, Ph.D., 1987.
8. Scull, Museums of Madness, pp.125-185; W.F. Bynum, 'Rationales for
Therapy in British Psychiatry, 1780-1835,' Med.Hist., 1974, 18: 3 17-34;
Roger Cooter, 'Phrenology and British Alienists, Ca. 1825-1845,' in
Madhouses. Mad-Doctors, and Madmen, ed. by Scull, 58-104; L.S. Jacyna,
'Somatic Theories of Mind and the Interests of Medicine in Britain, 1850-
1879,' Med.Hist., 1982, 26: 233-58.
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attempts to revise the historiographical distortion have not been made
until Roy Porter started to examine psychiatry in the 'long' eighteenth
century (by which term Porter means the period from the Restoration to
the Regency). Throwing new light on the neglected period, Porter
challenged the bleak picture about eighteenth-century environment in
which the mad were treated, kept, and understood, and successfully
rectified the former over-emphasis on discontinuities between the ethos of
eighteenth-century psychiatry and that of nineteenth-century psychiatry.9
Refuting MacDonald's thesis which has characterized the eighteenth
century as the period when former psychological and religious healing was
lost, and the flat medicalization, the brutal treatment and the confinement
of madness were going on, Porter has shown that the long eighteenth
century was not a disaster for the mad, and the period did not lose its rich
and nuanced culture about madness.'° Challenging Andrew Scull's view
of eighteenth-century psychiatry as a business to domesticate, so to speak,
a wild beast, Porter has proved that compassionate and benevolent attitude
towards lunatics, which have been regarded as the innovation and the
hallmark of nineteenth-century reforms in lunacy, had a substantial
presence also in the eighteenth century.' 1 Moreover, Porter has rectified
the former image of private madhouses as places of mercenary trade, the
hotbeds of abuse and illegal confinement, and the enemy of the progress
of humanitarian psychiatry. Instead, he maintained that private madhouses
in the eighteenth century served as the gestation site of the new psychiatric
profession, putting them in the broader context of the coming of the
9. As Porter has pointed out, Whiggish historians, Foucault, Scull, and
MacDonald all agreed on that the eighteenth century was a 'dark age' for
the mad. See Mind-forg'd Manacles, p.4.
10. Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, pp.4, 8 & 33-109; MacDonald, Mystical
Bedlam, pp.197, 230-231.
11. Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, pp.143-47; Andrew Scull, 'Domestication
of Madness,' Med.Hist., 1983, 27: 233-48.
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commercialization of medical service at that time. 12 Following largely
Porter's lead and concentrating on Bedlam, Jonathan Andrews has
demonstrated that Bedlam in the eighteenth century was not an ineffectual
receptacle of the mad and a pandemonium of abuse and cruelty, but a
place where the patient received medical treatment.' 3 Andrews also
proved that respectable and professional mad-doctors were not the
invention of the nineteenth century, but Bedlam doctors were enjoying a
considerable amount of both respect and prestige in the Georgian era.'4
Mainly thanks to Porter's and Andrews' works, we are now in a far better
position to understand the debt of nineteenth-century psychiatry to
psychiatry in the previous century, and to assess the uniqueness of the
outlooks and content of psychiatric care in the both centuries.
Study of eighteenth-century psychiatry and madness has been
conducted also in the area what used to be regarded as marginal and
insignificant domains, such as literary and/or visual representations of
madness and sufferers of mental disturbances; psychological devices in
fiction; the voices of the mad themselves. Perceptive literary critics like
Michael DePorte, Max Byrd, and Brian Conneiy have described how
madness (often embodied in the form of Bedlam) haunted the literary
imagination of eighteenth-century literary figures such as Swift, Pope,
12. Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, pp.167-228; idem, 'Madness and Its
Institutions.' For eighteenth-century private madhouses, see William Li.
Parry-Jones, The Trade in Lunacy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1972).
13. Jonathan Andrews, "Hardly a Hospital, but a Charity for Pauper
Lunatics"?: Therapeutics at Bethiem in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries,' in Medicine and Charity Before the Welfare State, eds. by
Jonathan Barry and Cohn Jones (London: Routledge, 1991), 63-81. See
also Patricia Ailderidge, 'Management and Mismanagement at Bedlam,
1547-1633,' in Health. Medicine and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century,
ed. by Charles Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1979), 14 1-64; idem,
'Bedlam: Fact or Fantasy?' in The Anatomy of Madness, vol.2., eds. by
W.F. Bynum et al. (London: Tavistock, 1985), 17-33.
14. Jonathan Andrews, 'A Respectable Mad-Doctor?: Richard Hale FRS,'
Notes and Records of the Royal Soceity of London, 1990, 44: 169-203.
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Johnson and Sterne. 15 Sander Gilman's pioneering study of visual
representations of madness from the late Medieval Age to the twentieth
century included many materials from the eighteenth century.' 6 As the
nineteenth century had John Perceval's Narrative and Daniel Schreber's
Memoirs, the long eighteenth century had Goodwin Wharton's
autobiography and George Trosse' and William Cowper's account of their
own mental breakdown and inner struggle for recovery, which again have
been examined by Porter.17
Problems: the intellectual history of Enlightenment psychiatry
As is evident from the brief historiographical account given above,
the recent history of psychiatry has been multi- and inter-disciplinary.
Medical, social, legal, cultural, literary, sociological historians have vastly
contributed to the field, in sharp contrast to the situation a few decades
ago, when only medical historians and psychiatrists were writing 'in-house'
history of psychiatry.'8
15. Max Byrd, Visits to Bedlam (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1974); Michael Deporte, Nightmares and Hobby Horses: Swift.
Sterne and Augustan Ideas of Madness (San Marino: Huntingdon Library,
1974); Brian A. Connery, 'Self-Representation, Authority, and the Fear of
Madness in the Works of Swift,' Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture,
1990, 20: 165-82; Roy Porter, "The Hunger of Imagination": Approaching
Samuel Johnson's Melancholy,' in The Anatomy of Madness, eds. by
Bynum et al., vol.1, 63-88. See also papers in Christopher Fox ed.
Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century (New York: AMS
Press, 1987).
16. Sander L Gilman, Seeing the Insane (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1985).
17. Roy Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, pp.247-268; idem, The Social
History of Madness (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987). See also
the pioneering work by Dale Peterson ed., A Mad People's History of
Madness (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982).
18. Besides Hunter and Macalpine's works cited above, the 'in-house'
studies include: Gregory Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (New
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However, one branch of the historical discipline has not made
substantial contribution to the area, especially to the study of eighteenth-
century psychiatry. This silent sector is so-called intellectual history or the
history of ideas.19 For the nineteenth century, we have a number of
detailed studies attempting historical analysis of the intellectual content of
psychiatry and related disciplines at that time. Michael Clark, Roger
Cooter, W.F. Bynum, Roger Smith, and German Berrios have surveyed a
wide range of topics in the nineteenth century, such as the conflict and
congruence between psychological and somatic thinkings in psychiatry, the
impacts of phrenology, the formation of physiological psychology, and the
history and implications of various diagnostic categories. 20 In contrast,
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1941); Erwin H. Ackerknecht, A Short History
of Psychiatry, 2nd ed., trans. by Sula Wolff (New York: Hafner, 1968);
Denis Leigh, The Historical Development of British Psychiatry (Oxford:
Pergamon, 1961); Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholia and Depression: from
Hippocratic Times to Modern Times (New Have: Yale U.P., 1986).
19. The discipline of so-called intellectual history as such seems to be
declining and some intellectual historians are being alarmed. See William
J. Bouwsma, 'Intellectual History in the 1980s: from History of Ideas to
History of Meaning,' Journal of Interdisciplinar y History, 1981, 12: 279-9 1;
Joel Colton, 'Intellectual History in the 1980s: the Case for the Defence,'
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1981, 12: 293-298; John E. Toews,
'Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: the Autonomy of Meaning
and the Irreducibility of Experience,' American History Review, 1986, 92:
879-907; Donald R. Kelly, 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?'
Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1990, 51: 3-25.
20. Michael Clark, 'The Rejection of Psychological Approaches to Mental
Disorder in Late Nineteenth-Century British Psychiatry,' in Madhouses.
Mad-Doctors and Madmen, ed. by Scull, 271-312; Roger Cooter,
'Phrenology and British Alienists, ca. 1825-1845,' in ibId., 58-104; W.F.
Bynum, Rationale for Therapy in British Psychiatry, 1780-1835,' in Ibid.,
35-57; idem, 'Varieties of Cartesian Experience in Early Nineteenth
Century Neurophysiology,' in Philosophical Dimensions of the Neuro-
Medical Sciences, eds. by S.F. Spicker and H.T. Engelhardt Jr. (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1976), 15-33; Roger Smith, 'The Background of Physiological
Psychology in Natural Philosophy,' Hist.Sci., 1973, 11: 75-123; German
Berrios, 'The Psychopathology of Affectivity: Conceptual and Historical
Aspects,' Psychological Medicine, 1985, 15: 745-58. For a more
comprehensive list of the works by them, see note 35 of Porter, 'History
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the intellectual history of eighteenth-century psychiatry has been very much
understudied: with the exception of Foucau it's astute analysis presented in
the second part of Histoire de la folie and Porter's rich narrative in his
Mind-forg'd Manacles, we do not possess any large-scale attempt to
capture the intellectual aspects of psychiatry in the eighteenth century.2'
Reactions to Foucault's Histoire de ia folie epitomize the lack of interest
in the intellectual aspects among historians of psychiatry: although many
historians have adopted, questioned, modified, and denied Foucault's thesis
of the 'great confinement' put forth in the first and social historical part
of the book, almost none has discussed the intellectual historical issues
raised in the second part of the same book.22
I am far from taking a reactionary stance and arguing that
psychiatry consisted solely in intellectually formulated theory, and that the
intellectual aspects should be the only concern of historians of psychiatry.
The general historiographical trend from psychiatry (and medicine in
general) as purely intellectual activity to socially, culturally, and
of Psychiatry in Britain.'
21. Foucault, Histoire de Ia folie, pp.18 1-360; Porter, Mind-forg'd
Manacles, esp., pp.169-228. John P. Wright has recently started to
research into the area. See John P. Wright, 'Association, Madness, and
the Measures of Probability in Locke and Hume,' in Psychology and
Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Fox, 103-27; idem, 'Boerhaave
on Minds, Human Beings, and Mental Diseases,' Studies in Eighteenth-
Century Culture, 1990, 20: 289-302. See also valuable exceptions like W.F.
Bynum, 'The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the Functions of
the Brain,' 1973, 64: 445-69; Thomas Harmon Jobe, 'Medical Theories
of Melancholia in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,' ciiQ
Medica, 1976, 11: 217-31.
22. As for criticism of the 'great confinement' thesis, see chapter one
below. The French original of Foucault's Histoire has a tripartite
structure: in the first part the socio-ideological aspects of the 'great
confinement' in the 'classical age' is discussed; in the second, medical,
scientific, intellectual, philosophical and metaphysical aspects of the
psychiatry then is discussed; in the third, as if in the manner of the
Hegelian dialectic, nineteenth-century synthesis of the institutional and
intellectual issues are discussed. The second part has enjoyed the least
attention both from favourable and critical points of view.
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ideologically constructed fabric is very much welcome. I am just saying
that it seems a simple truth that we need good historical studies based on
analysis and contextualization of the intellectual aspects of eighteenth-
century psychiatry in order to achieve full understanding of its matrix, and
that we still do not possess one. The major aim of this thesis is to fill this
lacuna of present historiography of eighteenth-century British psychiatry
by examining its intellectual aspects, and to contribute to the domain
pioneered by Foucault and Porter by developing their seminal suggestions,
criticizing them when necessary, and looking at aspects which have escaped
their attention.
Among many intellectual issues involved in eighteenth-century
psychiatry, I will principally look at the medical/scientific aspects and
philosophical/metaphysical ones. As for medical/scientific issues, no
justification is needed for looking at them. As a part of the systematic
medical and natural philosophical knowledge at that time, it is
understandable that the pathology of madness made shifts in accordance
with major changes in basic schemes of medical systems. This was the
more the case during the eighteenth century, because there hardly existed
independent psychiatric discipline with its own problems and theoretical
framework. Rather, much of the medical discourse on madness during the
century was a part of medico-theoretical 'story telling.' Starting from basic
tenets, medical system-builders applied them to their account of madness
to demonstrate the usefulness and truth of their systems. Their students
adopted the same tactics, to show their mastery of the mentors' systems
and to fashion themselves as learned and competent physicians endowed
with systematic knowledge.23
23. Although outdated, the fullest account of eighteenth-century medicine
remains Lester King, The Medical World of the Eighteenth Century
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958). See also the recent
revisions of much of King's work in W.F. Bynum, 'Health, Disease and
Medical Care,' in The Ferment of Knowledge, eds. by G.S. Rousseau and
Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1980), 211-53; Guenter B. Risse,
'Medicine in the Age of Enlightenment,' in Medicine in Society, ed. by
15
Caution is necessary here. Although this thesis is primarily
concerned with British psychiatric writings, it is not sufficient merely to
study Britain, for medical learning and education was an international
business in the eighteenth century. As well as British major medical
figures such as Thomas Willis, Archibald Pitcairn, and William Cullen,
some major Continental medical theorists such as Herman Boerhaave,
Albrecht von Hailer, and Boissier de Sauvages exercised influence on
general medical writings in Britian, and, consequently, on the accounts of
madness included there. The works of the Continental medical professors
were read, translated, and cited; their schemes and basic notions were
adopted, incorporated, developed, and sometimes criticized. Many British
students crossed the Channel to study medicine on the Continent
(especially at Leiden), partly because Oxford and Cambridge kept their
doors closed to Dissenters and provided medical students only with costly,
prolonged, and somewhat inferior education. 24 Accordingly, medical
accounts of madness by British writers included the key notions of the
Continental as well as British medical professors.
As for philosophical/metaphysical issues, some explanation is
needed. Since madness was largely understood in the eighteenth century
as a disease of the mind, medical accounts of madness included the
dimension of the philosophy of the mind and/or the metaphysics of the
soul. Indeed, this interplay of medicine and the philosophy of the
Wear, 149-95.
24. As for Boerhaave's influence on Britain, see G.A. Lindeboom ed.,
Boerhaave and Great Britain (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974); E. Ashworth
Underwood, Boerhaave's Men: at Leiden and After (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh U.P., 1977); Andrew Cunningham, 'Medicine to Calm the Mind:
Boerhaave's Medical System and Why It Was Adopted in Edinburgh,' in
The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, eds. by Andrew
Cunningham and Roger French (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1990), 40-
66. As for medicine at Oxford and Cambridge in the eighteenth century,
see Charles Webster, 'The Medical Faculty and the Physic Garden,' in Th
History of the University of Oxford, vol.5, ed. by L.S. Sutherland and L.G.
Mitchel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 683-723; Arthur Rook, 'Medicine
at Cambridge 1660-1760,' Med.Hist., 1969, 13: 107-22.
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mind/soul was not limited to the psychiatric sector of medical discourse.
Problems of the mind/soul were also one of the major concerns expressed
in general medical systems of that time. Since almost all major medical
theorists (with a handful of exceptions of the notorious materialists like La
Mettrie) believed in the doctrine that man has two distinctive aspects, i.e.,
the body and the soul, medical science as the study of the health and
disease of man encompassed the discourse on the soul/mind. Although
many eighteenth-century medical writers expressed a visible desire to avoid
being over-involved into philosophical and metaphysical problems related
to the mind/soul, still they talked about the problems and incorporated a
certain amount of the philosophy and metaphysics of the mind/soul. It is
hence not surprising that psychiatric discourse, which had a special
connection with the mind/soul, included philosophical and metaphysical
dimensions.
Among philosophical and metaphysical problems in the eighteenth
century, three intertwined issues were of special importance to psychiatric
discourse at that time. First, the problem of the immortality of the soul
was an enormous concern for medical theorists in the eighteenth century.
Hence it played an important role to formulate their accounts of madness.
Having become a built-in part of philosophy during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the problem of the immortality was still an essential
concern of metaphysics in the eighteenth century. 26 Metaphysicians (and
25. Study of the problems of the soul in eighteenth-century medicine
include: Roger K. French, 'Sauvages, Whytt and the Motion of
the Heart: Aspects of Eighteenth Century Animism,' CIio Medica, 1972,
7: 35-54; idem, 'Sickness and the Soul: Stahl, Hoffmann and Sauvages on
Pathology,' in The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, eds.
by Cunningham and French, 88-110; idem, Robert Wh ytt. the Soul, and
Medicine (London: The Weilcome Historical Medical Library, 1969).
26. As for the Renaissance period, see papers in P.O. Kristeller,
Renaissance Concepts of Man and Other Essays (New York: Harper &
Row, 1972). Seventeenth-century notions of the immortality are discussed
in Emily Michael & Fred S. Michael, 'Two Early Modern Concepts of
Mind: Reflecting Substance vs. Thinking Substance,' Jour.Hist.PhiI., 1989,
27: 29-48. We do not have a survey of the idea in the eighteenth century.
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physicians) were the more eager to prove the immortality of the soul,
because the doctrine of immortality was regarded as an ideological prop
of morality: no life after the death of the body meant no fear of
punishment after death, hence no respect for moral. Although eighteenth-
century moral philosophy became based less on the fear of the punishment
of the soul after death, many critics of mortalists' and materialists' schemes
were worried about the effect of the materialistic doctrine on people's
moral.
Reflecting these metaphysical and ideological concerns, physicians
were keen to reinforce the doctrine of immortality in their medical
publications, and in particular when they talked about mental diseases.
This was even more the case, because the instance of madness was
employed by some materialists as an evidence against the immortality of
the soul: they interpreted madness as an injury in the soul, and from the
observation deducted its corruptibility, and hence mortality. 27 During the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, physicians kept trying to construct
the medical account of madness that could go with the doctrine of the
immortality of the soul, refuting the materialists' interpretation of madness.
Secondly, there existed the problem of dualism. Since the
seventeenth century, keen concern for the issue of the immortality led
many philosophers to make a sharp distinction between two things in man,
i.e., the immortal and incorporeal soul and the perishable and material
body. They disagreed with each other over many problems related with
dualism, e.g. how the two things could interact, what were the attributes
of the two things, where the body ended and the soul started, whether
there was the third intermediate thing, or even whether there were two
Some useful discussion is found in John Yolton, Thinking Matter:
Materialism in Eighteenth Century Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
27. The materialist polemic based on the instance of madness was, to my
knowledge, used first in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, 3 vols., ed.
and trans. by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), vol.1, pp.325-
29.
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things at all. Philosophical disputes over such issues continued well into
the eighteenth century, with different authors and shifts of foci.
Eighteenth-century medicine, as well as medicine in the seventeenth
century was involved in the problems, incorporating many issues related
with dualism into their account of the soul, the body, their interaction, and
madness.
Thirdly, one can detect both positive and negative influence of the
philosophy of John Locke on eighteenth-century medical and psychiatric
writings. Locke's visible impact on the psychiatric discourse in the
earlier half of the century was almost nil. Indeed, some medical writers
on human mind and its disorders at that time were overtly anti-Lockean
and embraced fundamentally different approaches to the problem from
that of Locke's own. The situation, however, changed drastically from the
1760s, and physicians in the late eighteenth century talked about normal
and abnormal mental operations in the language of Locke (and of some
other philosophers such as Hume). This late-century introduction of
Locke's language into the medical consideration of the mind and its
diseases was one of the most important breakthroughs during the century,
and the pattern established there seems to have been inherited by early
nineteenth-century psychiatry. Close examination of the structure of the
Lockean coup in medical and psychiatric discourse will be of much help
to understand continuities and changes in the matrices of psychiatry in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
28. As for eighteenth-century medicine and dualism, see John Wright,
'Metaphysics and Physiology: Mind, Body, and the Animal Economy in
Eighteenth-Century Scotland,' in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish
Enlightenment, ed. by M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 251-
301.
29. Locke's influence on psychiatry in the eighteenth century has been
discussed in Klaus Doerner, Madman and the Bourgeoisie: a Social
History of Insanity and Psychiatry (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp.23-4;
Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, pp.188-93.
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These philosophical and metaphysical factors, together with the
medical and natural philosophical issues, constituted a very complex
structure of distinctive patterns of psychiatric discourse. Impetuses of
shifts in the formulations of psychiatric discourse, therefore, largely came
from outside the psychiatric sector of medical discourse. Psychiatry in the
eighteenth century were not a self-contained domain with only internal
changes contributing to its changes, let alone a monotonous monolith, but
a fluctuating discursive space open to many factors outside the domain.
In the course of this thesis, I will show that eighteenth-century psychiatry
was, so to speak, a fluid and fast-changing mosaic which consisted of many
extra-psychiatric factors.
Chronology of the chapters
Accordingly this thesis will not deal with a single and monolithic
eighteenth-century psychiatry, nor with a single continuous linear
development of a self-contained discursive sector. Instead, I will try to
capture plural, heterogeneous and distinctive patterns of psychiatric
discourse, which replaced one another and/or existed conterminously, and
examine diverse and distinctive constructions of psychiatric discourse and
diverse approaches to the problem of madness at that time. Although
there existed conterminous different approaches, I will, for convenience's
sake, follow the chronological order and will start from the Oxford
medicine during the Restoration period and end at Cullen's Edinburgh
around the 1770s.
Following Roy Porter's 'long eighteenth century' and Michel
Foucault's 'l'áge classique,' the first chapter will look at the third quarter
of the seventeenth century. In England, the period represented a
transition from the Galenic-Aristotelian system to the mechanical
medicine. The major, though not sole, foreign influence in the period
seems to have come from Descartes, who propagated the most thorough
mechanization of the understanding of the human body. Moreover,
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Descartes provided the philosophical and medical world of the mid-
seventeenth century with the most radical version of mind-body dualism.
Taking Thomas Willis and Walter Charleton, who were both active at the
Restoration Oxford, as the site to examine the influence of the mechanical
philosophy and dualism, I will start this chapter with the assessment of the
influence of the Cartesian dualism on the Oxford medicine. I will then
proceed to assess continuities and changes in the medical schemes for
understanding madness during the seventeenth century, comparing Willis'
chemical and mechanical medicine with the medicine before Descartes.
After the dissolution of the Oxford school, a very idiosyncratic
medical group led by Archibald Pitcairn arrived at the British medical
scene around the turn of the century. Chapter two will examine the group.
The members of the group proposed a sweeping and radical reform in
medicine, claiming medicine should be modelled after Newtonian
mathematics. Influenced by the scientific methodology which was
prevalent in England at that time, they tried to achieve mathematical
certainty in medicine. One of the ways for them to achieve this aim was
to eliminate problems of the soul/mind from the scope of medicine and
to construct a medical system which terminated in the body. Accordingly,
their understanding of madness was very peculiar: in a word, they were
trying to do psychiatry without any issues related to soul/mind. Their bold
attempt to construct the unique psychiatric scheme will be examined in the
second chapter.
After the rather quick decline of the iatro-mathematical school, the
new mental disturbances of hysteria and hypochondria became a very
much fashionable topic from around the 1730s. Chapter three will discuss
the intellectual, social and ideological environment of the fashion. In that
chapter I will lay more emphasis on socio-ideological aspects of medical
discourse, and contextualize the medical discourse on the new mental
diseases into the broader issue of the English Enlightenment. The topics
I will look at will be: instructing lay audience into believing the bodily
causation of mental diseases; the coming of the consumer society; the
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environmental, social and political understanding of mental and bodily
health. It seems that one cannot grasp the nuance of the early Georgian
medical discourse on hysteria and hypochondria without taking those issues
into consideration.
Chapter four will deal with a highly philosophical topic: the
problem of Lockeanism and anti-Lockeanism in psychiatric discourse
around the mid century. The starting point is that Locke's Essay exercised
surprisingly little influence on psychiatric discourse during the earlier half
of the century. Substantial and significant medical incorporation of the
Lockean analysis of normal and abnormal mental operations had not
appeared until David Hartley's Observations on Man (1749). Indeed,
Locke's theory of the mind was not only ignored by also quite often
refuted by early-eighteenth medical writers. In the chapter I will examine
why Locke had been long absent and was treated unfavorably in the earlier
half of the century. Then I will discuss Hartley's breakthrough and his
construction of a new grid for understanding the mind and its diseases.
Chapter five will look closely at the dispute between William Battle
and John Monro in 1758. There needs little justification for looking at the
dispute, as Battle has often been regarded as a sort of the father of British
psychiatry. In the chapter, I will examine two neglected aspects of the
dispute, namely the context of the innovations in mid-century physiology
and the influence of eighteenth-century epistemology upon medical
understanding of man's perception of the external world. I will argue that
the key impetus of Battle's work came from Albrecht von Hailer's famous
experiments on the sensibility of animals. I will then proceed to examine
the epistemological undercurrent of the dispute, relating the dispute and
some other medical and philosophical works with the Lockean distinction
of sensation and perception, epitomized in 'Molyneux's question.'
The last and sixth chapter will deal with new medical approaches
to madness formulated in the 1760s and 70s. The new approaches
encompassed two closely intertwined important factors: the use of nosology
and the full employment of philosophical language to describe human
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mind and its diseases. The Continental site I will look at is Boissier de
Sauvages, the major proponent of nosology. There I will show how the
technique of nosology and the heavy use of the philosophy of Christian
Wolff transformed Sauvages' psychiatric discourse. I will then examine
somewhat parallel shifts in William Cullen's works and consider the
influence of David Hume's philosophy on Cullen's new pattern of
discourse to describe the human mind and its diseases. I will relate
Cullen's attempt with the intellectual milieu of the Scottish Enlightenment.
A tentative assessment of the relation between Cullen's works and
specialized psychiatric works at the turn of the century will conclude the
chapter.
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Chapter One
Seventeenth-Century Background: Continuity and Change
Introduction
a) Intellectual and medical world turned upside down
Following Roy Porter's 'long eighteenth century' and Michel
Foucault's 'l'âge classique,' the 1650s seem to be the place to start this
thesis. In England at that time, not only the political but also the
intellectual world was being turned upside down. Almost ubiquitous
challenges against authorities--church, crown, masters--were embodied into
new or revived intellectual alternatives: radical religious sects,
republicanism, and communism were mushrooming around 1650.1 This
was also the case within the domain of natural philosophy, where the
'Scientific Revolution' was maturing. 2 The subtle Aristotelian system of
logic, physics and metaphysics, which had been the backbone of
Scholasticism, was vehemently criticized or even despised as a fanciful and
meaningless babble. 'The Philosopher' was dethroned, and new
intellectual pretenders and their devotees arrived on the English
intellectual scene--Paracelsus (c1493- 1541), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and
René Descartes (1596-1650), to name only a few. Bacon's 'Great
Instauration' and attack against the idola theatri of Aristotelianism found
a host of English supporters. 3 Descartes' works, some of which became
1. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1978).
2. The literature on the Scientific Revolution is vast. For an up-to-date
assessment of it, see Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, eds. by
David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.,
1990).
3. For English proponents of Baconian reform of science before the
establishment of the Royal Society, see Charles Webster, The Great
Instauration: Science. Medicine and Reform 1626-1660 (London:
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available in English in 1650s, were eagerly read, digested, and sometimes
criticized by Keneim Digby (1603-65), Henry More (1614-87), Robert
Boyle (1627-92), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and others. 'The
mechanization of the world picture' was on its way in England.4 The
mechanical world views and rational Enlightenment fought not only with
the Aristotelians but also with the Paracelsian natural philosophy, often
amalgamated with mystical, occult, magical, aichemical, Hermetic,
kabbalistic, Neoplatonic, Rosicrucian traditions.5 In disputes between the
new mechanical establishment and the mystical challenge--such as those
between Mann Mersenne (1588-1648) and Robert Fludd (1574-1637);
Henry More and Thomas Vaughan (1622-66); Seth Ward (1617-89) and
John Wilkins (1614-72)) and John Webster (1610-82)--, political, religious
and ideological issues as well as intellectual ones were at stake.6
Duckworth, 1975). The studies on the Royal Society has been summarized
with helpful bibliography, in Michael Hunter, Science and Society in
Restoration England (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1981). One recent
stimulating account of the Restoration science is Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes. Boyle and the
Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1985).
4. Marjorie Nicolson, 'The Early Stages of Cartesianism in England,'
Studies in Philology, 1929, 26: 356-74; S.P. Lamprecht, 'The Role of
Descartes in Seventeenth Century England,' Studies in the History of Ideas
(New York, 1935), 181-240; G.A.J. Rogers, 'Descartes and the English,' in
The Light and Nature: Essays in the Histor y and Philosophy of Science
Presented to A.C. Crombie, eds. by J.D. North and J.J. Roche (Dordrecht:
Matinus Nijhoff, 1985), 281-302. E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of
the World Picture, trans. by C. Dikshoorn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961;
rept. Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1986), see especially pp.403-91.
5. For a recent examination of the problem of the magic and science
during the Scientific Revolution, see papers in Occult and Scientific
Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. by Brian Vickers (Cambridge:
Cambridge U.P., 1984).
6. Studies of the confrontations of magical and rational world views
include: Noel L. Brann, 'The Conflict between Reason and Magic in
Seventeenth-Century England: a Case Study of the Vaughan-More
Debate,' Huntington Library Quarterly, 1980, 43: 103-26; Frederic B.
Burnham, 'The More-Vaughan Controversy: the Revolt against
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Medicine was a vital part of this intellectual upheaval. A number
of attempts were made to replace old models with new ones, in both
practical and theoretical aspects of medicine, i.e., medicine as healing art
and medicine as natural philosophy. 7 As for practice, there emerged a
new notion of cure. Rather than a long course of therapeutic regimen
whose end was to restore the nature of the patient, particular drugs
provided by apothecaries aimed at quick recovery from particular
diseases.8 Medical consumers welcomed the shift toward less costly and
less time-consuming cures, and many elite London physicians during the
Restoration found themselves on the losing side of the competition with
the apothecaries.9
Medical theory as a part of natural philosophy went through a
modification similar to the shift which took place in natural philosophy in
general. Galenism went into a decline similar to that of Aristotelian
natural philosophy.'0 Baconian experimental method was applied to the
Philosophical Enthusiasm,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1974, 35: 33-49; Thomas
Harmon Jobe, 'The Devil in Restoration Science: the Glanvill-Webster
Witchcraft Debate,' 1981, 72: 343-56; Irving Kirsch, 'Demonology and
Science during the Scientific Revolution,' Jour.Hist.Behav.Sci., 1980, 16:
359-68.
7. See papers collected in Roger French and Andrew Wear eds.,
Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 1989); Allen G. Debus ed., Medicine in Seventeenth-Century
England: a Symposium Held at UCLA in Honor of C.D. O'Malley
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
8. See the perceptive account in Harold J. Cook, 'The New Philosophy and
Medicine in Seventeenth-Century England,' in Reappraisals of the
Scientific Revolution, eds. by Lindberg and Westman, 397-436.
9. Theodore M. Brown, 'The College of Physicians and the Acceptance of
latromechanism in England, 1665-1695,' Bull.Hist.Med., 1970, 44: 12-30;
Harold Cook, The Decline of the Old Medical Regime in Stuart London
(Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1986). See also the works of Rattansi and Webster
cited in below note 13.
10. Lester King, 'The Transformation of Galenism,' in Medicine in
Seventeenth-Century England, ed. by Debus, 7-31. Walter Pagel has
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study of the working of the human and animal body. Instead of the
bookish study of the Classical texts, medical inquiry examined 'the book
of Nature,' through observation, dissection and animal vivisection, a
process best exemplified in the animal experiments conducted at the early
Royal Society." The new corpuscular and mechanical philosophies of
Descartes and Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) were very quickly incorporated
into physiological and pathological works from 1650s, especially in Oxford
and the Royal College of Physicians in London. 12 Paracelsian anti-
rational, mystical, aichemical and animistic natural philosophy was
vigorously incorporated or reproduced by many English writers on
medicine during the Interregnum and Restoration.13
shown, however, that a substantial part of seventeenth-century 'revolutions'
in medical theory, like Harvey's circulation and Glisson's irritability, took
place within the framework of Aristotelianism. See Walter Pagel, 'Harvey
and Glisson on Irritability with a Note on van Helmont,' Bull.Hist.Med.,
1967, 41: 497-5 14; idem, 'The Reaction to Aristotle in Seventeenth-Century
Biological Thought,' in Science. Medicine and Histor y: Essays on the
Evolution of Scientific Thought and Medical Practice, ed. by E. Ashworth
Underwood, 2 vols. (London: Oxford U.P., 1953), vol.1, 489-509.
11. For the Baconianism in English medicine in this period, See Webster,
The Great Instauration. For medicine and animal experiments at the
Royal Society, see A. Rupert Hall, 'Medicine and the Royal Society,' in
Medicine in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. by Debus, 421-52.
12. For Descartes's influence, see Theodore M. Brown, 'Physiology and the
Mechanical Philosophy in Mid-Seventeenth-Century England,'
Bull.Hist.Med., 1977, 51: 25-74. A detailed and excellent account of
Oxford medical theories is given in Robert G. Frank, Harvey and the
Oxford Physiologists, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980). A socio-
political account of the Royal College's adoption of the mechanical
philosophy in the Restoration was given in Brown, 'The College of
Physicians and the Acceptance of latromechanism.'
13. Charles Webster, 'English Medical Reformers of the Puritan
Revolution: a Background to the "Society of Chymical Physicians," AmbLx,
1967, 14: 16-41; P.M. Rattansi, 'The Helmontian-Galenist Controversy in
Restoration England,' Ambix, 1964, 12: 1-23; idem, 'Paracelsus and the
Puritan Revolution,' Ambix, 1963, 11: 23-32.
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b) Historiography of seventeenth-century madness
What happened, then, to the understanding and treatment of
madness during this period of revolution?
At one extreme, there is Gregory Zilboorg's scenario of 'the first
psychiatric revolution,' a scientific and humanistic breakthrough against the
bad old days. Zilboorg's 'revolution' consisted in criticisms of the belief
in witchcraft and demonic possession. Heroes like Johann Weyer (15 15-
88) in Germany and Reginald Scot (1538?-99) and Edward Jorden (1569-
1632) in England fought against the demonologists like Jean Bodin (1530-
96) and King James I (1566-1625) to rescue alleged witches and
demoniacs. 14 It seems that few historian of science, medicine and
psychiatry today accept Zilboorg in toto. Recent study has shown that the
background of some denials of the reality of witchcraft may be best
described as magical, rather than scientific. 15 Moreover, the debates over
witches and demoniacs are now increasingly seen more as a part of early
modern religious, political and ideological polemics: Protestant versus
Catholic over the problem of miracles (Scot); Anglican attack against the
Puritan and Catholic propaganda (Jorden); spreading the idea of absolute
monarchy protecting true religion (King James I); combatting against the
modern Sadducees (Joseph Glanvill and More).16
14. The originator of the myth of 'The First Psychiatric Revolution' was
Gregory Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1941), pp.175-224. The myth was adopted by E.H.
Ackerknecht, A Short History of Psychiatry, 2nd ed., trans. by Sula Wolff
(New York: Hafner, 1968), in an uncritical manner, rather uncharacteristic
for the author. See also Hunter and MacAlpine, Three Hundred Years of
Psychiatry, pp.32-35 and 68-75.
15. Christopher Baxter, 'Unsystematic Psychopathology: Johann Weyer's
De Praestigiis Daemonum' in The Damned Art, ed. by Sydney Anglo
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 53-75; Jobe, 'Devil in
Restoration Science.'
16. See papers in Sidney Anglo ed., The Damned Art. See also idem,
'Melancholia and Witchcraft: the Debate between Weyer, Bodin, and
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On the other hand, we have another account of the shift in the
period, which says that the shift consisted in the de-mystification of
madness and its transfiguration into an object of control. The most
powerful proponent of the view has been Michel Foucault.' 7 Foucault
argued the beginning of the 'Classical Age' was marked by the decline of
the Medieval and Renaissance association of madness with
otherworldliness, divine wisdom, and the power to arouse transcendental
fear. Deprived of its mystical, religious, theological and metaphysical
symbolism, madness became an object of this-worldly understanding,
handling and treatment. Following this secularization, Foucault
maintained, there took place in mid-seventeenth-century France, England,
and Germany, the massive confinement of the mad into those institutions
which were built essentially to punish the immoral delinquent, such as
criminals, vagrants, sodomites, and the idle. People started understanding
madness with respect to the breach of the bourgeois work ethic and in the
context of the system of punishment and policing.
It is now agreed that seventeenth-century England experienced
neither the confinement of lunatics into penal institutions nor the
identification of them with the immoral in as large a scale as Foucault
Scott,' in Folie et déraison a Ia Renaissance, ed. by A. Gerlo (Bruxelles:
Editions de 1'Université de Bruxelles, 1976), 209-28; Stuart Clark,
'Inversion, Misrule and the Meaning of Witchcraft,' Past and Present, 1980,
87: 98-127; idem, 'The Scientific Status of Demonology,' in Occult and
Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, 35 1-74; Michael MacDonald ed.,
Witchcraft and Hysteria in Elizabethan London: Edward Jorden and the
Mary Glover Case (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991), 'Introduction' by
MacDonald; Jobe, 'The Devil in Restoration Science'; David Harley,
'Mental Illness, Magical Medicine and the Devil in Northern England,
1650-1700,' in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, eds.
by French and Wear, 114-44.
17. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie a l'ge classique, 2nd ed. (Paris:
Editions Gallimard, 1972).
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would have us believe.' 8 It does seem, however, that Foucault's claim of
the secularization of madness has found support. The Pauline idea of the
good Christian fool, which elevated madness even to the state of Christ
himself, found less appeal as the seventeenth century went on, and
Christianity became more reasonable and less mysterious. 19 The court
jesters vanished during the century and the 'fools' who had once spoken
the ambivalent language of both Tom o'Bedlam and the wise philosopher
disappeared. 2° The elite establishment was increasingly disturbed at the
mystical, anti-rational and often politically radical religious sects which
regarded inspired vision as a vital part of its religious experience: they
were labelled 'enthusiasts,' their claim to holiness being degraded into a
simple delusion of stark madness. 2 ' As Michael MacDonald argues,
Richard Napier's (1559-1634) and Robert Burton's (1577-1640) early- and
mid-seventeenth-century hybrid of magical, astrological, religious, popular
18. Roy Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles: a History of Madness in England
from the Restoration to the Regency (London: The Athione Press, 1987);
H.C.E. Midelfort, 'Madness and Civilization in Early Modern Europe,' in
After the Reformation: Essays in Honor of J.H. Hexter, ed. by Barbara
Malamount (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1980), 247-65;
Akihito Suzuki, 'Lunacy in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century England:
Analysis of Quarter Sessions Records,' parts I & II, History of Psychiatry,
1991, 2: 437-56, & 1992, 3: 29-44.
19. Michael A. Screech, 'Good madness in Christendom,' in The Anatomy
of Madness: Essays in the History of Ps ychiatry, 3 vols, eds. by W.F.
Bynum et al. (London: Tavistock, 1985-88), vol.1, 25-39; Hill, The World
Turned Upside Down, pp.2T1-286; Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the
Age of Reason (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960).
20. E. Weisford, The Fool: His Social and Literary History (London:
Faber, 1935); Sandra Billington, The Social History of the Fool (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1984).
21. Michael Heyd, 'The Reaction to Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth
Century: towards an Integrative Approach,' Journal of Modern History,
1981, 53: 258-80, includes a good assessment of the studies on the topic.
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and psychological medicine of madness were giving way to more rational,
elite and somatic medicine.22
c) Problems: mechanical medicine and the mind/body dualism
Despite all those studies on the religious, cultural, and ideological
aspects of madness in the seventeenth century, there is no detailed account
of the technical concepts and theories about madness held by doctors in
this period.23 Given the great intellectual upheaval of the Scientific
Revolution and especially the coming of mechanical medicine, there is
good reason to ask whether the Scientific Revolution and the
mechanization of understandings of man (best exemplified by Descartes)
included any revolution in psychiatry, or whether it was simply the problem
of changing the old language of humours into the new one of particles and
mechanism,--as Roy Porter puts it 'pouring old wine into new linguistic
bottles.'24
The seventeenth century witnessed not only the new mechanical
understanding of the body, but also the new philosophical formulation of
the soul/mind and its relation to the body. The most prominent--or
notorious--proponent of this new philosophical formulation was again
Descartes. The impact of Cartesian dualism on psychiatry and medical
understanding of the mind has been argued to be immense. Contrast has
22. Michael MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam: Madness. Anxiet y, and Healing
in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1981),
pp.l'7l-Z3l; idem, 'Religion, Social Change, and Psychological Healing in
England, 1600-1800,' in The Church and Healing, ed. by W.J. Sheils
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 101-25.
23. See, however, some valuable exceptions like Thomas Harmon Jobe,
'Medical Theories of Melancholia in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth
Centuries,' Clio Medica, 1976, 11: 217-31; Stanley Jackson, Melancholia
and Depression: from Hippocratic Times to Modern Times (New Haven:
Yale U.P., 1986), chapter 6.
24. Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, p.47.
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been assumed between pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian medical
understandings of the body/soul issues: C.E. McMahon wrote that 'In pre-
Cartesian era, medicine was invariably holistic and psychosomatic. In the
post-Cartesian, dualistic era, mechanistic physiopathology gained
ascendancy, and psychophysiological events were forbidden on logical
ground.' This statement has not been examined at all, however.
Moreover, one has to be careful not to oversimplify the relationship
between dualism and psychiatry, not least because Descartes was not an
isolated figure in his attempt to separate the mind/soul and the body. As
Emily and Fred Michael have shown, many philosophical writers before
Descartes put enormous amounts of intellectual energy into attempts to
prove the immortality of the soul, due to religious turmoil and to the
Church's encouragement particularly in the eighth session of Pope Leo X's
Lateran Council of 1513 to combat the Averroistic view of the mortality
of the soul. Many physicians before Descartes were therefore already
well aware of the mortalist and materialist threat on the Christian religion,
were incorporating the defence of the immortality in their works, and were
producing rigorously dualistic medical account of madness, as I will show
below.
25. C.E. McMahon, 'The Role of Imagination in the Disease Process: Pre-
Cartesian History,' Psychological Medicine, 1976, 6: 179-84, esp., 184. For
a perceptive criticism of McMahon's view, see Theodore M. Brown,
'Descartes, Dualism, and Psychosomatic Medicine,' in The Anatomy of
Madness, eds. by Bynum et al., vol.1, 40-62, esp., 50.
26. Emily Michael and Fred S. Michael, 'Two Early Modern Concepts of
Mind: Reflecting Substance vs. Thinking Substance,' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1989,
27: 29-48; idem, 'Corporeal Ideas in Seventeenth-Century Psychology,'
Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1989, 50: 3 1-48. The averroistic mortalism found its most
powerful expression in Pietro Pomponazzi's De Immortalitate Animae
(1516), an English translation of which is available with introduction by
J.H. Randall, in Ernst Cassirer et a!., eds. The Renaissance Philosophy of
Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp.257-393. In his
Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes explicitly wrote that his aim is
to support the eighth session of the Late ran Council. René Descartes, Ih.
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., eds. by John Cottingham et al.
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1984-1991), vol.2, p.4.
32
The broadest question of this chapter asks: what did Descartes do
in the history of psychiatry? To answer the question in a comprehensive
manner would be a task of another entire thesis. I will be therefore highly
selective and will look principally at two seemingly promising sites: first
Descartes himself, and secondly the ideas about madness expressed in the
mechanical medicine at Oxford from about 1650 to 1670, especially in the
works by Thomas Willis (162175).27 In the first section, I will examine
the Oxford physicians' response to Descartes' dualism. In that section I
will show that the Restoration Oxford produced two major proponents of
anti-Cartesian medical formulation of the problem, namely Willis and
Walter Charleton (1619-1707).
In the second section, I will look at Willis' view of madness in the
longer-term and broader fabric of the shift from humoral medicine to
mechanical one, from the late sixteenth century to the late seventeenth
century, adopting a provisional framework of 'before and after,' for
convenience's sake. There I will compare the earlier medical writings on
madness, mainly those of Timothy Bright (1551?-1615), André du Laurens
(1558-1609), and Robert Burton, with Willis's works on mental disease,
and show that the earlier and the later medical discourses on madness
shared many basic assumptions. Especially, I would like to argue that
medical understanding of madness was rigorously dualistic both before and
after Descartes.
Descartes, however, did introduce a drastic change, which will be
discussed in the third section. Descartes established an anti-Aristotelian
and mechanical account of human perception of external things. And
there Descartes forged an innovative model of madness as illusion, to
27. Other seemingly promising sites like Paracelsian philosophy and
medicine, natural philosophy and medicine at Cambridge and the Royal
Society have been not consulted in detail.
28. In making comparison between Neo-classical and mechanical
formulations of madness, I am not going to present a full picture of the
former with its own intellectual complexity. Rather, I will try to give a
broadest picture of what I think the most basic issues there.
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support his explanation of the process of our having the idea of an external
thing. The new Cartesian model of madness, coupled with his
epistemology, found its way to medical discourse and transformed the
fundamental scheme for physicians to understand and to explain madness.
The non-Cartesian dualism at Oxford
a) Descartes's dualism and its English critics
One of Descartes' most profound impacts upon medicine in the
seventeenth century was his rigorous ontological distinction between the
soul, res cogitans, and the body, res extensa. In sharp contrast to the
Galenic system of a tripartite soul controlling the living body, Descartes
claimed that the sole role of the soul was thinking, in which no bodily
processes were involved, and the soul had nothing to do with the natural
and vital bodily processes such as nutrition and the circulation of blood.
Separated from the psychic control, the changes and motions in the living
body were in strict accordance only with mechanical laws. The working of
the whole world other than the human soul (and angel and God) was a
great machine in which only matter in motion was necessary, and the
human body was no exception. 29 The nature of life and death was
transformed accordingly from a problem of psyche to that of machine.
29. René Descartes, Treatise of Man, trans. by Thomas S. Hall
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1972), esp., p.113. See also Description
of the Human Body and of All Its Functions, in idem, Philosophical
Writings, vol.1, pp.314-24, esp. pp.314-16. As for Descartes' research
programme into the human body, see Thomas S. Hall, 'Introduction' to
Treatise of Man; idem, 'Descartes' Physiological Method: Position,
Principles, Examples,' Jour.Hist.Bio., 1970, 3: 53-79; G.A. Lindeboom,
Descartes and Medicine (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1978); Julian Jaynes,
'The Problem of Animate Motion in the Seventeenth Century,'
Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1970, 31: 219-34; Phillip R. Sloan, 'Descartes, the Sceptics,
and the Rejection of Vitalism in Seventeenth Century Physiology,'
Stud.Hist.Phil.Sci. 1977, 8:1-28.
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The processes like life, death, nutrition and the circulation of the blood
were purely mechanical and bodily phenomena; thinking, reasoning, and
will were purely mental ones.3°
Descartes, however, admitted another category of phenomena, i.e.,
those functions in which both the soul and the body were concerned. John
Cottingham rightly suggested that although Descartes admitted only two
substances, i.e. the body and the mind, he actually distinguished three
modes of phenomena, i.e. purely somatic, purely mental, and the union of
both.31 In his Meditations Descartes said the faculties of sensation and
imagination were 'special modes of thinking.' As he later explained to
Frans Burman (1628-79), they were special because they involved both
physiological processes of making images printed on the pineal gland, and
the mental one of perceiving the images and forming ideas of them;
whereas reasoning, like thinking about a thousand-sided figure, does not
involve the process of image-making, hence is performed without the
body.32 Descartes' scheme may best be described as dualism in terms of
substance and trialism in terms of mode of the operation of the substances.
Descartes, however, could not explain the interaction, and to provide an
explanation of the problem was left to post-Cartesian Continental
philosophers like Malebranche (1638-1715) and Leibniz (1646-1716),
30. As for life and death, Descartes, Description of the Human Body, in
Philosophical Writings, vol.1, p.315.
31. John Cottingham, 'Cartesian Trialism,' Mind, 1985, 94: 218-230; idem,
Descartes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.107-34.
32. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.2, pp.54 & 51; idem, Descartes'
Conversation with Burman, ed. and trans. with introduction and
commentary by John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p.27.
The difference between purely mental faculties and the 'hybrid' faculties
of sensation and imagination is amply discussed in Cottingham, 'Cartesian
Trialism.'
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whose impact on the eighteenth-century medical metaphysics has recently
been studied.33
Descartes' system was introduced into England rather quickly, but
found a mixed reaction in the mid-century. Thomas Hobbes and
Henry More were probably the epitomes of English criticism of Descartes'
dualism. Hobbes, who had already contributed extremely hostile
objections to Descartes' Meditations in 1641, infuriated Interregnum
Englishmen with an out-and-out mechanistic and materialistic system in
Leviathan (1651), De Corpore (1655) and De Homine (1658). In these
works, the thought that mental processes might be irreducible to corporeal
ones never occurred to Hobbes, for he thought thinking was identical with
the succession of corporeal images. 35 After his enthusiastic admiration
of the French philosopher had faded, Henry More produced very different
philosophical system from Descartes': for More, no substance existed
without extension; God and angels, let alone the mind, were extended; the
'Spirit of Nature,' an activating spiritual but extended principle found no
33. The issue of mind-body interaction in late-seventeenth-century
Rationalists thought is nicely introduced in John Cottingham, Th
Rationalists (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1988), pp.115-54. For its connection
with medicine then, see John Yolton, Locke and French Materialism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp.10-37; L.W.B. Brockliss, 'The Medico-
Religious Universe of an Early Eighteenth-Century Parisian Doctor: the
Case of Philippe Hecquet,' in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth
Century, eds. by French and Wear, 191-221; Johanna Geyer-Kordesch,
'Passions and the Ghost in the Machine: or What Not Ask about Science
in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-century Germany,' in bId., 145-63.
34. See Nicolson, 'The Early Stage of Cartesianism'; Charles Webster,
'Henry Power's Experimental Philosophy,' Ambix, 1967, 14: 150-78;
Lamprecht, 'Role of Descartes'; Rogers, 'Descartes and the English'; Alan
Gabbey, 'Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646-1671),'
in Problems of Cartesianism, eds. by Thomas M. Lennon, et a!., (Kingston:
McGill-Queen's U.P., 1982), 171-250, especially 195.
35. Tom Sorell, Hobbes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p.75.
For the criticisms against Hobbes, see Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of
Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1962).
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place in Descartes' system; More's animals were not automata, but had
spiritual and immortal sou1s.
b) Criticism against Cartesian dualism at Oxford
Critical assessment of Descartes' dualism also characterized many
Oxford natural philosophers during the Interregnum and Restoration. The
Oxford response to Descartes' dualism deserves closer examination
because it involved a lot of medical and physiological ideas, best
exemplified in the writings of Walter Charleton and Thomas Willis.
Moreover, with all our detailed knowledge of their physiology excavated
by Robert Frank, we do not yet have a complete study of their idea on the
soul. Looking at their notions about the mind-body interaction will help
us to have a fuller picture of the Oxford physiology in the mid- and late-
seventeenth century, and will provide us with an interesting case study of
the medical response to Cartesian dualism.37
36. See John Henry, 'A Cambridge Platonist's Materialism: Henry More
and the Concept of Soul,' Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute,
1986, 49: 172-95; idem, 'Atomism and Eschatology: Catholicism and
Natural Philosophy in the Interregnum,' Brit.Jour.Hist.Sci., 1982, 15: 211-
39; idem, 'Medicine and Pneumatology: Henry More, Richard Baxter, and
Francis Glisson's Treatise on the Energetic Nature of Substance,'
Med.Hist, 1987, 31: 15-40; idem, 'Occult Qualities and the Experimental
Philosophy: Active Principles in Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory,' Hist.Sci.,
1986, 24: 335-81; idem, 'The Matter of Souls: Medical Theory and
Theology in Seventeenth-Century England,' in The Medical Revolution of
the Seventeenth Century, eds. by French and Wear, 87-113.
37. The study of the Oxford physiology include: Frank, Harvey and the
Oxford Phvsiologists; idem, 'Science, Medicine and the Universities of
Early Modern England: Background and Sources, Parts 1 & 2,' Hist.Sci.,
1973, 11: 194-216 & 239-69; idem, 'Thomas Willis and His Circle: Brain
and Mind in Seventeenth-century Medicine,' in The Language of Psyche:
Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. George S. Rousseau,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 107-46; Brown, 'Physiology
and the Mechanical Philosophy'; idem, 'The College of Physicians and the
Acceptance of latromechanism.'
37
First, Descartes' rigid separation of soul and life does not seem to
have found supporters in Oxford physiologists. William Harvey (1578-
1657), their mentor, consistently claimed that the soul residing in the blood
performed vital functions. Following partly Harvey and partly Gassendi,
the arch-opponent of Descartes, a lot of Oxford physiologists embraced the
Epicurean and anti-Cartesian notion of the corporeal soul controlling the
life, which doctrine was to echo in Locke's concept of the human mind.39
Life was still largely a psychic problem at the Interregnum and Restoration
Oxford.4°
Descartes' account of mind-body interaction, too, was critically
examined at Oxford, and the figure behind the criticism seems to have
been again Gassendi. Unlike Descartes who maintained there is only one
soul in man, Gassendi claimed there are two souls, one corporeal and the
other incorporeal, and endowed the corporeal and incorporeal souls with
different faculties and different natures, trying to 'Christianize' the
Epicurean atomist philosophy.41 The corporeal soul was material, the
38. As Harvey's view on the soul and the nutritive and vital faculties, see
Pagel, 'The Reaction to Aristotle'; John S. White, 'William Harvey and the
Primacy of the Blood,' Ann.Sci., 1986, 43: 239-55.
39. As for Willis's and Locke's idea of the corporeal soul, see John P.
Wright, 'Locke, Willis and the Seventeenth-century Epicurean Soul,' in
Atoms. Pneuma. and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in
European Thought, ed. by Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.,
1991), 239-58. Willis's Sedlean lectures transcribed by Locke and John
Lower are available in Thomas Willis, Thomas Willis's Oxford Lectures,
trans. and ed. by Kenneth Dewhurst (Oxford: Stanford Publications, 1980).
40. Walter Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature, in VI Anatomic
Praelections in the New Theatre of the Royal College of Physicians in
London (London: Robert Boulter, 1680), esp. pp.378-79.
41. Gassendi's works available in English are: Pierre Gassendi's Institutio
Logica (1658), ed. with trans. and intro, by Howard Jones (Assen, The
Netherlands: van Gorcum, 1981); The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi,
ed. and trans. by Craig B. Brush (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1972).
Secondary sources include, Howard Jones, Pierre Gassendi 1592-1655: an
Intellectual Biography (Nieukoop: B. de Graaf, 1981); Margaret Osler,
'Baptizing Epicurean Atomism: Pierre Gassendi on the Immortality of the
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principle of life and of 'phantasy,' by which term he meant all mental
activities which involve the corporeal image of the thing thought. 42 On
the other hand, the other part of the soul was incorporeal, immortal, and
the basis of the faculty of 'intellectus,' whose uniqueness lay in that it
enabled man to think without images (e.g. forming a universal concept).43
Walter Charleton, one of the major Oxford figures and the
popularizer of Gassendi's atomism, took side with his mentor, and
issued a direct and straightforward attack against Cartesian formulation of
the dualistic interaction in his Natural History of the Passions (1674),
conducting his argument 'as a natural philosopher conversant in
pathology.'45 His most pointed criticism in his work was directed to
Descartes' denial of the widely held belief in The Passions, that the
passions occur because of the conflicts between 'the lower part of the soul,
which we call "sensitive" and the higher or "rational" part of the soul.'
Descartes' rejection there of the idea of the passions as a battle between
Soul,' in Religion. Science, and Worldview: Essays on Honor of Richard
S. Westfall, eds. by Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1985), 163-83; David Glidden, 'Hellenistic
Background for Gassendi's Theory of Ideas,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1988, 49: 405-
24.
42. Gassendi, Institutio Logica, LI-Lill and p.83.
43. Gassendi, Institutio Logica, LIV; The Selected Works of Gassendi,
pp.412-13. As for Gassendi's theory of images and of the incorporeal soul,
see Emily Michael and Fred S. Michael, 'Two Early Modern Concepts of
Mind'; idem, 'Corporeal Ideas in Seventeenth-Century Psychology.'
44. Walter Charleton, Ph ysiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana: or a
Fabrick of Science Natural, upon the H ypothesis of Atoms, (London:
Thomas Heath, 1654). There is no substantial modern historical study of
Walter Charleton. See DSB; Robert Kargon, 'Walter Charleton, Robert
Boyle, and the Acceptance of Epicurean Atomism in England,' 1964,
55: 184-92.
45. Walter Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, (London: James
Magnes, 1674), 'Epistle Prefatory.' He also wrote that he consulted three
philosophers' writings on the passions, i.e. Gassendi's, Descartes' and
Hobbes' (ihid.)
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the two souls was closely connected with one of the fundamentals of his
system, indivisibility of the soul: 'there is within us only one soul, and this
soul has within it no diversity of parts: it is at once sensitive and rational
too.' Given that the soul is indivisible and that there is only one soul,
'It is to the body alone that we should attribute everything that can be
observed in us to oppose to our reason.' Descartes thus concluded that
the passions were nothing but the mind pushing the pineal gland to one
side and the body to the other.47
Charleton stood up to defend what Descartes rejected and issued
some counter-criticisms against Descartes. As an anatomist, he protested
that the anatomical structure of the pineal gland did not fit to perform the
role Descartes ascribed to it.48 Moreover, Charleton was well aware of
the built-in fundamental difficulty of Cartesian dualism: how can
interaction be possible at all between two entirely different things? Even
if one admitted Descartes' model of the pineal gland bending to one side
and the other, Charleton argued that Descartes left it inconceivable, 'how
46. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.1, pp.346 & 355. Indivisibility
was the unique feature of res cogitans. As he put it in the Sixth
Meditation, 'There is a great difference between the mind and the body
inasmuch as the body is by its nature always divisible which the mind is
utterly indivisible.' (Philosophical Writings, vol.2, p.59.)
47. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.1, p.346.
48. Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, 'Epistle Prefatory.'
Charleton could make use of Thomas Willis' Cerebri Anatome (1664), and
perhaps Nicolaus Steno's work (1669), both of which rejected Descartes'
localization of the soul at pineal gland on anatomical basis. Thomas
Willis, The Anatomy of the Brain, in Willis, Dr Willis's Practice of Phvsick
Being the Whole Works (London: T. Dring, et al., 1684), pp.42-158;
Nicolaus Steno, A Dissertation on the Anatomy of the Brain, trans. with
a preface and notes by Edv. Gotredsen (Copenhagen: Arnold Busck, 1950).
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an immaterial agent, not infinite, comes to move by impulse a solid
body.'49
The solution of the difficulty was, Charleton maintained, possible
only by introducing the Gassendian corporeal soul, 'the mediation of a
third thing that is less disparil [sic] or disproportionate to both':
It seem'd to me unintelligible, how an agent incorporeal, but not
infinite, such as the rational soul by her excellent faculties and
proper acts appear's to be, can act physically in and upon a gross
and ponderous body, such as ours are, immediately or without the
mediation of a third thing; which though corporeal too, yet be of a
substance so refined and subtil, as to approach somewhat neerer to
the nature of a pure spirit, than the body itself does.5°
This 'third' intermediate thing was similar also to the animal spirits
in pre-Cartesian medicine. In his Treatise of Melancholie (1586), Timothy
Bright, for example, wrote there are three things in man, i.e. the body, the
spirits, and the soul. Although the animal spirits 'rise from earthly
creatures,' they are more excellent than earth. At the same time, they are
not 'comparable in purenesse and excellence, unto that breath of life,
herewith the Lord make Adam a living soule, whiche proceeded
immediately from Him selfe.' These three should form an uninterrupted
continuum, to ensure that there took place any interaction between the
mind and the body:
49. Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, 'Epistle Prefatory.' See
also ibid., p.4.
50. Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, 'Epistle Prefatory.'
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as it is not possible to passe from one extreme to an other, but by
a meane; and no meane is there in the nature of man, but spirit; by
this only the bodie affecteth the mind.'51
Although Charleton's language did not include so great a tinge of
Neo-Platonist theory of spiritual influx as Bright's, their arguments about
the soul and the body were isomorphic. Unlike Descartes who claimed
that there are only two kinds of substance and the animal spirits were
nothing but matter, Charleton, like Gassendi and Neo-classical doctors,
believed there were three things, i.e. the immaterial soul, the gross matter,
and the intermediate material agent, without which the interaction
between the soul and the gross matter would be impossible. In other
words, there had to be two ontologically different categories of matter,
instead of only one, to ensure the mind-body interaction to take place.
Charleton thus took an explicitly non-Cartesian and largely a Gassendian
view of the dual soul and the dual matter and rehabilitated it into the
medical discourse on the passions.
The business of building the medical system on the anti-Cartesian
and Gassendian idea of the corporeal soul was conducted in a much more
large scale by Thomas Willis, another major Oxford figure, in his i
Anima Brutorum (1672).52	 There Willis combined Gassendi's
essentially metaphysical idea and new elements in physiological
investigation at Oxford, to produce a very ambitious system of physiology
and pathology of the corporeal soul. In this work, Willis expressed his
dissatisfaction at the Aristotelian psychology, in favour of Gassendi's. He
51. Timothy Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie (London: Thomas
Vautrollier, 1586), pp.37-S. For the life of Bright, William J. Canton,
Timothe Bright. Doctor of Ph ysicke (London: Elliot Stock, 1911). For a
similar English medical representation of the three things, see,
Anthropologie Abstracted: or the Idea of Humane Nature (London: Henry
Herrington, 1655), p.97.
52. Indeed, Charleton acknowledged his debt to Willis, in his Natural
History of the Passions, 'Epistle Prefatory.'
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incorporated natural philosophical ideas of Bacon, van Helmont (1579-
1644), Boyle, and Robert Hooke (1635-1703). Willis has also benefited
from Richard Lower's (1631-91) formidable skill in dissection, and from
the interest in chemistry and atomism which was current in Oxford at that
time. In addition, the published book benefited from Christopher Wren's
superb technique in engraving.53 As a proper object of medical study,
Willis's corporeal soul had 'not only extension, but members, and as it
were organical parts, yea peculiar diseases, and proper means of curing
them.' Backed by optimism over the progress of medical knowledge,
Willis wanted to add to the Oxford medical research the problems of the
corporeal soul, a new physiological and pathological unit: 'why may we not
also hope, that there may be yet shewn a new disquisition concerning the
soul, and with better luck than hitherto.' 55 Willis thus wanted firmly to
establish the non-Cartesian dualism as a medical research programme of
the corporeal soul.56
53. Frank, Harvey and the Oxford Phvsiologists, pp.246-74; idem, 'Thomas
Willis and his Circle.' For Bacon's idea of the life-flame, see Thomas S.
Hall, History of General Physiology 600 B.0 to A.D. 1900, 2 vols.
(Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1969), pp.235-36. As for Willis's Helmontian
chemical ideas, see J.R. Partington, A History of Chemistr y, 4 vols.
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1960-70), vol.2, pp.304- 11 & p.548 In his
Skeptical Chymist (1661), Boyle refuted Paracelsian doctrine of three
prime matters (mercury, salt, sulphur) and claimed the proper number
would be five, adding water and earth, which was followed by Willis. See
Willis, Of Fermentations, in Dr Willis's Practice of Physick, pp.4-8. The
relation between Hook's experiments on respiration and combustion and
Willis's idea of life as a flame is suggested in Hall, History of General
Physiology, vol.1, pp.304-309 & 315-20.
54. Thomas Willis, Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes, trans.
by Sydney Portage (London: Thomas Dring, 1683; rept. with intro, by
Solomon Diamond, Gainesville, Florida: Scholar's Facsimiles & Reprints,
1971), 'The preface to the reader.'
55. Willis, Two Discourses, p.1.
56. It seems that some other doctors followed Willis's formulation of the
new genre: Friedrich Hoffmann was probably influenced by Willis in his
setting up an independent chapter on the pathology of the animal spirits
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c) Metaphysics and politics of the corporeal soul
Charleton's and Willis's Gassendian corporeal soul theory had its
own problems and critics. The problem of the immortality and the
immateriality of the soul was largely solved by Gassendi by positing an
incorporeal rational soul, independent of the corporeal sensitive one.
Willis and Charleton repeated the Gassendian notion that man had an
incorporeal soul besides a corporeal one which he shared with animals.
Charleton wrote that he wholeheartedly submitted to 'the undeniable
authority of the Lateran Council, ... which having decreed the
anathematization of all atheists who durst question ... the immortality of
the human soul'; Willis wrote that one of the benefits of studying the
corporeal soul was that one could know the incorporeal and rational soul
by contrast. 57 Indeed, Willis included a long chapter in which he made
it clear how the rational and sensitive souls are different, and he made a
sort of tour de force of transforming the similarity of the brain of beasts
and that of men into evidence for the existence of the rational soul which
acts without the body.58
Willis and Charleton were, however, aware of another counter-
criticism from the Cartesians against the doctrine of the corporeal soul:
in his Fundamenta Medicinae (1695), intro, and trans. by Lester S. King
(London: MacDonald, 1971), 'Of diseases arising from defect of the animal
spirits,' pp.67-78.
57. Walter Charleton, The Immortality of the Human Soul. Demonstrated
by the Light of Nature (London: Henry Herringman, 1657), p.60; Willis,
Two Discourses, p.1.
58. Willis, Two Discourses, 38-44. As for Willis's metaphysical use of the
comparative anatomical observations, see W.F. Bynum, 'The Anatomical
Method, Natural Theology, and the Functions of the Brain,' 1973, 64:
445-69. Besides the issue of the immortality, Willis and Charleton were
aware of the possible association of the doctrine of the dual soul with
Manicheanism, which needs more detailed study. See Willis, Ii
Discourses, 'The Epistle Dedicatory' and pp.40-41; Charleton, Natural
History of the Passions, 'Epistle Prefatory'; idem, The Immortality of the
Human Soul, pp.75-76.
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given that the corporeal soul is matter, how can it be sensitive? Samuel
Haworth adopted the view and criticized the doctrine of the corporeal
soul.59 He correctly summarized the doctrine as attributing to man 'three
essential parts, a body, a [corporeal] soul, and a spirit.' Among the three,
the corporeal soul posed a problem, for it is 'a substance ... participating
both of the nature of a body and a spirit,' which he thought is a logical
absurdity:
Whether body and spirit be not things of a quite different nature?
whether rarefaction or subtilization make a body to be less body,
or more a spirit, than it was before?6°
The point raised here, how matter acquires a special character and
becomes a soul-like thing, posed difficulties for Charleton and Willis.
Charleton wrote it should 'transcend the capacity of human understanding'
to answer to 'this aenigmatic question' of 'what particular mode of
composition or contexture of insensible matter ... gives to it the nature and
faculties of a sensitive souL' 61 Unlike for Descartes, however, clear and
distinct intelligibility was not the test of truth for Charleton. Even if a
certain phenomenon is unintelligible to human reason, it can take place if
it pleases God. The omnipotent God must be able to make sluggish and
inert matter feel and perceive, by giving certain disposition to it. 62 Willis
59. Haworth was an empiric doctor patronized by the Duke of York, later
James II, and admitted in 1680 as an extra-licentiate to the Royal College.
(DNB) One is tempted to see Haworth's criticism of the doctrine of the
corporeal soul as an internal struggle in the College. See Harold Cook,
The Decline of the Old Medical Regime.
60. Samuel Haworth, Anthropologia: or. a Philosophic Discourse
concerning Man (London: Stephen Foster, 1680), pp.30-33.
61. Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature, p.391.
62. Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature, pp.387-88.
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took an identical position in his attempt to defend the doctrine of
corporeal soul:
I profess the great God, as the only work-man, so also as the first
mover, and auspiciously present, every where, was he not able to
impress strength, power, and faculties to matter, fitted to the offices
of a sensitive life?63
Although this defence by Charleton and Willis can be interpreted as an
ironical acceptance of the rigorous Cartesian distinction between the body
and the mind (they tacitly admitted that matter was insensible in nature,
and divine miracle was necessary to make it sensitive), they insisted on the
non-Cartesian model of mind-body interaction.
The reasons for their not adopting Descartes' model may be many:
the inertia of tradition, Harvey's influence, Gassendi's lead, theology at
Oxford, are possible reasons, but full assessment of the factors remains to
be studied.M To these intellectual factors, I would add tentatively an
extra-intellectual one: the political metaphor of the soul. Both Charleton's
and Willis' accounts of the relationship between the soul and the body
made use of political metaphor, which fit in well with the contemporary
political situation.
Charleton's criticism of Descartes was filled with political
metaphors: he said that it is absurd to believe that a single and all-
powerful ruler (Descartes' rational soul) could be put into submission
(mind's being overwhelmed by the passions) by the totally inferior subject
(Descartes' inert body). Instead, argued Charleton, the passions should be
63. Willis, Two Discourses, 'Preface to the reader.' John Wright argues
that this passage of Willis might be the direct source of Locke's famous
thinking matter hypothesis. Wright, 'Locke, Willis and the Seventeenth-
century Epicurean Soul.'
64. Both Charleton and Willis cited Henry Hammond (1605-60), the public
orator of Oxford during the Civil War. The connection of religion and
medical thinking on the soul at Oxford seems worth looking at.
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the product of two rulers (Gassendian rational and sensitive souls)
struggling with each other, or 'from a duumvirate, as it were, of rulers
contending for superiority within us, and inclining us two contrary ways at
once.' The phrases have almost unmistakable political allusion of the
Civil War. Indeed, the following account of Charleton's of the 'civil war'
between two souls reads just like the history of the Civil War and the
Restoration:
Yea sometimes grown weary of subjection, [the corporeal soul]
takes occasion to cast off her yoke of allegence, and like a proud
and insolent rebel!, aspires to unbounded license and dominion
And (what is yet more deplorable) the event of this combat is often
so unhappy, that the nobler part is subdued and led captive by the
ignoble: ... When the divine politie of the rational soul being
subverted, the whole unhappy man is furiously carried away to
serve the brutish lusts of the insolent usurper, and augment the
triumphs of libidinous carnality ... Nay sometimes reason, after she
hath been long held captive, breakes off her fetters; and
remembering her native soveraignity, grows conscious and shamed
of her former lapse: and thereupon with fresh courage and vigour
renewing the conflict, vanquishes and deposed the sensitive soul
with all its legions of lusts, and gloriously re-established herself in
the throne.
The same story of the rebellious corporeal soul succeeding in 'usurpation'
and after a while the rational soul in exile returning to restore her former
throne is also found in Willis. William Cole, another Oxford physiologist,
attributed apoplexies to the soul leaving 'her province and mansion' when
65. Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, 'Epistle Prefatory.'
66. Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, pp.58-59.
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the brain or 'her Royal seate happen[s] to be overwhelmed with such a
deluge ... thus become[s] so unfit for her residence.'67
And both Charleton and Willis wrote that the dominion of the
rational over the corporeal soul is far superior than the reverse: the
rational soul establishes 'the precepts of philosophers and moral institute'
and with the help of Sacred Religion carries a man near to God, while the
usurping corporeal soul makes him little better than the beast, wallowing
in sensual p1easures. This says that the proper king frames
philosophical, moral and religious man and the usurper does the reverse.
One is very much tempted to read this as a Royalist polemic disguised as
physiology.
It may be fruitless to ask to what extent their experience of the
Civil War, the 'duumvirate' of two rulers, determined their adoption of the
doctrine of the corporeal soul. What I would like to argue is that they
formulated their presentation of the issue of the dual souls in terms of
politics or civil war, and that we have good reason to relate it to their
experience of the Civil War. Both Willis and Charleton witnessed the
Royalist army defeated by Parliament and Charles 11(1630-85) exiled.
When the monarchy was restored, it did not eliminate the Parliament but
the 'duumvirate' continued. It is thus not surprising that the Royalist
physiologists thought there must be two souls or rulers in man.
Willis established the non-Cartesian contemporary medical
discourse of the physiology and pathology of the corporeal soul. I now
turn to his account of mental diseases and ask whether it involved any
radical shift from earlier medical schemes to explain madness. The next
section will highlight some continuities found there.
67. Willis, Two Discourses, p.43; William Cole, A Ph ysico-medical Essay
concerning the Late Frequency of Apoplexies (Oxford: Sheldonian
Theatre, 1689), p.25.
68. Willis, Two Discourses, p.43.
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New Wines in Old Bottles: continuities in the basic issues
a) Diagnostic categories
The diagnostic categories of 'mental diseases' changed little over
the course of the seventeenth century. The three major diagnostic labels
continued to be phrensy, mania and melancholy. Laurens wrote 'the
disease which doe most sharply assaile our mindes, ... are three: the
frensie, madness, and melancholie'; Lazare Rivière (1589-1655), a
celebrated professor at Montpellier, wrote that the diseases of the internal
senses of imagination, memory and reasoning were 'frenzie, madness,
melancholly.' 69 The trio formed a unit because in all of them the
imagination and/or reason are deprived. And they were mutually
distinguished from each other: phrensy was accompanied by fever, while
mania and melancholia were not; mania and melancholia were
characterized by fury and sadness respectively. 70 To these tripartite
69. André du Laurens, A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: of
Melancholike Diseases: of Rheumes. and of Old Age, trans. by Richard
Surphiet (London: for Ralph Iacson, 1599), p.81; Lazare Rivière, Ih
Practice of Physick. in Several Books ... by Nicholas Culpeper. Abdiah
Cole and William Rowland. Being Chiefly a Translation of the Works of
Lazarus Riverius (London: by Peter Cole, 1655), p.1. 'Madness' seems
to have been most usual English translation of 'mania.' Philip Barrough,
for instance, wrote 'mania in Greek is a disease which the Latines call
insania and furor: that is, madnesse and furiousness.' See Philip Barrough,
The Method of Physick, containing the Causes. Signes. and Cures of
Inward Diseases of Mans Body, from the Head to the Foot (London:
Abraham Miller, 1652), p.44.
70. See, for instance, Daniel Sennert, The Institutions or Fundamental of
the Whole Art. Both of Ph ysick and Chiurgery, trans. by N.D.B.P.
(London: Lodowick Lloyd, 1656), pp.74-75; Oskar Diethelm and Thomas
F. Hefferman, 'Felix Platter and Psychiatry,' Jour.Hist.Behav.Sci., 1965, 1:
10-23.
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system, some nosologists added stupidity and some other diseases like
drunkenness and rabies.7'
This diagnostic system can be found in the identical form in Willis'
Two Discourses. Willis singled out a class of diseases whose common
symptom is that 'the imagination, and by consequence the mind and will,
and the other powers of the superior soul, are wont to be perverted.' And
this group was construed in a very similar manner, largely consisting in
fever and sadness/fury issues. 72 Although Willis was usually credited with
the honour of being the first doctor to describe the disease which is today
called manic-depressive disorder, the idea that he should make it an
independent diagnostic category seems never to have occurred to him.73
He did not, therefore, created any new diagnostic categories, neither did
he stop to use the old ones.
b) The centrality of the interactive agent
When we turn to the most basic schemes in the aetiologies and
therapeutics of madness, we find an apparent continuity there again. To
be brief, both pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian doctors believed that
madness was essentially a product of bodily disorders and especially of the
71. See Dietheim and Hefferman, 'Felix Platter,' 13. In establishing the
class of the disorders in which the imagination and the ratiocination are
hurt, John Jonston, a Scot-Polish medical and natural philosophical writer
who took MD at Leiden, counted hurt of memory, short-term delirium,
and rabies besides with the usual three. See John Jonston, The Idea of
Practical Physick in Twelve Books, trans. by Nicholas Culpeper (London:
Peter Cole, 1657), 'The Eighth Book,' pp.18-24.
72. Willis, Two Discourses, p.179.
73. Kenneth Dewhurst, Thomas Willis as a Physician (Los Angels: William
Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1964), pp.6-7. For another attempt to
look at Willis from modern psychiatric view, see Paul F. Cranefield, 'A
Seventeenth-century View of Mental Deficiency and Schizophrenia:
Thomas Willis on "Stupidity or Foolishness",' Bull.Hist.Med., 1961, 35: 291-
316.
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disorder in the mind-body interactive agent, and medical intervention
should mainly directed to it, rather than the mind per Se.
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century the discourse on
mental disease was formulated around the brain. In his Anatomy of
Melancholy, Robert Burton wrote that 'the most received division [of
melancholy] is into three kinds': one in which the brain is primarily
affected, one in which the temperature of the whole body affects the brain,
and one in which corrupted vapour from the lower bowel, liver, spleen, or
hypochondria affects the brain.74 This says that the seat of melancholy
is the brain, and there are three ways for the brain to be affected.75 As
the widely accepted seat of the rational soul, the brain was the pivotal
organ of the pathology of the mind.76
The seat of melancholy was the brain, and its most immediate cause
was disorders in the animal spirits. Rivière wrote:
74. Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melanchol y, ed. with an introduction
by Holbrook Jackson (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), part I, p.175. As
for Burton and his book, the following studies are useful: Bergen Evans,
The Psychiatry of Robert Burton (New York: Octagon Books, 1972);
Lawrence Babb, Sanity in Bedlam: a Stud y of Robert Burton's Anatomy
of Melancholy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1959);
MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam, chap.5.
75. See also: Barrough, The Method of Physick, p.45; Petrus Pomarius,
Enchiridion Medicum: Containing an Epitome of the Whole Course of
Physicke (London: John Royston et al., 1612), p.25; Bright, A Treatise of
Melancholie, p.2.
76. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.170. 'Some difference
I find amongst writers, about the principal part affected in this disease,
whether it be the brain, or heart, or some other member. Most are of
opinion that it is the brain.' See also Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie,
'Epistle dedicatory'; Gualtherus Bruele, Praxis Medicinae. or the Physicians
Practice (London: William Sheares, 1639), p.25. As for long and
complicated history of the controversies over whether the seat of the soul
is the brain or heart, see Walter Pagel, 'Medieval and Renaissance
Contributions to Knowledge of the Brain and Its Functions,' in Ih
History and Philosophy of Knowledge of the Brain and Its Functions, ed.
by F.N.L. Poynter (Oxford: B!ackwell Scientific Publications, 1958), 95-114.
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The immediate cause of melancholy is a dark spirit or vapour very
black; for when the animal spirits ought in their own nature to be
pure, thin, and transparent for the cheerful preforming of the
actions of the brain, and to cause cheerfulness, if they change their
constitution, and become dark and obscure, they produce sorrow
and fear.77
As the bridge between the mind and the body, the animal spirits had to
possess the qualities to facilitate the interaction. Although corporeal, they
should be more 'noble' than gross earthy matter, pure, thin, and
transparent. And when this instrument of the soul was deprived of its
noble qualities, it 'becometh an instrument unhandsome for performance
of such actions.'78
Despite all his chemical-corpuscular 'modern' theories and vastly
improved knowledge of the anatomy of the brain, Willis followed the same
scheme of understanding the aetiology of mental disorders delineated
above, and elaborated it by his new learning. In Willis's research
programme, the seat of madness was the sensitive part of the corporeal
soul, which was the theoretical equivalent of the animal spirits. As the
sensitive corporeal soul resided mainly in the brain and the nervous
system, the pathological site of madness was the brain: mental diseases
'are ordinarily induced by reason of ... distempers of the head, and of the
spirits inhabiting it.' 79 Both for pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian doctors,
what mattered the most in the pathology of madness was the material
agent of the mind-body interaction and the brain, its main residing place.
Accordingly, when they talked about seemingly 'psychological'
aetiology of madness, it was almost always constructed with reference to
77. Rivière, The Practice of Physick, p.49.
78. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie, pp.35-36. The same idea was
expressed in Laurens, A Discourse, p.91.
79. Willis, Two Discourses, p.179.
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the body. This is the most evident in their accounts of the passions as a
cause. Robert Burton, for example, wrote that 'passions and perturbations
of the mind' would cause melancholy, giving a long account of how the
passions like sorrow, fear, shame, envy, hatred, anger, discontents,
ambition, immoderate pleasures, self-love, and excessive scholarly study,
could be the causes of melancholy. 8° These passions of the mind,
however, did not constitute genuine 'psychological' problem for Burton, but
were mapped on the bodily pathology. He traced the process from the
image to the passions as the process from the brain to the heart:
imagination communicated the image to the heart, then the heart,
responding to the passion caused by it, 'bends itself to prosecute or avoid
it, and withal, draweth with it other humours to help it: so in pleasure,
concur great store of purer spirits, in sadness, much melancholy blood; in
ire, choler.' This says that the violent passions cause madness because
they affect the physiological processes at the heart and because they do
harm to the balance of humours and the good disposition of the body.81
This formulation of the indirect psychological causation of madness
is found in the identical form in Willis. Willis wrote that 'destroying love,
vehement sadness, panick fear, envy, shame, care, and immoderate study'
often excite melancholy. The process from the passions to melancholy was
explained, again with the heart as the pivotal organ of producing the
pathogenic matter: the vehement passions deviates the animal spirits from
its due courses and prevents the heart from moving in regular manner;
then the blood, being deprived of its due temper, 'encreases to the
melancholick disposition.'82
80. Burton, The Anatom y of Melancholy, part I, pp.250-330.
81. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.252. In another place,
citing Fernel and Piso, Burton wrote that the sorrow 'hinders concoction,
refrigirates the heart, takes away stomach, colour, and sleep; thickens the
blood, and contaminates the spirits.' (Jiii p.260).
82. Willis, Two Discourses, p.192. The process from the violent passions
to mania was understood in the same framework: the violent and terrible
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Likewise, in the therapeutics of madness, the major target of
medical intervention was the body and the mind-body medium, both in
pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian eras. Willis and neo-classical doctors
shared certain kind of technique of seemingly 'psychological' therapies,
which was actually directed to the body. Summarizing contemporaiy
medical opinions, Burton wrote that to avoid the disturbances of the mind
was of utmost importance in curing melancholy. However 'psychological'
it may seem, the rationale the Renaissance doctors attached to the
'psychological' therapy was somatic: Thomas Fienus (1567-1631), for
example, wrote that the imagination cannot per se cure diseases, but only
by inducing bodily changes. 83 When music was prescribed to a
melancholic patient, Levinus Lemnius (1505-1568) thought that it affected
'not only the ears, but the very arteries, the vital and animal spirits.'
The 'psychological' therapies were not directed exclusively to the mind of
the patients: rather, it rationale of cure was based on the change in the
state of the body it would create.
In just the same way, Willis thought that acting on the passions of
the patients would help to cure them of mental diseases: the vehement
passions had to be 'appeased, or subdued by other opposite.' Accordingly,
'to desperate love ought to he applied shrewd indignation and hatred:
sadness is to be opposed with the flatteries of pleasure, musick,' etc.
In doing so, Willis, too, was aiming at the animal spirits of the patients:
'the intention of the physician is so much to lift up, make volatile, and
corroborate the more fixed or dejected animal spirits.' And pleasant talk,
passions confuses the motion of the animal spirits, triggers the change in
its chemical constitution through blood, and engenders the chemical liquor
which is the immediate cause of mania.	 p.203.)
83. L.J. Rather, 'Thomas Fienus' (1567-1631) Dialectical Investigation of
the Imagination as Cause and Cure of Bodily Disease,' Bull.Hist.Med.,
1967, 41: 349-67; Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part II, p.103.
84. Cited in Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part II, p.115.
85. Willis, Two Discourses, pp.193-94.
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jesting, singing, pictures, dancing, travelling, building houses or gardens,
tilling the ground, etc. would contribute to the cure of melancholy, because
by doing so 'the animal spirits, being called outwards. may be solicited
from their diversions, into their former and accustomed tracts.' Even
Willis' notorious cure of mania by 'punishments, and hard usage, in a strait
room' was principally directed at the animal spirits, not at the mind per se:
'for by this means, the corporeal soul being in some measure depressed
and restrained.' 87 For psychological treatment to make sense, the somatic
underpinning seems to have been necessary, both to pre-Cartesian and
post-Cartesian doctors.
Here a few words are necessary about the supernatural causation
of madness in Renaissance medicine, for many historians have argued that
around the seventeenth century the 'de-mystification' of madness was
proceeding centred around the disbelief in witchcraft and demonic
possession.89 Although it is clear that the late seventeenth century
witnessed the gradual disappearance of the supernatural explanation of
madness, it seems wrong to assume that medical theory before was
genuinely supernatural.
It is true that many Renaissance doctors believed that madness was
sometimes occasioned by supernatural causes: Burton wrote that the
86. Willis, Two Discourses, p.194.
87. Willis, Two Discourses, p.206.
88. There was, however, the tradition of a sort of psychological treatment
without somatic explanation, which consisted in playing a deceptive trick
on the madman and outwitting him. See William Vaughan, Approved
Directions for Health. Both Naturall and Artificiall: Derived from the Best
Physitians As Well As Moderne As Auncient, 4th ed. (London: Roger
Jackson, 1612), p.90; Robert Bayfield, A Treatise de Morborum Capitis
Essentiis et Prognosticis (London: by D. Maxwel, 1663), p.37; James [j]
Ferrand, Erotomania: or A Treatise Discoursing of the Essence. Causes.
Symptomes. Prognosticks. and Cure of Love Melancholy (Oxford: L.
Lichfield, 1640), 'the author to the reader' and p.278; Willis, L
Discourses, p.193.
89. See my introductory section above.
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general causes of melancholy were either natural or supernatural, by the
latter meaning madness from God and His Angels or from the devil; Felix
Platter (1536-1614) wrote that a malicious spirit could be the cause of
demoniacal possession, a species of mania. 90 But these supernatural
causes did not constitute a genuine and self-standing medical problem.
There existed a clear notion among medical writers that physicians'
concern should be 'natural' causes. Hence supernaturally caused madness
should be either excluded from genuine medical concern, or looked at only
from 'natural' point of view. When madness was caused by God's
punishment (like Nebuchadnezzar's), all one could do was to 'submit
ourselves unto the mighty hand of God, acknowledge our offences, call to
Him for mercy,' for 'physicians and physic can do no good.' 9' As for
madness caused through Devil's intervention, one did not have to deny the
possibility of the demonic possession or the existence of devil to take
'natural' point of view. Many doctors adopted the idea that the devil
affected the victim through natural means, i.e. melancholy humours: as
Burton cites Lemnius, 'evil spirits insert themselves in depraved humours
and black bile.' Hence the exorcism of diabolically caused melancholy was
performed with the help of purging the melancholic humour, and
sometimes even purging only was enough. 92 Supernatural etiology of
90. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.178; Diethlem, 'Felix
Platter and Psychiatry,' 16.
91. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.179. See also Bright, ,
Treatise of Melancholie, p.189, in which Bright wrote 'Here no medicine,
no purgative, no cordiall, no tryacle or balm are able to assure the afflicted
soule and trembling heart, now panting under the terrors of God.'
92. See Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.200; Martin Ruland,
Experimental Physick. or Seven Hundred Famous and Rare Cures, trans.
by Nicholas Culpeper and Abdiah Cole (London: by Peter Cole, 1662),
p.284. This 'naturalistic' interpretation of the devil's operation seems to
be in accordance with the general view held by late Renaissance
demonologists. The devil's power was regarded as limited to natural
realm, only able to produce effects through natural means, and hence
unable to achieve something 'supernatural' or miracle, which was allowed
only to God. See Clark, 'The Scientific Status of Demonology.'
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madness was, therefore, not the essential part of Neo-classical medicine on
madness. The medical discourse on madness was framed mainly around
the medium of mind-body interaction, as was Willis's pathology of the
corporeal soul. Exaggeration of the supernatural elements seems to be
misleading, at least when we understand its intellectual and theoretical
framework.
c) The intactness of the rational soul.
Both Neo-classical physicians and Willis, therefore, understood
madness primarily as the disorder of mind-body interaction. Moreover,
both consistently argued that the immortal and rational soul per se
remained intact in madness. Although madness affected the faculties of
the mind like imagination and reasoning, and although 'the minde seems
to be blame worthy,' Bright insisted that 'the bodie and this [animal]
spirite are rather to be charged, things corporall and earthy':
This affecting of the minde, I understand not to be anything
empairing of the nature [of the mind]; or decay of any facultie
therm; or shortening of immortality; or any such infirmitie inflicted
upon the soule from the bodie: but such a disposition, and such
discontentment, as a false string lute, giveth to the musician: or a
rough and evill fashioned pen, to the cunning writer: which only
obscureth, the shew of either art, and nothing diminisheth of that
facultie, which with better instruments, would fully content the eye
with a faire hand, and satisfie the eare with most pleasant
harmonie.93
The defect, thus, lay in the instrument of the mind, rather than the mind
itself.
93. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie, pp.36-38.
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Bright's idea that the soul is intact during madness was framed as
a polemic against the mortalists and materialists. The tactics of
combatting the heresy were more clearly spelled out in his 'Epistle
Dedicatorie.' There Bright lamented that physician curing madness
through bodily methods 'hath caused some to judge more basely of the
soule, then agreeth with pietie and nature, ... not considering herein any
thing divine, and above the ordinarie events, and natural course of
thinges.' 'To confute the absurd error' and 'correcting the judgement of
such as so greatly mistake the matter' were, he wrote, his major aims in
publishing the book.94 It seems almost certain that Bright had in mind
Lucretius's proof of the mortality of the soul in Book Three of De Rerum
Natura, which used the instance of madness and its cure by bodily
medicines as an evidence for the corporeality and hence mortality of the
soul, claiming 'whether mind is sick ... or whether it is changed by
medicine ... gives signs of its mortality.' 95 Bright wanted to refute this
'Stoical prophanes of Atheisme.'96
Another tactic in Bright's refutation of the mortalist and materialist
heresy was to argue that there is another type of soul's 'disease' which had
no organic disorder, and which any bodily or medicinal intervention could
not cure. Bright expected the existence of such calamity to support his
argument that there was something that is not body in man. Bright
dedicated the last quarter of his book to a discussion of the differences
between melancholy as bodily disorder and 'that heavy hande of God upon
the afflicted conscience,' and maintained that bodily melancholy did not
affect the substance of the soul.97 Accordingly, its cure was no medical
94. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie, 'Epistle Dedicatory.'
95. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, 3 vols., ed. and trans. by Cyril
Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), vol.1, pp.325-29.
96. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholy, p.188.
97. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholy, 'Epistle Dedicatory.' His discussion
'of the affection of conscience for sinne' occupies pp.184-242 of his book,
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problem: Bright wrote that 'the puritie of the bloud, and the sinceritie and
livelinesse of the spirits avayle nothing to mitigate the paine [of the
wounded conscience.]'98
The religious polemic against mortalism was also found in Laurens's
book on melancholy. There he wrote that the madman is just like a beast,
and 'thou shalt not find therein any thing worthie of a man.' This did not,
however, mean that the madman's soul itself suffered change:
I would not have thee (0 thou atheist whosoever thou art)
hereupon to conclude, that the soule of man suffereth anything in
his essence, and thereby to become subject to corruption: it is never
altered or changed, neither can it suffer anythingf9
Just as 'the sunne doth never feele any diminishment of brightness' when
it seems dark and eclipsed because of thick clowd or the moon coming
between, the soul, too, never changes its essence even when it seems to
lose its power of reasoning.100
Like Bright, Laurens also drew a clear distinction between what he
considered a genuine psychological disturbance and madness caused by
somatic disorders. Laurens made it clear that the problem is whether the
soul is affected per se or via body:
see especially pp.193-198. Bright's strong tone of religious polemic is quite
understandable, since he made narrow escape from the Massacre of St
Bartholomew's Day when he was in Paris and later he deserted medical
career for ecclesiastical one. See DNB and Canton, Timothe Bright. As
for seventeenth-century association with atheism and medicine, see Henry,
'The Matter of Souls.'
98. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie, p.194. See also Burton on the
melancholy caused by God, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.179.
99. Laurens, A Discourse, pp.81-82.
100. Laurens, A Discourse, p.82.
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This alteration [of human mind] is seene oftentimes in the soule
alone, the bodie standing sound and without blemish: as when a
man by his malicious will becoming an apostate and revolt, defaceth
the ingraven forme of the deitie, and commeth by the filth of sinne
to defile the holy temple of God ... I come to the other deformitie,
which is violently throwne upon man, and may happen unto the
most religious, being, when the bodie, which is as it were vesell of
the soule, is so greatly altered and corrupted, the sences seeme all
of them to wander and goe atray, every motion to be out of order,
the imagination troubled, the reason foolish and rash, ..Y
The former, maintained Laurens, was not a medical problem: 'I goe not
about to redresse this deformitie, I leave the discourse for the learned
divines.' And the religious profession seems to have welcomed the
dichotomy of bodily madness and purely spiritual mental disturbance. For
sickness of the soul per Se, one had to prescribe 'the soules physick,' moral
and religious instruction, and sometimes punishment: while madness needs
medical and bodily treatment, and 'a tender and charitable compassion'
instead of severe censure.102
In madness, therefore, the malady was located in animal spirits, the
corporeal instrument of the soul. With this scheme in mind, some Neo-
classical doctors went even further to determine which faculty was
disordered in madness and which remained intact, or which was primarily
damaged and which was consequently disordered. Despite some
disagreements, the generally accepted theory was 'first in imagination, and
afterwards in reason,' as Burton assessed. Daniel Sennert (1572-1637)
101. Laurens, A Discourse, p.81.
102. John Abernethy, A Christian and Heavenly Treatise: Containing
Physicke for the Soule (London: Robert Allot, 1630), p.54. Lemnius
applied the dichotomy of the spiritual error which needs punishment and
madness needs medicines and pity to the problem of suicide. See Levinus
Lemnius, The Secret Miracles of Nature: in Four Books (London: by Jo.
Streater, 1658), pp.63-65.
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wrote that in melancholy, the memory and imagination are 'either
abolished or diminished, principally through the fault of the instrument,
which is the brain,' whereas 'the reasonable faculty is not diminished nor
abolished of its self, ... but because the fantasie is hurt.'103
The pre-Cartesian scheme of the body as the sole pathological site
and the soul as an immutable, incorruptible, and immortal substance, and
of imagination as the primarily affected faculty was retained by many late
seventeenth-century doctors. In 1685, Michael Etmueller (1644-1683)
expressed the same concern:
The intellect or rational faculty being immaterial, cannot be vitiated
of it self by any morbific cause; but for so much as 'tis conversant
about the objects of our internal sense, it makes use of their
ministry; and if they are out of order, shares of common calamity.
Thus whatever impairs the right use of reason, must immediately
affect the imagination and memory.1°4
This was even more the case with Charleton and Willis, for they
were very keen to distinguish the rational and sensitive souls and their
respective faculties. 105 Accordingly, Willis inherited the dualistic model
which said again that the primarily disordered faculty in mental disorders
was imagination, and that the intellect was secondarily affected:
if any time the imagination is so disturbed, or perverted, that it
falsly conceives, or evilly composes or divides, the species and
notions brought from the sense or memory; presently for that
103. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.171; Sennert, Th
Institutions, p.29. See also Laurens, A Discourse, p.74.
104. Michael Etmueller, Etmullerus Abridg'd: or a Compleat System of the
Theory and Practice of Physick (London: E. Harris, et al., 1699), p.532.
105. Willis, Two Discourses, p.1.
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reason the intellect beholds or forms conceptions and thoughts only
deformed, distracted one from another, and very confused.'°6
Even stupidity, which 'most chiefly belongs to the rational soul, and
signifies a defect of the intellect and judgment,' actually had its roots in
imagination. 107
Summing up, the basic structure of the medical discourses on
madness during the seventeenth century seems to have been quite stable
despite the Scientific Revolution going on then. Willis's discourse on
mental disorders was formulated around the same issues as Bright's and
Laurens'. They used very much the same diagnostic category. The
principal defect in madness lay in the animal spirits. Hence therapeutics
were principally targeted at the body. The rational and immaterial soul
itself must remain intact during madness. The faculty initially damaged
was imagination; the higher faculty was damaged only indirectly. Medical
theory on madness was rigorously dualistic with principal stress on the
body long before Descartes, in the sense that it established two rigorously
distinguished things: the matter/body which is susceptible to diseases and
the unchangeable, incorruptible and immortal soul.
Shut within his own world: New Images about madness
a) Light versus darkness: Renaissance etiology of madness
As we have seen in the previous section, both early and late
seventeenth-century medical discourse on mental disorders was centred on
the animal spirits and the faculty of imagination. Now let us examine how
the disordered animal spirits could actually cause mental disorders in those
two schemes, to locate the radical shift which occurred there.
106. Willis, Two Discourses, p.179.
107. Willis, Two Discourses, p.209.
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Since in Renaissance and Neo-classical medicine the Galenic
humoral system was still dominant, the ideas on madness were largely
framed around the issue of humours, with melancholy as the key humour.
The other humours could cause mental diseases by being burned and
cooked into 'unnatural melancholy': the 'unnatural' melancholic humours
were engendered, wrote Bright, by overheating of either natural
melancholic humour, choler, or blood. Each had different emotional
symptoms: 'if it [unnatural melancholy] rise from [overheated] natural
melancholy, [it] frames monstrous terrors of feare and heaviness without
cause, ... if it rise of choler, then rage playeth her part, and furie joyned
with madness, ... if blood supplies it, jest prevailes.'108
These melancholic humours cause melancholy, the doctors believed,
because they are black and darken the mind, half metaphorically and half
literary. Bright wrote that when the animal spirits was stained by the
melancholic humour:
that natural and internal light is darkened, their fancies arise vayne,
false, and voide of ground: even as in the external sensible
darkness, a false illusion will appeare unto our imagination, which
the light being brought in is discerned to be an abuse of fancie.109
Two levels of logic are fused here: one is the level of metaphor of the light
of reason and of melancholy darkening it into madness, and the other is
the level of the physical purity and transparency of the spirits and the
108. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie, p.111. See also Bruele, Praxis
Medicinae, p.103. As for the plurality of the meaning of 'melancholy,' see
Jean Céard, 'Folie et demonologie au XVIe siècle,' in Folie et déraison a
la Renaissance, ed. by Gerlo, 129-48. See also Stanley Jackson,
Melancholia and Depression, pp.7-11.
109. Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie, p.103.
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blackness of the melancholic humour."° The logic is that because the
melancholic humour is dark, it darkens the light of reason and makes the
mind mad.
This contrast of light and darkness was, therefore, at the pivot of
the Renaissance and Neo-classical medical discourse on madness.111
Rivière expressed a similar idea that the animal spirits need to be pure,
thin, and clear 'for the perfect performance of the actions of the brain,'
and when a melancholic humour, 'being possessed with thickness, darkness,
and blackness' infects the spirits and 'makes them cloudy and dark,' the
contaminated spirits infect the image one makes, 'as a colored glass doth
represent the species of the object to the eye with its own tincture.'
Laurens wrote that melancholy-infected spirits troubles the powers of the
soul principally by damaging the imagination, 'presenting unto it
continually blacke formes and strange visions."12
b) Madness in the new Cartesian epistemology
On one level, the late seventeenth-century writers had the same
scheme to explain the madness as that of the early part of the century: the
disordered animal spirits damaged the faculty of imagination and the false
images were created in the mind of the patients. The process was,
however, explained in a radically different way, and the impetus to the
recasting seems to have come from Descartes' new epistemology, which
exploded the Aristotelian one, under which the Renaissance and the Neo-
classical physicians had theorized.
110. As for the Renaissance mixture of the different level of discourse, see
Michel Foucault, The Order of ThJjig, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1974).
111. As for the basic scheme of argument by polarity in the early modern
period, see Clark, 'Inversion, Misrule and the Meaning of Witchcraft.'
112. Rivière, The Practice of Physick, p.49; Laurens, A Discourse, p.91.
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The key to the Aristotelian epistemology was the intentional species
residing in the object perceived. In short, the theory of intentional species
held that the idea which we have in our mind when we perceive something
external resides in the object perceived. Pre-Cartesian medicine made use
of this theory: in Anthropologie Abstracted, for example, the author wrote
that 'the objects are endowed with sensible qualities and contain in them
the formality of sensibility.' Hence, the sensible objects are not 'restrained
only to the poverty and coarse operation of real and material, but are
enriched with the finer endowments of spiritual and intentional
qualities.'113
The Scholastic scheme of intentional species met radical criticisms
from 'modern' philosophers, including Descartes. In his Optics, Descartes
compared our perception of external things to a blind man touching things
with a rod in his hand. 114 This model says that nothing is transmitted
from the perceived body to the perceiving mind other than matter in
motion, and what triggers the idea in the mind is nothing but the
mechanical resistance of the seat of the soul to the motion transmitted
from the object to the nerves via our eyes. Hence, 'there is no need to
suppose ... that there is something in the objects which resembles the ideas
or sensations that we have of them." 5 What exists outside our mind is
extended matter in motion, totally void of anything that resembles the idea
of heat, colour, smell, etc., which takes place in our mind. Entering from
our sense organs, transmitted through nerves, and giving a mechanical
shock at the seat of the soul, only the matter in motion is necessary to
trigger our ideas.
Since the most immediate cause of our idea is the change at the
seat of the soul, mere mechanical shock is able to produce an idea in our
113. Anthropologie Abstracted, p.102.
114. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.1, pp.152-56.
115. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.1, p.153.
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mind even without the object corresponding to the idea. Descartes made
use of the example of seeing fire when struck on the eye:
people struck in the eye seem to see countless sparks and flashes
before them, even though they shut their eyes or are in a very dark
place: hence this sensation can be ascribed only to be the force of
the blow, which sets the optic nerve-fibres in motion as a bright
light would do."6
With no inherent species in the object perceived, the presence of the
object became unnecessary for us to have the idea of it.
Descartes went further to argue that the same process is taking
place in the mind of a madman and of a man who is dreaming:
madmen and those who are asleep often, see, or think they see,
various objects, which are nevertheless not before their eyes:
namely, certain vapours disturb their brain and arrange those of its
part normally engaged in vision exactly as they would be if these
objects were present."7
Here Descartes took up the old framework of madness as the disturbance
of the brain and the false vision, and radically recast the content: the false
idea of a madman was not due to the darkness of the animal spirits, but
to the motion in the brain which reproduces the false idea. A Renaissance
madman was in darkness and was deprived of the light of reason, with the
animal spirits darkened by melancholic humour. Descartes' madman was
dreaming, with the animal spirits giving shock to the seat of the soul and
raising corresponding ideas.
116. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.1, pp.167-68.
117. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol.1, p.172.
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c) Medical application of the new epistemology
Descartes' new mechanical epistemology was embraced by some
mid-century English philosophers, such as Hobbes and Boyle. 118 In
particular, Boyle adopted Descartes' theory of perception and illusion
caused by matter in motion in toto. In his Experiments and
Considerations Touching Colours, Boyle equated seeing fire, dreaming and
madness. 119 Given the popularity of the model, and Willis's familiarity
with the contemporary natural philosophical writings, there is little surprise
in that Descartes' new model of perception and illusion found its way into
Willis's medical formulation of the problem of sense perception and
madness.
In his Sedleian lectures, Willis elaborated speculation on the
process by which the motion of the animal spirits, like the billiard-balls
transmitting the shock, cause our sensation, perception, and
imagination. 120 The shock-transmission model was very much elaborated
with anatomical details in his Cerebri Anatome: when the shock on the
exterior part of the soul was transmitted to the 'chambered bodies' of the
brain, 'as an undulation or waving of waters,' perception took place; the
imagination is due to this impression reaching the callous body, and the
memory is made when 'the same fluctuation of spirits is struck against the
cortex of the brain."2'
118. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C.B. MacPherson
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p.86; Robert Boyle, Selected
Philosophical Papers of Robert Bo yle, ed. by M.A. Stewart (Manchester:
Manchester U.P., 1979), xv.
119. Robert Boyle, Robert Boyle on Natural Philosophy: an Essay with
Selections from His Writings, ed. by Marie Boas Hall (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1965), pp.255-56.
120. Willis, Oxford Lectures, pp.54 & 65-66.
121. Thomas Willis, The Anatomy of the Brain, in Dr Willis's Practice of
Physick, pp.78-9.
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Willis combined this model of the motion of the spirits making
images with chemico-corpuscular explanation to produce a new system of
pathology of mental diseases. He started to outline the system of chemical
exploration of the animal spirits in mental disorders in his Sedleian
lectures, which developed into an elaborate, if fanciful, system in De
Anima Brutorum. 122 The classical trio of phrensy, melancholia, and
mania were attributed to the changes in the chemical nature of the animal
spirits, which must be of the nature of volatile salt when healthy. When
the spirits contain too much sulphur, they will excite phrensy. If they come
to have the nature of vinegar, they will cause melancholy. The animal
spirits having acquired the nature of nitrous stygian water will cause mania.
Willis underpinned this statement by correlating the motion of the
chemically transformed animal spirits and the mental symptoms of the
mental diseases. Let us take his explanation of melancholy, for example.
Willis stated the three major symptoms of melancholy are:
1. That the distemper'd are almost continually busied in thinking,
that their phantasie is scarce ever idle or at quiet. 2. In their
thinking they comprehend in their mind fewer things that before
they were wont, that oftentimes they roll about in their mind day
and night the same thing, never thinking of other things that are
sometimes of far greater moment. 3. The ideas of objects or
conceptions appear often deformed, and like hobgoblins, but are
still represented in a larger kind or form; so that all small things
seem to them great and difficult.'23
Willis tried to correlate the three symptoms of the melancholic mind with
the motion of the vinegar-like animal spirits, by relying on the shock-
122. Willis, Oxford Lectures, pp.119-34.
123. Willis, Two Discourses, p.188.
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transmission model of our image-making as the basic assumption. From
the observation of the vinegar, Willis drew three characteristics of the
motion of the acid nervous juice, each corresponding to one of the three
symptoms of melancholy.
First, the particles in the vinegar-like animal spirits 'creep about
here and there, slowly, but incessantly.' 124 This is why the mind of the
melancholiacs is incessantly engaged in thinking, as whenever the spirits
open a certain pore in the brain, there takes place a corresponding idea.
Secondly, as the effluvia from vinegar 'do not go far ... but penetrate only
the neighbouring bodies,' so the acid animal spirits 'do not irradiate and
quickly pass thorow the whole compass of the brain, as before, but flowing
in the middle part, are carried with its force only into the nearest pores
'125	 .and passages. This is why the melancholic mind can think about only
few things and is always engaged in the same idea. Thirdly, the acid
animal spirits can 'cut out pores and passages that are new' in the same
manner as the spirits of vinegar make the cork friable and crumbling, and
'many bands of spirits are thrust together.' The opening of unnatural
pores and the unnatural accumulation of the spirits make the mind think
of extraordinary things and misunderstand a small object as 'very great and
of notable weight.'126
The intention of Willis's chemical analogy of the melancholic and
acid animal spirits was to correlate their specific types of motion in the
brain with the mode of producing images in the mind. Phrensy, mania and
stupidity were provided with the linkage of the two Cartesian categories
of phenomena--matter in motion and the idea produced by the shock it
gives.' 27 As we have seen, the origin of the departure from the
124. Willis, Two Discourses, p.190.
125. Willis, Two Discourses, p.190
126. Willis, Two Discourses, p.190.
127. Willis, Two Discourses, p.182.
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dichotomy of light and darkness to new model of madness as an illusion
caused by matter in wrong motion was in Descartes', Hobbes's and Boyle's
philosophical writings about the qualities and our perception of them.
And Willis was not an isolated figure in adopting the new epistemology:
Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742) was another to embrace the Cartesian
model of perception and madness, probably Wi11is.' And a lot of
early eighteenth-century medical writers jumped on the new bandwagon,
as I shall show later.
The shift at Oxford from humour-based to mechanical and
corpuscular medicine did not involve total changes in fundamental schemes
of the technical medical discourse on madness. Diagnostic categories, the
pivotal role of the animal spirits both in etiology and therapy, intactness
of the rational and immaterial soul, and the imagination as the principally
damaged faculty were all found in medicine both before and after
Descartes. Willis's research programme of the physiology and pathology
of the corporeal soul was very much a new language of Helmontian
chemistry and Gassendian atomism in old bottles.
I would like to argue that my 'continuity thesis' in the medical
theories of madness during the seventeenth century is consistent with,
rather than in conflict with, Michael MacDonald's assertion of the shift in
the culture of curing the mad during the seventeenth century. MacDonald
asserts convincingly that the decline of eclectic and diverse culture in
treating madness took place largely because of extra-intellectual factors
such as Puritan hostility towards magic and dominance of elite and learned
culture over popular one, rather than because of the shifts in the medial
theory itself. My examination above confirmed MacDonald's assertion: the
basic tenets of the elite medical discourse remained very much the same
during the century.
128. Hoffmann, Fundamenta Medicinae, p.71.
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There was, however, the major shift of recasting madness according
to the new mechanical epistemology during the century. The implication
of the new model was that the right perception of the world resembled
madman's illusion, for both are the product of the matter in motion, rather
than the direct influx of the idea residing in the object perceived. Denied
direct access to the external world, both sane and insane mind were
enclosed within the veil of representational ideas.
In the light of this new model of madness, Foucault's argument that
Descartes and the eighteenth century purged the possibility of being mad
from thinking ego seems to need revision. In his Histoire de la folie,
Foucault claimed that Descartes put dreams and madness in ontologically
different categories and did not admit the possibility of his being mad,
whereas the possibility of his dreaming was examined and eventually
denied. For Foucault, this attitude of Descartes meant that Western
reason in 'l'áge classique' purged itself of the threat of madness in a priori
way: Renaissance anxiety over the mixture of reason and madness had
gone and the reason in late seventeenth and early and mid-eighteenth
century assumed an essential gap between itself and madness from the
beginning.129
First, at the most superficial level, Foucault is simply wrong in his
attempt to attribute to Descartes the fundamental difference between
madness and dreaming. Rather, Descartes established a close parallelism
of madness and dreaming, and doctors followed him: Hoffmann wrote,
'deliria are the dreams of the waking.' 13° Secondly, and more
importantly, I would like to argue that Cartesian philosophy minimized the
gap between right perception and madness, rather than created the
bottomless abyss between them, as Foucault wanted us to believe. One
has to remember that Descartes made use of the example of madness to
convince the reader of the validity of his new mechanistic model of right
129. Foucault, Histoire de Ia folie, pp.56-59.
130. Hoffmann, Fundamenta Medicinae, p.71.
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sense perception. There mad illusion was something comparable to our
right perception of the external world, and our perception resembles
madman's illusion in its causation. Madness, the perception of things
those which do not exist, provided an important prop for the new
epistemology which tried to do without species residing in the object, and
according to Berkeley's version, even without the external world itself.
Madness became, therefore, an integral part of Descartes' and other
eighteenth-century philosophers' epistemology. The threat of madness was
still there, or, in other words, it was no longer a threat to but a replica of
our normal and normative mental activity.
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Chapter Two
Soul Lost—and Regained?: British latro-Mathematicians 1690-1720
Introduction
a) A new scientific group: Pitcairn and his followers
From around 1690 to 1720, a newly formed scientific group was
active in the English and Scottish medical scene. This group had a distinct
identity: it embraced an extremely idiosyncratic research programme;
proposed sweeping reforms in medical theory and practice; and launched
vigorous attacks against other medical 'schools.' Although it was in many
senses an offshoot of mid- and late-seventeenth-century English natural
philosophy, it turned out to be a formidable critic of the schools which
flourished during the Interregnum and Restoration. Thomas Sydenham's
(1624-89) Baconian bedside medicine; van Helmont's chemical animistic
medicine; and Willis's elaborate system of the corporeal soul: all were
scornfully dismissed by the supporters of this new research programme.
The pivotal figure of this group was Archibald Pitcairn (1652-1713),
shortly to become professor of physic at Leiden and later on at Edinburgh.
Pitcairn recast the Italian iatro-mechanism of Giovanni Alphonso Borelli
(1608-78) and Lorenzo Bellini (1643-1704). He initiated many English and
Scottish medical students into his 'mathematical physic' at Leiden and
Edinburgh, and later lent his patronage to some of his Scottish students
who were trying to build a scientific reputation in London. 1 He developed
1. A good modern biography of Pitcairn is still wanting. Useful materials
include: DNB; DSB; Charles Webster, An Account of the Life and
Writings of the Celebrated Dr Archibald Pitcairne (Edinburgh: Gordon
and Murray, 1781); Anita Guerrini, 'Archibald Pitcairne and Newtonian
Medicine,' Med.Hist., 1987, 31: 70-83; The Best of Our Own: Letters of
Archibald Pitcairn 1652-1713, collected and annotated by W.J.Johnston
(Edinburgh: Saorsa Books, 1979); G. A. Lindeboom, 'Pitcairne's Leyden
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in Edinburgh in the 1690s such a close association with George Hepburn
(1670?-1759), Jacobus Johnstone (fl.1700), and George Cheyne (1671-
1743), (all formerly students of his at Leiden), that one of their opponents
used the phrase 'Dr. P. and his club.' 2 In addition to this 'club,' one can
find around Pitcairn many prominent medical writers of the day, active in
London and Oxford, as well as Edinburgh. These include Richard Mead
(1673-1754), William Cockburn (1669-1739), James Keill (1673-1719), John
Quincy (d.1722), and John Freind, (1675-1728). Besides sharing some
scientific concerns, they were connected with each other by religious,
political and regional ties. As Anita Guerrini has shown, the major
members were 'Episcopalian, High Church, anti-Whig (Tory or Jacobite)
Scots.'4
Since this group was strongly associated with Borelli and Bellini and
claimed that the human body is a machine, they have sometimes been
labelled 'iatro-mechanist' by historians. 5 As has been pointed out by
Interlude Described from the Documents,' Ann.Sci., 1963, 19: 273-84;
Anita Guerrini, 'The Tory Newtonians: Gregory, Pitcairne, and Their
Circle,' Journal of British Studies, 1986, 25: 288-3 11.
2. [Charles Oliphant?], A Refutation of the Short Answer to the
Examination of Dr. Pitcairn's Dissertations (Edinburgh: n.p., 1702), p.16.
3. For biographical information about these figures, see DSB; DNB;
Matthew Maty, Authentic Memoirs of the Life of Richard Mead (London:
J. Whiston et al., 1755); Richard H. Meade, In the Sunshine of Life: a
Biography of Dr. Richard Mead 1673-1754 (Philadelphia: Dorrance &
Company, 1974); Arnold Zuckerman, 'Dr. Richard Mead (1673-1754),'
University of Illinois, Ph.D., 1965; Roy Porter, 'Introduction' to George
Cheyne, The English Malady (London,1733; rept., London:
Tavistock/Routledge, 1991); F. Valdez and C.D. O'Malley, 'James Keill of
Northampton, Physician, Anatomist, and Physiologist,' Med.Hist., 1971, 15:
317-35; Guerrini, 'The Tory Newtonians'; R.W.Innes Smith, English-
Speaking Students of Medicine at the University of Leiden (Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd, 1932).
4. Guerrini, 'Tory Newtonians.'
5. See, for instance, Lester King, The Philosophy of Medicine: the Early
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1978), Chap.5
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Theodore Brown, however, their program of reforming medical theory and
practice was of a very different nature from the late seventeenth-century
medicine which developed under the influence of the mechanical
philosophy of Descartes or Gassendi. 6 Indeed, Cartesian physiology and
the theory of Willis, the most influential Gassendian medical theorist, were
lambasted by Pitcairn. 7 It was not mechanical philosophy but
mathematics which provided the model upon which the members of this
school moulded their medicine.8 Their enemies, too, perceived the
medicine of the group as 'mathematical' rather than 'mechanical': Pitcairn
was depicted in a satirical pamphlet as Apollo Mathematicus, and later
Albrecht von HaIler (1708-77) wrote 'Archibaldus Pitcairne dictus est inter
physiologos iatro-mathematicus.' 9 Although it is sometimes fruitless to
classify historical figures into 'isms,' it appears that the group may be more
properly called the 'iatro-mathematical' school.
This scientific group had not been an object of serious historical
study until Theodore Brown, in his thesis in 1968, put it into an well-
'iatromechanism'.
6. Theodore M. Brown, 'The Mechanical Philosophy and the "Animal
Oeconomy": a Study in the Development of English Physiology in the
Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century,' Princeton University, Ph.D.,
1968, Chaps. 4 and 5.
7. For general criticisms against Cartesians and Willisians, see, for
instance, Archibald Pitcairn, The Works, Wherein Are Discovered the
True Foundation and Principles of the Physick (London: E. Curl!, 1715),
p.9 and pp.34-3'7; idem, The Philosophical and Mathematical Elements of
Physick in Two Books (London: A. Bell, 1718), vi.
8. Richard Mead, A Mechanical Account of Poisons (London: R. Smith,
1702), 'Preface,' which says 'introducing mathematical studies.., into
medicine ... is so much moment to the welfare of mankind'; George
Cheyne, A New Theory of Acute and Slow Continu'd Fevers, 2nd ed.
(London: G. Strahan, 1702), p.27, where Cheyne stated 'we want a
Principia Medicinae Theoreticae Mathematicae.'
9. Edward Eizat, Apollo Mathematicus: or the Art of Curing Diseases by
the Mathematics According to the Principles of Dr. Pitcairn ([London]:
n.p., 1695); Webster, Dr. Archibald Pitcairne, p.26.
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articulated context of mechanical philosophy from Harvey up to the mid-
eighteenth century. He singled out Pitcairn's 'mathematical physic' as a
radical departure from the older versions of mechanical physiological
theories and depicted the acceptance of a Pitcairnian research program by
the Royal Society of London and, more reluctantly, by the Royal College
of Physicians.'° While such late seventeenth-century Oxford physiologists
like Thomas Willis, Walter Charleton, and William Cole, had tried to
underpin medical theory and practice by largely 'hypothetical' corpuscular
philosophy, Pitcairn followed the example of Isaac Newton (1642-1727),
the new hero in the British scientific scene, and aimed at providing
medicine with the more solid foundation of mathematics. 11 Just as
Newton wrote Principia (1687) to give a mathematical description of the
macrocosm, so Pitcairn and his disciples looked at the microcosm of the
human body in terms of the laws of motion, which were to be described
in the language of mathematics.
The influence of Newton's ideas upon Pitcairn's circle has been also
studied from the viewpoint of the history of matter-theory. Arnold
Thackray's Atoms and Powers and Robert Schofield's Mechanism and
Materialism, both published in 1970, argued that Newtonian matter theory
(short-range attraction or subtle elastic fluid with attractive force) played
a critical role in the medical writings of Keill, Freind, Mead and others.12
More recently, Anita Guerrini has published a series of detailed papers
10. Brown, 'The Mechanical Philosophy and the "Animal Oeconomy,";
idem, 'Medicine in the Shadow of the Principia,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1987, 41:
629-48.
11. For a more contextualized view of the background of Willis and others,
see Robert G. Frank, Harvey and Oxford Ph ysiologists (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980).
12. Arnold Thackray, Atoms and Powers: an Essay on Newtonian Matter-
Theory and the Development of Chemistry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
U.P., 1970), pp.43-85; Robert E. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism:
British Natural Philosophy in an Age of Reason (Princeton: Princeton
U.P., 1970), pp.40-72.
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about Pitcairn's circle, arguing along the same lines as Thackray and
Schofield and investigating the shifts in their physiological theories in
accordance with Newton's alterations in successive editions of Principia
and Optics. Guerrini has also shown that Newton not only provided an
intellectual impetus, but also acted as a direct and indirect patron.'3
b) The problems: psychiatry without mind
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the writings of the iatro-
mathematicians led by Pitcairn, and investigate their ideas on the
soul/mind and its disorders. Since their radical reformulation of the whole
domain of medicine included a thorough recasting of the medical problem
of the soul/mind, we have to start from rather fundamental issues. Instead
of asking how they understood the soul/mind and its diseases, we have to
raise the question of whether or not 'mind' represented the object of their
study, and whether they considered madness to be a 'mental' disease. The
short answer to these questions is negative. Although the iatro-
mathematicians still wrote about mania and melancholia, and admitted
that man has a soul, there was hardly any space for the soul/mind in their
newly constructed medical discourse and accordingly their notions on
madness did not encompass any 'mental' issues.
Pitcairn's expulsion of the soul/mind from the scope of medical
inquiry was largely the consequence of his adopting mathematics as the
model of medicine, a practice which was eagerly followed by his disciples.
Their 'mathematical physic' not only meant quantifying medicine and
stuffing their publications with ostentatious numerical formulae and apish
adoption of the ideas of Newton: it also involved a radical recasting of the
13. Guerrini, 'Archibald Pitcairne'; idem, 'Tory Newtonians'; idem, 'Isaac
Newton, George Cheyne and the Principia Medicinae,' in The Medical
Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, eds. by Roger French and Andrew
Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989), 222-45; idem, 'James Keill,
George Cheyne, and Newtonian Physiology, 1690-1740,' Jour.Hist.Bio.,
1985, 18: 247-66.
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sphere of medical knowledge by a deliberate restriction on the way this
knowledge is obtained. This was motivated by both intellectual and
political concerns. Pitcairn tried to redefine the scope of medical
discourse, partly in order to determine proper objects of the discourse and
get rid of improper ones, and partly to specify the field in which the
'mathematical physic' was to take place. His expulsion of mental issues
was part of his ambitious and thorough reform of medical discourse.
In the following sections I shall look at this attempt to create a
medicine without the soul, in which the discourse on madness excluded any
mental issues. The first section will examine what Pitcairn and his
followers aimed to achieve by restricting the scope of their medical
discourse, and why they came to embrace that rather peculiar research
programme. I will look at both the intellectual background to their
mathematical physic, and their social concern of their 'mathematical
physic' will be looked at. I will argue that the impetus for their attempt
came not solely from Newton: the epistemology and scientific methodology
put forth by late seventeenth-century English writers like Robert Boyle and
John Locke played an important part in the formulation of their tactics, as
well as their desire to combat medical 'empirics' and to differentiate
themselves from quacks.
The second section is concerned with their exclusion of the
soul/mind from the realm of medical knowledge, and their assertion that
'pure body' is the only proper object of medical inquiry. The similarities
and differences between their research programme and 'dualistic,'
especially Cartesian, programmes will be assessed. Although their
systematic expulsion of psychic issues was unique, I will argue that they
were, in a sense, expressing what was then in the air: unlike Charleton and
Willis, many British medical writers around 1690-1720 were reluctant to
talk about the soul, and the iatro-mathematicians seem to have focussed
the attitude.
The third section will examine their recasting of 'mental' disorders
like mania and melancholia. The major source I have consulted for this
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section is Richard Mead's account of the physical effects of tarantula bites
and of rabies. I will show how Mead and others adapted the clinical
observations on madness to their mathematical and purely bodily medicine,
and managed to explain madness with almost no recourse to mental issues.
'Mathematical Physic': In Quest of Certainty
a) Medicine free from 'philosophical sects'
Pitcairn was very innovative right from the beginning of his teaching
career. In his inaugural lecture at Leiden in 1692, he announced that his
principal and ultimate goal was to establish firm and stable principles on
which medical theory and practice should be based. To achieve this aim,
Pitcairn wrote, it is necessary to get rid of speculative 'philosophical sects'
from medicine: 'let the infamous mark of uncertainty, ... be at last wiped
off, and removed from our profession.' And the audience seems to have
appreciated his point and welcomed it.14
The key word of his reform in medicine was 'certainty.' Terms like
'solid principles,' 'certain foundation of medicine,' 'infallible ground,' etc.
were often used to describe his attempt, both by his friends and foes.
George Sewell (d. 1726) and J.T. Desaguliers (1683-1744), the English
translators of Pitcairn's medical works, wrote that Pitcairn introduced into
medicine 'a more solid way of reasoning,' and his Leiden lectures 'lay more
certain and infallible fundamentals of the most comprehensive art [of
14. 'An Oration proving the profession of physic free from the tyranny of
any sect of philosophers' in Archibald Pitcairn, The Whole Works of Dr.
Archibald Pitcairn, 2nd ed., trans. by George Sewell and J.T. Desaguliers
(London: E. Curll et al., 1727), pp.5-22. The quote is from p.17. As for
the background of the lecture, see Lindeboom, 'Pitcairne's Leiden
Interlude.'
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physic].' 15 In his Apollo Mathematicus, Edward Eizat included a chapter
entitled 'A discourse of certainty,' and attacked Pitcairn's abuse of the idea
of certainty in medicine.'6
This Pitcairn's concern to provide medicine with certain and firm
foundations was shared by some slightly later medical theorists on the
Continent, some of whom may have been inspired by Pitcairn's attempt.
Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742) wished to delineate the infallible basic
ground in Fundamenta Medicinae (1695): 'As with every sort of discipline
the medical art should have its firm basic principle and steadfast maxims.'
Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738), one of Pitcairn's students at Leiden and
was the most eminent Professor of medicine there, began his Institutiones
Medicae (1709) with almost the same claim as Hoffmann's: 'as it is in
other sciences, we ought to make our principles or fundamentals certain
and plain demonstrations.' 17 After years of upheavals and bitter sectarian
struggles in medicine, medical theorists at the turn of the century seem to
have become aware of the need to build a certain and irrefutable basis for
medical knowledge and to achieve universal consent. These are the goals
which Descartes tried to achieve in philosophy.
Pitcairn's attempt to establish the unshakable basis of medicine was,
however, diametrically opposite to the Cartesian enterprise. Indeed,
15. Pitcairn, The Works, vii; idem, The Whole Works, 'Translators'
Preface.'
16. Eizat, Apollo Mathematicus, 'A Discourse of Certainty,' pp.1-25.
Almost nothing is known about the author.
17. Friedrich Hoffmann, Fundamenta Medicinae, trans. and intro, by
Lester S. King, (London: MacDonald, 1971), p.3. Herman Boerhaave,
Institutions in Physick, trans. by Joseph Browne (London: Jonah Browne,
1714), xii. As for the social and intellectual background of Boerhaave's
quest for 'fundamentals,' see Lester King, The Background of Hermn
Boerhaave's Doctrines (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1965); Andrew
Cunningham, 'Medicine to Calm the Mind: Boerhaave's Medical System
and Why It Was Adopted in Edinburgh,' in The Medical Enlightenment
of the Eighteenth Century, eds. by Andrew Cunningham and Roger French
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1990), 40-66.
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Descartes was one of Pitcairn's targets of criticism. As the title of his
inaugural lecture shows, Pitcairn stated that to achieve certainty it was
necessary to get rid of all speculative hypotheses of 'philosophical sects'
from medicine, and in the 'philosophical sects' he included not only
Aristotelian, Willisian and Helmontian, but also Cartesian. Cartesian
'subtile matter,' as well as the Aristotelian 'fear of vacuum' and Willisian
and Helmontian 'fermentation,' were all speculative 'occult qualities' and
stained by the 'infamous mark of uncertainty.' 18 Basing medical theory
on such notions would only do harm and be 'of no service to a
physician." 9 For Pitcairn, Cartesian mechanical philosophy was no more
certain than Aristotelian and chemical ones, and medicine should do
without any of them.
In his hostility towards 'philosophical sects' and their 'occult
qualities,' Pitcairn shows a striking similarity with the major English
advocates of the 'new science' in the late seventeenth century. The
supporters of the Baconian research programme who flocked into the
Royal Society of London thought that knowledge about the natural world
should be freed from the preoccupations of speculative philosophical
schools (idola theatri), and that this could be done by replacing
philosophical doctrines based on occult qualities with mechanical principles
based on observation and experiment. These would achieve universal
assent.2°	 In his Sceptical Ch ymist (1661), Robert Boyle attacked
18. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.14 & 17.
19. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, p.10.
20. Some relevant primary and secondary materials are: Marie Boas Hall,
Robert Boyle on Natural Philosophy: an Essay with Selections from His
Writings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), esp. p.58; Thomas
Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (London: J. Martyn,
1667); P.B. Wood, 'Methodology and Apologetic: Thomas Sprat's History
of the Royal Society,' Brit.Jour.Hist.Sci., 1980, 13: 1-26; Peter Dear, 'Totius
in Verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society,' Isis, 1985,
76: 145-61; Steven Shapin, 'Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle's
Literary Technology,' Social Stud y
 of Science, 1984, 14: 481-520. However,
K.T. Hoppen, 'The Nature of the Early Royal Society,' Brit.Jour.Hist.Sci.,
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Aristotelian and Paracelsian doctrines as not being well founded and
lacking in certainty. Boyle made a similar criticism of the Hobbesian
version of Epicurean atomism in his Some Considerations touching the
Usefulness of Experimental Philosophy (1663-71), and Joseph Glanvill,
another spokesman of the Royal Society, rejected philosophical
speculations in his Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661).21
Pitcairn was surely well aware of what was going on in London's
scientific community, for Edinburgh in the 1680's saw a vigorous infusion
of scientific culture and the establishment of scientific communities
modelled mainly after the Royal Society of London. 22 Pitcairn was one
of the members of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh when it
was founded in 1681 and was well acquainted with some of the key figures
of the early Scottish Enlightenment, such as David Gregory (1661-1708)
and Sir Robert Sibbald (164 1-1722). Pitcairn's attempt to reform medicine
by getting rid of philosophical speculations, which is best exemplified in his
Leiden inaugural lecture, was a product of the early Scottish
Enlightenment, which was itself a descendant of the English scientific
milieu, as embodied in the Royal Society.
b) Limit on the scope of medical knowledge
1976, 9: 1-24 & 243-73, argues that the occult qualities still played an
important role in the writings of minor fellows.
21. Boyle's and Glanvill's hostility to ill-founded philosophical opinions is
neatly discussed in Henry G. van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in
English Thought 1630-1690 (Hague: Martirius Nijhoff, 1963), pp.71-89.
22. John Christie, 'The Origin and Development of the Scottish Scientific
Community, 1680-1760,' Hist.Sci., 1974, 12: 122-41; Roger L. Emerson,
'Science and the Origins and Concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment,'
Hist.Sci., 1988, 26: 333-66; idem, 'Sir Robert Sibbald, Kt, the Royal Society
of Scotland and the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment,' Ann.Sci., 1988,
45: 4 1-72.
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Pitcairn's debt to late seventeenth-century English natural
philosophy becomes clearer if one looks at the rationale of his attempt to
do without any philosophical school. His logic of reform in medicine was
construed along the line of the epistemology and scientific methodology of
the proponents of the Royal Society, which was later embodied into John
Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). His concern for
certainty in medicine also had its origin there.
In brief, the proponents of the Royal Society were keen to establish
the limit of human knowledge; to distinguish certain knowledge from
probable and dubious opinion; and to adapt their scientific study of the
natural world to the compass of the human mind: 'before we set our selves
upon enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own
abilities, and see, what objects our understandings were, or were not fitted
to deal with.' 23 They largely agreed that with the exception of
mathematics, which gives absolute certainty, immediate sensory knowledge
could achieve the highest probability and therefore should form the most
reliable basis of our knowledge of natural world. 24 Accordingly, they
were often reluctant to trespass across the boundary between what is given
directly to the senses and what is not, and they wanted to do without
dubious opinion about the 'hidden' nature of things. 25 A student of
23. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P.H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.7. See John Yolton, Locke
and the Compass of Human Uncle rstanding (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.,
1970), chaps 2 & 3.
24. The problem of the certain and probable knowledge has been
discussed in Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty; Barbara J. Shapiro,
Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton:
Princeton U.P., 1983).
25. See, for instance, Locke, Essay, 4.3. Although one is tempted to say
that Pitcairn imbibed Lockean agnosticism about the nature of things ii
the first edition of Newton's Principia (1687), Lockean epistemology had
not become evident in Newton's writings until the second edition of
Principia (1713), to which Newton added Regulae Philosophandi. The
correspondence between Locke and Newton in 1690-1692 was mainly
concerned with their biblical study, not epistemology. See H.W.Turnbill
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natural philosophy should, therefore, abandon or minimize speculation
about the hidden nature of things and should concentrate on their
'qualities' and 'powers,' which were directly given to senses. Robert Boyle
wrote in his Origin of Forms and Oualities according to the Corpuscular
Philosophy (1666):
For the knowledge we have of the bodies without us, being, for the
most part, fetched from the informations the mind receives by the
senses, we scarce know anything else in bodies, upon whose account
they can work upon our senses, save their qualities.26
Given that human knowledge about the natural world was drawn from
sense experience, direct sense information should be given priority over
philosophical speculations about the hidden nature of things.27
Although Pitcairn did not make any reference to the source of his
ideas about the epistemological restriction on the study of medicine, it is
obvious that he owed a lot to what was claimed by the English proponents
of the methodology of new science and the philosophical justification of it.
Applying the argument on certainty and probability, Pitcairn maintained
that an infallible principle of medicine is possible only by adjusting the
limit of medical discourse to the sensory boundaries of human knowledge:
'nothing ought to be used as a principle in physic, which is not as certain
ed. The Correspondence of Isaac Newton vol.3 (Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 1961), pp.71, 79, 82, 129-49. The influence of Lockean epistemology
upon Newton's later methodological argument (H ypotheses non fingo) is
discussed in G.A. Rogers, 'The System of Locke and Newton,' in
Contempora Newtonian Research, ed. by Zev Bechler (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1982), 215-38.
26. Boyle, The Origin of Forms and Qualities ... (1666), in Selected
Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle, ed. and intro, by M.A. Stewart
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979), p.13.
27. Glanvill expressed a similar concern. See Leeuwen, The Problem of
Certainty, p.77.
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as the object of our senses.' 28 And the following passage from his Leiden
inaugural lecture reads like Boyle's epistemological justification of
experimental philosophy:
It is evident to any one who has been a little more than ordinary
conversant in the mathematics, or the practice of physic, that our
knowledge of things is confined to the relations they bear to one
another, the laws and their properties or powers. ... a physical
cause, and the nature of things which the philosophers so much
enquire about, is that unknown something in things from whence
they will have all its powers and properties derived.29
This passages inplies that it is necessary to get rid of speculations of
'philosophical sects,' because the human mind can never penetrate into
such 'physical causes, and the nature of things' with certainty, but is
restricted in knowing their operations, 'powers and relations.' Since any
doctrine about the hidden causes of phenomena was beyond the direct
access of the human mind, a solid basis for medicine could be established
only by discarding all doctrines about the 'hidden' nature of things.3°
Only those investigation of the operations of things which could be
confirmed by 'the evidence of senses' would serve as a certain basis of
medicine. This viewpoint is clearly a product of late seventeenth-century
English epistemology and scientific methodology as propagated by Boyle,
Locke and Newton.3'
28. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, p.14.
29. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.9-10. This aspect of Pitcairn's was paid
due attention first in Lester King, The Philosophy of Medicine, pp.112-i4.
30. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, p.17.
31. For Locke's epistemology and Newton's methodology, see G.A. Rogers,
'The System of Locke and Newton'; idem, 'Locke's Essay and Newton's
Principia,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1978, 39: 217-232.
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Pitcairn's debt to the milieu of English natural philosophy is
rendered the more evident when he is compared with Hoffmann, a
medical theorist who also tried to provide medicine with an infallible basis
but went in the opposite direction. Following the Cartesian model of
reforming natural philosophy, Hoffmann thought Descartes' mechanical
philosophy was the solution to the present chaotic struggle of medical
sects, rather than the cause of it. Hoffmann wrote 'without natural
philosophy the whole science of healing is maimed and weak,' and 'the
origin of sects must be attributed to ignorance [my emphasis] of natural
philosophy.' Cartesian natural philosophy would help medicine as it 'peers
into the recesses of nature, examines the hidden structures, proportion, and
mixtures.' 32 As we have seen, Pitcairn dismissed these aims as fanciful
and essentially impossible. It seems justifiable to paint Hoffmann's reform
as a product of Cartesian enterprise and Pitcairn's as a product of Lockean
empiricism.
Pitcairn's English and empirical scientific methodology appealed to
many. James Keill rejected Descartes' philosophy on the hidden nature of
things because it was not certain hut 'merely possible.' If one follows
Cartesian philosophy, Keill warned, the only result is an uncertain
medicine:
Most theories of diseases are built upon such [dubious] principles,
and therefore we never can have any certainty, or indeed so much
as a degree of probability, that the indications drawn from them are
right.33
32. Hoffmann, Fundamenta Medicinae, pp.1-2.
33. James Keill, Essays on Several Parts of the Animal Oeconom y, 2nd ed.,
(London: G. Strahan, 1717), xx. As for detailed analysis of the shift in
Keill's matter theory, see Guerrini, 'James Keill, George Cheyne, and
Newtonian Physiology.'
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John Quincy justified his limiting medical knowledge within the 'properties'
of things, by a long argument on the various degrees of certainty (which
resembles Glanvill's argument) and by citing Locke's arguments on
qualities and the human mindY' Any search after hidden causes of
phenomena was scornfully dismissed. In one of his bitter controversial
pamphlets with Charles Oliphant over Pitcairn's tract on fever, Jacobus
Johnstone wrote that 'Mr. Newton has taught us, that no man ever knew
a physical cause, neither will you find any mention of a final cause in this
dissertation of Dr. P's.' 35 William Cockburn wrote that it was only
'quacks and mountebanks' who claimed to have knowledge about 'these
first qualities, or physical causes.' 36 The supporters of Pitcairn's reform
in medicine all agreed that certain medicine must be achieved only by the
sacrifice of any discourse on hidden causes, which are not certainly known
by human mind.
Quite understandably, Willis's highly speculative research
programme of the hidden chemical principles and the intangible corporeal
soul was attacked by Pitcairn and his disciples. Pitcairn wrote that Willis'
books were 'full of nothing but old notions disguised under new forms' and
the English translators of Pitcairn's work turned a scornful shoulder by
writing that Charleton and Willis 'have only abused us with new words,
without any ideas, and which have no relation to the animal oeconomy.'37
34. John Quincy, 'An introduction concerning mechanical knowledge, and
the grounds of certainty in physick,' in Medicina Statica: Being the
Aphorisms of Sanctorius Translated into English with Large Explanations
Wherein Given a Mechanical Account of the Animal Oeconomy, ed. and
trans. by John Quincy (London: W. Newton, 1712), xxxvi-xlii.
35. J[acobus].J[ohnstone], A Short Answer to a Late Pamphlet against
Doctor Pitcairn's Dissertations (Edinburgh: Thomas Carruthers, 1702),
p.11. Attribution of the pamphlet to Johnstone is mine.
36. William Cockburn, The Present Uncertainty in the Knowledge of
Medicine (London: B. Barker, 1703), 'preface.'
37. Pitcairn, The Works, p.34; idem, The Philosophical and Mathematical
Elements, vi. The irony is that Charleton (and probably Willis too) was
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The rapid decline of Willis's chemico-atomistic medicine seems to have
been partly due to the fact that English medicine at the turn of the century
had the aim of achieving certainty: it tried to restrict the extent of medical
knowledge according to the limitations of the human mind and to
eliminate any discourse on hidden causes. As British medicine seems to
have entered a new phase of putting rigorous limits on the extent of
medical discourse, Willis's research programme was simply stamped out.
c) 'History' versus 'Demonstration': Politics of iatromathematics.
I have argued that the attempts by Pitcairn and his followers to
achieve certainty in medicine by basing medical principles on the senses
was a product of late-seventeenth-century English milieu. However, they
made an important departure from the argument on certain and probable
knowledge. Pitcairnians claimed that they could achieve the same extent
of certainty in the field of medicine as one could in mathematics and
geometry, while Locke and others thought one could not. Locke, for
example, drew a sharp distinction between mathematical and geometrical
demonstration and empirically based sciences in terms of their levels of
certainty:
I am apt to doubt that, how soever human industry may advance
useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scientifical
will be out of our reach ... Certainty and demonstration are things
we must not, in these matters, pretend to.
well acquainted with the argument about certainty and probability. See
Walter Charleton, The Immortality of the Human Soul. Demonstrated by
the Light of Nature (London: Henry Herringman, 1657), p.62.
38. Locke, Essay, 4.3.26. See Shapiro, Probability and Certainty; Leeuwen,
The Problem of Certainty.
88
It was largely agreed among late seventeenth-century English natural
philosophers that mathematics was, pace Descartes, an inappropriate
model for the study of natural world, for they belonged to different
categories of knowledge.
This raises the question of why and how Pitcairnians tried to
introduce mathematics into medicine and thus provide it with 'certainty,'
departing in this respect from the English tradition. Part of the answer
lies, as has been already pointed out, in the influence of Newton. 39 That
the iatro-mathematicians modelled their works after Newton's is obvious
from looking at their books: many of them adopted a Principia-like format
of geometrical demonstration and included numerous mathematical
formulae.4° Imitating Newton, they started from the high probability of
sensory data, reduced them to laws, and expressed the laws in the manner
of mathematical and geometrical demonstration: by doing this they hoped
to provide their work with an absolute certainty. Pitcairn explained how
to achieve hypothesis-free medical system, by following the example of
Newton's Principia:
The business of a physician is to weigh and consider the powers of
medicines and diseases as far as they are discoverable by their
operations, and to reduce them to Laws. ... Physicians ought to
propose the method of astronomers as a pattern for their imitation.
They never ... call in the assistance of a romantic hypothesis ... but
compute the powers and forces which bodies in motion observes
in their tendency to other bodies.41
39. See articles by Guerrini and Brown, cited above.
40. Some of the examples are: Cheyne, A New Theory of Fevers; Keill,
Essays on Several Parts of the Animal Oeconomy.
41. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.10-14. The term 'powers' was a
technical term in late seventeenth-century natural philosophy, which meant
a kind of quality of a body discoverable by its virtue to affect other bodies.
See for example, Boyle, Selected Philosophical Papers, pp.1-96; Locke,
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This passage states that physicians, like astronomers, should do three
things: refrain from basing their argument on speculations about the
'nature of things'; limit their concern to 'operations, powers, and forces'
discoverable by the senses; and establish laws about described in
mathematical terms. The last part, Pitcairn thought, would give his
medical system a certainty as absolute as that enjoyed by Newton's
Principia. Newton's achievement seems to have inspired Pitcairn to defy
the rigid barrier between certain mathematical knowledge and probable
sensual knowledge.42
Another reason why the iatro-mathematicians insisted on the
certainty of medicine was their struggle with another offshoot of
empiricism, namely 'empirical medicine,' as proposed by Thomas
Sydenham.43 Newton was used as a device to provide Pitcairn's
'mathematical physic' with superiority over Sydenham's research
programme, and the iatro-mathematicians made a severe assault on the
Sydenhamian idea that medical knowledge should be based on the mere
Essay, 2.21.
42. Pitcairn was not the only figure that tried to follow Newton and to
provide non-mathematical knowledge with the certainty of mathematics.
A lot of philosophers and theologians became optimistic about the
prospect of making philosophy and theology infallible. Locke, for example,
wrote, perhaps inspired by Newton, 'moral knowledge is as capable of real
certainty, as mathematicks.' (Essay, 4.4.7.) See Mordechai Feingold,
'Partnership in Glory: Newton and Locke through the Enlightenment and
beyond,' in Newton's Scientific and Philosophical Legacy, eds. by P.B.
Scheurer and 0. Debrock (Dordrecht: Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 1988),
291-308.
43. For Sydenham, see Kenneth Dewhurst, Dr. Thomas Svdenham (1624-
1689): His Life and Original Writings (London: The Weilcome Historical
Medical Library, 1966); Andrew Cunningham, 'Thomas Sydenham:
Epidemics, Experiment and the "Good Old Cause," in The Medical
Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, eds. by French and Wear, 164-90.
For Locke and Sydenham, Patrick Romanell, John Locke and Medicine:
a New Key to Locke (New York: Prometheus Books, 1984); Kenneth
Dewhurst, John Locke (1632-1704), Physician and Philosopher (London:
The Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1963).
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accumulation of empirical observations, without any theory. Their hostility
to empirical medicine was best expressed in the fever dispute of the 1690s
in Edinburgh, of which Andrew Cunningham has made a penetrating
account.' The pattern of 'Sydenham versus Newton' established there
can also be found elsewhere.
Pitcairn's hammer to crush the empirical medicine was, again, the
argument over certainty. In his lecture 'A Solution of the Problem
concerning Inventors,' he divided the whole of human knowledge into two
kinds: one is 'historical'; the other 'demonstrative.' The former could
enjoy only limited certainty, as it was confirmed only 'by the light of other
things,' i.e. 'upon the credit and ability of the reporter.' The latter, for
example, 'the whole is greater than the part,' was the superior one, as it
was 'demonstrated by its own evidence.'45 And the goal of medicine
should be the latter kind of knowledge, rather than Sydenhamian
'historical' knowledge. What matters was, Pitcairn maintained, whether a
piece of knowledge was demonstrated or not: 'There is no one who will
allow a geometrician to be the author of a theorem, which he has not
demonstrated.' 46 Pitcairn was not saying here that empirical medicine
was wrong, but saying that it lacked demonstration, the distinguishing sign
of real knowledge.
Pitcairn's followers adopted the same strategy of degrading the
medicine of the enemy as uncertain, and glorifying the medicine of their
own as demonstrated and infallible. Cockburn followed Pitcairn's
dichotomy of knowledge by dividing it into 'experimental' and 'sciental';
the example given for the former was 'such and such medicines are
44. Andrew Cunningham, 'Sydenham versus Newton: the Edinburgh Fever
Dispute of the 1690s between Andrew Brown and Archibald Pitcairne,'
Med.Hist., Supplement No.1, 1981: 71-98.
45. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.139-67. The original intention of this
work was to establish Harvey's priority in the discovery of the circulation
of blood.
46. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, p.156.
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recommended for, and are good or bad in particular diseases' and it was
'the lowest piece of knowledge that can be expected from physicians.' The
latter sort of knowledge would be achieved when the statement was
established in an demonstrative manner, which was, thought Cockburn, 'as
noble a piece of science as physick can be supposed to admit of.' John
Quincy also followed the same strategy as Pitcairn's and Cockburn's, and
made a tripartite distinction between 'historical' certainty, 'moral' certainty
and 'demonstration,' among which the last should be 'our only guide' in the
study of human body.47 Their message was crystal-clear: their own
mathematical physic was demonstrated and infallible; their enemy's
empirical medicine was merely a collection of hearsay and dubious. As
Richard Mead put it in a straightforward way, mathematical demonstration
in medicine was 'the distinguishing mark of a physician from a quack.'48
However, their attack against unlearned quacks seems also to have
embarrassed the learned physicians in Edinburgh, who had been their
former allies in the 1690s' Edinburgh fever dispute, and probably, the
physicians at the Royal College in London. The barely concealed message
of iatro-mathematicians was that the differentiating mark between quacks
and learned physicians was mathematics, rather than the knowledge of
classical medicine which had long been the raison d'être of learned
physicians.49 Pitcairn's message was that those who relied on classical
47. Cockburn, The Present Uncertainty of Medicine, p.2; Quincy,
Medicina Statica, xiv-xviii.
48. Quincy, Medicina Statica, xi; Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons,
'Preface.'
49. There were attempts to revive Hippocrates during the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century, through Sydenham, Baglivi, Hoffmann, and
Boerhaave. See Giorgio Baglivi, The Practice of Phvsick, Reduc'd to the
Ancient Way of Observations (London: A. Bell et al., 1704); lain M.
Lonie, 'Hippocrates the latromechanist,' Med.Hist., 1981, 25: 113-50.
Andrew Cunningham, 'Medicine to Calm the Mind.' Baglivi's influence on
English medicine can be seen in Thomas Apperly, Observations in Phvsick.
Both Rational and Practical (London: W. Innys et al, 1731), xviii, in which
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medical writings were basing their medicine on mere hearsay, which could
achieve only the lowest degree of certainty. Anyone who wants to make
use of classical medical writings can do so only by giving it a mathematical
and demonstrative format. The reformatting of Hippocrates was done by
John Freind, another supporter of Pitcairn, in his polemical edition of
Hippocrates' fever tracts, as R.J.J. Martin has perceptively pointed out?°
James Harvey (fl.1708), another iatro-mathematician also tried to
introduce mathematical reasoning into the field of prognosis, in which
Hippocrates and his followers were triumphant. Harvey accused the blind
followers of Hippocratic prognosis as 'neglecting to inquiring into the
reasons of observation, ... unalterable laws of motion and mechanism.'5'
The mathematical format was, they maintained, the only proper way to do
medicine.
Small wonder that other physicians felt upset. In the 1700s Pitcairn
went through bitter controversies with fellow physicians of the Royal
College of Edinburgh, and his disciples in London did not find an easy
path to the Royal College of Physicians, although the Royal Society, where
Newton had already achieved eminence, welcomed their mathematical and
Newtonian physic. It was only after the Newtonian coup at the Royal
College around 1715 that Pitcairnian medicine was accepted there: his
collected works were translated into English in 1715 and 1718, with the
imprimatur of the Royal College, and the work of Bellini, the Italian
the author wrote 'The two great pillars of physick, as the Italian
Hippocrates says, are reason and observation.'
50. R.J.J. Martin, 'Explaining John Freind's Histor y of Physick,'
Stud.Hist.Phil.Sci., 1988, 19: 399-418.
51. James Harvey, Praesagium Medicum. or the Prognostic Signs of Acute
Diseases (London: G. Strahan, 1706), ix. There Harvey also wrote 'How
conductive soever towards the improvement of medicine observations may
be, yet they must be much more so, when founded upon solid reasoning,'
i.e. 'the unalterable law of motion and mechanism.'
93
mentor of the iatro-mathematicians, was translated in 1720, again with the
College's authorization.52
Although the intellectual rationale of this essentially political refusal
of mathematical medicine has not been studied in depth, the issue of
certainty in medicine was again at stake. In his Apollo Mathematicus,
Edward Eizat attacked the very core of Pitcairn's research programme of
certain medicine. Eizat accused Pitcairn of deism, for a deist denied
revealed religion and the authority of the Bible by claiming that 'nothing
is certain but a mathematical demonstration, and that all historical
certainty amounts to no more but a meer conjecture, and that the best
attested history is little better than a romance.' Pitcairn's denial of the
authority of historical writing would, warned Eizat, 'strike at the root, and
shake the foundation of all historical certainty, whether the history be
sacred or profane.'53
Pitcairn's mathematical physic emerged from a tangle of factors,
both intellectual and social, as we have seen above. The mathematics he
absorbed from Newton, mainly via Gregory, provided a model for
reforming medicine. However, Pitcairn's bold research programme was
not solely due to Newton, just as Newton himself did not come out of the
blue. Pitcairn's pursuit of certainty in medicine was an offshoot of the
late-seventeenth-century English philosophical and epistemological
52. Lorenzo Bellini, A Mechanical Account of Fevers (London: A. Bell,
1720). For the Newtonian coup at the Royal College around 1715, see
Martin, 'Explaining John Freind's History of Physick'; Brown, 'The
Mechanical Philosophy and the Animal Oeconomy,' pp.238-307. The full
details of the Newtonian coup at the College remain yet to be studied.
53. Eizat, Apollo Mathematicus, pp.5 & 13. We know relatively little
about the criticism against iatro-mathematicians. See a valuable exception
of Philip K. Wilson, "The Greatest Lies Can Be Invented": Daniel Turner
on Mechanists, Quacks, and Atheists in Newtonian London,' an
unpublished paper read at 'Day of Enlightenment,' a Conference held by
the London Centre for History of Science, Medicine and Technology, 1
March, 1991.
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arguments over certainty and probability, which had been incorporated
into the scientific research programme at the Royal Society of London,
and had just reached Edinburgh at the time when Pitcairn started his
medical career. However, Pitcairn's introduction of mathematics was
rather alien to the Baconian tradition of the Royal Society and to medicine
in the late seventeenth century. The Pitcairnians' claim that mathematical
and demonstrative certainty was the goal of medicine was largely a device
for their polemic against other types of the study of medicine.
It was in this radically new scheme of mathematical medicine that
their elimination of the problems of the soul/mind was pursued. The next
section will look at their formulation of a medicine without the soul/mind.
Formulation of Pure Body as the Medical Object
a) Dualistic medicine at the turn of the century
In England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century,
medical books published by authors outside the iatro-mathematical school
were overwhelmingly 'dualistic,' in the sense that they framed the twofold
compound of the mind and the body as a phenomenon which they had to
examine, explain, and treat. There was almost no disagreement among
medical writers of the time that man is made up of the soul and the body,
although where the soul actually resides in the body was hotly disputed.TM
As Walter Charleton put it in his anatomical lectures at the Royal College
54. The argument over the seat of soul was very extensive in late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century English medical scene. Major
contributors in the seventeenth century include: Descartes, Helmont,
Willis, and French anatomists such as Daniel Duncan (1649-1735), Daniel
Tauvry (1669-1701), and Raymond Vieussens (1641-1716). As for the
history of brain and its functions in this period, see Edwin Clarke and
Kenneth Dewhurst, An Illustrated History of Brain Function (Oxford:
Stanford Publications, 1972), chaps. 7 & 9.
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of Physicians in London, published in 1680, the broadest object of
medicine was man, 'composed of two principal parts, a soul and body.'55
Medicine then was a study of man, which was called 'anthropology.'56
The object of 'anthropology,' however, did not entirely square with
that of medicine. As man is composed of two things, the soul/mind and
the body, 'anthropology' consisted of two parts, the study of the soul/mind
and the study of the body, which were often named 'psychology' and
'somatology.' 57 'Psychology' was not a proper medical concern, and
medical writers confessedly neglected purely mental phenomena which the
body has nothing to do with. Charleton, for instance, stated that 'thinking,
knowing, judging, reasoning, concluding, electing, willing.., being remote
from the province of anatomists, I leave them handled by philosophers
inquiring into the nature of the soul.' Such things as are 'peculiar to the
soul or mind' should be expelled from medical study. 58 English Medicine
55. Walter Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature in VI Anatomic
Praelections in the New Theatre of the Royal College of Physicians in
London (London: R. Boulter, 1680), 'Preface,' p.1.
56. See, for instance, Anthropologic Abstracted: or the Idea of Humane
Nature (London: Henry Herrington, 1655), The content of this early genre
of 'anthropology' has been little studied. Valuable but passing comment
on the genre is found in Christopher Fox, 'Defining Eighteenth Century
Psychology: Some Problems and Perspectives,' in Psychology and
Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Christopher Fox (New York:
AMS Press, 1987), 1-22.
57. See Oxford English Dictionary, 'anthropology,' etc.
58. Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature, p.1. As for the dualism of
seventeenth-century medicine, see John Henry, 'The matter of Souls:
Medical Theory and Theology in Seventeenth-century England,' in Medical
Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, eds. by French and Wear, 87-113;
Johanna Geyer-Kordesch, 'Passions and the Ghost in the Machine: or
What Not to ask about in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth- Century
Germany,' in iljL, 145-63; Theodore M. Brown, 'Descartes, Dualism, and
Psychosomatic Medicine,' in The Anatomy of Madness, 3 vols., eds. by
W.F. Bynum, et al., (London: Tavistock, 1985-88), vol.1., 40-62.
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at that time did not take a whole man as the object of its study; the whole
man minus purely mental phenomena was the proper object.
For Charleton and Willis, the rest of the human actions was still
essentially the phenomena which were simultaneously bodily and psychic.
Charleton continued the lecture by specifying the proper object as 'the
body, as organical and animated by the soul.' By the turn of the century,
however, English medical writings had slid into the Cartesian scheme,
apparently without visible fuss.59 The soul was no longer omnipresent in
physiology but was confined in a limited area of faculties, which was often
referred to 'animal,' and the rest was 'pure body,' which has nothing to do
with the soul. As I have discussed in Chapter one, Descartes distinguished
three modes in human actions: purely mental phenomena (like thinking),
purely bodily phenomena (like the movement of the heart), and the
interaction between the mind and the body (sensation, imagination, and
voluntary locomotion). The proper object of medicine was, many thought,
the last two categories. William Cowper (1666-1709), a London surgeon
and the author of a popular Anatomy of Human Bodies (1698), divided all
function of animal body into natura1 functions which terminate in the
body' and 'animal functions,' i.e. sense and voluntary motion, 'in which the
soul is concerned.'60 Many other works used a similar Cartesian
framework. Some of these were written by English authors and others
were translations from foreign writers, for example, Gideon Harvey
(1640?-1700), Humphrey Ridley (1653-1708), Michael Etmueller (1644-
59. This silent shift toward the Cartesian scheme is very difficult to explain.
A lot of the publications I have consulted did not even mention the name
of Descartes in proposing a Cartesian research programme of pure body
and its interaction with the soul.
60. William Cowper, The Anatomy of Human Bodi (Oxford: S. Smith et
al., 1698), 'Introduction,' and See also Thomas Nevett, The Rational
Oeconomv of Humane Bodies. Wherein the Nature of the Chyle. Blood.
Lymph. and Other Juices Is Discovered (London: T. Parkhurst, 1704),
pp.27-28. Little is known about Nevett. He studied under P. Burman,
professor of Botany at Leiden, and got an M.D. in 1703.
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1683), Giorgio Baglivi (1668l707).61 English medical writings around
1700, unlike those in the Restoration period, formulated the object of
medicine in a strictly Cartesian manner.
Within this Cartesian framework, the mechanism of the interaction
between the mind and the body was a medical problem to be solved.
Here again, however, one can detect an obvious departure from the
Interregnum and Restoration Oxford medicine. Unlike Willis and
Charleton, who invested so much energy in solving the problem of the
interaction and gave the intermediate agent the central position in their
physiology, Cowper and Baglivi were reluctant to touch the issue,
abandoned any explanation, and were ready to skip the question. Cowper
wrote:
the manner ... how a material substance can affect and be affected
by an immaterial, is obscure and scarce to be conceiv'd. Wherefore
waving all precarious hypothesis, I shall confine myself to the
description of such phenomena as are matters of fact, and
undeniable, and leave the reader at liberty to erect what system he
believes.62
Cowper here is not saying that mind-body interaction is impossible, but
saying that explanation of it is beyond the scope of medicine. Interactive
phenomena like sense and voluntary motion were proper objects of
medical study, but their hidden mechanism was not.
61. Gideon Harvey, The Vanity of Philosophy in Physick (London: A.
Roper, 1699), esp., pp.1141-66; Humphrey Ridley, The Anatom y of the
Brain Containing Its Mechanism and Physiology (London: S. Smith et aL,
1695), pp.157-200; Michael Ernst Etmueller, Etmueller Abridg'd: or a
Complete System of the Theory and Practice of Medicine (London: E.
Harris et al., 1699), esp., pp.487-556; Giorgio Baglivi, The Practice of
Physick, esp. pp. 177-89.
62. Cowper, The Anatomy of Human Bodj , 'Introduction.' See also
Baglivi, The Practice of Physick, pp.182-83.
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We can, therefore, find two major shifts in English medicine outside
the iatro-mathematical school from the period of Willis and Charleton to
the turn of the century. One is the appearance of 'pure' body purged of
psychic issues as an object of medical study, and the other is the
disappearance of the problem of explaining the way in which mind-body
interaction takes place. Although these shifts seem to have been largely
silent ones, the figure behind them was certainly Descartes. English
medicine, which during the Restoration produced such powerful opponents
to the Cartesian programme, seems by the end of the century to have
adopted the basic scheme of the French philosopher. As for the cause of
interaction, Descartes did not give any explanation and Malebranche made
it a problem of divine intervention, a question beyond the scope of natural
philosophy. Small wonder then that physicians were reluctant to step into
the metaphysical domain of the interaction; it seems that they felt relieved
to be free from the headache of explaining interaction.63
b) Medicine without soul by the iatro-mathematics
Despite their hostility to Descartes' speculative physiological
theories, the iatro-mathematicians adopted a Cartesian formulation of the
fundamental object of medicine, i.e. life. Unlike many of his
contemporaries who still believed that life consisted in the union of the
soul and the body, Pitcairn made it a purely bodily phenomenon,
63. Some Parisian anatomists in the late 17th century adopted
Malebranche's occasionalism and used it as a rationale for omitting the
problem of the interaction. See, for instance, John Baptist Verduc, A
Treatise of the Parts of Humane Body (London: W. Turner, 1701), p38;
Daniel Tauvry, New Rational Anatomy (London: D. Midwinter et al.,
1701), p.184. The medical and religious milieu of French medicine at that
time is nicely discussed in L.W.B. Brockliss, 'The Medico-Religious
Universe of an Early Eighteenth Century Parisian Doctor: the Case of
Philippe Hecquet,' in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century,
eds. by French and Wear, 191-221.
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identifying it with the circulation of bloodP' In doing so, Pitcairn
deprived Harveian circulation of both its initial Neo-Aristotelian content
and of the chemical substructure provided by the Oxford physiologists,
transforming the circulation into a matter of simple hydraulics. Pitcairn's
hero was not the Harvey who claimed that the soul is in the blood, but the
Harvey who did the mathematical calculations of the circulation of the
blood. Pitcairn declared, 'Those who enjoy this circulation [of blood]
have life. Life itself is either this circulation, or this the measure of it.'
As is often the case with him, his remark was brief but precise, destroying
the dualistic idea of life at one blow: life was no longer the soul-body
compound, but the mechanism for keeping the soulless hydraulic machine
going. Few medical theorists in his time were as thorough-going a
Cartesian.
What about, then, the other Cartesian field of interactive
phenomena? Here again, the attitude of the iatro-mathematicians was
similar to those of Cowper and Baglivi discussed above: in the writings of
the iatro-mathematicians, there is no attempt to provide any explanation
of the cause of the interaction. In fact, there is a visible concern to avoid
anything related to the soul/mind and, to build a framework in which they
could concentrate on the hydraulics of the body. The iatro-mathematicians
recast the ideas of the animal faculty and the role of the brain. The seat
of the soul, which attracted so much interest from other contemporary
64. See, for instance, Giovanni Alphonso Borelli, On the Movement of
Animals, trans. by Paul Maquet (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag,
1989), pp.7-8 & 285; Charleton, Enquiries, p.378; Hoffmann, Fundamenta
Medicinae, p.11; Verduc, Treatise, p.38. The role of the soul in Borelli's
explanation of the motion of the heart is discussed in Roger K. French,
'Sauvages, Whytt and the Motion of the Heart: Aspects of Eighteenth-
Century Animism,' Clio Medica, 1972, 7:35-54.
65. See Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.139-67, in which Pitcairn
appreciated Harvey's demonstration of the circulation in mathematical and
mechanical way.
66. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, p.7.
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anatomists, was not discussed at all, and the Willisian localization of the
faculties of the mind was dismissed as fanciful. The brain was, for them,
simply a part of the hydraulic machine of the human body. James Keill
wrote that 'all the use we know of the brain' was the secretion of the
animal spirits from the circulating blood. 67 When Pitcairn defined animal
faculties, he did not relate them to the operations of the soul, as had been
commonly done; they were, for him, simply 'that power, which whilst the
blood circulates within the brain, is exerted for the separation of a liquor
[i.e. animal spirits] to be derived into the nerves.' Thus brain was no
longer the seat of the soul, but a sieve-like secretive organ. Likewise, the
animal faculties were not a special domain where the soul and the body
interact, but just a kind of hydraulic operation.
This does not mean that the iatro-mathematicians were Hobbesian
materialists who denied the existence of the soul.69 There is no passage
where they denied that man has a soul, neither did they earn any
contemporary notoriety for being materialist, as far as I am aware of.
Indeed, they explicitly admitted the existence of soul in a human being.
After claiming that the human body is a pure machine, Quincy wrote.
'there is something further, besides physical agents, which has to do in a
human body ... and that is the mind, soul, or power of thought, whatsoever
is called.' In his Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion, Cheyne
maintained that, 'voluntary motions of rational creatures are altogether
unaccountable from the laws of mechanism.'7° Although man's body is
a pure hydraulic machine, man itself is not a Hobbesian pure mechanism.
67. James Keill, The Anatomy of the Human Body Abridg'd, 1st ed.
(London: Keblewhite, 1698), p.151.
68. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, p.50.
69. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1968), pp.85-99.
70. Quincy, Medicina Statica, 1-li; George Cheyne, Philosophical Principles
of Natural Religion: Containing the Elements of Natural Philosophy
(London: 0. Strahan, 1705), p.29.
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They did not, therefore, identify the interactive phenomena with
bodily ones, neither did they reduce the former to the latter. What they
actually did was to neglect the mental part of the interaction and limit
their concern to the bodily and hydraulic part. At issue here was the
question of how to delineate the proper scope of medical discourse,
purging it of the metaphysical subject of the soul. George Cheyne, in his
second edition of A New Theory of Fevers (1702), wrote, 'whatever be the
principle of perception in human,.., all sects of philosophers and physicians
will agree that the diseases should be caused by changes in bodily fluid or
solid.'7' The hydraulic pathology was independent of psychic issues,
hence there was no need to probe into them.
Accordingly, only the bodily changes involved in the mind-body
interaction constituted a proper object of medical study. In brief, they put
the role of the soul in parentheses and devised, so to speak, a black-box
theory of soul. To know the role of the soul itself in the interaction is
unnecessary; the knowledge of its bodily effects should be enough for the
purpose of medical theory and practice. The soul no longer existed in the
human being as a substance which required special attention by physicians,
so their object of study consisted in purely bodily phenomena (life, blood
circulation, etc.) and the strictly bodily side of the interactive phenomena.
The iatro-mathematicians' strategy to bracket the soul off is most
obvious when they talked about the passions, which had been the major
battlefield between Descartes and the Oxford physicians. The iatro-
mathematicians were on the Cartesian side, in that they did not see
anything like Willisian corporeal soul. There was no such thing like a
special body. As the translators of Pitcairn's works wrote, 'the nature of
71. Cheyne, A New Theory of Fevers, pp.5-6. Later Cheyne wrote that this
work had been suggested by Pitcairn as a blow against his opponents in his
controversy with Charles Oliphant. See George Cheyne, Dr. Cheyne's
Own Account of Himself and His Writings, Faithfull y Extracted from His
Various Works (London: J. Wilford, 1743).
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matter in all bodies is certainly the same, ... and therefore all bodies, how
great or small soever, are liable to the common influences of motion and
alteration.' 72 However, they did not take an entirely Cartesian viewpoint,
for they did not see two things in the passions. They deliberately turned
a blind eye to the role of the soul, and confined themselves to the bodily
and hydraulic aspects of the passions. Pitcairn wrote, 'all the affections [of
the mind] are then to be considered as the cause of distempers, when they
may increase or diminish the bloods' circulation.'73
James Keill went even further in claiming that it was possible to
find bodily equivalents of the passions and the physicians could look at
them instead of the passions themselves. In the first edition of
Account of Animal Secretion, he wrote that the soul acts in the body only
in 'the same way as if they had proceeded from other [bodily] causes.'74
In the second edition of the same book, he developed the idea and devised
an interesting metaphor:
tho' it [the soul] does excite motions which disturb the oeconomy,...
yet we know how to rectify their irregularities without any regard
had to the soul; in the same manner exactly, as any one strikes back
a ball sent from another's hand, with a force opposed to the ball,
not to the hand that moves it.75
This metaphor says that physicians don't have to look at the soul (the
hand), the original cause of the bodily change, but can do without it. The
72. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, xxvii.
73. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, p.75.
74. James Keill, An Account of Animal Secretion. the Ouantity of Blood
in the Humane Body and Muscular Motion, 1st ed. (London: G. Strahan,
1708), 'preface,' p.vii.
75. Keill, Essays on Several Parts of the Animal Oeconom y, 2nd ed. The
shift of Keill's idea about the attractions is quite well surveyed in Guerrini,
'James Keill, George Cheyne, and Newtonian Physiology.'
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object of medical study and treatment is the bodily change (the ball). The
game of medicine, claimed Keill, consists in hitting the ball, not the hand
that has thrown the ball. The iatro-mathematician's game was quite
different from, for example, the game played by Baglivi, who wrote
'diseases arising from care and anxiety of mind, will hardly be altered by
medicines, unless the mind be restored to a state of tranquility.'76 Baglivi
obviously wanted to hit the hand.
John Quincy proceeded still further in specifying the bodily
equivalents of the passions. Quincy stated that man's passions and
dispositions of the mind gave 'that particular modification likewise, and
degree of tension to the fibres, as cold bathing, a cold air, a moderate
exercise, when we see them attended with the same consequences.' As
such physical causes were known to 'draw up and shake the constituent
machinulae of the fibres, promote their elastic powers, break the nervous
juice finer,' so a physician, claimed Quincy, must postulate that 'these
passions of the mind do also give the same modifications to the fibres, by
which the same effects are produced.' 77 For Quincy, what mattered was
only the bodily analogue of the passions, which were reproducible by
mechanical causes: 'When any passions of the mind is said to have this or
that effects upon the body, we ought to consider that passion only as a
physical agent.'78
As I have examined in the previous section, this formulation of the
object of medical inquiry as the pure body, with the soul put into
parentheses, was connected with their methodology. It is understandable
that the soul was the last thing that would occupy a solid place in their
sense-based, demonstrative and mathematical medicine. It was by
definition invisible and intangible; it did not follow the mechanical laws of
motion and one could not calculate the mind in the same way as one could
76. Baglivi, The Practice of Physick, p.187.
77. Quincy, Medicina Statica, pp.264-65.
78. Quincy, Medicina Statica, p.265.
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the blood pressure. Small wonder that they claimed that any argument
about soul/mind could not achieve the same certainty as that about pure
body. Quincy epitomized the rationale of the certain and bodily medicine:
Insomuch as a human body can be considered as a machine, and so
far as the properties of all those things with which it may be
influenced, can be known upon the same principles, so far it is
attended with certainty; But as for what concerns it otherwise, with
relation to such causes as cannot be brought about sensible
evidences, it must always remain doubtful, beyond what common
observation does assist us.79
As one could not expect mathematical certainty from any argument about
the soul, so medical knowledge concerning the soul was to remain inferior,
observational knowledge.
When they wrote about the passions, they tried to eliminate the
psychic issue, using Newton as their model. They thought that Newton had
achieved mathematical certainty by eliminating any speculation about the
cause of gravitation, and by limiting his argument to the mathematical
description of the phenomena. In the same manner, they wanted to do
without the mental causes of bodily changes, and to concentrate on the
visible phenomena of the bodily changes themselves. As is evident from
the above quotes from Keill and Quincy, they tried to bracket the soul off
and to look only at the bodily effects of the soul. The soul did not matter
for their medicine, just as the physical cause of the gravitation did not
matter for Newton's astronomy. The translator of Pitcairn's works wrote
that the validity of astronomers' demonstration is not weakened, 'whether
there by such things as substantial forms, or not, and whether there does
exist a subtile matter, or not.' 8° In a similar manner, Keill wrote that the
79. Quincy, Medicina Statica, ii.
80. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, xxiii.
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relevance of his mathematical medicine was 'not in the least altered, by
that we have a principle within us, not subject to the law of motion.'8'
There was, therefore, no room for the soul/mind in their carefully
drawn out scope of medicine. Our next question is: how did they manage
to explain 'mental' disorders in their rigorously bodily research
programme?
Mental Diseases without Mind: the iatro-mathematicians on madness
a) Madness as diseases of senses and motion
Pitcairn's account of madness was in keeping with his research
programme of purely bodily medicine: to understand madness he departed
from the dualistic framework and cut off the mental part of the
composition of madness. First of all, he did not recognize a category of
diseases of the 'mind,' and transformed madness into a mere problem of
hydraulics. In one of his Leiden lectures, he criticized the classification of
diseases propagated by Sennert and others, and reformulated the Classical
ideas about the causes of diseases (e.g. six non-naturals) around his notion
of body as a hydraulic machine: 'all these affections are then to be
considered as the cause of distemper when they may encrease or diminish
the blood's circulation.' 82 This scheme was put forth in his dissertation
'Of the Division of Distemper.' 83 There Pitcairn claimed, 'all diseases are
either from the fluids, or the canals, or compounded of both, or without
the animal.'	 In this sweeping reduction of diseases to hydraulic
81. Keill, Essays on Several Parts of the Animal Oeconomy, 2nd ed., xv.
82. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, pp.72 & 75.
83. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.252-71.
84. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, p.252.
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problems, he did not allow any special independent status to what had
been recognized as 'mental' diseases:
Therefore to the diseases of the excretory ones belong sleepy
symptoms, which are owing to the defect of the excretion in the
brain, and the palsy from the same reason: but the epilepsy arises
from the increase, and the vertigo from the defect. Madness from
the increase.85
Madness, which had been the key species among the mental diseases, was
nothing but a disease caused by the increase of fluid in the brain. In
Pitcairn's new classification of diseases, there was no disease in which
damage to the 'mind' was explicitly delineated.
Pitcairn not only abandoned the independent category of 'mental'
diseases; he also gave significantly different definitions to diseases which
had previously been classified as such. In his lectures on pathology at
Leiden, he allotted one chapter to 'madness' in which he discussed mania
and melancholia. 86 There he adopted, like Willis and Hoffmann, the
recently established Cartesian model of madness as illusion, and even
more forcibly put forth the parallelism between illusion/dream and
madness. In dream, Pitcairn wrote, one has ideas of things 'wherewith we
have been acquainted,' variously compounded and mixed with each other,
85. Pitcairn, The Whole Works, pp.252-53. Latin original for the term
'madness' is 'mania.' See Archibald Pitcairn, Opera Omnia Medica
(Leiden: J.A. Langerak, 1737), p.319. Pitcairn's idea of classifying whole
diseases only along the hydraulic mehcanism seems to have come from
Bellini. Bellini, however, wrote 'a delirium happens from the same
diminution of the spirits in quantity.' Bellini, A Mechanical Account of
Fevers, pp.255.
86. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, 'Of Madness,'
pp.186-93.
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and caused by the 'various repercussions of the animal spirits.' 87
 This was
also the case with madness:
A delirium therefore is the dream of waking persons, wherein ideas
are excited without order or coherence, and the animal spirits are
drove into irregular fluctuations. If the cause inducing a delirium
be of that nature, it can excite idea or motions of a lively and
considerable impetus without any manner of certainty and order.
There was nothing new in comparing madness to illusion/dream, for
it had long been maintained by Descartes, Boyle, Willis. The passage
quoted above, however, is saying two new things: one is the addition of the
problem of motion, and the other is the omission of any damage to the
higher faculty.
I shall first deal with the new dimension of disordered motion in
madness. It had long been noted that a madman shows disorderly motion
with extraordinary strength, yet it had not constituted the central
problematics of medical theory on madness: madness had been first and 	 Z
foremost a problem of intellectual disorder. For Pitcairn, incoherent and
violent motion in delirium shared a central place with disordered idea:
delirium consisted in or motions of a lively and considerable impetus
without any manner of certainty and order [my emphasis].' This binary
characterization of madness as disordered idea and/or motion fitted in
very well with the role of the animal spirits in the physiology of the iatro-
mathematicians, for they were regarded as the vehicle of both sensation
and muscular motion. When they flow from the sensory organ to the
brain, sensation takes place and when from the brain to muscles, motion
87. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, p.186.
88. Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements, p.186.
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is effected.89	If one suffered, the other would naturally share the
disorder.
Moreover, a mechanical account of muscular locomotion and its
strength was one of the foremost achievements of mechanical and
mathematical medicine, best exemplified in Borelli's De Motu Animalium
and in Mead's and Henry Pemberton's 'Introduction' to the posthumous
edition of William Cowper's Myotoma Reformata. 9° The mathematical
characterization of mad motion reached grotesque proportions in Edward
Strother's (1675-1737) Criticon Febrium (1718). Although Strother
apparently had no personal connection with Pitcairn and his circle, the
work on fever is aggressively mathematical and shows great reverence for
Pitcairn.9 ' There he, like Pitcairn, constructed a hydraulic pathology of
various disorders, based on the quantity and pressure of blood flowing, and
gave the following account of madness:
If the blood be so vitiated, as that the strengths are augmented or
diminished, 'tis the same thing as if the blood offended in quantity.
Suppose a person under a disease where the strength are much
augmented, as madness, and such-like, from some acrimony of the
blood; 'tis the same thing as if the blood were augmented. So that,
89. See, for example, Pitcairn, Philosophical and Mathematical Elements,
p.59: 'animal motion is effected by an efflux of spirits into the muscles, but
sensation is performed by a reflux of those animal spirits towards the
brain, the origin of the nerves.'
90. Borelli, On the Movement of Animals; William Cowper, Myotomia
Reformata: or an Anatomical Treatise on the Muscles of the Human Body
(London: P. Knaplock, 1724), 'Introduction,' by Henry Pemberton.
91. Edward Strother, Criticon Febrium (London: C. Rivington, 1718). He
studied at Christ's College, Cambridge, got an M.D. at Utrecht in 1720,
and was elected FRCP in 1721. At one point he disagreed with Pitcairn,
but 'with deference to the manes of so great a man.' (pL37) Quincy,
however, was extremely hostile to this work. In his Lexicon Physico-
Medicum: or. a New Physical Dictionary (London: A. Bell, 1719), xv-xvi,
he maintained that Criticon Febrium is as hypothetical and 'vague and
delusory' a book as 'Agrippa's Occult Philosophy.'
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suppose a person has in his vessels 20 pounds of blood, and the
strengths equivalate 5 pounds; then if we consult Sir Isaac Newton's
Law of Motion, it will stand thus ac=m, or 20 multiplied by 5, is
equal to lOOlb. which this person can lift. If then any one falls ill
of Madness, and can lift up 1401b. then the Moment of Strength in
each pounds of Blood, amounts to 7lb. for 20 multiplied by 7, is
140.92
In this unashamedly Newtonian account of madness, the only aspect of
madness taken into account was its extraordinary strength, which could be
calculated. It is an example of the iatro-mathematical explanation of
madness in its extreme form.
Secondly, an implicit and silent shift in Pitcairn's formulation of
madness was the absence of issues related to the higher mental faculties,
such as reasoning. Essentially, what Pitcairn was saying was not very much
different from Willis, and even from earlier medical writers: madness was	 '
a disorder in our activity of image-making. However, Pitcairn omitted any
damage to reasoning, which was involved in the former accounts of
madness. In the early seventeenth century, John Jonston (1603-75), for
example, wrote:
A Deliry is a depravation of the phantasie, and the rationation
faculty, arising from the bringing and presenting of an absurd and
inconvenient phantasme.93
Although both Pitcairn and Johnston claimed that in delirium false and
confused ideas were excited in the mind, Pitcairn did not mention the
deprivation of any mental faculties, which constituted the principal part of
92. Strother, Criticon Febrium, p.20.
93. John Jonston, The Idea of Practical Physick in Twelve Books, trans. by
Nicholas Culpeper (London: Peter Cole, 1657), p.19.
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Johnstone's statement. Johnstone's language was framed around the
faculties of the soul, while Pitcairn's was that of hydraulics. The iatro-
mathematician's explanation of madness stopped just when the false ideas
are produced in the mind, and therefore omitted the consequent
depravation of the mental faculties. Pitcairn's disciples seem to have
followed their mentor and kept silence on the issue of mental facultiesY
Although it is dangerous to argue from the absence of evidence, the iatro-
mathematicians' omission of any issues concerning higher mental faculties
from their account of madness was in keeping with their general strategy
of practicing purely bodily medicine, with the soul excluded from the scope
of medical discourse. It seems likely that this omission formed a part of
their reform of the extent of medical knowledge.
In brief, a madman constructed by the iatro-mathematicians was a
disordered hydraulic machine, in which high blood pressure and a
disordered flow of the animal spirits gave rise to erroneous sensations and
incoherent and extraordinarily strong movement of its limbs. Reference
to damage of the mind was minimized, or even negated. The iatro-
mathematicians, in a word, managed to produce a 'psychiatry without
mind.'
b) Richard Mead on madness as reflex action
Psychiatry without mind was epitomized by Richard Mead, one of
the most prominent physicians of his age and in his youth the most staunch
supporters of Pitcairn's mathematical physic. In the second essay of his
extremely successful Mechanical Account of Poisons in Several Essays, he
gave an account of the effect of poisons present in the bites of the
94. See, for example, James Harvey, Praesagium Medicum, 'Of a Delirium
and Frenzie,' pp.4.-l4.
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tarantula spiders and mad dogs, both of which he understood as species of
delirium.95
Mead put these two sorts of poisons under the same head, since
both of them 'induce a particular delirium sui generis, attended partly with
maniacal, partly with melancholy symptoms.' 96 Mead's idea of madness
was in strict keeping with that of Pitcairn, stressing both false ideas and
disorderly motion. Moreover, establishing a close tie between the two
elements, Mead employed the notion of what is today called reflex motion,
which was forcibly propagated by, inter alia, Descartes.
Mead started by making a mechanical account of perception and
voluntary motion, in which the soul is conscious of perceiving the idea,
and, in response to this perception, commands the animal spirits to flow
into muscles to perform some desired actions. When a certain set of the
perception and the motion is repeated and becomes a habit, Mead
continued, the mind retreats from the scene and the motion comes to be
performed unconsciously and involuntarily: 'at length by a kind of natural
habitude, without the intervention of the reasoning faculty, representations
made to the mind do immediately and necessarily produce suitable
motions in the bodily organs.' 97 Although Mead did not give any
reference, here he was obviously following the idea of reflex movement,
which was propagated by Descartes, Willis, and Borelli.98
95. As Mead admitted himself, his description of the bite of the tarantula
owes substantially to Giorgio Baglivi's account of it found in Baglivi, flj
Practice of Physick, pp.345-409. And the bite of a mad dog was very much
a fashionable topic in the medical profession then. The Philosophical
Transactions in this period included a lot of articles on the topic. Further
study into the intellectual and social background of the rise of the
discourse on rabies seems necessary.
96. Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons, pp.57-8.
97. Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons, p.63.
98. Probably Mead's direct source was Borelli's De Motu Animalium
(1680-81), which he mentioned several times. See Borelli, On the
Movement of Animals, pp.285-286. As for Descartes' and Willis's notion
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Mead's originality lies in connecting the concept of reflex movement
and the senso-motory account of madness. The reflex is, Mead claimed,
exactly what happens to a madman. The irregular representation of the
ideas, triggered by disordered flow of the animal spirits, generated
incoherent bodily motions:
a delirium is the representation and various composition of several
species to the mind without any order or coherence; together, at
least most commonly, with irregular, or as it were, undesigned
motions of the body; that is, such a wandering and irregular motion
of the nervous fluid, whereby several objects are represented to the
mind, and upon this representation divers operations performed by
the body, tho' those objects are not impressed upon the organs, not
those operations or motions deliberately commanded by the soulY
Delirium was, for Mead, a disordered involuntary reflex motion, which was
produced without any intervention of the mind. In this scheme for
understanding madness, there was no place for the soul/mind.
Accordingly, Mead claimed that although delirium was called 'perturbation
of the mind,' 'it is very manifest that in reality the defect is not in the
rational but corporeal part.'
Although this statement may appear similar to the earlier claims of
incorruptibility of rational and incorporeal soul per Se, the contents of
these claims were different. The rationale of the intactness of the soul was
religious and metaphysical: ontological separateness of the rational and
immortal soul from perishable matter did not permit any disorder of the
soul itself. Mead, on the other hand, did not base his claim on
metaphysical argument, and invented a model of madness from which the
of reflex, see Georges CangLlilhem, La formation du concept du reflex aux
XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: J. Vrin, 1977), pp.27-78.
99. Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons, p.M.
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disturbance of the soul was omitted from the beginning: mad and
incoherent motion was not the product of a wrong mind, but of wrong
hydraulics.
This point is made clear in his account of rabies, the delirious
disease caused by the bite of a mad dog. Mead admitted that there was
a dispute among physicians over the question of whether rabies could be
properly called a delirium. The main objection against classifying rabies
as a delirium was, Mead wrote, that the patients who suffered from rabies
or hydrophobia did sometimes show the sign of reason. For Mead, who
recast the model of delirium into reflex action with no place for the soul,
the argument of the opponents provided another reason to count rabies as
delirium and to enforce his purely bodily model of delirium:
I know indeed that the main and most plausible abjection against
delirium is this, that the patient himself does reason against his
timorousness, ... Which from what I have already said concerning
a delirium, appears to be very consistent with it, nay, convinces that
there is the greatest degree of it in this case: in as much as that is
not a distemper of the mind but of the body.10°
This claim, that delirium is not a distemper of the mind but of the body,
is repeated again and again in the Mechanical Account of Poisons, and
provides a sharp contrast to the earlier idea that madness was a disorder
in which the higher mental faculty of reasoning is damaged. Mead's
message was that the rational faculty of a madman is not disordered and
that this shows the more clearly that madness is not a disorder of the
mind, but of the hydraulic automaton.'°'
100. Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons, p.82.
101. Likewise, Locke argues that madman does not lose his reasoning. See
Essay, 2.11.13; Dewhurst, John Locke, pp.70, 71, 89-90. Dewhurst's
misleading translation in one of the passages related with the issue of
madness has been pointed out by John P. Wright, 'Association, Madness,
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Accordingly, Mead framed his explanation of the symptoms of the
bites of the tarantula and mad dogs around the issue of hydraulics. When
the poisons were infused into the blood vessels, a cohesion of globules
took place, forming numerous clusters. This makes the blood pressure
unequal and irregular and 'the fluid of the nerves must necessarily be put
into various undulatory motions.' 102 Under such a circumstance:
the most light occasion will make as real a reflux and undulation of
[the nervous fluid] to the brain; that is, will present as lively and
vivid species there, as the strongest cause and impression can
produce in its natural state and condition.	 Nay, in such a
confusion, the [animal] spirits cannot but sometimes, without any
manifest cause at all, be hurried towards these organs, to which at
other times they have bin most frequently determined.103
Hence, the patient shows such incoherent symptoms such as 'extreme
pleasure at what is but a trivial entertainment, ... wonderful sadness at
anything, ... ridiculous laughter, obscene talks.' All these were not the
product of the mad mind, but were done without any mental intervention.
Expulsion of the mental issue seems to have reached at pinnacle with
Mead's model of madness as a disordered reflex motion.
In concluding the chapter, I would like to emphasize again that
Pitcairn's pursuit of certainty in medicine was very much a product of the
late seventeenth-century English intellectual milieu, which was centred on
the Royal Society of London and tried to do without philosophical
speculations and to base scientific discourse on sensory knowledge. The
and the Measures of Probability in Locke and Hume,' in Ps ycholo and
Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Fox, 103-27, esp., note 12.
102. Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons, pp.67-68.
103. Mead, Mechanical Account of Poisons, pp.69-70.
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Pitcairnians sought a certain medicine, combatting the empirics and
differentiating their own medicine from that of the medical establishment.
Following Newton, they introduced mathematics into medicine, and so
doing they re-designed the scope of medical knowledge, from which they
tried to expel any forms of dubious knowledge.
Knowledge about the soul/mind, which at that time was increasingly
considered to present an insoluble problems by doctors outside the iatro-
mathematical school, was deliberately expelled from the proper scope of
medicine. Thus the iatro-mathematicians consolidated the tendency to
depart from Willis-like speculations on the role of the soul, or quasi-soul,
in the body. In adopting the model of life as a purely bodily phenomenon,
rather than a dualistic one, they firmly established Descartes' research
programme, although ironically they heavily criticized its speculative
aspects. Moreover, by excluding the role of the soul in interactive
phenomena like the passions, they marked out a medical research
programme which was concerned only with the body. This definition of
pure body as the only proper object of medicine was directly connected
with their pursuit of certainty in medicine.
In the course of this research programme, they formulated a new
model of madness. Unlike the dualistic framework, which understood
madness as a disorder of the mind caused by bodily disturbances, they
described madness with almost no recourse to the faculties of the mind j
. Their madness was a disorganization of hydraulic automata,
characterized by wrong sensation and incoherent motion, and was
epitomized in Richard Mead's model of madness as an incoherent reflex
movement.
The research programme of the 'mathematical physick' did not last
long, however. Even in the heyday of the school, about 1700-1720, a
considerable number of medical publications in England did not conform
to the aims of the school and Pitcairn was a target of open criticism by
some of his Scottish fellow physicians. Towards the end of this period, the
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militant proponents of mathematical physic were leaving the scene:
Pitcairn, their leading star, died in 1713, and Keill in 1719. Many
members of the school had ceased to pursue their former goal of
'mathematical physick' by 1720. Mead established a lucrative medical
practice in London and fashioned himself more as a connoisseur than as
a radical theoretician: Cheyne, after physical breakdowns in 1705 or 1706,
stayed away from the scientific community of London, and wrote books
addressed to a lay audience rather than to his professional colleagues.104
By 1730, the impetus to do medicine in a rigorous mathematical
way had declined. In 1731, Thomas Apperly (1674-1735), an M.D. from
Cambridge, stated that 'mathematical learning has added little to the most
useful, i.e. the practical part of physick,' although he still showed some
reverence to Pitcairn)°5 Thomas Morgan (d.1743), a self-styled M.D.,
went still further, turning a scornful shoulder to Bellini, the Italian patron
saint of the British iatro-mathematical school, and writing that Bellini was
'the principal corrupter of medicine." 06 Francis Clifton (d. 1736), an
M.D. from Leiden, epitomized the way in which the iatro-mathematical
bold research programme turned sour. He wrote that, 'the knowledge of
the circulation, and some other things lately discovered, is not of so much
importance as was at first apprehended; ... we are but little the better for
104. See Zuckerman, 'Dr. Richard Mead,' pp.132-85; Meade, In the
Sunshine of Life, pp.83-lOU; Roy Porter, 'Introduction' to Cheyne, Th
English Malady.
105. Apperly, Observations in Physick. Both Rational and Practical, p.13.
Although Apperly admitted that Pitcairn 'is almost everywhere, and often
justly exploding the ancient definitions in physick,' he could not see that
'medicine, strictly speaking, will be much advanced thereby.' For a
criticism in the same vein, see [Charles Oliphant?], A Refutation of the
Short Answer..., pp.15-16.
106. Thomas Morgan, The Mechanical Practice of Physick (London: T.
Woodward, 1735), xiii. For biography of Morgan, see DNB. Morgan was
a prolific Deistic writer, whose medical and philosophical ideas remain to
be studied.
117
these discoveries, and in some degree worse."°7 Theodore Brown listed
several reasons for the decline of the iatro-mechanical school: the
emphasis on experiment revived; Boerhaave's eclectic medicine ascended
to the new intellectual authority of English medicine; the anti-theoretical,
'historical' method of Sydenham, the chief target of the iatro-
mathematicians, gained popularity; a vitalistic or even animistic tinge was
added to English medical writings.108
The influence of the eclectic Boerhaavian medicine on English
medicine is best exemplified in A Treatise on the Non-naturals, in Which
the Great Influence They Have on Human Bodies Is Set Forth and
Mechanically Explained (1738), which was written by John Burton (1710-
1771), Boerhaave's student at Leiden)°° Although Burton followed the
programme of mechanical medicine (as the title suggests), and attacked
Aristotelian and chemical medicine, as well as the pure empiricists who
'rejecting all reasoning in Physic, mock at any rationale on drugs or
diseases, and patronize experience only,' he did not share the enthusiasm
for introducing mathematics into medicine.' 10 Apparently with Mead in
mind, he wrote:
107. Francis Clifton, The State of Ph ysick. Ancient and Modern. Briefly
Consider'd (London: John Nourse, 1732), p.122. Clifton got an M.D. at
Boerhaave's Leiden and became an F.R.C.P. in 1729. He was an admirer
of Hippocrates and Baglivi for their collect observation (ibid., pp.l25-2'7,
163-64.), and proposed for printing all the works of Hippocrates in 1732.
108. Brown, 'Animal Oeconomy,' pp.354-366.
109. John Burton, A Treatise on the Non-Naturals, in Which the Great
Influence They Have on Human Bodies Is Set Forth and Mechanically
Accounted for (York: A. Staples, 1738). Burton learned under Boerhaave
in 1730, and the book is aggressively Boerhaavean. He dedicated the book
to Boerhaave himself, and wrote in preface that 'the book is a mere
collection from others, or what I have pick'd up from Boerhaave's lectures
and conversation.'
110. John Burton, A Treatise on the Non-Naturals, pp.5-7. Like
Boerhaave, he thought learned medicine needs both experience and
natural philosophy: 'Experience without theory will never make a safe, and
skilful physician.' (Ibid., p.7.)
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I can't agree with a very great man, who says, that a thorough
knowledge of the mathematics, ought to be made the distinguishing
characteristic of a physician from a quack; for mathematics can give
us no more help in the cure of disease, than they can in explaining
the mysteries of revealed religion.11'
Here mathematics is neither beneficial to the therapeutics, nor a proper
model of medicine. Although Burton, like Pitcairn, maintained that
medical science 'must proceed upon demonstrative principles; because it
is conversant with objects discernable only by the evidence of sense,' this
evidence of the senses did not constitute 'absolute certainty' as Pitcairn
insisted. Rather,
it is impossible to discover certainly the natural dimensions of the
canals in a human body, even in a healthy state, much less is
possible to determine accurately their various degrees of
contraction and dilatation, which may, and actually do produce
diseases."2
One can achieve highly reliable mechanical medicine by experience and
proper natural philosophy: mathematical certainty is not necessary for the
purpose.
With the decline of iatro-mathematics in the 1720s, the argument
about the soul/mind made a revival, and a dualistic formulation of the
object of medical study was re-introduced. One of the clearest signals of
this shift came from Nicholas Robinson (1697-1775), who was as staunch
111. Burton, A Treatise on the Non-Naturals, pp.10-il. The authority he
cited for that claim was Baglivi: 'I rather agree with Baglivi, that
mathematics, rhetoric, astronomy, etc. are as conductive to an exact history
and cure of diseases, as the art of painting is to music.' 	 p.11.)
112. Burton, A Treatise on the Non-naturals, pp.11-i3. Burton cited 'Dr.
Beat' as the authority of the claim, whom I could not identify.
119
an admirer of Newton as Pitcairn and his followers had been, but had
apparently no connection with the iatro-mathematical school. In his
New Theory of Physick and Diseases. Founded on the Principles of the
Newtonian Philosophy (1725), Robinson re-introduced the twofold human
being as the object of medical study. He wrote that human 'consists of two
parts, matter and thought, or soul and body, evidently distinct in all
operations,' with no effort to establish a single object of pure body.113
In his A New System of the Spleen. Vapours. and Hypochondriack
Melancholy, published four years later, the challenge to Pitcairn's certain
and bodily medicine took an unmistakable form: Robinson introduced the
discourse on the mind, and defied the former rigorous requirement of
certainty. About one-third of this book is dedicated to the consideration
of 'the nature of thought,' e.g. perception, reason, understanding, memory,
will, all of which were removed by the iatro-mathematicians from the
scope of medicine. In doing so, Robinson was quite well aware that he
'had got into a scene of nature, where it was highly difficult to discover the
least sure footing, ... and where the nature of the subject itself scarce
admits of evidence, much less demonstration [my emphasis]." 4 He was,
however, resolute in his attempt to do medicine where the iatro-
mathematicians dared not tread. He claimed that one should be content
with 'the most seeming probability [my italics], where I cannot discover
demonstrative evidence." t5 Thus rigorous requirements of a certain
medicine based on mathematical demonstration and restricted to the pure
body disappeared. In its place, one could claim 'probable' medical
knowledge about the mind. The bold attempt to construct a psychiatry
without mind seems to have quickly faded. In the following chapters I will
113. Nicholas Robinson, A New Theory of Physick and Diseases Founded
on the Principles of the Newtonian Philosophy (London: C. Rivington,
1725), pp.10-11.
114. Nicholas Robinson, A New System of the Spleen. Vapours and
Hvpochondriack Melancholy (London: A. Bettesworth, 1729), p.3.
115. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.3 & 9-10.
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examine the content and the structure of the restored psychiatric discourse
about 'mental' diseases.
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Chapter Three
Hysteria and Hypochondria in Early Georgian England
Introduction
a) New mental diseases: hysteria and hypochondria
From around 1720, the English medical scene saw a rapid growth
of literature on nerves and nervous diseases. Among the nervous
disorders, hysteria and hypochondria, or what was called 'spleen,' 'vapours,'
and 'hyp' at that time, were the most fashionable topic. A mere glance at
the medical monographs on the diseases published around 1720 to 1740 is
enough to show the great vogue of discussion of the diseases. 1 The
hysteric and hypochondriac disease was discussed extensively in the general
medical works in the period as well.2
Although one can trace a long history of the diseases back to
Hippocratic medicine, medical historians now agree that a drastic change
1. Bernard Mandeville, A Treatise of Hvpochondriack and Hysterick
Disease, 2nd ed. (London: J. Tonson, 1730); William Stukeley, Of the
Spleen (London: for the Author, 1722); Richard Blackmore, A Treatise of
the Spleen and Vapours: or Hypochondriacal and Hysterical Affection...
(London: J. Pemberton, 1725); Nicholas Robinson, A New System of the
Spleen. Vapours. and Hypochondnack Melancholy (London: A.
Bettesworth, 1729); Richard Browne, Medicina Musica: or a Mechanical
Essay on the Effects of Singing. Musick and Dancing on Human Bodies
(London: John Cooke, 1729); George Cheyne, The English Malady: or. a
Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds, as Spleen. Vapours. Lowness
of Spirits. Hypochondriacal, and Hysterical Distempers (1733), intro, by
Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1990); Malcolm Flemyng, Neuropathia:
sive de Morbis Hvpochondriacis et Hvstericis. Liber Tres. Poema Medicum
(York: for the Author, 1740).
2. John Allen, Synopsis Medicinae: or a Summary View of the Whole
Practice of Physick, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: J. Pemberton et al, 1733),
vol.1, pp.195-206; Francis Fuller, Medicina Gymnastica: or. Every Man His
Own Physician, 7th ed. (London: E. Carll et al., 1740), pp. 121-39; Charles
Perry, A Treatise of Diseases in General, 2 vols. (London: T. Woodward
et al., 1741), vol.1, pp.161-66 and vol.2, pp.49-69.
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in the etiology of them took place during the seventeenth century.3 The
works of Edward Jorden Charles Lepois (1563-1633), Nathaniel Highmore
(1613-85), and above all, Thomas Willis and Thomas Sydenham,
transformed the seat of hysteria from the womb to the brain and nervous
system, dissociating the nature of the disease from frustrated sexual
desire.4 Their works also included a parallel change in the understanding
of hypochondria: the theory of the putrid fume arising from the spleen
('the vapours') was dismissed as imaginary and was replaced by the theory
of cerebral and nervous origin.5 Moreover, physicians at that time
associated hysteria and hypochondria so tightly that they regarded the
diseases as an essentially indistinguishable pair, abandoning the rigid
distinction between female hysteria and male hypochondria.6 And most
importantly, the aspect of mental affliction of the diseases was re-
discovered during the period. Sydenham wrote that in hysteria 'the mind
is still more disordered [than body],' which statement was often cited in the
early Georgian medical writings.7
3. Ilza Veith, Hysteria: the History of a Disease (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 120-54; idem, 'On Hysterical and
Hypochondriacal Afflictions,' Bull.Hist.Med., 1956,30:233-40; Jeffrey M.N.
Boss, 'The Seventeenth-Century Transformation of the Hysteric Affection,
and Sydenham's Baconian Medicine,' Psychological Medicine, 1979,9:221-
34; John P. Wright, 'Hysteria and Mechanical Man,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1980,
41: 233-47.
4. Willis's dispute between Highmore and Sydenliam's debt to Willis are
nicely discussed in Hansruedi Isler, Thomas Willis 1621-1675: Doctor and
Scientist (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1968), pp.127-40.
5. Hypochondria in the seventeenth century has been understudied. See
the works cited in notes 3 and 4; Oskar Dietheim, Medical Dissertations
of Psychiatric Interest Printed before 1750, (Basel: S.Karger, 1971), pp.85-
96.
6. Veith, Hysteria, p.129; Isler, Thomas Willis, pp.139-41.
7. Cited in Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, p.222. As for
hypochondria, there existed a long tradition of associating it with
melancholy, and 'hypochondriacal melancholy' was almost always one of
the subspecies of melancholy. See Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholia and
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The vogue of nervous disease as a medical topic continued well into
the latter half of the eighteenth century in Britain. The physiology and
pathology of nerves were the focus of attention especially for the medical
professors at Edinburgh, then being established as one of the centres of
medical study in Europe. Robert Whytt (1714-1766), Professor of
medicine there, published Observations on the Nature. Causes and Cure
of Those Diseases Which Are Commonly Called Nervous. Hypochondriac
or Hysteric in 1764 and William Cullen (1710-1790), partly depending on
his predecessor Whytt, developed new physiology and pathology of nerves
and coined the term 'neurosis.'8
The early Georgian writings on hysteria and hypochondria fell in
the lacuna between the twin peaks of Willis-Sydenham and Whytt-Cullen,
the so-called 'lost half century of British medicine.' 9 Unlike the four
medical giants who wrote for their medical colleagues and students, many
of the early Georgian writers on hysteria and hypochondria had lay general
readers in mind and wrote their works as advice manuals: Richard
Blackmore (1650-1729) intended his Treatise of the Spleen and Vapours
for 'intelligent persons, though not great scholars or student in physick';
George Cheyne's (1671?-1743) The English Malady was initially written as
'a legacy and dying speech, only to my fellow sufferers under these
Depression: from Hippocratic Times to Modern Times (New Haven: Yale
U.P., 1986), pp.274-310.
8. Roger French, Robert Whytt. the Soul, and Medicine (London: The
Welicome Historical Medical Library, 1969), ppL3l-45; José M. LOpez
Pihero, Historical Origins of the Concept of Neurosis, (Cambridge:
Cambridge U.P., 1983), chap.1; Christopher Lawrence, 'The Nervous
System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment,' in Natural Order:
Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, eds. by Barry Barnes and Steven
Shapin (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), 19-40.
9. W.R. Le Fanu, 'The Lost Half-Century in English Medicine, 1700-1750,'
Bull.Hist.Med., 1972, 46: 3 19-48.
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complaints.' 10 From Whiggish point of view, they were second-rate
personnel, overshadowed by both their predecessors and antecedents, and
wrote for scientifically inferior audience. When Whiggish medical histoiy
was dominant, they were largely neglected. Instead, literary historians took
the lead, examining the background of literary representation of
melancholy and sensibility.11
Recently, Roy Porter has started to provide some fresh insights into
the Augustan medical concern on hysterical and hypochondriacal disorders,
putting them in the broader social and ideological situation of the
period.12 His insights particularly relevant to this chapter include: his
emphasis on the somatic nature of the understanding of hysteria and
hypochondria at that time; his analysis of ideological construction of the
10. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, vi; Cheyne, The English Malady,
11.
11. The literary history of the nerves and nervous diseases of the period
include: Cecil A. Moore, Backgrounds of English Literature 1700-1760
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1953), pp.179-235;
Oswald Doughty, 'The English Malady of the Eighteenth Century,' Th
Review of English Studies, 1926, 2: 257-69; John F. Sena, 'The English
Malady: the Idea of Melancholy from 1700 to 1760,' Princeton University,
Ph.D., 1967; Michael DePorte, Nightmares and Hobby-Horses: Swift.
Sterne. and Augustan Idea of Madness (San Marino, Calif.: Huntington
Library, 1974); G.S. Rousseau, 'Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Towards
Defining the Origins of Sensibility,' in Studies in the Eighteenth Century,
eds. by R.F. Brissenden and J.C. Eade (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1976), 137-57; John Mullan, 'Hypochondria and Hysteria: Sensibility
and the Physicians,' The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation,
1984, 25: 14 1-77; Carol Houlihan Flynn, 'Running Out of Matter: the Body
Exercised in Eighteenth-Century Fiction,' in The Languages of Psyche:
Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. by G.S. Rousseau
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 147-85.
12. Roy Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles: a History of Madness in England
from the Restoration to Regency (London: Athione Press, 1987), pp.8l-9;
idem, 'The Rage of Party: a Glorious Revolution in English Psychiatry?'
Med.Hist., 1983, 27: 35-50; idem, 'Introduction' to George Cheyne, Ih
English Malady; idem, 'Civilization and Disease: Medical Ideology in the
Enlightenment,' in Culture. Politics and Society in Britain. 1660-1800, eds.
by Jeremy Black and Jeremy Gregory (Manchester: Manchester U.P.,
1991), 154-83.
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hysteric body; the characterization of the diseases as the malady of the
newly arrived consumer society, or the disease of civilization.'3
b) Problems: Mind and Body in the Enlightenment
The texts I am going to deal with in this chapter are very different
from the medical writings I have examined in the previous chapters. First,
they were not the product of any single medical 'group' of relatively solid
identity, such as Oxford physiologists or the Pitcairnian iatro-
mathematicians. Although it is almost certain that they knew each other's
work, they did not frequently cite each other, neither does it seem that
they formed a group. We are not looking at 'isms,' or, specific medical-
scientific research programmes.
Secondly, they wrote largely for general readers, not for their
professional colleagues, as I have mentioned above. Cheyne's switch from
technical mode to popularizing one epitomized the difference. While he
was active as one of the most aggressive iatro-mathematicians, he wrote in
such an abstruse manner that even Martin Lister (1638?-1712), Fellow of
Royal Society, could not understand Cheyne's tract on fever.' 4 In
contrast, his later works for lay general readers like The English Malady
13. The somatic nature of the eighteenth-century mental disorders is aptly
discussed in Roy Porter, 'Divided Selves and Psychiatric Medicine,' Cycnos,
1990, 6: 95-106; idem, 'Barely Touching: a Social Perspective on Mind and
Body,' in The Languages of Psyche, ed. by Rousseau, 45-80. The
eighteenth-century ideology of the body as the principal target of discipline
(in a Foucauldian way) is discussed in idem, 'Bodies of Thought: Thoughts
about the Body in Eighteenth-Century England,' in Interpretation and
Cultural History, eds. by Joan H. Pittock and Andrew Wear (London:
MacMillan, 1992), 82-108. The social and cultural making of the nervous
diseases is discussed in Porter, 'Civilization and Disease' and idem,
'Introduction' to Cheyne, The English Malady.
14. Theodore Brown, 'The Mechanical Philosophy and the "Animal
Oeconomy": a Study in the Development of English Physiology in the
Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century,' Princeton University, Ph.D.,
1968, pp.253-54.
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(1733), An Essay on Regimen (1740), and The Natural Method of Curing
the Diseases of the Body (1742) were consulted, digested and eagerly
followed by figures with apparently little scientific background, e.g. Samuel
Johnson (1709-84), Samuel Richardson (1689-1761), and the Countess of
Huntingdon (17071791).15
Thirdly, the works on hysteria and hypochondria during the early
eighteenth century characterized the diseases socio-culturally. The authors
tried to be the doctors of society as well: they located the diseases in the
economic, soda!, political, and cultural situation of their age.
We have, therefore, a group of medical writings which served as
vehicles to spread medical expertise to general readers and which related
the diseases with the contemporary social situation. Just as Joseph
Addison (1672-1719) wanted to bring 'philosophy out of closet, and
libraries, schools, and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-
tables, and in coffee-houses,' the early Georgian writers on hysteria and
nervous diseases wanted to be doctors of the market place: they preached
their ideas there, and situated the diseases there. 16 This is best
understood as an aspect of the the English Enlightenment.
The following sections will try to examine both intellectual and
extra-intellectual aspects of them. The first section will briefly discuss the
new physiology and pathology of nerves and natural-philosophical
background of the nervous diseases and the mind-body interaction. There
15. See George Cheyne, The Letters of Dr. George Cheyne to the
Countess of Huntingdon., ed. with intro, by Charles F. Mullett (San
Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library, 1940); idem, The Letters of George
Cheyne to Samuel Richardson (1733-1743), ed. by Charles F. Mullett
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1943). A satirical pamphlet
published in 1737 depicted how Cheyne was enthusiastically followed by
his patients. See The Diseases of Bath (London: J. Roberts, 1737).
16. Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Spectator, 5 vols., ed. by
Dopald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), no.10. See Roy Porter,
'The Enlightenment in England,' in The Enlightenment in National
Context, eds. by Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 1981), 1-18, esp. 5-6.
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I will continue to examine similar issues to those I have raised in the
previous chapters, i.e., the medical and philosophical framework to
understand mental disorders. In the second section. I will examine the
physicians' attempts to 'enlighten' the general readers into believing the
bodily interpretation of mental disturbances. The third section will discuss
the socio-cultural issues of the nervous diseases. There I will throw some
light on the complex construction of the image of hysteria and
hypochondria. Some promising sites such as hysteria and sexuality, cultural
history of the body during the Enlightenment, and the literary construction
of nervous personality will be left unexamined.17
Medical and Philosophical Framework of Hysteria and Hypochondria
a) The new problem of Boerhaavian nervous fibre
As up-market books for learned readers who were increasingly
getting familiar with the scientific culture of the age, many of early
Georgian writings on nervous diseases contained many up-to-date medical
ideas. The eighteenth-century medical world was a relatively fast-changing
one, and a fashionable medical system was replaced by another in a few
decades, with conterminous competitions among several schools. Battles
between medical schools were going on in the books on the nervous
diseases. One was that between the ancients and the moderns. Mainly
owing to Willis and Sydenham, the 'moderns' proudly announced that the
etiology of wandering uterus and corrupt vapours was just wrong:
Blackmore (who was actually one of the 'moderns' in Swift's Battle of
Books) wrote that the ancients' theories were 'mere imaginary'; Ephraim
Chambers' (d.1740) Cyclopaedia said those notions were a vulgar error and
17. These new historiographical trends are nicely discussed in Porter,
'Bodies of Thought,'; G.S. Rousseau, 'Cultural History in a New Key:
towards a Semeiotics of the Nerve,' in Interpretation and Cultural History,
eds. by Pittock and Wear, 25-81.
128
'the learned all discard it.' 18 The 'moderns' fought with each other as
well: Bernard Mandeville (1670?-1733) threw no less fierce invective
against Willisian chemical theories than against Galenist doctrines,
preferring Sydenham's and Baglivi's empirical medicine.19
And the new seat of the diseases, i.e., the nervous system, was at
the centre of the revisions of the framework of medical theories which
were then going on.2° English physicians at that time were becoming
aware of the shortcomings of the former iatro-mathematical reduction of
physiology, pathology, and even life itself, to the circulation of the blood.
The circulation was no longer the sole key to life and death, and the
nerves were as important in those fundamental issues in medicine.2'
Accordingly, some diseases which the Pitcairnians understood in the
framework of the circulation were re-interpreted with reference to nerves:
Thomas Morgan (d.1743) on madness, Richard Mead's revision of his own
18. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, p.1; Chamber's Cvclopedia, 2nd
ed., 2 vols. (London: Midwinter et al., 1738), 'Hysteric Affection'; Jonathan
Swift, A Tale of Tub and Other Satires, ed. with intro, by Kathleen
Williams (New York: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1975), p.158. Blackmore
was one of moderns in literary issues as well, and published 'An account
of the present controversy concerning Homer's Iliad.' See A. Owen
Aldridge, 'Ancients and Moderns in the Eighteenth Century,' in DHI.
19. Mandeville, A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases,
pp.7-19 tells the story of both the Galenist and iatrochemist failing to cure
the spleen. For Mandeville's vindication of Sydenham's and Baglivi's
medicine based on observation without theory, see pp.56-68 and
pp.1 19-20.
20. See Max Neuburger, The Historical Development of Experimental
Brain and Spinal Cord Physiology before Flourens, trans. and ed. by Edwin
Clarke (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U.P., 1981), pp.17-109; Eric T.
Carlson and M. Meribeth Simpson, 'Models of Nervous System in
Eighteenth-Century Psychiatry,' Bull.Hist.Med., 1969, 42: 101-15.
21. Blackmore, A Treatise on the Spleen, p.xiv; Nicholas Robinson, A
Treatise of Sudden Death, 2nd ed. (London: R. Ware, 1735), p.18.
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account of delirium, and Blackmore on fever were a few of the attempts
to recast the pathology.tm
Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738), the celebrated Professor at Leiden,
was one of the major figures behind this renewed interest in the nerves.
His influence was ubiquitous in English medical scene from around the
1720s: his textbooks, commentaries to them and notes of lectures were
published and translated; both the Royal College of Physicians and the
Royal Society admitted many students of Boerhaave; some eminent
English doctors corresponded with him in search of diagnosis. tm The
early Georgian writings on the nervous disorders thus involved a new way
to look at the nerves and nervous disorders, which is rightly called
Boerhaavian.
Boerhaave's system had the double foci of fluid and solid, unlike
Pitcairn's with the single focus of the former. His two major textbooks,
Institutes of Medicine (1708) and Aphorisms (1709) were most clearly
framed into the binary system of fluid and solid: his physiology divided the
whole components of human body into solid and fluid, and his pathology
22. Thomas Morgan, The Mechanical Practice of Physick (London: T.
Woodward, 1735), pp.120 & 127; Richard Mead, The Medical Works of
Richard Mead (London: C. Hitch et al., 1762), 'The Memoirs of the Life
and Writings of the Author,' iv-v; Blackmore, A Treatise on the Spleen,
p.xiii.
23. For Boerhaave's influence on Britain, see E. Ashworth Underwood,
Boerhaave's Men: at Levden and After (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.,
1977); GA. Lindeboom ed., Boerhaave and Great Britain (Leiden: EJ.
Brill, 1974). See also Lester King, The Background of Herman
Boerhaave's Doctrines (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1965); idem, Ih
Medical World of the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1958), pp.59-121; G.A. Lindeboom, Herman Boerhaave
(London: Methuen, 1968); Andrew Cunningham, 'Medicine to Calm the
Mind: Boerhaave's Medical System and Why It Was Adopted in
Edinburgh,' in The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, eds.
by Andrew Cunningham and Roger French (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.,
1990), 40-66.
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consisted of the accounts of the diseases of the solid and those of the
fluid.' And among the solids of the body, Boerhaave stated, a nervous
fibre was the most fundamental element--all solids of the body were
composed of nervous fibres. A nervous fibre was the ultimate
physiological unit in human body, or, as Li. Rather claimed, something
comparable to a cell in the nineteenth century. Hence Boerhaave's
pathology of the diseases of solid was framed according to the state of
fibre: they were divided into 'the distempers of the stiff and elastick fibre'
and 'the distempers of a laxe and weak fibre.' The nerves were thus
one of the fundamental bases of Boerhaave's pathology. Note that the
new basis was not the Willisian fiery and inperceptible 'corporeal soul.'
Instead, it was relatively visible and tangible. Hysteria and hypochondria
were thus conceptualized, visualized, and solidified through the conception
of the nervous fibres.
Boerhaave's system was very welcome: Chambers' Cyclopaedia says
'the learned Boerhaave furnishes us a much more accurate and scientifical
division of Diseases, into those of the solids and fluids,' and Cheyne
reproduced Boerhaave's classification in his The English Malady,
identifying all nervous disorders 'from yawing and stretching, up to a
mortal fit apoplexy' with 'the disorders of the solids.' 27 And Cheyne
adopted the almost identical phrases with those of Boerhaave, like
24. Herman Boerhaave, Aphorisms (London: B. Couse et al., 1715); idem,
Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures on the Theory of Physic, 6 vols.
(London: W. Innys, 1742-46).
25. Li. Rather, 'Some Relations between Eighteenth-Century Fiber
Theory and Nineteenth-Century Cell Theory,' Clio Medica, 1964, 4: 191-
202.
26. Boerhaave, Aphorisms, pp.5-8 and pp.8-9.
27. Chambers' Cyclopaedia, 'Disease'; Cheyne, The English Malady, pp.6-8
& 14-15. W. Riese wrote that Cheyne's idea about the nervous diseases
was one of the forerunners of Cullen's 'neurosis.' See W. Riese, 'History
and Principles of Classification of Nervous Diseases,' BuIl.Hist.Med., 1945,
18: 465-512, esp., 471-72.
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'relaxation,' 'weakness,' 'elasticity' of the nervous fibres. It is thus not
surprising that John Allen (1660-1741), the author of a very successful
medical compendium, Synopsis Medicinae (1719), mis-cited a passage from
Cheyne's The English Malady as an extract from 'Treatise de Natura
Fibrae.'
Under the Boerhaavian binary system, there appeared the
consciousness that phenomena in the human body had dual factors of
fluids and solids. Blackmore claimed that both the fluid and the solid
were concerned in nervous diseases: 'the ill conformation of the solid
parts, and inordinate dispositions of the juices or serum, often conspire as
partial and confederate causes in the constitution of distempers.' Even
when the Georgian writers on nervous diseases adopted disorder in
secretion as their causes, they were trying to look at the other side of the
model as well, i.e., not only the secreted fluid but also the secreting
solid.30
Moreover, the period saw a split between the fluidist's and solidist's
interpretations over the nervous diseases. Francis Fuller's (1670-1706)
Medicina Gvmnastica made a solidist statement that physicians had been
misguided by 'our too partial consideration of the body of man by
attributing too little to the solids' and applied the solidist pathology to
28. John Allen, Synopsis Medicinae, vol.1, p.144.
29. Blackmore, A Treatise on the Spleen, pp.xii-xiii. See also Robinson,
A New System of the Spleen, pp.17-19. This fits well with G.S. Rousseau's
characterization of this period as 'from humours to nerves.' G.S.
Rousseau, 'Psychology,' in The Ferment of Knowledge, eds. by G.S.
Rousseau and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
143-210, esp. 169.
30. Blackmore, A Treatise on the Spleen, 39-40. There were, however, still
some fluidist doctors. Richard Manningham, a graduate of Cambridge,
F.R.S. and F.R.C.P., still embraced Bellini's model of fever and blood
circulation to explain the diseases. See Richard Manningham, Th
Symptoms. Nature. Causes and Cure of the Febricula. or Little Fever:
Commonly Called the Nervous or Hysteric Fever: the Fever on the Spirits:
Vapours. Hypo. a Spleen (London: T. Osborne, 1746), p.47.
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hypochondria: 'Whenever there is a depression of the mind, ... there is
reason to suspect the solids, that is the nerves, are more in fault than we
think for.' On the contrary, Richard Browne, an apothecary in Oakham,
gave priority to fluids: 'I only suppose at the same time that [relaxation of
solids] to be a consequence of a prior disorder in the spirits.'3'
Disagreement between the solidists and the fluidists extended over the
question whether hysteria and hypochondria were the same diseases or
not: Charles Perry (1698-1780) and Robert James (1703-76) claimed that
the two diseases must be distinguished from each other, as hypochondria
is the disease of the blood or fluid, and hysteria is the disease of the solid
nerve.32 The pathology of hysteria and hypochondria in early eighteenth-
century England was not monolithic.33
b) hysteric and hypochondriac mind
By the time when hysteria and hypochondria became a very
fashionable medical topic, the Pitcairnian research programme had had its
day. The strict elimination of the soul/mind from the scope of medicine
had gone with its rigorous mathematical methodology. From around the
31. Fuller, Medicina Gymnastica, i-u and p.128; Browne, Medicina Musica,
p.72.
32. Perry, A Treatise of Diseases in General, vol.1, pp.161-6 'Of
Hypochondriac Diseases' and vol.2, pp.49-69, explicitly distinguished them,
for, he claimed, hysteria is 'purely nervous' and hypochondria is 'purely
sanguineous.' (thi. vol.2, p.68) Robert James, citing Hoffmann, suggested
that 'there certainly is a much wider difference' between these two diseases
than 'the generality of moderns' claimed. Robert James, A Medicinal
Dictionary (London: T. Osborne, 1743-45), 'Hypochondria, Morbus' and
'Hysterica.' See also Richard Brookes, The General Practice of Physic, 2
vols. (London: J. Newbery, 1751), vol.2, p.440.
33. Henry Fielding wrote in Amelia that 'our physicians have not agreed
upon its name. Some call it the fever on the spirits, some a nervous fever,
some the vapours and some the hysterics.' Quoted in Doughty, 'The
English Malady of the Eighteenth Century.'
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1720s, English medical scene witnessed a revival of psychic and mental
issues.
The revival of psyche was the most evident in some doctors'
'animistic' claim that the soul controls life itself--the diametrically opposite
position to Descartes, Pitcairn and Boerhaave.M Biyan Robinson (1680-
1754) wrote that 'the soul has a very great power over the heart,' observing
the instance of a dying man recovering the motion of the heart by the
excitement of the mind. Cheyne favourably cited the passage in his
English Malady, and himself gave further support to the idea by adding his
own observation of the case of one Colonel Townshend, who 'could die or
expire when he pleased, and yet by an effort, or some how, he could come
to life again.' Impressed by William Porteruield's treatise on the motion
of the eyes, Richard Mead apostatized to a determined animist in the
1730s and wrote about the soul controlling bodily processes and getting rid
of harmful substances from the body.37 Although it is rather misleading
to paint all of them mentioned above as determined animists who turned
the Cartesian mechanical foundation upside-down, it seems certain that the
early Georgian writers were no longer determined to do medicine without
34. Stahl's so-called animism was one of the very few things that
Boerhaave threw bitter criticism against. See Herman Boerhaave,
Institutions in Physick, trans. by Joseph Browne (London: Jonah Browne,
1714), xiii-xiv.
35. Bryan Robinson, A Treatise of the Animal Oeconomy, 2nd ed.
(Dublin: S. Powell, 1734), pp.179-80.
36. Cheyne, The English Malady, pp.69 and 308.
37. Mead, The Medical Works of Richard Mead, pp.314-iS. For
Porterfield's challenge to the mechanical medicine, see John P. Wright,
'Metaphysics and Physiology: Mind, Body, and the Animal Economy in
Eighteenth-Century Scotland,' in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish
Enlightenment, ed. by M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 251-
301, esp. 264-76.
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the soul and were ready to look at the issues related with the
sou1/mind.
Accordingly, the early Georgian writers characterized hysteria and
hypochondria with liberal use of language related to the mind and its
higher faculties. Following Sydenham, Chambers' Cyclopaedia wrote that
when the disease gets serious, 'the patient is more affected in mind than
in body'; Nicholas Robinson (1697-1775) wrote that spleen or vapours
'appeare more immediately to affect the mind, and disconcert the powers
of the intellectual faculties'; Cheyne claimed that serious spleen and
vapours is attended with 'a deep and fixed melancholy, wandering and
delusory images on the brain, and instability and unsettledness in all the
intellectual operations.'39
Indeed, the mental faculties that were considered to be damaged
were something higher than sense and motion, in which the iatro-
mathematicians' madness consisted. Blackmore wrote that illusory
disorders like 'vertigo, a ringing noise in the ears, sad and monstrous
dreams, nightmares' were not the genuine mental symptoms of the spleen
but 'corporeal, and respect the organical parts of the human animal.'
When the disease reaches at a more severe stage, 'there are many besides
that affect the mind, and disturb the superior commanding powers.'4°
The disorders in the higher intellectual faculties were thus reintroduced as
the hallmark of the 'mental' diseases.
38. Here I do not entirely agree with Wright's claim that Porterfield and
Cheyne 'believed that the Townshend case provided a kind of crucial
experiment which challenged the claim of Boerhaave and his followers that
the mind cannot affect the vital and natural motions of the body.' (Wright,
'Metaphysics and Physiology,' 271.) This was certainly the case with
Porterfield, but not with Cheyne. Cheyne just gave the narrative and left
its explanation to readers, which Porterfield recast into the crucial
experiments against Cartesian scheme. To paint Cheyne as a determined
animist does not seem appropriate.
39. Chambers' Cyclopaedia, 'Hypochondriac Affection'; Robinson, A New
System of the Spleen, p.228; Cheyne, The English Malady, p.199.
40. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, p.24.
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The restoration of the mind into medicine was exemplified also in
the cure of hysteria and hypochondria. Richard Browne's Medicina
Musica makes a sharp contrast with Mead's purely bodily account of the
curative effect of music on delirium. For Mead, the reason why music
cured the delirium caused by the bite of a tarantula was that the tremors
of the nerves caused by the undulating sound-wave broke down unnatural
coagulation in the blood, and that the joy of listening to the music
prompted 'more frequent and stronger pulse.' 4' For Browne, this
exclusively bodily interrpretation was not entirely the case. Cure was
achieved by the effect of music on the depressed mind per Se:
In nervous disorders, such as the hypochondriack, hysterick, and
melancholick afections, singing will be much conductive to the cure:
for as in these diseases the mind is fill'd with gloomy dejecting
ideas, and the body labours under a deficiency of spirits, and as by
singing we may possibly strike the ear to pleasingly as to affect the
mind, as divert our anxious thoughts, by the succession of the brisk
and lively ideas of the tune; we may certainly by this means chear
and elevate the soul, and by sympathy invigorate the motion of the
spirits.42
Music could divert sad ideas, invite cheerful ones, and cure the spleen:
Mead would have tried hard to underpin the process with exclusively
somatic mechanism. On the other hand, Browne was hardly a proponent
of exclusively 'psychological' therapy of mental diseases. His another
statement on the curative effect of singing was no less somatic than
Mead's: 'I have suppos'd that singing, etc. contribute to the cure, only as
41. Richard Mead, The Mechanical Account of the Poisons (London: R.
Smith, 1702), p.72.
42. Browne, Medicina Musica, pp.28-9.
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they help to invigorate the [animal] spirits.' 43 This shows that the strict
dichotomy between the mechanical-somatic psychiatry and psychic-
psychological one did not exist in the period. Although there had been the
rigorous 'somatic' school of the iatro-mathematicians, yet not following the
school did not necessarily mean that one had to be a determined supporter
of psychological medicine.
c) Intellectual and/or emotional mental diseases.
Hysteria and hypochondria thus involved certain damage on the
'mind' of the sufferers. What kind of damage was it then? How did the
physicians understand the mental aspects of the diseases, especially when
they already had the more established mental diseases, i.e. mania and
melancholia?
Depending partly on the traditional link between hypochondria and
melancholia, the early Georgian medical writers understood the newly
fashionable mental diseases as something analogous to melancholia,
characterizing them by the symptom of depression. Cheyne wrote to
Richardson, that the 'hyp' was a distemper 'attended with lowness of
spirits'; John Burton (1710-71), the reputed model of 'Dr. Slop' in Tristram
Shandy, when writing about the passions of fear and sorrow, referred only
to 'hypochondriac and hysteric affections' as if they were the best examples
of fear and sorrow.45 Splenetic valetudinarianism was interpreted as
melancholic fanciful despair on one's health or on the hope of recovery:
43. Browne, Medicina Musica, p.1.
44. As for eighteenth-century example of 'hypochondriac melancholy,' see
Herman Boerhaave, Aphorisms, p.294. Boerhaave wrote that when
melancholy fluids 'gradually stop, be accumulated and stagnate in the
hypochondriac vessels, then [the disease] is called an hypochondriac
disease, or in usual terms in England, the spleen.'
45. Cheyne, The Letters to Samuel Richardson, p.59, and John Burton, A
Treatise on the Non-naturals (York: A. Staples, 1738), pp.338-39.
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Sydenham observed that 'it being the nature of this disease to be attended
with incurable despair; so that they cannot bear with patience to be told
that there is hopes of their recovery.' With the pivot of sadness and
despair, the link between the spleen and melancholia was reinforced in the
early eighteenth century.
Many indeed went further to claim that there was little difference
between the two pairs of hysteria/hypochondria and mania/melancholia,
and hysteria and hypochondria were understood as milder analogues of
mania and melancholia.47 Blackmore, for example, wrote:
The limits and partitions that bound and discriminate the highest
hypochondriac and hysterick disorders, and melancholy, lunacy, and
phrenzy, are so nice, that it is not easy to distinguish them, and set
the boundaries where one ends, and other begins.
On the other hand, they did not think mania-melancholia and
hysteria-hypochondria were identical. As for the former, the early
Georgian writers largely adopted the Cartesian model of madness as a
production of false ideas in the mind: Blackmore wrote that melancholy
is 'accompanied with great disturbance of the imagination and fancy, and
continued and uninterrupted flux or train of thoughts fixed upon on sad
object'; Robinson modelled mania exactly after Pitcairnian manner as an
epistemological disorder accompanied with incoherent motion caused by
46. Quoted in Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, p.222. See
also Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.213.
47. See Max Byrd, Visits to Bedlam: Madness and Literature in the
Eighteenth Century (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1974),
pp.1 16-22.
48. Blackmore, A Treatise on the Spleen, pp.163-4. See also Robinson, A
New System of the Spleen, pp.199, 228 and 230. Cheyne seems to have
been of a different opinion. He made more strong distinction between
hypochondria and hysteria and lunacy. Unfortunately, he did not spell out
the differences. See Cheyne, The English Malady, pp.254-55.
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violent shock on the seat of the soul, writing that it takes place when 'the
impulses [yj. , nervous fibres] are strongly struck on the seat of the common
sense, and the rational soul [is] divested of all its noble and distinguishing
endowments.'49 The early Georgian picture of mania and melancholia
remained very much the same as the Cartesian and the iatro-mathematical
ones. It consisted in a shock on the seat of sensation, false ideas, and
disordered motions. It was framed around man's ability to perceive the
external world and to act accordingly.
Hysteria and hypochondria did not consist in delusion, however.
The diseases were more conceived as the inconstancy of the mood, rather
than stark illusion. Probably following Sydenham, who observed that
hysteric patients 'are only settled in inconstancy,' Blackmore wrote that the
major mental affections of the diseases were found in 'unsteady and
changeable judgment, purpose, diversity and inconstancy in their temper
and passion,' and 'fluctuation of judgment, and swift turns in forming and
reversing of opinions and resolutions, inconstancy, timidity, absence of
mind, want of self-determining power, inattention, incogitancy, diffidence,
suspicion, and an aptness to take well-meant things amiss.'5° Robinson
gave a more detailed description:
And they are thus wavering and unsteady in their judgment, neither
do they observe a rectitude in any one action of life: now they love
a person to excess, presently after they hate him in the other
extreme; anon they resolve to do such an action, a moment after
they alter their purpose, and take directly contrary measures; so
that thro' the whole scene of their lives, you shall always observe
them constant to nothing but inconstancy; always wavering,
unsteady, and fearful of doing wrong, in the most trifling concerns
49. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, p.156; Robinson, A New System
of the Spleen, pp.241 & 29 1-92.
50. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, pp.26 & 107.
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of life: yet in all other respects, as ingenious, well-disposed people,
as you would desire to converse them.51
The hysterics and hypochondriacs represented here do not lose touch with
the external world: they neither see pink elephants, nor mistake themselves
for a glass pitcher. They just did not act in an ordinaiy, predicable and
expected way. And there was little effort to adjust the epistemological
disorder of madness and the unpredictable mood of hysteria and
hypochondria.52 The discrepancy was largely left open.
Thus we have the confusing and apparently confused picture of
hysteria and hypochondria. They were said to be almost indistinguishable
from mania and melancholia. On the other hand, the described symptoms
of the two pairs of mental diseases were significantly different. How
should we read this extremely amorphous construction of the mind
affected by hysteria and hypochondria? Part of the answer lies in the
contemporaly understading of the diseases. The complexity of the
symptoms was a built-in part of the eighteenth-century understanding of
hysteria and hypochondria, for, again following Sydenham, they were
frequently referred to as 'proteus,' a disease that imitates a lot of other
diseases.53 Given that protean nature of hysteria, there is no wonder that
it was accompanied by the symptoms proper to mania and melancholia.
Besides, we are able to make a tentative assessment of the more
fundamental way in which the early Georgian doctors understood mental
diseases. As is evident from their claim that the spleen and madness were
51. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.214.
52. See, however, John Purcell, A Treatise of Vapours. or Hysteric Fits
(London: Edward Place, 1707), pp.124-29.
53. See Chambers' Cyclopaedia, 'Hypochondriac affection.' As late as
1769, a summary book of medicine says that 'there are no distempers
which assume such a variety of forms, as those called nervous; and there
are few complaints which they do not resemble or mimick.' A
Compendium of Physic. and Surgery. for the Use of Young Practitioners
(London: J. Nourse, 1769), p.141.
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almost indistinguishable, any rigid framework which would have
distinguished emotional from intellectual disorders, disturbance of mood
from epistemological failure, let alone neurosis from psychosis, was alien
to them.M Instead of a separate framework, they had a gradual scale.
Something that differentiates stark madness from the spleen existed, and
this something consisted in the difference in intensity of affliction. Early
eighteenth-century medicine stopped just there and did not think about
going further to clarify actually where and how milder nervous diseases
ended and stark madness started. The medical writers at that time did not
pose themselves the problem of separating the mad from the nervous.
Asking them to spell out that something is asking them a question which
they did not recognize.
d) The problem of the mind-body interaction
I have concentrated on the aspect of the mental disturbances in
hysteria and hypochondria. The diseases were, however, not exclusively
mental. Unlike maniacs who were found as healthy as (or even healthier
than) normal people in bodily terms, patients of the nervous diseases were
accompanied with a host of bodily symptoms.55 As well as the symptoms
of the disorders in the mind, the patients showed such bodily symptoms as
impaired digestive faculty, degeneration in the concoctive power of the
ventricle, windy affluvia, paroxysms, pain, palpitation and trembling of the
54. For a good summary of the idea on disorders on affection, see G.E.
Berrios, 'The Psychopathology of Affectivity: Conceptual and Historical
Aspects,' Psychological Medicine, 1985, 15: 745-58; Ernest R. Hilgard, 'The
Trilogy of Mind: Cognition, Affection, and Conation,' Jour.Hist.Behav.Sci,
1980, 16: 107-17. See also Esther Fischer-Homberger, 'Hypochondriasis
of the Eighteenth Century--Neurosis of the Present Century,'
Bull.Hist.Med., 1972, 46: 391-401.
55. The idea that maniacs are healthier than ordinary people is expressed
in Richard Mead, Medical Precepts and Cautions, cited in Hunter and
Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, p.388; William Battie, A Treatise on
Madness (London: J. Whiston et al, 1758), p.61.
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heart, vertigo, giddiness, dulness, dimness of the sight, and a ringing noise
in the ears?6 Here again at work was gradation from bodily symptoms
to mental ones instead of rigid dichotomy between the spleen that affected
the body and the spleen that tormented the mind.
In terms of the causes, the medical writers on hysteria and
hypochondria were straightforward in embracing the somato-psychic
causation of the diseases. As I have already examined, they were caused
by the disorder in the nervous fibres. This, however, does not mean that
the mind there played only a passive role in the pathology.57 Frequent
account was made about ill and beneficial effects of the passions of the
soul upon the bodily health as well as somato-psychic ones. 58 Cheyne
wrote about both directions: 'The bodily machine, disordered or spoiled,
will sink, debase, blunt and confound the operations of the spirit; and the
spirit violently agitated, or too closely confin'd, will disturb the oeconomy
of the bodily functions.' 59 Edward Strother (1675-1737) maintained that
'small-pox have been introduc'd by excessive anger'; John Armstrong
(1709- 1779), in his didactic medical poem, wrote that while 'the mind, with
56. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, pp.17-26. See also James, A
Medicinal Dictionary, 'Hypochondria, Morbus.'
57. C.E. McMahon, 'The Role of Imagination in the Disease Process: Pre-
Cartesian History,' Psychological Medicine, 1976, 6: 179-84. Theodore M.
Brown, 'Descartes, Dualism, and Psychosomatic Medicine,' in Th
Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the Histor y of Psychiatry, 3 vols., eds. by
W.F. Bynum et a!. (London: Tavistock, 1985-88), vol.1, 40-62; L.J. Rather,
Mind and Body in Eighteenth-Century Medicine, (London: The Welicome
Historical Medical Library, 1965), p.140.
58. Psycho-somatic influence was frequently discussed in the writings on
passions of the soul. See, John Burton, A Treatise on the Non-naturals,
pp334-4O, 'Of Affections of the Mind,' and William Clarke, A Medical
Dissertation concerning the Effects of the Passions on Human Bodies
(London: W. Frederick, 1752). Clarke's work was first published in Latin
at Leiden in 1727 as his dissertation done under Boerhaave.
59. George Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen. together with Five Discourses.
Medical. Moral and Philosophical (London: C. Rivington, 1740), p.158.
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various thought amus'd / Nor aches itself, nor give the body pain ... 'Tis
painful thinking that corrodes our clay.'60
The scheme behind the interaction was essentially Cartesian
philosophical framework, i.e., the interaction of pure matter and the soul.
Hence there was no Willisian corporeal soul, nor the matter specially
endowed with the power to think, which Locke suggested hypothetically to
cause an avalanche of protests. 61	Nicholas Robinson took an
unmistakable Cartesian position, when he wrote as follows:
The mind can reason, act, and think without any assistance from
the body; nor can we conceive how the finest fibres, the purest
blood, or most exalted spirits, can ever inspire the bodies of ours
with thought, reason, and reflection; they are foreign to a capacity
of thinking, and as distant from reflection as the very bones that
support the machine, though subtiliz'd to the highest degree of
spirituality by all the process of nature.62
With no intermediate 'third' agent endowed with the power to think
or feel, doctors made recourse to Malebranche's or Leibniz's
transcendental solution: God's intervention or design. Boerhaave, the
60. Edward Strother, An Essay on Sickness and Health (London, 1725),
p.441, cited in Sena, 'The English Malady,' p.5; John Armstrong, The Art
of Preserving Health: a Poem, (London: A. Millar, 1744), p.105.
61. I shall discuss in detail medical reactions to Locke's thinking matter
hypothesis in the next chapter.
62. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.26. See also David Bayne
Kinneir, A New Essay on the Nerves, and the Doctrine of the Animal
Spirits Rationally Considered (London: W. Innys et al., 1738), p.17.
Richard Bentley, for example, wrote no 'species of matter, as the brain and
animal spirits, hath any power of sense and perception.' See Richard
Bentley, Matter and Motion Cannot Think (London: T. Parkhusrt et a!.,
1692), p.16. Here I don't agree with Sena's claim that the animal spirit in
the eighteenth-century was 'a third substance, not quite matter and not
quite immaterial.' (Sena, 'The English Malady,' p.11)
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mentor of the many of the early Georgian medical writers, supported the
Leibnizian version.63 Echoing Boerhaave, Robinson wrote that 'God
form'd us; and thus he has ordain'd, that material should obey the
direction of immaterial, and immaterial of material beings. Thus matter
moves thought, and thought matter.M
It would be, however, misleading to paint Boerhaave, Robinson,, and
many others as preaching Leibnizian or Malebranchean model of the
interaction. Boerhaave did not positively believe in the pre-established
harmony. Rather, he made a reluctant choice, writing that Leibniz's
solution 'leaves us equally in the dark with the other [Malebranclie's
occasionalism],' claiming that no model could successfully explain the
interactionP Of course, this does not mean that Boerhaave denied the
possibility of interaction. What he actually denied was the possibility of
explaining interaction:
we cannot understand or explain the manner in which the body and
mind reciprocally act upon each other from any consideration of
their nature separate; we can only remark by observation their
effect upon each other without explaining them.M
The message to medical students was clear: think mainly about the body,
look at the interaction when it takes place, describe the effects of the
interaction, but refrain from explaining the mystery of the interaction
because it is a waste of time.
63. Herman Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.1, p.69.
Boerhaave's idea on the mind-body interaction is aptly discussed in John
P. Wright, 'Boerhaave on Minds, Human Beings, and Mental Diseases,'
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 1990, 20: 289-302.
64. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.53.
65. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.1, p.69.
66. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.1, p.66.
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As I have argued in the previous chapter, Willis's and Charleton's
effort to provide an alternative to Descartes's model had faded by the end
of the seventeenth century. Boerhaave thus consolidated the attitude
already in the air, and the attitude of the early Georgian medical writers
was largely in keeping with Boerhaave's instruction. Although they made
some conjectures about the mind-body medium, what they were doing was
to identify where matter ends and they did not go beyond to discuss how
indeed matter and mind can interact. 67 To say (as Anita Guerrini has
done) that physicians at that time were trying to solve the 'Cartesian'
mind-body dualism is misleadingP The medical problem of dualism in
this period was concerned exclusively with the material side, taking the
existence of the interaction for granted and putting the gap in parentheses.
Once the medium is found, that is the end of the question. The difference
between medical and philosophical problems is epitomized in a passage
from Blackmore. Blackmore wrote that 'it is easy to conceive [my
emphasis] how these depraved, active instrument of the mind, by unique
and seditious connections, embroil her government and operations.'69
The gap between the material and the immaterial, the eternal mystery for
Descartes and the Cartesian philosophers, was 'easy to conceive' for
Blackmore a physician.
I have looked at medical and philosophical content of the early
Georgian writings on hysteria and hypochondria. Below I will turn to the
interface of the intellectual and extra-intellectual issues found there.
67. See, for instance, Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.78-9;
Perry, A Treatise of Diseases in General, pp. 161-66.
68. Anita Guerrini, 'Isaac Newton. George Cheyne, and the Principia
Medicinae,' in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, eds.
by Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989),
222-45.
69. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, p.35.
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Mind, Body and the Enlightenment
a) New Ideology of the body
As I have examined, the early Georgian medical writers could not
explain the interaction per Se. Nevertheless, they were confident in their
discovery of the 'mental' diseases of hysteria and hypochondria being "
caused by bodily disorder. In doing so, they were not making scientifically
grounded pathological statement. Instead, they were preaching to their
readers a new creed of faith that mental disorder was nothing but the
product of bodily disorder.
This is most evident in Nicholas Robinson's way of vindicating
bodily causations of the mental symptoms of the disease. Robinson wrote"
that the spleen had long been so mysterious a disease that 'some
gentlemen are so ready to resolve all into whim.' 7° In his attempt to
refute the view and to establish the bodily etiology of the disease, he did
not base his claim on any empirical observation:
I deny, that the thought themselves can ever start from a regular
way of thinking, without inferring, at the same time, a change in the
motions of the animal fibres: ... it's impossible that the mind can
suffer, and the body be unaffected at the same time, & vice
versa.7'
This says that the mental disturbance in the spleen is caused bodily, just
because every mental suffering must be accompanied with the
corresponding change in the body. In other words, 'Every change of the
70. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.175.
71. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.176.
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mind ... indicates a change in the bodily organ.' 72 He was not saying that
such and such part of the body was responsible for mental diseases: rather,
he was saying that when there was any mental phenomena, the cause had
to be looked for in the body.
The status of their discourse about the bodily basis of the mental
disease can be discerned in their style of writing as well. Let us listen to
Cheyne's pompous statement:
Upon the strictest enquiry, and most anxious examination, I could
never find a natural and philosophical cause for, or account of
ideotism, stupidity, loss of senses, memory, or judgment, or lunacy
or madness, or any of those distempers that are called cephalic or
nervous, or which is attended with a deviation from what is called
common sense, or just thinking, but an obstruction, extinction,
relaxation, or malformation of the proper organs.73
The grandiose overstatement ('upon the strictest enquiry') and the
sweeping generalization ('any of those distempers that are called cephalic
or nervous') were the style of missionary rather than of science.
Indeed, they were engaged in a sort of militant attack against the
opposing view and scornfully denied that the hypochondriac 'mental'
disturbances such as whims, inconstancy, and despair were the maladies
imaginaires of hard-to-please malcontents. In a satiric pamphlet,
Observation on the Spleen and Vapours, a valetudinarian idle person
complained of people's perception of his suffering:
72. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.178. I shall discuss the
metaphysical background of the statement in the next chapter.
73. George Cheyne, The Natural Method of Curing the Diseases of the
Body, and the Disorders of the Mind Depending on the Body (London:
Geo. Strahan, 1742), p.78.
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I perceive, says he, you have the same notion of my distemper, that
several others of your profession have had: you fancy I have got the
spleen, and that all my ailments are imaginary.74
This was the view which early Georgian writers tried to combat, and they
took almost every occasion to refute it and to preach their own. In his
letter to Samuel Richardson, Cheyne scolded the novelist, who probably
expressed an embarrassment against being labelled as 'hyp,' like Queen
Anne (1665-1714) sacking John Radcliffe (1650-1714) diagnosing her
complaint as 'vapours':
You have quite a wrong notion about the hyp, as in truth all but
sensible physicians have. We call the hyp every distemper attended
with lowness of spirits, whether it be flatulence from indigestion,
wind cholic, head-pains, or an relaxed state of the nerves ... so that
the hyp is only a short expression for any kind of nervous
disorders.75
Here the theory of nerves buttressed Cheyne's authoritative tone in
instructing the novelist. Hence it played the role of distancing 'sensible
physicians' and lay readers, as well as spreading the scientific knowledge.76
74. Sir John Midriff [pseud.], Observations on the Spleen and Vapours
(London: J. Roberts, 1721), p.9.
75. Cheyne, The Letters to Samuel Richardson, p.108. For Queen Anne,
see Roy Porter, The Mind-Forg'd Manacles, p.57.
76. For the power relationship between medical practitioner and lay
people, especially patients, see N.D. Jewson, 'Medical Knowledge and the
Patronage System in Eighteenth-Century England,' Sociology, 1974, 8: 369-
85; Roy Porter, 'Laymen, Doctors and Medical Knowledge in the
Eighteenth Century: the Evidence of the Gentleman's Magazine,' in
Patients and Practitioners: Lay Perceptions of Medicine in Pre-Industrial
Society, ed. by Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1985), 283-314.
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The mission of prevailing the true, scientific, and bodily
understanding of hysteria and hypochondria continued well into the late
eighteenth century. William Buchan (1729-1805) wrote in his Domestic
Medicine:
The low spirits, timorousness, melancholy, and fickleness of temper
which generally attend nervous disorders, induce many people to
believe that they are entirely diseases of the mind: but this change
of temper is rather a consequence, than the cause of nervous
diseases77
This quotation from 1769 shows that the mission was not a short-term
fashion limited in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. Neither did
the eagerness to preach depend on the pathological details the medical
writers embraced. Both solidists and fluidists believed that the disease was
real. While Cheyne and others wrote that the hyp was real disease as it
was located in the nerves, John Hill (1716?-1775) said it was 'a real, and
a sad disease' because it had its bodily seat in the 'obstruction of the
spleen, by thickened and distempered blood.'
We are, therefore, not looking at such and such technical medical
theory in a short term, but at the common assumption, or rather, dogma,
of longue dure. At issue here was the long-term Enlightenment crusade
which seems to have lasted the whole eighteenth century: the doctors then
were fighting the battle against the view that said the spleen was mental,
77. William Buchan, Domestic Medicine: or the Family Physician,
(Edinburgh: Balfour et al., 1769), p.508.
78. John Hill, Hypochondriasis: a Practical Treatise on the Nature and
Cure of that Disorder (London: for the Author, 1766), p.3 As for Hill, see
G.S. Rousseau, 'John Hill, Universal Genius manqué: Remarks on His
Life and Times, with a Checklist of His Works,' in The Renaissance Man
in the Eighteenth Century, eds. by J.A. Leo Lemry and G.S. Rousseau
(Los Angels: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1978), 45-129.
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which they find 'vulgar,' 'ignorant' and 'crnel.' The learned, scientific,
compassionate, progressive and bodily interpretation versus the vulgar,
unscientific, mental, traditionalist and cruel view. Few things epitomized
the ideal of the Enlightenment more aptly.8°
b) Body as the key to mental phenomena
The hypochondriacs were not the only target of the Enlightenment
medicalization of mental disturbances. Rather, as I have examined above,
the early Georgian medical writers were trying to make a sweeping claim--
all mental phenomena, diseases included, must somehow be caused by
corresponding bodily changes. Accordingly, they included a lot of mental
disturbances in the same category of somato-psychic diseases. Blackmore
wrote that religious melancholy was a bodily disease and hence a problem
of physicians rather than that of priests: the sufferers of the diseases 'must
more depend upon the art of the physician, and the force of medicine than
the skill and reasonings of the casuist, for their recovery.'8'
Not only the over-religious, but also the non-religious were regarded
as bodily disordered. As if echoing The Spectator which wrote that the
infidels and atheists 'are made up of pride, spleen and cavil,' Cheyne
thought that a disturbing freethinking libertine was actually disturbed in his
body: 'he is in a bad state of health, under a dangerous bodily disease, or
under a perpetual mal-regimen'; Robinson included 'religious madness'
79. Cheyne, The English Malady, p.117, Hill, Hvpochondriasis, p.3.
80. As for general characterization of the Enlightenment, see Peter Gay's
still useful The Enlightenment: an Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York:
Vintage, 1966-69); Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (London: MacMillan,
1990). There is a fast-growing body of literature on the Enlightenment
and the body, which I have not extensively consulted. Roy Porter, 'Bodies
of Thought: Thoughts about the Body in Eighteenth-Century England,'
includes useful historiographical assessment of the topic.
81. Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, p.160.
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and 'atheistical madness' in his list of the bodily-caused mental disorder.82
In their sweeping reduction of religious melancholy, enthusiasm, and
atheism to bodily distemper, Blackmore, Cheyne, and Robinson seem to
have represented the long-term shift from the late sixteenth- and early
seventeenth-century, when the physicians like Timothy Bright and André
du Laurens were eager to maintain that there should be two sorts of
mental disturbances, one being organic mental ailment, the other purely
mental one with no organic disorder accompanying. The early Georgian
medical writers no longer admitted the 'purely mental' disturbances,
neither did they think any mental disturbances should be left to the hand
of divines.
It is extremely difficult to specify when the shift started, but one
possible sign of it was Robert Burton's and Henry More's attack on
religious melancholy and enthusiasm in the mid-seventeenth century.
Eighteenth-century bodily interpretation of mental disturbances was partly
the continuation of the tactics of Burton and More. As I have mentioned
in Chapter One, they medicalized their polemic against Puritans and
enthusiasts and debased their claim to holy inspiration to mad delusion.
Robinson's claim that Methodists and French Prophets were mad because
of their bodily disorder was just an eighteenth-century version of Burton's
and More's attack against undesirable religious sects in medical or pseudo-
medical format."
82. Addison and Steele, The Spectator, no.38 1; Cheyne, The Natural
Method, p.&4; Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.239-40 and 246-
47. The Spectator also associated over-religious persons with the spleen
in no.491.
83. See, inter alia, Michael Heyd, 'The Reaction to Enthusiasm in the
Seventeenth Century: towards an Integrative Approach,' Journal of
Modern History, 1981, 53: 258-80.
84. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.246-47. For French
Prophet, see Hillel Schwartz, Knaves. Fools. Madmen, and that Subtile
Effluvium: a Study of the Opposition to the French Prophets in England.
151
There was, however, substantial difference between seventeenth-
century invectives against the wrong religious sects and early Georgian
medicalization of hysteric, hypochondriac, religious-melancholic, and free-
thinking mental disturbances. In reducing the religious or anti-religious
mental disturbances to bodily diseases, the early Georgian writers were not
constructing a polemic against such and such disturbing religious sects.
Their polemic was directed not to the sufferers of the disturbance in the
mind. Rather, they were bodily sick, hence were objects of pity,
compassion, and medical treatment, instead of contempt and elimination.
The real enemy was those who were not medically and scientifically
learned. The main impetus seems to have been the determination to
instruct their readers into believing the bodily causation of the mental
disturbances (which is most evident in Cheyne scolding Richardson). They
were not principally fighting a battle between right and wrong religions,
but that between those who were scientifically learned and Enlightened
and those who were not.
Another twist is that the body was not only regarded as sickening
but also improving the mind. Of course, optimism about improving the
mind by medical intervention to the body was not their own creation, but
had already been expressed by, for example, Descartes in his Discourse on
Method. Their contribution was that they provided detailed self-help
1706-17 10 (Gainesville, Florida: The University Press of Florida, 1978).
Roy Porter, 'The Rage of Party,' 39-4 1, discusses aearly eighteenth-century
reactions against enthusiasm.
85. Whether or not lay people were persuaded into believing the bodily
interpretation of mental disturbances is not clear. Although Lady Mary
Wortley Montagu wrote to her daughter that 'madness is as much a
corporal distemper as the gout or asthma,' my very limited look at relevant
materials does not allow generalization. Lady Mary's remark is cited in
George Rousseau, 'Science,' in The Eighteenth Centur y, ed. by Pat Rogers
(London: Methuen, 1978), 187.
86. René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., eds.
by John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1985-91), vol.1,
p.143: 'For even the mind depends so much on the temperament and
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manuals for bodily improvement of the mind and reached a far wider
audience. What Descartes prophesied as a wild dream in the technical
and philosophical text was transformed in the Enlightenment England into
digestible how-to manuals.
Accordingly, it was frequently recommended to refine one's body
in order to improve one's mind. Cheyne wrote:
the perfection, and full, free and just use of the intellectual
faculties, depends, in a great measure, on the soundness and health
of the bodily machin, more particularly of the organs of these
intellectual faculties.87
Cheyne almost said that if one follows proper diet, one can be a Newton.
The Newton in Cheyne's books was not a divinely inspired genius of the
Romantics, but a man who kept his body healthy and fit for intellectual
activity: men of great intelligence 'maintained their superiority of parts,
their penetration, attention, just and close thinking, by extreme
temperance.'
The body was supposed to develop moral virtues as well as keen
intelligence. Cheyne maintained that 'calmness, serenity, chearfulness and
common sense, and an esteem and love of virtue ... are the constant
disposition of the bodily organs that if it is possible to find some means of
making men in general wiser and more skilful than they have been up till
now, I believe we must look for it in medicine.'
87. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, pp.166-67. Robinson wrote 'the bodily
organs, and especially those on which [soul's] operation immediately
depend, vary mightily, by which the exercise of its faculties are lessen'd or
improv'd.' Robinson, A New System of Spleen, p.31.
88. Cheyne, The Natural Method, p.82. For changing images of Newton
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see Richard Yeo,
'Genius, Method, and Morality: Images of Newton in Britain, 1760-1860,'
Science in Context, 1988, 2: 257-86.
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attendants, and only infallible symptoms of perfect bodily health.' Even
when Cheyne admitted that the moral and intellectual powers of the mind
were mutually dependent, he thought that the one could improve the other
only y body:
The restoration [of intellectual faculties] must be brought about by
the culture of the moral qualities, which perfect and develop the
natural ones, and thereby purify and sublime the [bodily] vehicle,
extend and form intellectual organs.9°
Moral qualities of the mind thus enabled one to refine the body by
temperance, then the refined body improves the intellect. In other words,
the moral power could 'mend and improve the bodily health by
temperance and abstinence, and consequently rectify and tune the organs
of the intellectual faculties.'91
The body was therefore the vehicle of the improvement of the
mind, rather than its enemy. One must refine the mind by taming the
body and by making it a suitable instrument of the mind:
Our bodies ... cannot be brought into absolute subjection and
obedience; but we may readily bring them to the present docility
and subjection we have of the domestic animals; by timeously
bridling, trammeling and disciplining them, i.e., by feeding them
coolly and sparingly, giving them due air, exercise and cleanness,
89. Cheyne, The Natural Method, pp.84-85.
90. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, p.167.
91. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, pp.165-66. His advice to the Countess
of Huntington tells the same assumption. See Cheyne, The Letters to the
Countess of Huntingdon, p.10.
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and physicking them properly when they grow rampant, rebellious,
or obstreperous?
Neither complete denial of the flesh nor going out of one's body into pure
spiritual realm was Cheyne's way to mental perfection. Instead, Cheyne
adopted a more this-worldly view, and said that the proper care of the
body was vital for spiritual perfection.
c) 'The Rise of Modern Paganism'?
For the early-Georgian doctors, especially for Cheyne, taking care
of one's mind meant par excellence taking care of one's body, one's diet
and life-style. Cheyne was preaching: keep temperance, eat and drink
proper things in a proper amount, and take exercise, and you will be
intellectual, virtuous and a good Christian. The bodily influence on the
mind indeed overshadowed philosophical and religious mental instruction:
Different natural complexions of the soul and intellectual faculties,
and different improvements from education, philosophy, or religion,
may make some small odds in the behaviour of different persons
under these disorders. But this depends much upon the degrees of
distemper, and the original frame and make of the body.93
Here underlies a potentially subversive claim that moral and religious
instruction is less important than the bodily one. The former could make
only 'some small odds' and what really mattered was the body. Cheyne
himself admitted that his prescription was essentially secular one. Trying
to persuade Richardson to follow a thin diet, he wrote:
92. Cheyne, The Natural Method, p.87.
93. Cheyne, The English Malady, p.2.
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It is true that you are not a physician, but you are I hope a
Christian. St Paul kept his body under. Our saviour bids us fast
and pray and deny ourselves without exception. But for this there
is no need of revelation advice. [my emphasis] If you read but what
I have written in this last in the Essay on Regimen [and] in long
Life and Health ... your own good sense would readily assure
you?4
Although this tells the novelist to follow Jesus and keep temperate, the
rationale of the instruction the physician gives is medical, not religious.
This, however, does not mean that Cheyne and his fellow
Enlightenment physicians were infidels or supporters of the 'modern
paganism.' Militant medical scientific Enlightenment did not necessarily
mean militant secularism?5 Indeed many of the medical writers I have
looked at were active in buttressing Christianity? Blackmore defended
immortality of the soul and attacked atheists and Arians; Cheyne was very
pious and found by the Countess of Huntingdon (who was a Methodist) to
have 'the most refined notions of the true spiritual religion I almost ever
met with.' They were not a La Mettrie (1709-175 1), who turned mid-
94. From Cheyne to Richardson, Jan 10 174 1-2. In The Letters ... to
Samuel Richardson, p.81.
95. As for classical interpretation of the Enlightenment as 'the rise of
modern paganism,' see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. Roy Porter aptly
criticized Gay's expansion of the French model to England. See Roy
Porter, 'The Enlightenment in England,' 6.
96. Porter, 'The Enlightenment in England,' 6.
97. Richard Blackmore, Essays upon Several Subjects, 2 vols. (London: E.
Carli et al., 1716), vol.1, pp.291-356, 'An Essay upon the Immortality of the
Soul,' and vol.2, pp.1-166, 'An Essay upon Atheism'; Cheyne, The Letters
to the Countess of Huntingdon, viii. G.S. Rousseau suspects that
Cheyne belonged a mystical religious sect in G.S. Rousseau, 'Mysticism
and Millenarianism: "Immortal Dr. Cheyne," in Millenarianism and
Messianism in English Literature and Thought 1650-1800, ed. by R.H.
Popkin (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1988), 8 1-126.
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century medical theory into the most formidable weapon against the
established Christian metaphysics of immaterial and immortal soul, nor a
Helvétius (1715-1771), who wrote that Christianity did only harm to the
education of the human mindY
Neither did the contemporary religious profession find the
physicians' bodily explanation as a threat to religion. One can indeed
detect a clergyman's readiness to accept the medical view of hypochondriac
low-spiritedness and religious melancholy. As early as 1692, John Moore
(1646-1714), chaplain to William and Mary, delivered a sermon Qf
Religious Melancholy, in which he stated that the so-called religious
melancholy was 'distempers of the body, rather than faults of the mind.'
As the century went on, a more explicit debt to medical literature
came to be expressed. In his pamphlet published in 1750, Lewis
Southcomb, the rector of Roseash, Devon, described the emotional
disorder of religious depression in a more medicalized language. Unlike
some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers on the 'physick of the
soul,' Southcomb did not make a watertight distinction between the
sickness of the mind and bodily diseases. Although he still admitted that
there are two sorts of depression, 'a wounded conscience convicted by a
sense of sin' and 'a wounded spirit proceeding from a disordered body,' he
98. La Mettrie's materialism has been nicely discussed in Aram Vartanian,
La Mettrie's "L'Homme machine" (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1960); idem,
Diderot and Descartes: a Study of Scientific Naturalism in the
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1953). An attempt to
contextualize La Mettrie in the Enlightenment has been made in Kathleen
Weliman, 'Medicine as a Key to Defining Enlightenment Issues: the Case
of Julien Ofiray de La Mettrie,' Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture,
1987, 17: 75-89. For Helvétius, see Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 'Helvétius'
by Aram Vartanian; Claude A. Helvétius, De l'ésprit or Essays on the
Mind (1810: New York: Burt Franldin, 1970).
99. Cited in Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, pp.252-253.
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bowed to Cheyne's authority and welcomed medical know1edge.
Citing Cheyne, he adopted medical discourse to admit that it was so
difficult to recognize the diseases that both clergymen and laymen had
been deceived into believing that the complaints were mere fancy and
whims. 10' To avoid this mistake, the religious profession should work
with the medical one:
If the case be such as appertains truly to Conscience, then divines
are the best judges, and we ought to be directed by them. But if
the case be such as appertains not at all to casuistical divinity, or
if there be a mixture partly appertaining to conscience, and partly
to distemper, there will be but little satisfaction given by the divine,
without the help of the physicians.102
Later in the century, a dissenting minister Benjamin Fawcett (1715-1780)
published Observations on the Nature. Causes and Cure of Melancholy
(1780), to express his hope for medical help to treat religious melancholy:
I am the more desirous to avail myself of the judgment of the best
writers in medicine, because it is very difficult to convince persons
afflicted with melancholy, that their distemper arises from the body,
and is from thence communicated to the mind; and because the
100. Lewis Southcomb, Peace of Mind and Health of Body United
(London: M.Cooper, 1750). He was admitted to The Queens' College,
Cambridge, in 1701. British Library catalogue attributes seven publications
to him, some of which seem to have been written by his father of the same
name.
101. Southcomb, Peace of Mind, p.15.
102. Southcomb, Peace of Mind, p.26.
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friends of such are so prone to mistake the case, ... to pronounce it
nothing but the effect of imagination or vapours;'°3
No antagonism is found here between the medical, scientific, and bodily
world view and the religious one, and the split was rather assumed
between those medically learned (clergymen included) and those not.
Peter Gay's Enlightenment militant secular paganism did not take place
in the bodily interpretation of the mental and often religious disturbances
in early Georgian England. Although the English physicians claimed that
the mental and religious disturbances were actually bodily disorders and
hence belonged to physician's domain, they did not open fire at religion
and the religious profession. The religious profession, too, seem to have
been friendly to the medicalization of mental disturbance, believing in the
expertise of the Enlightened medical profession.
I have examined how the early eighteenth-centuiy medical
construction of the hysteric and hypochondriac mind and the body can be
contextualized into the English Enlightenment. The medical discourse on
the diseases involved another construction--the society which engendered
the nervous diseases, which I will discuss in the next section.
Hysteric/Hypochondriac Man and Society
a) Environment and the human mind
Hysteria and hypochondria were almost unanimously understood as
the disease local to England. Replacing Gideon Harvey's (1640-1700)
consumption as seventeenth-century morbus anglicus, the English,
foreigners, lay travellers and medical professors identified hysteria and
hypochondria as an English malady. The discourse about the rationale of
103. Benjamin Fawcett, Observations on the Nature. Causes and Cure of
Melancholy: Especially of That Which is Commonly Called Religious
Melancholy (Shrewsbury: J. Eddows, 1780), p.3.
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locating the diseases in England was based on the natural and social
environmental argument, another feature commonly attributed to the
Enlightenment.104
The major proponent of the natural and social environmental
characterization of the English Malady was Cheyne, whose socio-cultural
account of the English malady has been perceptively discussed by Roy
Porter. Besides being the disease caused by natural factors like moist air
and variable weather, Cheyne's English malady was a mental disease of the
Enlightened civilization--a high, rich, urbane, and sedentaiy life, with
abundance of exotic food, evening entertainment, and all sorts of
unhealthy luxuries brought about by the flourishing economy. 105 On the
contrary, those who lived a primitive life were not susceptible to the
diseases. Flattering the sick novelist, Cheyne wrote to Richardson that 'all
below farmers have few or no natural distempers' and 'outlive three or
four landlords at an average.' 1°6 Unlike robust farmers, the modish,
polite and intelligent must suffer from nervous complaints, because:
those whose eminence and dignity consists in their head, faculties,
and spiritual nature ... or, in one word, ... those who govern ... have
more delicate and elastic organs of thinking and sensibility, ... they
104.For the medical construction of environment in late Enlightenment,
see L.J. Jordanova, 'Earth Science and Environmental Medicine: the
Synthesis of the Late Enlightenment,' In Images of the Earth: Essays in
the History of the Environmental Sciences, eds. by U. Jordanova and Roy
Porter (Chalfont St Giles: BSHS, 1979), 119-46. Philosophes'
consideration of the influence of environmental factors on civilization is
discussed in Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967), pp.551-622. See 'Environment and
Culture' in DHI by the same author.
105. Roy Porter, 'Introduction' to George Cheyne, The English Malady,
xxvi-x,odi.
106. Cheyne, The Letters to Samuel Richardson, p.76.
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are like fine lancets or razors, that coarse usage will soon ruffle and
spoil.1°7
The human mind is, therefore, malleable through environmental influence.
Manual labour produced a duml, mind, those fit for intellectual labour
were endowed with finer instrument, but urban luxurious living spoils the
fine instruments for thinking and engenders nervous disturbances.
Cheyne was not the only figure to bring natural and social
environmental issues into the discussion of the human mind, its
dispositions and diseases. Blackmore was another to provide a substantial
account of the problem, to give almost unbridled praise for England
(unlike Cheyne's rather mixed feeling). His syllogism to prove the
superiority of the English mind ran as follows. As the cause of the spleen
is 'the animal spirits, stimulated, enlivened, and refln'd ... to a greater
degree than they are in others,' it follows that 'those who are endow'd with
a moderate portion of the spleen in their complexion, are persons of
superior sense, and extraordinaiy vivacity of imagination.' The spleen is,
by the way, 'a quality almost peculiar to this nation.' Ergo, England is the
land blessed with a lot of geniuses like Milton, Locke, Newton, Wren, etc.,
and Britons are more original than, say, the French, the Spanish, the
Italian.108
Blackinore underpinned his argument in his relatively little known
work, The Nature of Man, a Poem (1711). There, he stated that the aim
of the book was to show:
how far the disparity of the intellectual faculties dispositions and
passions of men is owing to the different situation of their native
countries in respect of the sun; and to shew what advantage those
107.Cheyne, The Natural Method, pp.82-3.
108.Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, pp.258-6l; idem, The Nature of
Man, a Poem (London: Sam Backley, 1711), p.18.
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receive, who are born in a mild air and temperate climate; and
what disadvantages, in respect of understanding, and moral
improvements, those nations lye under, who suffer the extream
either of cold or heat.109
According to this scheme which sounds similar to that of
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, Blackmore mapped different types of
climate and corresponding mental dispositions.uo Where people are
exposed to too strong sunbeams and extreme heat, 'their spirits suffer by
too hot a ray / and their dry brain grows dark with too much day.'
Accordingly, the residents in hot countries such as the Congo, Aethiopia,
and Atlas had 'a disposition so unapt for thought' and 'various passions of
destructive kind.' 11 ' On the other hand, in the areas such as Iceland,
Greenland, and Muscovia, because of excessive coldness and poor diet, the
people's blood is 'unsprightly, coarse, and unfermented': hence their spirits
are thick, lazy and sluggish and their mind tends to stupidity, and they fit
only for manual labour: 'the hard natives of the frozen soil / robust of
sinew, and prepar'd for toil, patient of sweat can unexhausted bear / the
soldier's buckler, or the huntsman's spear." 12 Neither the hot nor the
cold areas were beneficial for civilized human intellectual activities: they
were lands of robust vengeful fighters and dumb manual workers, the
direct opposite to the polite, civilized, urbane creatures, who were product
of mild climate. In contrast with the two zones of extreme climates, 'the
middle realms, that stretch between the Northern Circles and the tropic
109.Blackmore, The Nature of Man, ii.
110. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. by Anne M.
Cohier (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989), esp. pp.231-45.
111. Blackmore, The Nature of Man, pp.4-7. The mental diseases typical
to the people in hot countries was stark madness, which Blackmore
stressed is quite different from the English spleen, the secret of English
genius. See also Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen, p.258.
112. Blackmore, The Nature of Man, pp.10-13.
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line' were 'a kinder seat to human nature.' Because of the mild climate
there, the secretion of the animal spirits from the blood was done in an
ideal manner, and the spirits were 'Apt to perform the mind's supreme
command.'113
After setting up the middle realms (especially Western Europe) as
the most beneficial site to the human mind, Blackmore started to
differentiate several countries therein. Here the measure of discrimination
was socio-political. Blackmore noticed that a beneficial political system
was necessary for a desirable flourishing of culture. Britain was, he wrote,
blessed with the right government, laws, and religion: 'I prefer the
moderate monarchy of Great Britain established and regulated by laws,
and all other constitutions fram'd and erected to that excellent model, to
any species of government whatsoever.' 114 Italy and France, despite all
its cultural refinement, lacked proper religion and government. The
people there were under a wrong papist religion and tyrannical
government: 'Let Italy with Wit and Art refin'd / invent religions to
enslave the mind; / Let the polite and well-bred slaves of France / Fine
manners teach, and know to dress and dance.' 1 '5 For Blackmore, whose
attachment to the causes of the Glorious Revolution was remarkable,
writing about the bodily and mental constitution of English people was the
occasion to sing the praise of status quo of post-Revolution, Protestant,
prosperous, free from tyranny, well- but moderately- governed England,
which is both blessed with a host of geniuses and haunted with the
spleen.116 Echoing Blackmore's view, Voltaire (1694-1778) wrote after
113.Blackmore, The Nature of Man, pp.15-17.
114.Blackmore, The Nature of Man, iii.
115.Blackmore, The Nature of Man., p.69. Besides papists and atheists,
he was against tolerating Arians. See Blackmore, Modern Arians
Unmask'd (London: John Clark, 1721).
116. His attachment to the Glorious Revolution is evident, for example, in
his 'Essay upon the Origin of Civil Power,' (Blackmore, Essays upon
Several Subjects, vol.1, 423-48) where he followed Locke to deny Robert
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his visit to England in 1726: 'La philosophie, la liberté, et le cimat,
conduisent a la misanthropie.' 117 The human mind and its diseases were
thus entrenched into natural, social, cultural economical, and political
environment.
b) Sociology of the English malady
The image constructed around hysteria and hypochondria I have
examined above seems to have encouraged narcissism of the polite,
flourishing, well-governed, liberal--in a word, Enlightened--English
society. 118 Although the physicians in Georgian England actually found
that the lower sort of people (such as those who were admitted to the
public hospitals) suffered from nervous disorders, the image attached to
the diseases was almost exclusively elitist. 119 No wonder, therefore, some
were eager to wear the diseases as a badge of distinction and others were
busy dismissing the fashion. Boswell (1740-1795) adopted
'hypochondriasis' as his literary persona, notwithstanding Dr Johnson
warned him not to believe Cheyne's 'foolish notion that melancholy is a
proof of acuteness' and Jeremy Collier (1650-1726) observed that "Tis
commonly said the spleen is a wise disease, which I believe makes some
Filmer's patriarchal origin of civil power.
117. Quoted in Doughty, 'The English Malady of the Eighteenth Century,'
257.
118. See Roy Porter, 'Civilization and Disease,' 175. As for broader issues
related with the cultural history of the nerves, see G.S. Rousseau, 'Cultural
History in a New Key.'
119. See, for example, John Andree, Cases of Epilepsy. Hysteric Fits. and
St. Vitus' Dance, with the Process of Cure (London: W. Meadows & J.
Clarke, 1746). The construction of the hysteria of poor working class
women in the slightly later period is nicely discussed in Guenter B. Risse,
'Hysteria at the Edinburgh Infirmary: the Construction and Treatment of
a Disease, 1770-1800,' Med.Hist., 1988, 32: 1-22.
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fond of catching it.' 12° Warning against the 'modish affectation of
vapours, hippo, and spleen,' an anonymous author of an anti-spleen
pamphlet lamented over a valetudinarian girl:
How cheerful, how gay, and entertaining, was the charming
Leonora, before her late indisposition, and the laziness indulged,
threw her into vapours and spleen, which she thought so
fashionable, and added so many new charms to her beauty, that she
indulged the indolent foible, till she is become a burthen to herself,
and the jest of all about her.121
The nervous diseases at that time were a social compound with cultural
and social values attached to them.
Klaus Doerner identified the values with bourgeois ones, writing
that the English spleen was 'not only integrated into but almost identified
with the bourgeoisie.' This link of bourgeoisie and the nervous
diseases is, however, not entirely convincing. As Porter has suggested, the
spleen were connected with the affluent life style of the patients rather
than with the way the riches were gained. Cheyne included only one
'merchant' in his published eighteen cases of nervous patients. In the
satire titled Observations on the Spleen and Vapours, the patients were
from the wealthy leisured class rather than Weberian hard-working
120. See Roy Porter, "The Hunger of Imagination": Approaching Samuel
Johnson's Melancholy' in The Anatomy of Madness, eds. by W.F. Bynum
et al., vol.1., 63-88. Collier's passage is quoted in Doughty, 'The English
Malady of the Eighteenth Century,' 260.
121.A Treatise of the Dismal Effects of Low-Spiritedness, (London:
W.Owen, [1750]), p.9 and p.22. The fashion of wearing nervous disease to
assert class distinction is discussed in Rousseau, 'Cultural History in a New
Key,' esp. pp.41-52.
122.Klaus Doerner, Madmen and the Bourgeoisie, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1981), p.31.
123. Porter, 'Rage of Party'; Cheyne, The English Malady, p.279.
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capitalists: one valetudinarian hypochondriac 'had a sufficient patrimony'
and 'he gave himself up to idleness.' And when the patients came from
bourgeois household, they were not the breadwinners themselves but their
wives. The most typical hyp wife was that whose hopes for 'a diamond
ring, a new white damask gown and petticoat, a large silver cup, a gold
watch, a set of new china, half a dozen new-fashioned spoons, a silver tea-
pot' etc. had evaporated.1M
This hints that what was really at issue was high-consuming life
style. So, if the hysteric and hypochondriac affections were 'bourgeois'
diseases at all, they were more related with newly arrived consumer society
than with the mode of production. 1 Cheyne's French cuisine and urban
night life and Midriff's gold watch and new china were all luxuries which
became widely available during the period, both in London and in the
provinces. Embarrassed with the riches, the high-consuming affluent
class was driven into the nervous diseases.
Moreover, working, the other side of economic activity, was curative
rather than productive of the diseases. 127 John Armstrong (1709-1779),
a physician-literatus, advised the reader not to 'court the luxury of tender
thought' to avoid falling splenetic low-spiritedness, and wrote:
124.Sir John Midriff, Observations on the Spleen and Vapours, pp.4-9.
125.For eighteenth-century consumer society, see N. McKendrick, et al.,
The Birth of a Consumer Society: the Commercialization of Eighteenth-
Century England (London: Hutchinson, 1982); Roy Porter, English Society
in the Eighteenth Century (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), pp.201-68.
126.Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century, pp.232-68; Peter
Borsay, 'The English Urban Renaissance: the Development of Provincial
Urban Culture,' Social History, 1977, 5: 58 1-603.
127.Benjamin Fawcett expressed a Weberian protestant capitalist
prescription for the spleen. Citing his mentor Andrew Baxter, Fawcett
wrote: 'Waste not one quarter of an hour in unprofitable musings. Be sure
to keep yourself constantly employed, as far as your strength will bear, in
the diligent labours of a lawful calling.' Fawcett, Observations on the
Nature ... of Melancholy, p.17. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930).
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Go, soft enthusiast, quit the Cypress groves,
Nor to the virulent's lonely moanings tune
Your sad complaint. Go, seek the cheerful haunts
Of men, and mingle with the bustling crowd;
Lay scheme for wealth, or power, or fame, the wish
Of nobler minds, and push them might and day
Or join the caravan in quest of scenes
Or, more advent'rous, rush into the field
Where war grows hot; and raging thro' the sky,
The lofty trumpet swell the maddening soul.1
This says that solitary and meditative life would feed splenetic affections
and active and social life would cure them. Here is a clear echo of the
Classical debates of vita contemplativa and vita activa, and Addison and
Steele's contrast between old meditative University scholars and new active
philosophers of market place. Robert James's Medicinal Dictionary said
'those ... are subject to this [hypochondriac] disease, who lead a sedentary
life, and indulge themselves too much in study, continual meditations and
lucubrations.' 1 The Spectator advertised that 'an infallible cure for
hypochondriac melancholy' was the journal itself, which was the symbol of
urban, sociable, cheerful, politely active and sophisticated life style.'3°
John Hill advised the hypochondriac sufferers to 'invite himself abroad and
128.Armstrong, The Art of Preserving Health, p.112.
129.James, The Medicinal Dictionary, 'Hypochondriasis, Morbus.' See,
however, Rousseau, 'Cultural History in a New Key,' 49-50, in which
Rousseau has found 'do nothing' was prescribed for the disease.
130.The Spectator, no.547. The article says that nos. 173, 184, 191, 203,
209, 221, 233, 235, 245, 247, and 251 of the journal will cure the spleen.
The content of some of the articles advertised as cure seems to support the
active and cheerful life as cure: 'who labours long, may be allowed to
sleep' (no.184), the excitement of lottery (no.192), sensual pleasure
(no.203) and the 'elegant entertainments .. in our theatres' (no.235).
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let his friends invite him by eveiy innocent inducement." 31 An active
and social life was a cure to the diseases of a retreated inactive life.
We have, therefore, two seemingly contradictory topoi of the
nervous diseases. On the one hand, physicians talked about the luxurious,
high-consuming and fashionable life engendering the diseases. On the
other hand, retreated meditative life was strongly associated with the same
diseases. One said that the patients had to avoid the over-indulgence in
urban life style, the other maintained that the patients had to go out of a
retreated inactive life. Just as the rural and urbane culture in early
eighteenth century did not make a sharp contrast, the early Georgian
medical writers on the nervous diseases were not polarized into aggressive
country lovers and yuppish town lovers. 132 Cheyne epitomized this
absence of polarity of the country and the town, as Porter has shrewdly
pointed out. 133 His keen perception of the urban vices did not made him
believe that out-and-out country and retreated life is the panacea of the
diseases of civilization. Instead, he prescribed going to Bath, the most
fashionable provincial commercialized resort town of the age, which his
rich clients preferred to the primitive, pure, and pensive life in the Lake
District: indeed, a contemporary satire said that posh, pleasure-hungry
ladies often feigned hysteric fits because they wanted to go to Bath.
The early Georgian writers on the nervous diseases of urbane,
sophisticated and luxurious life style did not prescribe shunning the
corrupted city and retirement to innocent purity. The Romantic rebellion
to the bourgeois urban values was still to come.
131.John Hill, Hypochondriasis, pp.26-7.
132.Borsay, 'The English Urban Renaissance.'
133.Porter, 'Introduction' to Cheyne, The English Malady, xxxi.
134.See J.H. Plumb, The Commercialization of Leisure in Eighteenth-
Century England (Reading: University of Reading, 1973), pp.18-19; Bath
a Poem (London: Longman and Shewell, 1748), p.5.
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Contrary to what used to be maintained by the type of medical
historians like Veith and King, the early Georgian medical writings on
hysteria and hypochondria involved a lot of new ideas, both in intellectual
terms and, even more, in extra-intellectual terms. They departed from the
former Pitcairnian research programme, employed the latest medical
theories and were engaged in the first-class medical controversy of the age.
They adopted the Cartesian scheme and some incorporated Newton's
suggestions of the aether in their looking at the mind-body interaction, and
treated the problem in a distinctly medical and non-metaphysical way,
suggested by, above all, Boerhaave.
As for extra-intellectual aspects, their modernity is even more
remarkable. They went to the market place AJ Addison and Steele to
preach their medical-scientific ideas. There they tried to instruct their
readers into believing that they at last found the spleen, the mysterious
mental disturbances, was nothing but a bodily disorder. They went further
to claim that they found a new way to restore and improve mental health
in a secular way--by taking care of and disciplining the body. They
preached a new optimistic way to cope with mental disturbances: tame the
body of the religiously undesirable people, and you will turn them into
good Christians; take care of your body, and you will be a Newton. The
body there was not the target of hatred and total denounciation: whipping
oneself for salvation, Puritan rigorous fasting, and denying one's body for
spiritual perfection were not what they prescribed. Instead, the body was
to be put under mild and 'scientific' discipline: physicking, diet, exercise,
temperance, spa water, etc. Convincing the patients and probably even the
religious profession of the new method to improve the mind, they
successfully contributed to spreading the medical knowledge and/or
ideology.
Moreover, their construction of the medical discourse on the mental
disorders encompassed much broader issues. They stepped into the
environment, both natural and social, economical, political, and cultural.
Hysteria and hypochondria were the diseases of wealthy, flourishing, polite,
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civilized, commercialized, and politically advanced England. In a word,
they were the diseases of the Enlightenment. The cure, too, of the English
malady consisted in the Enlightenment ideals. An active, social, and
cheerful life Addison and Steele could cure the disease of the inactive,
solitary and meditative life. Even Cheyne who turned the picture upside-
down to argue that the luxury urbane life engenders the disease did not
preach aggressive country life, but prescribed going to Bath.
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Chapter Four
Lockean Mind and Madness: Thinking Matter and Associationism
Introduction
a) Where was Locke in early eighteenth-century psychiatry?
Recent historians of eighteenth-century psychiatry agree that John
Locke (1632-1704) was an important figure. Klaus Doerner has written
that Locke provided a buttress to the Augustan bourgeois ideology in
which the new psychiatry of hysteria developed; Roy Porter has claimed
that Locke's psychology departed from the transcendental and tight
dichotomy of the rational and irrational and created a new 'humanized'
and relativistic version of the distinction; Michel Foucault refers to Locke
several times as one of the backbones of the psychiatry in 'l'âge
classique.' 1 Their arguments are convincing. As one of the major authors
of the Enlightenment, Locke must have played an important part in
forming a new intellectual climate in which the new psychiatry took place.
However, it is difficult to point out who was actually a Lockean
psychiatrist at that time. In Hunter and Macalpine's Three Hundred Years
of Psychiatry, there is an entry from Locke's own An Essay concerning
Human Understanding published in 1690, and the next time that Locke's
name appears in the book is in the entry of David Hartley's (1705-57)
Observations on Man, which was published about sixty years later.2
Porter's chronology of Lockeanism in eighteenth-century English psychiatry
1. Klaus Doerner, Madman and the Bourgeoisie: a Social History of
Insanity and Psychiatry (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp.22-23 & 31.
Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles: a History of Madness in England from
the Restoration to the Regency (London: the Athione Press, 1987), pp.187-
95. Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie a l'âge classigue, 2nd ed. (Paris:
Editions Gallimard, 1972), pp.213, 228, 368.
2. Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry, pp.236-39
& pp.379-82.
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has also presented the same picture of the absence of any Lockean
psychiatrist during the earlier half of the century. Although Porter argues
that 'Locke's formulations proved extraordinarily influential throughout the
eighteenth century,' the evidences he has produced are only from the latter
part of the century. 3 We have, therefore, a surprising absence of Locke's
influence in early eighteenth-century medical writings on madness.
A host of questions follow. What were English writers on the
diseases of the mind doing with the work of 'the father of modern
psychology,' the ultra-influential book containing seminal explanations of
some aberrant mental operations, madness included? 4 Why was
psychiatry unaffected when Lockean philosophy was giving a vast
stimulation to philosophers and theologians?5 Isn't it certain that Locke
would have been fruitful to the psychiatry in the early eighteenth century,
if one looks at late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century psychiatrists
such as Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), Thomas Arnold (1742-1816), and
Alexander Crichton (1763-1856) who followed Locke's footsteps? 6 Why
did doctors educated at English universities ignore Locke, whose Essay was
3. Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles, pp.191-92.
4. Locke has been frequently dubbed as the 'father', the 'founder' of
'psychology as the empirical science of the mind.' See, for example,
Robert Watson, The Great Psychologists, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott Company, 1978), p.186.
5. For the global account of the intellectual background against which
Locke composed his Essay and the of the reactions against Locke's
writings, John W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1956) has remained unsurpassed since its publication.
6. Philippe Pinel, Traité médico-philosophique sur alienation mentale ou
la manie (Paris: Richard et al., 1801; rept. with intro, by Francois Azouvi,
Gèneve: Edition Slatkin, 1980); Thomas Arnold, Observations on the
Nature. Kinds. Causes, and Prevention of Insanity, 2 vols., 2nd ed.
(London: Phillips, 1806); Alexander Crichton, An Enquiry into the Nature
and Origin of Mental Derangement, 2 vols. (London: Cadell and Davies,
1798). All these writers made an explicit statement of their debt to
Locke's ideas about the mind and madness. I will later discuss the issue
of Locke's direct influence in chapter 6.
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an important element in the first year compulsory course of logic in Oxford
or Cambridge?7
b) The difference between Lockean mind and physicians' mind
These questions are, however, formulated from an anachronistic
point of view.8 The underlying wrong assumption is that the human mind
studied by Locke, or, more generally, by eighteenth-century English
philosophers, and that studied by medical writers on madness were the
same object. I will briefly show that this assumption is wrong, and that the
philosophers and physicians at that time constructed the human mind as
the object of study in mutually exclusive ways.9
A very cursory look is enough to show that doctors and Locke were
largely talking about differently constructed objects. As I have argued in
the previous chapters, physicians were much more interested in bodily
aspects of the issues related with the mental operations. The barrier
7. Logic was one of the university disciplines in which Locke's influence
was most visible. See John Yolton, 'Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy,' in
The History of the University of Oxford: The Eighteenth Century, eds. by
L.S. Sutherland and LG. Mitchel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 565-9 1;
John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of Enlightenment (Cambridge:
Cambridge U.P., 1989), passim; Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-
Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1971),
pp.259-439.
8. For criticism of the old historiography of psychology, see Robert M.
Young, 'Scholarship and the History of the Behavioral Sciences,' Hist.Sci.,
1966, 5: 1-5 1; Roger Smith, 'The Background of Physiological Psychology
in Natural Philosophy,' Hist.Sci., 1973, 11: 75-123. New approaches have
been taken by Christopher Fox, 'Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology:
Introduction,' in Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed.
by Christopher Fox (New York: AMS Press, 1987), 1-22; G.S. Rousseau,
'Psychology,' in The Ferment of Knowledge, eds. by G.S, Rousseau and
Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1980), 143-210.
9. For the construction of objects of discourse, see Michel Foucault, Ih
Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by AM. Sheridan Smith (London:
Tavistock, 1972; London: Routledge, 1989), pp.40-49.
173
between 'metaphysical' and 'medical' enquiries was fairly solid and
physicians were reluctant to trespass the border, best expressed in the
iatro-mathematicians' works and Boerhaave's advice not to think about
purely mental phenomena: phenomena in which only the mind or soul was
concerned were not the proper objects of medicine, but of philosophy or
metaphysics.
This differentiation between philosophical and medical discourses
on the mind was also claimed from philosophers' side. Locke himself
duplicated the distinction at the vely beginning of his Essay, declaring that
he would not 'meddle with the physical consideration of the mind.' By the
term 'the physical consideration,' Locke meant the following problems:
by what motion of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come
to have any sensation by our Organs, or any ideas in our
understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any,
or all of them, depend upon matter, or no.1°
What kind of bodily changes cause our ideas; what is happening in our
body when we see, hear, imagine, remember. Such questions frequently
raised by many physicians were out of Locke's concern: 'These are
speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as
lying out of my way."
Instead, he tried to limit his discourse to the task of describing how
human mind gets ideas, handles them, connects and disconnects them,
10. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter
N. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1.1.2.
11. Locke's keeping himself away from speculation about the physiology
of thinking might be due to the fact that he adopted the empirical attitude
of Sydenham, with whom Locke studied medicine in London from 1667,
and whose influence upon Locke has been studied in detail. See, inter
aij , Kenneth Dewhurst, John Locke. Physician and Philosopher (London:
The Weilcome Historical Medical Library, 1963; rept. New York: Garland,
1984); Patrick Romanell, John Locke and Medicine (New York:
Prometheus Book, 1984).
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makes use of their signs, i.e. words, and reaches true or false or dubious
judgments based on them.' 2 This he did with minimal 'physical
consideration,' or little recourse to the physiological processes which
accompany the mental processes. 13 Locke's assumption was that the
mind handling the ideas and the mind seen from the 'physical' viewpoint
were categorically different objects of study.14
Although Locke was not always loyal to this restriction imposed by
himself on the scope of the subject of his Essay, he was consistent in not
picking up the bodily side of thinking as a major topic. None of his works
published in the eighteenth century contains as substantial an account of
physiology of thinking as Descartes' De l'homme (1662), Malebranche's
Recherché de la verité (1674-8) and Willis's De Anima Brutorum (1672).
It is true, that Locke's Essay makes an occasional use of the theory of the
animal spirits drawn probably from Malebranche and Willis and enters
12. Locke, Essay, 1.1.3.
13. I am here neither arguing that Locke was not knowledgeable in late-
seventeenth-century physiology, nor his Essay is free from any 'physical
consideration.' A lot of studies on the philosopher have shown quite
reverse. See John W. Yolton, Locke: an Introduction (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1985), p.18; idem, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 157-60; John P. Wright, 'Locke,
Willis and the Seventeenth-century Epicurean Soul,' in Atoms. Pneuma.
and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, ed.
by Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1991), 239-58.
Similarly, John Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume
(Manchester: Manchester U.P., 1983), pp.187-246 has thrown fresh light on
Hume's works by looking at the contemporary physiological background.
14. Locke, Essay, 4.21.1-5. Accordingly, the two 'minds' were distributed
into two different subjects within the university educational system of the
day, one being logic, the other natural philosophy. Locks's Essay entered
into university curriculum in the early eighteenth century as the textbook
of logic, replacing Neo-Aristotelian and Ramist ones. Medicine, on the
other hand, was a branch of natural philosophy within the educational
system of university. For the reception of Essay as a textbook of new
logic, see Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas; idem, 'Schoolmen,
Logic, and Philosophy'; Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and
Rhetoric.
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into the 'physical considerations' of the mind. But Locke's use of
physiological explanation of mental operations in his Essay does not seem
to have been the significant part of the work for his contemporary medical
readers. Some physicians in the early eighteenth century consulted Locke's
Essay as a guide to conduct medical thinking, that which would teach them
how to get scientific knowledge.'5 To use the book as the authority in
medical and bodily understanding of the mind/soul did not occur to them.
It is, therefore, understandable that Locke's works did not exercise
an immediate and direct influence upon physicians' understanding of the
mind and its disorders. The absence of Locke in the chronology of British
psychiatry during the earlier half of the eighteenth century is not a mystery,
if one considers: the mental restriction Locke made upon his works and
the somatic limits upon eighteenth-century medicine; their talking on
different planes of the human mind; and the distribution of the two 'minds'
into the different disciplines or categories of discourse. The mystery rather
lies in the very visible and direct influence of Locke on the psychiatrists in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which will be discussed
later in this thesis.
c) Problems: two coups in the earlier eighteenth century
There were, however, some occasions where early eighteenth-
century English psychiatric writings confronted Locke's Essay. The
confrontations then were mainly concerned with Locke's suggestion of the
thinking matter hypothesis which raised the question of whether matter
15. See, for example, John Quincy, Medicin g Statica: being the Aphorisms
of Sanctorius (London: W. Newton, 1712), xi; Samuel Clossy, Observations
on Some of the Diseases of the Parts of the Human Body. Chiefly Taken
from the Dissections of Morbid Bodies (London: G. Kearsly, 1763), iii-iv.
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can think or not. 16 Since Locke's thinking matter hypothesis drew an
avalanche of protest, it is not surprising that the encounter was not a
favourable one: medical writers such as George Cheyne (1671-1743),
Nicholas Robinson (1697?-1775), and Malcolm Flemyng (d.1764) joined
the controversy and refuted the materialist scheme.' 7 This is actually an
old story of refuting materialistic monism and establishing non-materialistic
and dualistic explanations of the human mental operations and mental
disorders, which I have looked at in chapter one. The old battle which
Timothy Bright (1551-1615), André du Laurens (1558-1609), and other
physicians had fought continued well into the eighteenth century. The
works of Cheyne and Robinson, however, involved an important revision
of the fundamental scheme of the dualism, and it was related with the new
pattern of dualism held by some metaphysicians then. One of the major
aims of this chapter is to examine the content of the coup in the early- and
mid-century.
Another principal aim of the chapter is to contextualize some
aspects of David Hartley's project in his Observations on Man (1749) into
the situation sketched above. I would like to argue that Hartley's project
involved again a radical departure--another coup--from both the scheme
expressed by Locke and many other philosophers of his time and that held
by Cheyne and Robinson and those philosophical and theological writers
who expressed the same concern with the physicians. Hartley pioneered
16. See an excellent account of the controversy by John Yolton, Thinking
Matter; idem, John Locke and the Way of Ideas, pp.158-66.
17. George Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen. together with Five Discourses,.
Medical. Moral and Philosophical (London: C. Rivington, 1740); idem, Th
Natural Method of Curing the Diseases of the Body. and the Disorder of
the Mind Depending on the Body (London: Geo. Strahan, 1742); idem,
Philosophical Principles of Religion: Natural and Revealed (London:
George Strahan, 1715); Nicholas Robinson, A New System of the Spleen.
Vapours and Hypochondriack Melancholy (London: A. Bettesworth, 1729);
Malcolm Flemyng, A New Critical Examination of an Important Passage
in Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding (London: Jacob Robinson,
1751).
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a new field of discourse which can be called, in Roger Smith's term.
'physiological psychology.' 18 In a word, Hartley tried to make a new
general science of man which underpinned Locke's language with that of
physicians', building a bridge over the two different categories of discourse
on the mind. And Hartley's attempt was followed by both medical and
non-medical writers both on the Continent and in England, some inspired
by him and some independently.
In brief, there were two complicated coups in the earlier half of the
eighteenth century. Neither of the two was completely new. Cheyne and
others were playing the old game of refuting materialists' polemical use of
madness, and Hartley's main devices of his physiological psychology--
Newton's vibration and Locke's association--had been fairly established
ideas in the English intellectual scene at that time. Both coups, however,
involved new schemes to understand the mind and its disorders. In the
following sections I will discuss the content of the two shifts outlined
above. In the first section I will examine the problem of madness which
appeared in the medical and philosophical tracts related with the thinking
matter controversy in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. The
second section will consider Hartley's new scheme for understanding
human mental operations and similar French and English attempts in the
mid-century.
Thinking Matter Controversy Materialism and Pneumatology
a) Locke's hypothesis, its supporters and critics
The thinking matter hypothesis suggested by Locke turned out to
be one of the most hotly disputed Lockean philosophical topics during the
eighteenth century. From the medical historical viewpoint, it overshadows
other topics associated with Locke, such as the rejection of innate idea, the
18. Smith, 'The Background of Physiological Psychology.'
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argument on personal identity, and the doctrine of association of ideas.19
The controversy had its origin in Locke's carefully composed passage in his
Essay, which said that it is intelligible that God 'superadded' the power of
thinking to matter.2° Given our inability to know the nature of
substances, thinking matter monism is no less (and no more) intelligible
than the soul-and-matter dualism.
Soon after Locke made the suggestion, there rose a coterie of
thinking materialists, who were at the same time deistic, free-thinking and
sometimes freemasomc, e.g. Anthony Collins (1676-1729), John Toland
(1670-1722), and Samuel Bold (16491737).21 At the early stage of the
controversy, this circle produced a good amount of materialistic polemic:
Collins' debate with Samuel Clarke; Bold's refutation of John Broughton's
Psychologia; and Toland's pantheistic and animistic writings. 22 Outside
the circle, some obscure writers such as William Coward (1657-1725) and
19. For personal identity, see Henry E. Alison, 'Locke's Theory of Personal
Identity: a Re-Examination,' in Locke on Human Understanding, ed. by
I.C. Tipton (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1977), 105-22; Howard M. Ducharme,
'Personal Identity in Samuel Clarke,' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1986, 24: 359-83;
Christopher Fox, 'Locke and the Scriblerians,' Eighteenth-Centur y Studies,
1982, 16: 1-25. Nicholas Robinson, however, provided a substantial
amount of argument on personal identity. See Robinson, A New System
of the Spleen, pp.36-40.
20. Locke, Essay, 4.3.6. See Yolton, Thinking Matter; Wright, 'Locke,
Willis, and the Epicurean Soul'; Margaret Wilson, 'Superadded Properties:
the Limits of Mechanism in Locke,' American Philosophical Ouarterly,
1979, 16: 143-50.
21. James O'Higgins, Anthony Collins: the Man and His Works (Hague:
Martinus Nijhof, 1970); Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment:
Pantheists. Freemasons and Republicans (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1981).
22. See Yolton, Thinking Matter, ppL38-42; Robin Attfield, 'Clarke, Collins
and Compounds,' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1977, 15: 45-54; O'Higgins, Anthony
Collins, pp.10 & 69-76; Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, passim.
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Henry Layton (1622- 1705) were active in developing materialistic
po1emic. Shortly after, Samuel Strutt, another obscure writer, published
A Philosophical Enquiry into the Physical Spring of Human Action (1731)
to maintain that the substance of man is nothing but a modification of
matter, denying the existence of the rational and immaterial soul?'
Locke's suggestion and the materialistic pamphlets largely inspired
by Locke triggered a storm of protest. Edward Stilhingfieet (1635-99),
Bishop of Worcester, levelled a vehement criticism of Locke, accusing him
of paving an easy way to atheism; alarmed at the materialist, Richard
Bentley (1662-1742) gave his second Boyle lecture the title of Matter and
Motion Cannot Think (1692). In his Psychologia, John Broughton
launched an attack against the 'partisans of Spinoza, Hobbs, Le Clerc, L--k
[i], and Toland.' Andrew Baxter (1686-1750) published several books
23. William Coward, Farther Thoughts concerning Human Soul (London:
Richard Basset, 1703); idem, Second Thoughts concerning Human Soul.
Demonstrating the Notion of Human Soul. as Believed to Be a Spiritual
Immortal Substance to Be a Plain Heathenish Invention (London: R.
Basset, 1702); idem, The Grand Essay: or a Vindication of Reason. and
Religion, against Impostures of Philosophy (London: P.G., 1704). Henry
Layton attacked Richard Bentley and John Broughton in his Observations
upon a Sermon. Intituled. ... Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692] and
Observations upon a Treatise. Intitl'd Psychologia [1703]. For Leyton's
view, See Yolton, Thinking Matter, pp.36-39. Collins wrote about
Coward's Grand Essay to Locke that 'he has published a book to show yt
not such thing as immaterial substance exists in nature and yt all matter
has originally a principle of self-motion in it. His argument are very far
from proving either.' Quoted in O'Higgins, Anthony Collins, p.S.
24. [Samuel Strutt?], A Philosophical Enquiry into the Physical Spring of
Human Actions, and the Immediate Cause (London: J. Peck, 1732). For
Strutt and his pantheistical circle, see Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment,
p.174.
25. Locke's debate with Stillingfleet is discussed in Yolton, Locke and the
Way of Ideas; idem, Thinking Matter. See Richard Bentley, Matter and
Motion Cannot Think (London: T. Parkhurst, 1692), p.14.
26. John Broughton, Psychologia: or an Account of the Nature of the
Rational Soul (London: T. Bennet, 1703), p.139. Collins wrote to Locke
about the book that it is 'a discourse about nothing.' (quoted in O'Higgins,
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to refute the materialists from the 1730s, some of which went through
several editions.V The core of their arguments was that God cannot
provide matter with the power of thinking without destroying the nature
of the matter, hence, that thinking matter is a logical absurdity God would
never create. Another concern as important to them was an ideological
one. They feared that the doctrine would invite a degeneration of people's
morality; should there be no immaterial and immortal soul, there would
not be no fear for divine punishment after death. They thought that the
thinking matter hypothesis was morally dangerous as well as logically
wrong.
b) Can the soul go mad?: metaphysician's opinion
The thinking matter controversy sometimes included the issue
related with the problem of madness. The essence of the problem
remained the same with the controversy in the late sixteenth and early
Anthony Collins, p.5).
27. See Andrew Baxter, An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,
2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: for the Author, 1737); idem, An Appendix to the
First Part of the Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (London: for
the Author, 1750). Immediately after the publication of Baxter's Enquiry,
John Jackson, rector in Rossington in York and master of Wigston's
Hospital in Leicester, published A Dissertation on Matter and Spirit: with
Some Remarks on a Book. Entitled. An Enquiry into the Nature of the
Human Soul (London: J. Noon, 1735), to attack Baxter. Jackson, however,
found neither thinking matter monism nor Baxter's dualism are
demonstrable. Moreover, he wrote that immortality is the
foundation of morality is a bigot. Baxter's and Jackson's works are
exceptionally readable and acute among the works I have consulted.
28. Yolton, Thinking Matter, Chaps. 1-3.
29. Besides the issue of madness, the controversy had some issues of
interest for medical historians, such as the animal soul, the nature of sleep
and dreaming. See Locke, Essay, 2.1.9-20; Thomas Branch Thoughts on
Dreaming (London: R. Dodsley, 1738); Robinson, A New System of the
Spleen, pp.34-5.
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seventeenth century: how can the immaterial power of thinking be
impaired by material causes? Is it possible for the soul, that immortal and
imperishable being, to corrupt in madness? Doesn't the example of
madness serve as a negative evidence against the immateriality and
immortality of the soul? Isn't it even more strange that the disease of the
soul can be cured by such somatic methods as purging and medication?
The materialist polemic based on the case of madness was
powerfully put forth by William Coward in his Second Thoughts
concerning Human Soul (1702). Coward's aim in this book was to
demonstrate that there was no immaterial and immortal soul, the soul was
identical with the material principle of life, and the soul died when the life
ended. The immortality of human soul was a 'heathenish invention' and
'imposture of philosophy' and immortality was given only by divine
intervention upon resurrection: the Bible too confirmed that 'man's
immortality begins not until the resurrection.'3°
To support his argument, he provided many argumentative devices,
one of which was the instance of madness. He started by establishing that
the principal mental faculty of understanding, which was alleged
immaterial, was destroyed in madness: during madness, 'that essential
faculty of the soul [understanding] perishes, and a man cannot reason or
act rationally, as we say, but like a brute beast.' 31 Although Coward
admitted 'madmen and fools' would have 'some sudden footsteps or flashes
of reason,' he treated such a case just as an exception. He claimed that
30. Coward, Second Thoughts, p.177. Little is known about Coward. DNB
says he was elected a Fellow of the College of Physicians, and the book
was burned by a common hangman by the order of the House of
Commons in 1704. He is also known as a controversialist in the acid-alkali
debate in the turn of the century. See Harold J. Cook, 'Sir John Colbatch
and Augustan Medicine: Experimentalism, Character and
Entrepreneurialism,' Ann.Sci., 1990, 47: 475-505, esp., 495-6.
31. Coward, Second Thoughts, p.133.
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it was evident even in such cases that the 'understanding or intellectual
faculty perishes.'32
On the basis of the observation, Coward proceeded to the core of
his polemic:
That being whose essential parts are perishable, is mortal and
corruptible: but the essential parts of the soul, viz, understanding
is perishable. Ergo, the soul it self is mortal or corruptible.
Here Coward reproduced the old Lucretian materialist polemic I have
looked at chapter one. Following Lucretius, Coward also employed cure
of madness as another evidence against the immateriality of the soul:
If such medicine afflict the body, it is still but a delusion to attempt
thereby to cure the mind, and you may as well damn up a current
to stop the fountain head. Therefore seeing experience testifies
such diseases frequently curable and cured, reason confirms the
impossibility of the existence of such an immaterial substance.M
Drawing attention to the widely accepted facts that the mind became
deranged by bodily and material causes, and that the deranged mind was
cured again by material method, he argued that there was no such things
as immaterial and immortal soul, but that the soul was one and the same
with the material principle of lffe?
This renewed Lucretian mortalist polemic based on the example of
madness posed a great threat to mid-century metaphysicians. Andrew
32. Coward, Second Thoughts., p.136.
33. Coward, Second Thoughts., p.133. See also idern, The Grand Essay,
pp.2 & 130.
34. Coward, The Grand Essay, p.1.
35. Coward, Second Thoughts, pp.90-95.
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Baxter admitted that this argument from the materialists' side made out
a strong case against the immortality of the soul. Baxter was annoyed at
the 'modern sceptic' (almost certainly he thought of Coward here) who
quoted Lucretius' argument based on the observation that 'in some
distempers of the body [the soul] is delirious and mad' and that 'the power
of medicine cures it again.' He was afraid that 'this objection is so
plausible, that the generality of men allow it to be matter of fact.'
To this powerful assault on the immateriality of the soul, their
opponents sometimes answered that bodily disorders did not always spoil
the intellectual faculties of the soul: 'there are instances of mortal diseases,
which do not at all affect our present intellectual powers.' 37 They did not
find this answer satisfactoiy, however. They prepared an iron-hard
counter-argument, which enabled them to claim that disturbances of
reason did not demonstrate corruptibility and materiality of the soul. In
his Psychologia which was directed mainly against Coward's Second
Thoughts, Broughton argued that disorders in our actual reasoning
involved only changes in the mode of the soul, and the example of
madness was thus not relevant to the issue whether the essential part of
the soul was corruptible or not? John Balignac, the Archbishop of
Cambrai, had the same sort of materialist polemic in mind when he wrote
An Essay ... Proving the Immateriality of the Soul, and made use of the
centuries-old metaphor of a musician and his instrument. 39 Andrew
36. Baxter, An Enquiry, vol.1, pp.382-83 & p.386.
37. Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed (1736),
in The Works of Joseph Butler, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896),
vol.1, p.40.
38. John Broughton, Psychologia, pp.199-200. As for the counter-criticism
by Coward to Broughton's argument here, see Coward, The Grand Essay,
pp.223-26.
39. John Balignac, An Essay Founded upon Arguments Natural and Moral.
proving the Immateriality of the Soul (London: L. Gilliver, 1730), pp.28-29.
I could not identify the author. For the use of the metaphor, see Baxter,
An Enquiry, vol.1, pp.386-8'7; George Cheyne, The English Malady (1733),
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Baxter expressed the old notion that the fault lay in the images and the
soul was mis-informed by them. 4° According to these controvertialists,
madness only showed that the soul got a wrong instrument of the body or
the unreal image, and it remained itself intact during madness. Here
again, we see continuity from the seventeenth centuly. Eighteenth-centuiy
metaphysicians promoted the same framework of the dualism of the soul
and the mind: the former was intact and only the latter was the seat of
madness. Immortal and imperishable, the soul per se never becomes mad.
On closer scrutiny, however, one can detect a new pattern of anti-
materialist polemic, and a definite shift in the way in which the
immateriality was vindicated.
In seventeenth-century discourse, what remained intact was the
rational faculty, and what got a damage was the bodily and inferior
faculties. André du Laurens concluded that in delirium it was the
imaginative faculty, rather than reason, that was primarily distempered.
Even if the reasoning seemed to suffer, it only appeared so, because the
faculty of reason was 'misse-informed by a fayned fantasie.'41 The author
of Anthropologie Abstracted (1655) confirmed this faculty-based
framework of intactness of the soul:
although the understanding faculty doth suffer depravation in
diseases of the brain; yet that depends on no other reason, then
intro, by Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1991), p.69.
40. Baxter, An Enquiry, vol.1, pp.387-95.
41. André du Laurens, A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight
(London: Ralph Iacson, 1599), p.74. See Thomas Harmon Jobe, 'Medical
Theories of Melancholia in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth
Centuries', Clip Medica, 1976, 11: 217-31.
185
that the subordinate, and subministry faculties, which are organicall
and interessed in the constitution of the braine, are injured.42
Michael Etmueller (1644-1683) also wrote that 'the intellect or rational
faculty being immaterial, cannot be vitiated of itself by any morbific cause.'
Locke epitomized the attitude: he maintained the actual faculty of
reasoning in madmen was intact and they could perform syllogism
perfectly.43 When looking at mental disorders, they were differentiating
immaterial and interactive faculties, vindicating the intactness of the
former and attributing all, or at least principal, faults to the latter."
On the other hand, the eighteenth-century writers adopted different
tactics. They no longer looked for a purely immaterial and non-interactive
mental activity that took place without the body. Rather, they recast the
very notion of interaction. They started from restructuring their
fundamental scheme, i.e. redefining the essence of the soul. Broughton
denied that the essence of the soul consisted in 'actual cogitation,'
maintaining that there must exist 'a substratum or substance' on which the
operation of actual thinking took place. This 'substance' was the essential
42. Anthropologie Abstracted: or the Idea of Humane Nature (London:
Henry Herrington, 1655), p.15.
43. Michael Ernst Etmueller, Etmueller Abridg'd: or a Complete System
of the theory and Practice of Medicine (London: E. Harris et a!., 1699),
p.532; Locke, Essay, 2.11.13.
44. In general vindication of immortality, too, many major philosophical
and medical figures like Descartes, Gassendi, Charleton and Willis were
in search of the immaterial faculty, the part of human mental activity
which does not depend on the body. See René Descartes, Discourse on
the Method, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. by
John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1984-91), vol.1,
p.127; John Cottingham, 'Cartesian Trialism,' Mind, 1985, 94: 218-30;
Emily Michael and Fred S. Michael, 'Two Early Modern Concepts of
Mind: Reflecting Substance vs. Thinking Substance.' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1989,
27: 29-48; Walter Charleton, The Immortality of the Human Soul.
Demonstrated by the Light of Nature (London: Henry Herringman, 1657),
p.67; W.F. Bynum, 'The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the
Functions of the Brain,' 	 1973, 64: 445-69.
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part of the mind, and our reasoning was a mere 'mode' or 'operation' of
it. The essence of the soul was, therefore, something immaterial that
stands behind our actual operations of the soul. Significantly, Broughton's
target of criticism here was Descartes: drawing a keen distinction between
the present operations of the soul and the substratum of the operations,
Broughton wrote that Descartes was wrong when he 'placed the essence
of the soul in actual thought.'45 Since all our mental operations were
mere modes of the soul, the Cartesian cogito did not constitute the essence
of the soul. The operation of the soul in its union with the body, was not
the essence of the substance, but a mere 'attribute, property, or quality' of
the substance in question, and the immateriality did not resides in the
actual operation, but in the substance.
The scheme introduced two rigidly distinguished groups of the
powers of the soul, a) our actual mental operations in this world, during
the soul's union with the body, and b) the immaterial substance's original
powers in the other world, after its separation from the body. These two
fields were not on the same level, but the latter was thought superior to
the former: our actual mental operations were but an obscure, incomplete,
and inferior shadow of the original and other-worldly powers of the
immaterial substance. Accordingly, Balignac claimed that our mental
capacity would be greater in proportion to its disengagement from the
body, and that the full powers of the soul would become manifest only in
its separation from the body:
The more it [the soul] is disengaged from matter, and retired from
the senses, the more capable it is to perform its most exalted
operations, and consequently, by an absolute separation, it is so far
from perishing, that it ascends to its perfection.47
45. Broughton, Psychologia, p.199.
46. Broughton, Psychologia, p.8.
47. Balignac, An Essay...Proving the Immortality of the Soul, p30.
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The soul was, therefore, endowed with its original powers independent of
the body, and the body lessened the original powers to our present mental
operations. It was hence absurd to misunderstand the impediment made
by the body for the producer of our mental operations was absurd:
To imagine, that the soul in the present state cannot understand
clearly without the convenient disposition of the body, therefore it
cannot act at all without it, is as absurd as to fancy, because a man
confined to a chamber can't see the objects without, but through
the windows, therefore he can't see at all, but through such a
medium; and that when he is out of the chamber he has totally lost
his sight.
Baxter also wrote 'that the soul after death is not in a state of insensibility,
torpor, or deadness; but still remains an active being, when separated from
the body.'49 Activity consisted in the soul, inactivity in the body. The
ultimate cause of our activity, therefore, resided in the soul. Anything that
lessened the soul's original active powers would be bodily.
In the argument looked at above one can detect a subtle shift from
the former faculty-based argument for immateriality to the substance-based
one. In the new scheme, the question of whether actual reasoning of a
madman is damaged was not in conflict with the argument over the
immateriality of the soul. What was intact was the hidden, latent and
original powers of the soul.
48. Balignac, An Essay ... Proving the Immortality of the Soul, p30. The
metaphor of the body as a chamber and sense organs as a window is found
also in Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary ed. and trans. by Theodore
Besterman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp.210-11.
49. Baxter, An Enquiry, vol.1, p.248. In jkjd, p.257, Baxter wrote: 'if the
soul hath the power of action in a state of separation, we must say that it
hath it always, and without interruption, since it hath it in itself. and
independent of matter.' [my emphasis]
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c) Medical pneumatology in the early eighteenth century
The metaphysical framework delineated above can be found in an
almost identical form in some of the Augustan medical writings. The
physician who made the most heavy use of the device was George Cheyne,
a disciple of Edmund Law (1703-87) and himself an able metaphysician
even before he knew Law.5°
Attacking the materialist scheme which said 'the principle of both
parts of the compound [the mind and body] were one, or if the whole had
but a material or organical part,' he claimed that the soul, or the
intelligent principle, was instead 'of a very different, if not quite contrary,
nature from this organical machine and has scarce anything in common to
them, but as they are substances.'51 And just like in Broughton's,
Balignac's and Baxter's writings, this immaterial substance was regarded
as an other-worldly and transcendental being. Indeed, Cheyne used more
religious and metaphysical language to characterize it than the
metaphysicians discussed above: man's soul is a 'diminutive angel shut up
in a flesh prison or vehicle'; the immaterial substances are 'miniatures,
effluxes, emanations, infinitesimals, or infinitely small sparkles' of God that
is 'this infinite source of living, intelligence, action, perfection and
happiness.'52
50. The relation between Cheyne and Law is briefly discussed in B.C.
Tennant, 'The Anglican Response to Locke's Theory of Personal Identity,'
Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1982, 43: 73-90, esp. 87-89. Cheyne referred to Law as a
genius of Newton's stature in his An Essay on Regimen, pp.166-67.
51. Cheyne, The English Malady, pp.68-9. There he stated the case of
Colonel Townshend (jj, pp.307-il) in which the patient could live and
die at his will is a support of dualism. See also idem, The Natural
Method, pp.'78-79; idem, An Essay on Regimen, p.147, idem, The English
Malady, pp.4 & 69.
52. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, p.120, and The Natural Method, p.79.
The analogy of the soul as the 'infinitesimal' of God appeared first in his
Philosophical Principles of Religion: Natural and Revealed, based on the
mathematical notion of infinity. Edmund Law, Cheyne's metaphysical
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Acquisition of knowledge about this transcendental thing belonged
to a different domain of discourse from that of getting knowledge about
things in this world. We cannot attain perfect knowledge of the soul
because our mind has lost its power by its union with the body: 'we shall
never perfectly know [the substance], till we arrive at the world of spirits,
and drop this coarse earthly tabernacle.' 53 Human reason, the usual
arbiter in our pursuit of knowing this-worldly things, is not of help here.
To try to know the soul by reason was, Cheyne claimed, like trying to
'taste colours and look into sounds.' Following probably William King
(1650-1729), who maintained that all our knowledge of God and his
attributes was analogical, Cheyne claimed that we must rely on the method
of analogy to understand the nature of the soul. Just as we reach some
knowledge about an infinite number by proceeding by analogy from our
knowledge of finite numbers, we have to achieve knowledge about the
other-worldly soul by proceeding from our knowledge of the mental
operation in this world. Knowing our own actual mental operations and
knowing the original powers of the soul involved two distinguished
methods of study.
In terms of recognizing them, therefore, the real mental operations
are given priority to the hidden original powers of the soul: the latter is
only known by way of analogy from the former. Whereas in terms of
ontology, the latter is given an absolute precedence to the former: our
actual mental operations are but an inferior mode of the original powers
of the soul. Since the soul must be endowed with the original powers
mentor, expressed almost the same sentiment that 'the soul ... must have
the nature and likeness of God in it.' (Cited in Tennant, 'The Anglican
Response to Locke's Theory of Personal Identity,' 89.) See also Robert
Eberwein, 'Samuel Johnson, George Cheyne, and the "Cone of Being",
Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1975, 36: 153-158.
53. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, p.123.
54. George Cheyne, Philosophical Principles of Religion: Natural and
Revealed, p.63.
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independent of the body, it is active without the body. Elaborating the
metaphysical scheme of the active soul and inert body, Cheyne wrote that
the spiritual substance had more perfect powers in a 'pre-lapsarian and
paradisaical' state, but it could not exercise its original powers in these
degenerated circumstances, when it was 'newly clothed with a crass,
unactive tabernacle or prison' of the body. 55 And this body-prison was
understood again as something that limited the powers of the soul which
would be greater in a separate state:
In this our own lapsed state, our gross and earthly prisons were
designed by infinite Wisdom, to curb, concentrate, and restrain the
exalted functions of the radical and intellectual faculties?6
Our own mental operations are therefore the soul's original activity minus
the impediment on it by the body. The two distinguished categories of the
activity of the soul were put in a hierarchical relation: one was concerned
with the primary, superior, divine, aspects of the soul and the other was
the secondary, inferior, diminished, and this-worldly shadow of it.
Cheyne's account of madness fits in well with the scheme. Given
that the body does harm to the original powers of the soul in its healthy
state, it must damage our mental operations even more when diseased.
Cheyne, therefore, could not find an account of 'ideotism, stupidity, loss of
senses, memory, or judgment, for lunacy or madness' but an 'obstruction,
extinction, relaxation, or malformation of the proper organs.' 57 And
during these instances of derangements of the mind, the original powers
of the soul remain intact:
55. Cheyne, Philosophical Principles of Religion, pp.160-61.
56. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, p.l66.
57. Cheyne, The Natural Method, p.78.
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The radical qualities of ... intelligence may be invariable in the rank
and degree proper to such a species of spiritual nature, whatever
machine or bodily organ it be cloathed with. Only it cannot exert
its elicit or exterior acts without a proper machine?8
Note that what is intact here is not the operations of our actual reasoning
but is the 'radical qualities of intelligence,' by which Cheyne meant pre-
lapsarian power of the soul that would become manifest only after its
separation from the body.
Probably we have to understand Cheyne's thin diet in this
metaphysical scheme of the interaction. The body, by its very existence
itself, impedes the exercise of the original powers of the soul. Baxter
wrote that 'the body cannot give [the soul] less impediment in acting and
perceiving, even when best disposed, than none at all.'59 The notion of
the body as an impediment is lurking behind Cheyne's rigorously thin diet
for improving one's intellect. Slender, scant, thin, delicate fibres make
acute mind, and gross and fat ones obstruct thinking; Newton maintained
his high ability of thinking 'by extreme temperance and abstinence'; too
much food would produce wrongheadedness and idiotism. 6° These
therapeutics states that the less the body is, the more perfect the mind is.
The difference between personal intelligent powers was explained
likewise. Cheyne developed what might be termed a neurophysiology of
genius. What makes the difference between Newton and a village idiot is
the different compositions of their bodies, especially of intellectual organs:
'what men call a genius, or a man of fine natural parts, a hero, or a
philosopher is much owing to the perfection of the machin or vehicle and
58. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, p.159.
59. Baxter, An Enquiry, vol.1, p.263.
60. Cheyne, The Natural Method, pp.81-82.
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its spiritual and ethereal organs.' 61 This bodily determination of one's
intellectual power was reinforced by the claim that all human minds are
in themselves equal. When every mind is equal, a principle of
differentiation must be nothing but the body that contains the mind. 'The
differences between an idiots and the most enlarg'd understanding ... arise
from the different mechanical affections of matter and motion,' for,
Nicholas Robinson stated, 'their souls are the same.' 62 The same idea
was expressed in a poem entitled An Essay on the Soul of Man (1744):
The soul, althou' in human kind the same,
Yet various seems, in every various frame,
The model of the fabric, where it dwells;
'Tis wrong, or right; it fails, or it excells;63
Although Cheyne's medical writings are in many respects much
more religious and metaphysical than his contemporaries', the almost
exactly the same argument can be found in Nicholas Robinson's A New
System of the Spleen, as I have mentioned just above. In the book,
Robinson explicitly refuted the thinking matter hypothesis. The mental
61. George Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, p.164. See also p.166;
Charles Collignon, An Enquiry into the Structure of the Human Body.
Relative to Its Supposed Influence on the Morals of Mankind (Cambridge:
J. Bentham, 1764). Collignon was professor of anatomy at Cambridge, and
in this work, he talked about blood, fibres, nerves, old age, habit,
education and fashion as influential on man's mind.
62. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.34. Richard Blackmore, too,
wrote in his A Treatise of the Spleen and Vapours: or Hypochondriacal
and Hysterical Affection... (London: J. Pemberton, 1725), pp.256-57,
'Those who believe that Minds are in themselves equal, ... will be ready to
embrace a mechanical explanation of the inequality of human
understanding.' See also his The Nature of Man, a Poem (London: Sam.
Buckley, 1711), pp.1-17, in which he attributes the different intellectual
powers of different nations to the natural environmental factors, as I have
discussed in the previous chapter.
63. An Essay on the Soul of Man (London: Jacob Robinson, 1744), p.3.
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faculties of perception, reason, understanding, and memory must be
'supported upon a substratum,' which is an immaterial substance. For
these faculties cannot be produced from matter and motion, 'nor can it be
any of the property superadded to certain parcels of matter, according to
a suggestion of Mr. Locke.M
And the substance was again other-worldly and unknowable, and
the original powers of this substance were superior to its actual operations:
These little spots of Earth, human machines, to which we are
chain'd, ... are the causes why we cannot discover the nature of this
spiritual being, and why its moving power is so greatly suspended
in its action: but were it once unfettered from the bondage of these
shackles, it would naturally rise, and takes its seat in the proper jj
of this immense theatre, ordain'd the happy mansion of spirits, by
the sovereign director of the universe.
This original power was intact during any instance of mental disorder.
Although 'the instruments, by which this immaterial being acts, seem to
alter the Soul's operation,'
this spiritual substance we call the soul, under all the pressures of
the most violent fever, under the severest symptoms of the most
raging madness, ... is the same mind, the same self, the same ray of
divinity, that almighty God infused, when he form'd it a living
soul.
Here again, what remains uninjured is not the faculties of reasoning but
the 'spiritual substance,' 'the same ray of divinity.' Robinson formed his
64. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.51-52.
65. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.29-30.
66. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.33-34.
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idea of the soul and madness within the same structure as Cheyne,
Broughton, Baxter and Balignac thought.
This medical and metaphysical scheme of the immaterial substance,
its original superior powers, and bodily impediments survived well into the
late eighteenth century.67 William Smith's Dissertation upon the Nerves
(1768), made use of an almost identical formulation: denying thinking-
matter hypothesis, positing transcendental unperishable soul, claiming that
the mental operation in this world is dependent on the body, and arguing
that madness does not affect the original powers of the soul. A
Dissertation upon the nervous system to Show Its Influence upon the Soul,
an anonymous tract published as late as 1780, also wrote that when mental
faculties were disordered, the change was not made in the soul itself. The
soul remained the same through the 'mechanical affections of matter and
motion.'69
d) A new pattern of dualism and its paradox
The new scheme of dualism adopted by many early eighteenth-
century physicians and metaphysicians was far from empirical and
'scientific,' in the sense that it was based on the very other-worldly,
essentially unknowable and highly theological Being. There was, however,
another side in their scheme. Paradoxically enough, the scheme developed
67. Richard Blackmore's 'An Essay upon the Immortality of the Soul,' in
Essays upon Several Subjects, 2 vols. (London: E. Curl! et al., 1716), vol.1,
pp.291-351, contains some passages which look similar to the metaphysical
scheme, see pp.297 & 350. Blackmore, however, made use of Cartesian
faculty-based argument in ikid., p.351.
68. William Smith, A Dissertation upon the Nerves (London: for the
Author, 1768). This included the refutation of thinking matter hypothesis
(pp.5-6). Although the author published many medical works in the 60s
and the 70s, little is known about him.
69. A Dissertation upon the Nervous System to Show Its Influence upon
the Soul ([London]: for the Author, 1780), pp.49-51.
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the bodily interpretation of mental phenomena which I have examined in
the previous chapter. Their scheme logically led to the idea that all the
actual operations of the mind--reason included--must depend on bodily
organs, in the sense that they were limited by the body. Instead of the
Cartesian version of dualism which said that there should be some purely
mental operations in us, there appeared the new dualistic scheme which
said that all our actual mental faculties were dependent on the body.
Every mental operation, whether rational or not, must be interactive and
exercised through the body. Cheyne wrote that 'the perfection ... of the
intellectual faculties' depended on the 'soundness and health of the bodily
machin,' i,e, 'proper organs, springs, ropes, and pipes': Robinson wrote that
mental capability did 'depend upon the power of its faculties, whose
exercise are the more conspicuous, the more the finest fibres of the brain,
in which they lie enveloped.'70
The scheme was not Cartesian in that it denied the Cartesian
bodiless cogito. Neither was it Lockean. Indeed, it was overtly anti-
Lockean at the most fundamental level. Its framework of understanding
the mind was constructed by the immaterial substance with its original
powers that can't be detected in this world, and by the bodily determinants
(or, impediments) of them. The discourse had two poles of metaphysical
pneumatology and bodily physiology, neither of which were Locke's major
concern in his Essay. Indeed, Locke explicitly shunned 'physical
consideration' of the soul and examined the actual operations of the soul
in living human beings, rather than its undetectable original powers.
Cheyne and Robinson expressed dissatisfaction at this essential
tactics of Locke's Essay. Cheyne wrote about Locke as follows:
Locke considered man, and his faculties, not indeed in their already
reprobated and hellish estate, but as he really now is, in the world,
70. Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen, pp.161 & 166; Robinson, A New
System of the Spleen, p.31.
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a composition of moral and natural good and evil: and this state he
has very farely and justly represented as far as it goes. But then.
either having no notion, or at least no regard, to his higher
faculties, which in natural and lapsed man, lye buried under the
rubbish of his present corruption and sensuality.7'
For Cheyne, Locke implied that the actual mental operations were the
only things about the soul/mind that matters because he over-concentrated
on the this-worldly aspects of the human mind. A similar charge against
Locke is found also in Robinson. Confuting the Lockean argument about
personal identity, Robinson criticized Locke for confusing 'person, a real
subsisting principle,' and 'consciousness, only an affection of that principle,
depending on the regular exercise of the corporeal organs.' 72 Locke
failed to distinguish, Robinson argued, 'the action of intelligent beings
from their spiritual essence.' 73 Here again, Locke is accused for not
paying proper attention to something spiritual that underlay our actual
mental operations.
A tentative assessment of the background of the criticisms of Locke
and the proposals of more metaphysical schemes seems to be possible.
The soul in early-century anti-materialists' polemic was a single substance
endowed with the original power which is the cause of all mental faculties,
rather than a bundle of hierarchically structured multiple faculties. It
seems that the characterization of the soul as an single metaphysical entity
had some connection with the dispute on personal identity, another widely
discussed Lockean problem. 74 Since Locke's suggestion that personal
71. Cheyne, Philosophical Principles of Religion, pp.114-15.
72. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.36-8. A similar criticism
was raised by Joseph Butler. See Butler, Works, vol.1, pp.387-396.
73. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, p.40.
74. See Sylvana Tomaselli, 'The First Person: Descartes, Locke and Mind-
Body Dualism,' Hist.Sci., 1984, 22: 185-205; Tennant, 'The Anglican
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identity must consist not in the unity of substance but in consciousness and
memory was often criticized at that time, it seems reasonable to suppose
a link between the refutation of the thinking matter hypothesis and the
attempt to produce an alternative to Locke's consciousness-based theory
of personal identity. Indeed, Nicholas Robinson tried to combat the
thinking matter hypothesis and Locke's theory of identity with the same
device of the soul as a metaphysical substance, as I have shown above. It
seems that behind the scene was lurking the religious, and sometimes even
mystical, counter-attack against the threat to Christianity posed by Locke:
George Berkeley (1685-1753), Joseph Butler (1692-1752), Scriblerians,
etc.75 However, I would like to emphasize again that this supposed link
is a very tentative one.
Here is a paradox of the Enlightenment. On one hand, Cheyne and
Robinson could be properly described as the physicians of the
Enlightenment who promoted the bodily interpretation of mental
phenomena, as I have examined in the previous chapter, for they
attributed all mental changes (mental diseases included) to the changes in
the body. On the other hand, they embraced the deeply anti-Lockean,
spiritual, other-worldly, and almost mystical formulation of the soul. The
hypothetical and metaphysical characterization of the immaterial substance
buttressed the medical reduction of the mental phenomena to the bodily
ones. Dual and seemingly diametrically opposite directions were thus
involved in the medical writings on the mind/soul and its disorders in the
earlier half of the eighteenth century.
Around the mid-century, a different scheme from Cheyne's and
Robinson's appeared in the project of David Hartley. Hartley's scheme
was not diametrically opposite to Cheyne's. Indeed, one is tempted to say
that early-century formulation of the new pattern of dualism made Hartley
Response to Locke's Theory of Personal Identity'; Fox, 'Locke and
Scriblerians.'
75. Tennant, 'The Anglican Response to Locke's Theory of Personal
Identity,'; Fox, 'Locke and the Scriblerians.'
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possible, by demolishing the former rigid distinction between material and
immaterial faculties and by claiming ji our mental activities are
accompanied by bodily changes. Hartley's scheme seems to have come n1
out of Lockean materialism, but from the new pattern of dualism worked
out in the attempt to refute the materialism. Hartley, however,
constructed a different field to understand the soul, its operations, and its
union with the body. In the next section I will examine those problems in
Hartley's grand project.
David Hartley's Observations (1749): Physiology of Thinking
a) Locke's associationism in the early eighteenth centuly
David Hartley published his Observations in 1749. As he wrote in
the preface to the work, and as is confirmed by Webb's detailed study of
the growth of Hartley's thought, this work was a product of long thinking
of eighteen years during which his thought followed a twisted way, with at
least one 'trial balloon' publication, and, possibly, another two. 76 During
the course, Hartley digested the two fundamental inspirations from the two
giants of the English Enlightenment--Newton's conjecture on the vibration
of aether as an instrument of our senses and motions and Locke's brief
76. David Hartley, Observations on Man: His Frame. His Dut y, and His
Expectations 2 pts. (London: Leake & Frederick, 1749). The 'trial balloon'
work is Various Conjectures on the Perception. Motion and Generation of
Ideas, originally published in 1746 in his De Lithontriptico... Joanna
Stephens, trans. by Robert E.A. Palmer, intro, by Martin Kallich (Los
Angels: University of California Press, 1959). Stephen Ferg, 'Two Early
Works by David Hartley,' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1981, 19: 173-89, has convincingly
attributed two anonymous works to Hartley, i.e., An Introduction towards
an Essay on the Origin of the Passions... (1741) and An Enquiry into the
Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections... (1747). However, Martha
Ellen Webb, 'A New History of Hartley's Observations on Man,'
Jour.Hist.Behav.Sci., 1988, 24: 202-11, the most detailed work on the
making of Hartley's Observations, did not suggest any evidence of
Hartley's publishing the two works, and, curiously, did not mention Ferg's
paper.
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statement on the association of ideas!7 Newton's tentative suggestion of
the elastic fluid attracted a great number of natural philosophers then,
with plenty of historical studies on acceptance of Newton's suggestion.
And Newton's theory of vibrating subtle fluid played, as C.U.M. Smith
pointed out, much greater role in Hartley's work than as a mere initial
inspirational kick: each vital component of Hartley's argument on vibratory
aether fits well with Newton's theory of matter.79
The other fundamental device to create Hartley's system, Locke's
association of ideas, did not find as large a number of followers as
Newton's aether until late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and
relatively few historical studies have been made on the subject in the
earlier half of the century.8° Hence a short summary of the history of the
reception and transformation of Locke's associationism will be helpful.
The seminal suggestion was made in Locke's addition of a brief
chapter to the fourth edition (1700) of his Essay. 81 In the chapter
77. Hartley, Conjectures, p.1; idem, Observations, 'Preface.' See also
[David Hartley], An Enquiry into the Origins of the Human Appetites and
Affections... (Lincoln: for R. Dodsley, 1747), pp.32-35.
78. See, among others, Robert Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism:
British Natural Philosophy in an Age of Reason (Princeton: Princeton
U.P., 1970).
79. C.U.M. Smith, 'David Hartley's Newtonian Neuropsychology,'
Jour.Hist.Behav.Sci., 1987, 23: 123-36.
80. The fullest account of Hartley's associationism is Barbara Bowen
Oberg, 'David Hartley and the Association of Ideas,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1976,
37: 44 1-54. See also H.C. Warren, A History of the Association
Psychology (London: Constable and Company, 1921); Robert Young,
'Association of Ideas' in DHI; Corinna Delkeskamp, 'Medicine, Science,
and Moral Philosophy: David Hartley's Attempts at Reconciliation,' Ih
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1977, 2: 162-76.
81. Locke, Essay, 2.33. John Wright has convincingly established that
Malebranche is an important source of Locke's idea of association. See
John Wright, 'Association, Madness, and the Measures of Probability in
Locke and Hume,' in Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century,
ed. by Fox, 103-27.
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entitled 'of the association of ideas,' Locke described the ill effects of our
making false and unnatural association between ideas, whose connection
was established 'wholly owing to chance and custom.' Locke observed
that self-love, wrong education, custom, and prejudice, were the chief
causes of man's extravagant opinions and his obstinate sticking to false
notions. This is because, Locke suggested, several ideas, which do not
have a 'natural correspondence and connexion one with another,' are
united in the person's mind and cemented so tightly that 'it is very hard to
separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any
time comes into the understanding but its associate appears with it.'
Locke gave an example of the association of the idea of goblins and that
of darkness. There exists no natural connection between them, yet as a
foolish maid often inculcates these two ideas on the mind when one is a
child, these two ideas become tightly united and he will have an idea of
goblin whenever it is dark, even after he is grown up. One cannot be
free from it and the false association will last 'so long as he lives,' for
'when this combination is settled, ... it is not in the power of reason to help
us, and relieve us from the effects of it.'
Apparently, association of ideas is, for Locke, the model of an
error, superstition, or abnormal and undesirable working of the mind. It
constitutes a vital part of one of the two main tasks of Locke's Essay, i.e.
to analyse the causes and mechanisms of aberrant thinking and to establish
a normative epistemoIogy. Accordingly, Locke went so far as to say
82. Locke, Essay, 2.33.5.
83. Locke, Essay, 2.33.5.
84. Locke, Essay, 2.33.10.
85. Locke, Essays, 2.33.13.
86. See John P. Wright, 'Association, Madness and the Measures of
Probability.'
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that association of ideas is a sort of madness, as 'opposition to reason
deserves that name, and is really madness.'87
The suggestion found few serious medical followers in the first half
of the century. The only and seemingly insignificant exception I have
found is John Hollings' (1683?-1739) Harveian Oration in 1734, which was
no more than a passing remark. Hollings simply addressed his audience
to pay attention to Locke's association of ideas, writing that Locke's
'connection of ideas' ought not to be neglected, for the knowledge of it
would be helpful for the right understanding of 'several diseases of the
head, such as delirious disorders, lethargies, madness and the like.'
Despite Locke's strong tone of identifying madness with association of
ideas, physicians then did not follow his lead, and Hollings seems to have
failed to stir medical interest in Locke's associationism.
For some philosophers in 1730s and 1740s, association of ideas
meant much more. Picking up Locke's suggestion, they made a more
general and ambitious use of it and transformed Locke's cause of mere
aberrant thinking into a principle that can form normal and normative
workings of mind. John Gay (1699-1745) used association as the vital
moulder of the basis of morality of man in his 'Preliminary Dissertation
concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality' (1732).
Dissatisfied with Francis Hutcheson's (1694-1746) 'innate disposition'
toward benevolent behaviour and inherent 'moral sense,' Gay argued that
87. Locke, Essay, 2.33.4.
88. John Hollings, The State of Human Nature (London: T. Roberts et al.,
1734), p.10.
89. Rev. John Gay, 'Preliminary Dissertation concerning the Fundamental
Principle of Virtue or Morality,' in William King, An Essay on the Origin
of Evil, translated by Edmund Law, 2 vols. (London: W. Thurlbourii,
1732), xxviii-lvii. Gay's 'Dissertation' is reprinted with an useful
introduction in LA. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, 2 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1897), vol.2, pp.267-285.
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moral sense and benevolent passions were not 'implanted,' but acquired
and moulded by the association of ideas through habits.
Another similar application of the principle of association was made
by David Hume (1711-1776) in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)
and Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the
Principles of Morals (1748) .91 Hume showed that our processes of
judgment, especially the judgment of cause and effect, were dependent
upon association of ideas, i.e. our repeated experiences of a certain event
and customs and habits. For Hume, our normative mental operations such
as reasoning and moral judgment, as well as abnormal thinking, were all
products of association. Association is, for Hume, the key to his whole
system of the philosophy of the human mind.
Roughly speaking, therefore, Locke's associationism appealed much
more to philosophers than to physicians in the early eighteenth century.
In the domains of moral philosophy and logic, there were important
attempts to use association as a fundamental principle, while physicians did
not show much interest in Locke's suggestion.
b) Hartley's physiological associationism
As a writer who was principally interested in moral philosophy,
Hartley took up the widened version of association as the principle of all
human mental activities such as memory, imagination, use of language,
understanding, affection and will. Indeed, Hartley admitted debt to
90. Gay, 'Dissertation,' xxxii. [David Hartley}, An Enquiry, pp.3-16, too,
made use of the principle of association to refute Hutcheson's innate
moral sense.
91. For Hume's use of association, see John Bricke, 'Hume's Associationist
Psychology,' Jour.Hist.Behav.Sci., 1974, 10: 397-409; John P. Wright,
'Association, Madness and the Measures of Probability.'
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Gay?2 What marked him as different from Locke, Gay and Hume, is
that he gave an elaborate physiological basis to the process with which
association moulds our various mental activities.
Hartley claimed that the white medullary substance of the brain,
spinal marrow, and the nerves was the immediate instrument of sensation.
When an external object hits a certain sensory organ, the sensation of it
makes minute particles in the medullary substance vibrate, and the
vibration causes in the mind the idea of the external object. When the
impression of the object is removed, the vibratory motion will remain for
a while?3 And if the impressions are repeated enough times, the 'vestige,
type, image' of the original vibration will be firmly established in the
medullary substance. This process of making vestiges of vibrations starts
as soon as one is born. The foetus has original vibration "N", and it gets
the vibration "A", caused by an impression of an external object:
Now let us suppose the first object to be impressed for the first
time and then removed. It is evident from the nature of vibratory
motions that the brain will not immediately return to state N, but
will remain for some time in state A, though decreasing in intensity.
Suppose the same object to be impressed again and again, and at
last the brain will not return to the state N at all but remain in
state A?4
92. Hartley, Observations, 'Preface.' As for the possibility of Hartley's
reading Hume, Warren answered in the negative, Oberg suggested Hartley
might read Hume. Neither of them produced conclusive evidence. See
Warren, History of Association Psychology, p.50; Oberg, 'David Hartley
and the Association of Ideas,' 441. That Hartley was principally interested
in moral, rather than natural, philosophy has been established by Webb,
'A New History of Observations.'
93. Hartley, Conjectures, p.13; idem, Observations, part I, pp.11-i2.
94. Hartley, Conjectures, p.24: idem, Observations, part I, p.61. [Hartley],
Enquiry, p.33, presents the identical model.
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Thus, the brain of a new-born baby (the physical analogue of Locke's
tabula rasp) starts to be moulded by receiving vibratory motions from the
sensation of an external object, and, accordingly, its mind is furnished with
an idea of it. Then Hartley proceeds to explain associations of several
ideas. When three vibratory states caused by external objects (A, B, C)
are repeated often enough, i.e. when the mind has three corresponding
ideas (a, b, c) sufficient number of times, the vibration of A alone will
cause the vibrations of B and C, that is, only having the idea "a" will cause
the ideas of "l" and "c."
As is evident from the brief summary of Hartley's basic starting
point given above, Hartley's fundamental device in his building a
physiology of thinking was one-to-one correspondence between one
vibration and one idea, the basic physical unit and the primary mental
unit: one simple vibration corresponds to one simple idea, and one
compounded vibration corresponds to one compounded idea?6
Hartley constructed the new scheme by building a bridge over two
disciplines of medical physiology and philosophy of the human mind.
Although medical writers such as Cheyne and Robinson had competent
knowledge of Newton's hypothesis, they did not take the 'idea' as the most
basic unit for understanding the human mind, neither did they correlate it
with the physical process of the vibration. Rather, their fundamental units
were mental faculties like perception, memory, understanding, etc., and
they correlated them with the structure of the fibres, as I have examined
above77	On the other hand, philosophical writers who analyzed the
95. Hartley, Conjectures, p.26; idem, Observations, part I, pp.62-63.
96. This was pointed out in Joseph Priestley, 'Introductory Essays', in
Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, on the Principle of the Association
of Ideas (London: J. Johnson, 1775), pp.xii-xiv.
97. Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.42-5l. As for Newtonian
physiology of Cheyne and Robinson, see Anita Guerrini, 'Isaac Newton,
George Cheyne and the Principia Medicinae,' in The Medical Revolution
of the Seventeenth Century, eds. by Roger French and Andrew Wear
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989), 222-45.
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mental faculties into the mental atoms of ideas did not express explicit
interest in the physiological side of the process, perhaps following Locke
in avoiding the 'physical considerations.' Isaac Watts (1674-1748), in his
Locke-inspired Logic. or the Right Use of Reason (1725), wrote that the
study of the mechanism of sensation must 'belong to another science
rather than logick': Hume regarded the examination of sensations as the
suitable task for anatomists and natural philosophers, rather than that for
a student of the human mind: Gay's associationism was not concerned with
the physical realm of man at all?8
There was, therefore, a gap between two groups of discourses in
England in the early eighteenth century. One that was concerned with the
understanding of the physical part did not analyse the mental operations
into its basic units of ideas, and the other that tried to analyse various
workings of the mind into associated, connected, composed ideas lacked
physiological basis. Anatomy of the body and analysis of the mind
belonged to different domains. Hartley's work represented one of the
most significant eighteenth-century attempts to link them together. He
Lockeanized the physiology of thinking pursued by the physicians, and
physiologized the Lockean associationism embraced by the
philosophers?9
98. Isaac Watts, The Works of the Late Reverend and Learned Isaac
Watts. D.D. 6 vols. (London: T. and T. Longman, et a!., 1753), vol.5., p.5;
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), p.8.
99. The bridge between associationism and the physiology of sensation was
not available to Hartley when he started to be interested in association
through Gay's work, and it took about eight years for Hartley to hit upon
the idea. See Webb, 'A New History of Observations.' And the expansion
of Hartley's interest into the corporeal domain was probably due to his
practice of medicine during this period, reading a lot of medical works,
publishing some medical pamphlets (on inoculation and 'Mrs. Stephens'
powder'), and getting acquainted with some members of the scientific
establishments in London to which he moved in 1735. See Martha Ellen
Webb, 'The Early Medical Studies and Practice of Dr. David Hartley,'
Bull.Hist.Med., 1989, 63: 618-36.
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Accordingly, Hartley's new genre of the study of man represented
two major departures from former 'anthropology.' 100 First, the mental
part of Hartley's works was not the same as the former 'psychologie' in
'anthropologie,' neither was it the same as what Cheyne and Robinson
talked about. They examined the nature of the soul, asked whether it was
substance or not, whether it was immaterial or not, how it was connected
to the body. To use Locke's term, they were engaged in 'physical
consideration' of the soul. Hartley, on the other hand, did not raise such
issues. Instead, he connected his physiological explanation with the
description of actual operations of the mind. The 'mental' part of his work
examined the question how human mind worked when it remembers,
imagines, uses language, makes judgment on ethical issues, and feels
sympathy, theopathy, and benevolence. These issues, in contrast with the
former 'physical considerations,' belonged to Locke's domain.
Secondly, he did not separate his account of the corporeal aspects
of man from mental ones. The corporeal and mental accounts of man
constituted different and highly independent parts in the former schemes
of 'anthropologie.' 101 Hartley interwove the two domains. The accounts
of the corporeal and mental aspects did not appear in different parts, but
were presented in turn in a single chapter, in which Hartley alternated
between the mental and corporeal. He explained how an association of
ideas takes place in our mind; then proceeded to support the argument by
giving an account of how the corresponding vibrations would coalesce into
one; went back to mental domain to explain how complex ideas are
formed: and proceeded to physical domain to talk about how 'the simple
miniature vibrations corresponding to those simple ideas run into a
100.For the subject called 'anthropology' in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, see Fox, 'Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology.'
101. See Anthropologie Abstracted: or the Idea of Humane Nature
(London: Henry Herrington, 1655).
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complex miniature vibration, corresponding to the resulting complex
idea.' 1°2 The two parts of the former 'anthropologie' were fused by
Hartley into one field of knowledge: there had been separate 'somatology'
and 'psychology,' while Hartley created so to speak 'somatological
psychology.'
In the Hartleian scheme, therefore, we see a fundamentally
different device for understanding the human mind. The gap between the
study of the working of the mind and that of its physiology was bridged; a
close one-to-one relationship between mental and physical unit was
established; rather than the old faculty-based pneumatology, the latest
Lockean psychology was adopted and combined with the physiology of
nerves. Then, what did he think about madness? Hartley devoted one
whole chapter to an examination on 'deviations from sound reason, and
alienation of mind,' so as to gather support to the theory of vibration and
association. 103 At the beginning of the chapter, Hartley characterized
madness as follows:
Mad persons differ from others in that they judge wrong of past or
future facts of a common nature; that their affections and actions
are violent and different from, or even opposite to, those of others
upon the like occasions, and such as are contrary to their true
happiness.104
Instead of Cartesian model of madness as an illusion and iatro-
mathematical model of madness as a disordered reflex action, Hartley
adopted Locke's suggestion of madness as mis-association, i.e., wrong
judgment and aberrant behaviour.
102.Hartley, Observations, part I, pp.65-67 and 73-79.
103.Hartley, Observations, part I, pp.390-403.
104.Hartley, Observations, part I, p.390.
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Hartley tried to underpin this Lockean characterization of mental
disorders by his physiology centred on the theoiy of vibration of nerves.
Idiocy was related with disorders in the brain which prevented a man from
receiving 'a disposition to the miniature vibrations in which ideas consist';
dotage of the old age was supposed to be caused by the decay of 'the part
of the brain in which the miniature vibrations ... have taken place'; a
wrong judgment takes place when '[the nervous disorder] increases the
vibrations belonging to its ideas so much, as to give it a reality.'105
These physiological explanations centred on the nerves were hardly
Hartley's original. As we have already seen, the nerves and the brain as
the instrument of mental operations had long been established, especially
in the writings of Cheyne and Robinson. Neither his characterization of
mental and behavioral aspects of madness was unique: Hartley owed a lot
to Locke's characterization of madness as deviation from common sense.
What seems original was, again, that he brought together two different
genres of discourse and tried to unify them into a single discourse. Those
who had written about madness from the mental point of view did not use
the language of physiology, and those who talked about the disordered
body largely stuck to the Cartesian illusion model of madness. Hartley
fused the two categories of discourse together: just as Hartley threw a
bridge between Lockean philosophy of the human mind and medical
physiology to pioneer the new field, his account of madness was both
Lockean and physiological.
Hartley seems to have failed to attract physicians' immediate notice,
however. Although Hartley wrote that his theoiy of association and
vibration would contribute to more correct understanding of madness, in
the immediate wake of the publication of the book, he found few, if any,
medical followers. As Robert Hoeldtke has argued, it was not until
William Cullen (1710-90) and his pupil Thomas Arnold that association
105. Hartley, Observations, part I, pp.391-401.
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was considered seriously as an important mechanism in madness. 1°6 And
as I will argue in the sixth chapter, there was to be a full development of
Hartley's seminal suggestion.
c) Other similar schemes
Although Hartley was unique in his fusing associationist psychology
and Newtonian physiology of sensation, there were some similar projects
on the French-speaking Continent and in England around the time of the
publication of Observations.
Contributors from the French scene included Charles Bonnet (1720-
93), a Swiss naturalist and philosopher, and Antoine le Camus (1722-
72) . b07
 The scheme presented in Bonnet's Essai de psychologie (1754)
and Essai analytigue sur les facultés de l'âme (1760) is strikingly similar
to Hartley's Observations. 108 Like Hartley, Bonnet proceeds step by step
from the mind/brain of a foetus to that of a thinking man, underpinning
each step by physiological explanation. Bonnet's foetus has no idea
(tabula rasp), its nervous and cerebral fibres are in the état primitif ou
original (Hartley's 'original vibration'); sensation changes the original state
to a new disposition (Hartley's 'vestige'); by association of simple
106.Robert Hoeldtke, 'The History of Associationism and British
Psychology,' Med.Hist., 1967, 11: 46-65.
107.John Yolton, Locke and French Materialism (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991).
108. [Charles Bonnet], Essai de ps ychologie: ou considerations sur les
operations de l'âme. sur l'habitude et sur l'éducation (London: no
publisher, 1755); idem, Essai analytique sur les facultés de l'áme
(Copenhagen: Cl. & Ant. Philibert, 1760). For the development of
Bonnet's psychological idea, see Lorin Anderson, Charles Bonnet and the
Order of the Known (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982), pp.16-18. The anonymous
author of Letters on Materialism and Hartley's theory of the Human Mind.
Addressed to Dr. Priestley (London: G. Robinson et al., 1776), associated
Bonnet and Hartley, writing both claimed 'that every mental process is a
mechanical effect, and therefore that all free election in man is a
chimerical and usurped prerogative.' (p.11)
210
sensations man is endowed with the faculties of judgment, reasoning, and
moral senses. 109 Just as Hartley relied on Locke's Essa.y, Bonnet
followed Condillac's (1715-80) Traité des sensations (1754), which was
inspired directly by Locke's Essay. Bonnet even used Condillac's famous
model of human statue gradually acquiring mental faculties through
sensations. Bonnet's Essai analvtique was thus a fusion of Condillac's
(and, ultimately, Locke's) psychology and medical physiology of nerves,
and, and the book looked very much the same with Hartley's Observations.
Antoine Le Camus's Médecine de l'esprit (1753) represented
another attempt to underpin Lockean psychology with the physiology of
nerves. 110 In the work, the account oscillated between mental and
physical domains in the way of Hartley and Bonnet. Each piece of
explanation of a mental faculty is followed by physiological underpinning
of it, using the device of the one-to-one correspondence between an idea
as the mental atom and 'une reflux des esprits' as the corresponding
physiological unit. In doing so, he knew exactly what he was doing: to
introduce physiological basis into the discipline of logic. He declared that
in that book he would discuss 'the mechanism which contributes to the
operations of our mind,' and suggested that 'this part of knowledge can be
called the logic of physicians [my emphasis]."11
109.Bonnet, Essai analvtique, pp.13, 32-33, 40, & 48-9.
110.Antoine le Camus, Médecine de l'esprit, 2 vols. (Paris: Ganeau, 1753).
For le Camus, see John W. Yolton, 'French Materialist Disciples of
Locke,' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1987, 25: 83-104; idem, Locke and French
Materialism, passim.
111.Le Camus, Médecine de l'esprit, vol.1, p.9. Compare his notion of the
environment making up the mind with Claude-Adrien Helvétius, I2
l'esprit: or. Essays on the Mind, and Its Several Faculties (1810; New
York: Burt Franklin, 1970). For discussion of ideologues and medicine in
late eighteenth-century France, see Martin S. Staum, Cabanis:
Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution,
(Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1980); idem, 'Medical Components in Cabanis's
Science of Man', Studies in History of Biology, 1978, 2: 1-31.
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Unlike their French colleagues, English medical writers do not seem
to have immediately produced any Hartleian version of physiological
psychology. Neither was Hartley a star in the domain of English
metaphysics: Priestley's abridged edition was the product of his
disappointment with people's ignorance of Hartley. 112 Some
metaphysical writers, however, were interested in what may be called
physiology of thinking. J. Richardson, an obscure writer in Kent, might be
one of the earliest writers that launched a Hartley-like project after the
publication of Observations. In his Thoughts upon Thinking (1755), he
expressed disappointment at the works by 'Bacon, Descartes, Fenelon,
Browne, Locke, Clarke, Watts, Wollaston, Berkeley, Cheyne, Baxter,
Leibnitz and others' and he claimed that his book attempts to explain
human mind 'upon principles entirely new.' 113 His 'new principle' was
to reduce human mental operations understood in Locke's framework into
physical analogue of sensation:
Thinking may not unaptly be defined a mimicking, or acting over
again, every kind of sensation, performed by the same organs, but
the impulse being different, and exerted in a different manner, for
that exhibited by real object.4
For Richardson, to remember, to imagine, to will, or to think, was to have
the inward mechanism of our sense organs modified 'as if I was actually
112. See Michael Barfoot, 'Priestley, Reid's Circle and the Third Organon
of Human Reasoning,' in Science. Medicine and Dissent: Joseph Priestley,
eds. by R.G.W. Anderson and Christopher Lawrence (London: Wellcome
Trust/Science Museum, 1987), 81-89; Richard H. Popkin, 'Joseph
Priestley's Criticisms of David Hume's Philosophy,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1977,
15: 437-47.
113.J. Richardson, Thoughts upon Thinking, or a New Theory of the
Human Mind (London: for the Author, 1755), p.5. Almost nothing is
known about the author.
114. Richardson, Thoughts upon Thinking, p.6.
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perceiving.' Thinking became a simulacrum of sensation that had apparent
physiological basis.1'5
Robert Applegarth, another obscure writer, published 'A
psychological stricture' affixed to his Theological Survey of the Human
Understanding, to promote the fusion of psychological and physiological
languages."6 Here again at issue was the discipline of logic. Unlike
Lockean, Humean, and many others' logic which tried to look at the idea
as a mental unit, Applegarth's reformed logic constructed its basic unit as
a fundamentally dual component of both mental and bodily phenomena:
In fine every idea (both sensation and reflection) may be
considered as composed of two parts: viz. 1) a pulsation of some
one nerve of the brain and 2) the impression made by that on the
percipient [mind]. And these two together (but neither alone) is
what I call thinking.117
Applegarth's scheme seems to have followed Hartley in trying to regard
human thinking as the inseparable compound of the bodily and mental
process. 8 Accordingly, in Applegarth's newly formulated 'psychology,'
the discourse on the body occupied a solid place. He wrote about: the
function of the brain to secrete the animal spirits; mental habit established
by 'the pulsatory habit of the interior nerves in the brain' (almost certainly
115.Richardson, Thoughts upon Thinking, pp.12-15.
116.Robert Applegarth, A Theological Survey of the Human
Understanding Intended as an Antidote against Modern Deism (Salisbury:
for the Author, 1776), 'A Psychological Stricture', pp.245-76. Almost
nothing is known about the author.
117.Applegarth, A Theological Survey, p.258.
118.He admitted Locke's 'physical consideration' of the soul into the basic
division of topics in logic. Applegarth, A Theological Survey, pp.247-48.
The traditional division of the topics in logic into four parts of perception,
judging, reasoning, discourse had been accepted since the Port-Royalists.
See Howell, Eighteenth-Centur y British Logic and Rhetoric, pp.307.
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the influence of Hartley's vibration theory); lunacy caused by forcible
shock on nerves. All these topics hardly existed in works of logic in the
early eighteenth century, for they were Locke's 'physical considerations,'
and Hume's 'task of anatomists.'119
The evidence given above from the 'minor' writers shows that
Hartley was not the only person to try to fuse Locke's psychology and
nervous physiology. Although Richardson and Applegarth did not use
associationism, they were doing essentially what Hartley did, i.e., to
provide a somatic basis to Lockean philosophy of the mind. Moreover,
they regarded their projects as something new and reformative of the
status quo of the philosophy of the mind. Therefore, around the mid-
century, there appeared a drive to defy the traditional Lockean barrier
between philosophy of the mind and the 'physical considerations of the
mind,' and to create a new form of discourse which can be called
physiological Lockean psychology.
There were two coups which involved re-structuring of
psychiatry/psychology in the earlier half of the century. One was
expressed in the physicians' and metaphysicians' polemic against the
materialists' threat. There the intactness of the immaterial faculty in our
actual mental operations was replaced by the intactness of the original and
primary powers of the soul, and all our actual mental operations became
a product of interaction. The other saw its fullest and the most elaborate
development in Hartley. It was essentially an attempt to bridge the gap
between the enquiry in the operations of the human mind in Lockean way
and the study of the physiological processes of thinking. Locke's rather
tight distinction between logic/moral philosophy and the 'physical
consideration of the soul' was defied, and the study of the mind and its
diseases came to have both the languages of Lockean philosophy and of
physiology.
119. Applegarth, A Theological Survey, pp.25l, 256 and 262.
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One thing to be pointed out is that none of the above mentioned
projects of fusing discourse on mental operation and that on physical
corresponding process was a militant monistic polemic such as those of La
Mettrie and Priestley. Hartley, Bonnet, Le Camus, Richardson and
Applegarth were all explicit in claiming that there were two substances in
man, i.e. thinking immaterial substance and the material one, and there is
no sign that any one of them intended to launch an attack against dualism.
Applegarth's work bears a subtitle of 'an antidote against modern deism,'
and Richardson was ready to admit the immateriality and divinity of the
soul.12° Neither did readers of their works recognize a threat of
materialism. Reading Bonnet's Essai analytigue, Jerome Gaub (1705-
1780) wrote to Bonnet that the work demonstrated the immateriality of the
soul the most successfully and provided a bastion against La Mettrie's
heresy.121
In that sense, the works of Hartley and others had continuity with
the works by Baxter, Cheyne, and Robinson. Both groups of writers were
loyal to the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul and man as consisting
of two substances. Both groups, at the same time, insisted that all mental
operations of man were dependent upon the body. Both Hartley and
Cheyne claimed that the human mind was improved yj working upon the
body it resided. Hartley's work was not directed against those of Cheyne
and others, despite the former embracing Locke and the latter rejected
him.
Hartley, however, started a new approach within the old dualistic
framework. Besides his establishing one-to-one correspondence between
the most fundamental mental and physical units, and besides his blurring
Locke's distinction of the three categories of knowledge, I would like to
point out three major shifts in Hartley's and other similar projects. First,
the radical departing point in Hartley's Observations from the discourse
120. Richardson, Thoughts upon Thinking, p.43.
121.Anderson, Charles Bonnet, p.19.
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by Cheyne, Robinson, and others was that the area of materially
determined mental faculties acquired autonomy. The former discourse on
the physiology of the mind was inseparable from the discourse on
immaterial, other-worldly, transcendental soul: there the discourse on the
physiology of actual mental operations was buttressed by the discourse on
the powers of the soul after its separation from the body. In that
configuration of the scheme, bodily determined actual mental phenomena
were the indirect, imperfect, and inferior manifestation of original powers
of the soul, which was essentially something unknown.
In Hartley's scheme, by contrast, there is no room for the other-
worldly soul to play as decisive a role as it did in Cheyne's. The actual
mental operations of man were not measured against the superior ones
after the death of the body. Hartley and Bonnet's human mind, starting
from its infancy with no ideas and no mental operations, gradually grows
to its maturity with the full exercise of the powers of intellect, and
aesthetic, moral and religious senses. Our mental powers are the stage
that have progressed from its infancy, not a degenerated or inferior one of
pre-lapsarian and/or post-separation powers of the soul: they are to be
measured against the mind of a baby, or even of a foetus. As is evident,
this is Locke's own scheme, i.e., human mind progressing from tabula rasa,
which was criticized by Cheyne and Robinson (and many others) as
eliminating the transcendental substance from man. Hartley achieved this
in a different manner from Hume: unlike Hume who uprooted the idea of
'substance' and replaced the substance of self with 'a bundle of
perceptions,' Hartley did not attack the doctrine of the substance itself: he
simply did without it in the field of mind-body problems where Cheyne and
others had found it indispensable.122
Secondly, related closely with the first point, the body in Hartley's
scheme played a different role from that in the scheme of Baxter, Cheyne,
Robinson and others. The body in the scheme of Cheyne and others was
122. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp.232-52.
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essentially an impediment to the transcendental soul, however its
refinement contributed to the improvement of the mind. With the
withdrawal of the transcendental soul from the scene, Hartley's body plays
only constructive role in developing our mental faculties. Without
vibrating nerves, there would be no idea, hence no mental powers: without
the body, our mind would stay in the identical state with that of a newborn
baby.
Thirdly, sensation, or perception of an external object played a
different part in the systems of Hartley and others. From the viewpoint
of transcendental understanding of the mind, sensation did not form the
most important part of human mind. For Baxter, sensation was still an
instrument, which the soul was forced to rely on in its union with the body.
The author of Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination
(1728), thought that the faculty of sensation, which man shares with
animal, was 'only a ministerial faculty, or hath the nature ... of an
instrument. Robinson still held the view that our mental faculties form 'a
ladder,' which stretches between the supreme faculty of understanding and
the lowest one of sensation.lB For Hartley and others in the mid-
century, in contrast, sensation gave a new physical dispositions to the
nerves and brain, and constructed 'higher' mental operations. Moral
senses, aesthetic taste, judgment, religious sentiment, and benevolent
feeling were all moulded by sensations.
Doing without transcendental soul, the constructive role of the
body, and placing sensation at the centre of the system--these are the
elements of the new systems proposed around the mid-century. Although,
as I have stressed, all these took place within the orthodox framework of
dualism, it is understandable that this new scheme of understanding the
123. Baxter, An Enquiry, vol.1, pp.263f. and 390; Two Dissertations
concerning Sense. and the Imagination. with an Essay on Consciousness
(London: J. Tonson, 1728), p.8. David G. Schappert writes that the
attributed authorship of this work to Zachary Mayne or Charles Mayne is
doubtful. See 'Selected Bibliography' in Christopher Fox ed., Psychology
and Literature, 342; Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, pp.50-5l.
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mind led some to out-and-out monism--most notably, Priestley--and upset
others. Reading Hartley, Priestley found that the doctrine of vibrations
'leaves nothing to the province of any other principle, except the single
power of perception.' From that Priestley concluded that 'if it were
possible that [man] could be endowed with this property, immateriality
would be excluded altogether'.'
An anonymous author of Letters on Materialism and Hartley's
Theory of the Human Mind. Addressed to Dr. Priestley made the same
observation on Hartley's work but did not welcome it as Priestley did:
Hartley's spiritual part might have no pretext to glory in its
superiority, he invidiously despoiled it of all its high endowments,
and [had] it servilely submite to all the mandate of the body. Thus
the soul from being considered as a substance supremely active, and
gifted with powers of reasoning and of ruling the motions of the
body, is let down to the level of a being, divested of every real
faculty, made passive and inert, and solely capable of receiving
impressions.'
The anonymous author here pointed out the three phases of the Hartleian
shift. The mind formulated by Hartley was, the author claimed, totally
secular, submissive to the body, and only a receptor of sensation. Both
Hartley's Observations and Bonnet's Essai analytigue, the author protested,
'infer that every mental process is a mechanical effect.' 1	Abraham
124.Priestley, Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, xix.
125.Letters on Materialism, pp.142-43. See also William Hazlitt's
'Romantic' criticism that Hartley and Helvétius made the human mind the
slave of selfishness, sensation, and habit. William Hazlitt, An Essay on the
Principles of Human Action and Some Remarks on the System of Hartley
and Helvétius (London: J. Johnson, 1805; a facsimile rept. with an
introduction by John R. Nabholtz, Gainesville, Florida: Scholars'
Facsimiles and Reprints, 1969).
126.Letters on Materialism, p.11.
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Tucker (1705-74), who usually occupies the next place to Hartley in the
chronology of associationism, attacked Hartley for having made the mind
a passive receiver of impression.127 Although Hartley's Observations did
not come under massive attack until Priestley's monistic use of it, Hartley's
new formulation of human mind turned out to be an offence against
transcendental understanding of the soul.1
Did Hartley's discourse on human mind represent Enlightenment
secularization? Yes and No. Yes, because Hartley may rightly be said to
have followed Locke and to have done without the other-worldly soul in
his physiology of human mind. No, because his practice of writing the
physiology of thinking was almost inseparably connected with religious
issues. We have to recall that Hartley did not initially intend to write
on physical consideration of the mind. That was a sort of by-product of his
studying moral and religious bases of human happiness. 130 Moreover, his
Observations contains Part II, in which he dealt with 'duty and
expectations of mankind,' including revealed religion. Historians of
psychology have not made serious study on Hartley's prescriptive morality
and religion in the second part of the work, and this is not fair to Hartley's
127.Abraham Tucker, The Light of Nature Pursued, cited in Warren,
History of Association Psychology, p.67.
128.The author of An Essay on the Immateriality and Immortality of the
Si (London: J. Dodsley, 1778) criticized Priestley's materialism but wrote
that 'Dr. Hartley's theory ... stands free from the objections I have made
to Dr. Priestley's, since Hartley allowed that we have immaterial
principles.' (JbI. p.79) Although Hartley' denial of 'philosophical
freedom' was a common aim of attacks (see, for instance, Letters on
Materialism, p.12), it seems that the attacks did not appear until Priestley's
publication of the abridged edition.
129. See, for instance, Margaret Leslie, 'Mysticism Misunderstood: David
Hartley and the Idea of Progress,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1972,33: 625-32; Robert
Marsh, 'The Second Part of Hartley's System,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1959, 2th
264-73.
130. Martha Webb, 'A New History of Hartley's Observations.'
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own intention, as Robert March has clarified. 131 As Margaret Leslie,
another revisionist on Hartley, has observes, we have been too accustomed
to looking at Hartley through Priestley's abridged version of Observations,
in which Priestley cut off 'a whole system of moral and religious
knowledge."32 Marsh pointed out that for Hartley, the second part was
the more important of the two, for religion was, for Hartley, the highest
form of inquiry to which all the other 'branches of knowledge ought to be
considered as mere preparatories and preliminaries,' and that Hartley
expected study of human mind and its physiological basis would 'lessen
difficulties attending natural and revealed religion, and to improve their
evidences, as well as concur with them in their determination of man's
duty and expectations.' 133 As Christopher Fox rightly says, 'many
attempts in the age to understand the mind were not done for the
purposes of psychology itself, but to gain some certainty in religious and
ethical matters.' These aspects of the Enlightenment physiological
psychology seem to remain to be explored.
131.Robert Marsh, 'The Second Part of Hartley's System.' See also
Stephen Ford, 'Coalescence: David Hartley's "Great Apparatus," in
Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Fox, 199-223.
132.Priestley, Hartley's Theory of Human Mind, iii. Leslie, 'Mysticism
Misunderstood,' 629.
133. Marsh, 'The Second Part,' 265 and 267. The citation is from Hartley,
Observations, Part I, pp.366-7 and Part II, 'Introduction.'
134.Christopher Fox, 'Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology,' 5.
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Chapter Five
Battie-Monro Dispute Revisited
Introduction
a) Battie-Monro Dispute: its interpretations
The dispute between William Battie (1703-76) and John Monro
(1715-91) took place in 1758. It was most probably the earliest exchange
of medical publications over the subject of madness. 1 In 1758 a small
book entitled A Treatise on Madness was published by Battie, then
physician to St. Luke's Hospital for Lunaticks founded in 1751. In the
book Battie made a barely veiled attack against Bethiem, criticizing, for
example, its copious and indiscriminate blood-letting and its 'keeping the
patients and cases to themselves.' John Monro, then physician to Bethiem
succeeding his father James, immediately replied with Remarks on Dr.
Battie's Treatise on Madness to defend Bethlem and his father, refuting
Battie's argument paragraph by paragraph.2
The dispute has long been regarded as a breakthrough in the
history of psychiatry, and it has been believed that the breakthrough
resided in solely Battie's side. The institutional bases of the two
controversialists have led medical historians to find there a picturesque
confrontation between the old and the new, i.e., reactionary Monro
representing the centuries-old ineffectual receptacle of the mad versus the
progressive Battie as the spokesman of the freshly established hospital for
1. William Battie, A Treatise on Madness (London: J. Whiston et a!.,
1758), rept. with John Monro, Remarks on Dr. Battie's Treatise on
Madness (London: Clarke, 1758), intro, by Richard Hunter and Ida
Macalpine (London: Dawsons, 1962).
2. Battie, Treatise, pp.3 & 94; Monro, Remarks, 'Advertisement' and pp.1-
2. Tobias Smollett thought that Monro's Remarks was motivated by filial
affection. See Critical Review, 1758, 5: 224.
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the mentally ill. 3 The beatification of Battle and St. Luke's seems to have
started in the mid-nineteenth century. 4 The great reformers of psychiatry
at that time such as John Conolly (1794-1866), Daniel Tuke (1827-95), and
Wilhelm Griesinger (1827-95) praised Battie and St.Luke's. They said:
Battie's Treatise was the first book on mental diseases in England; he was
the first in England to give clinical instruction on insanity and the first
London physician to deliver lectures on mental diseases; St. Luke's was the
first institution dedicated to the purpose of curing the insane and long the
only example of active humane feeling for the insane.5
Although these ovations seem to have been due to the reformers'
identification of themselves and their institutional bases with Battie and St.
Luke's, there is some truth in them. Battle was the first English physician
to a hospital for the insane who published a tract on madness, while
physicians to Bedlam had never published any words on madness for two
centuries until Monro's Remarks: Battie encouraged young physicians to
visit St. Luke's and to make observations there, while Bethiem had not
opened its doors to medical students until as late as 1843. Battie's
3. The old image of pre-nineteenth-century Bethiem as an ineffectual,
custodial, unscientific institution has been recently revised by a number of
historians such as Roy Porter, Patricia Ailderidge, and Jonathan Andrews.
A modern scholarly and detailed study of St. Luke's is still wanting. See
a rather old-fashioned C.N. French, The Story of St. Luke's Hospital
(London: William Heineman Medical Books, 1951).
4. For nineteenth-century contrasting images of St. Luke's and Bedlam in
the previous century, see, for example, Charles Dickens, 'A Curious Dance
round a Curious Tree,' Household Words, 17 Jan. 1852. In the eighteenth
century, however, it seems that there was little effort to contrast the two
hospitals, and St. Luke's identified itself as complementary, rather than
alternative, to Bethlem. See French, The Stor y of St. Luke's Hospital.
5. Heinrich Laehr, Die Literature der Psvchiatrie. Neurologie und
Psychologie von 1459-1799 (Berlin: Reimer, 1900): J. Clarke, A Memoir
of John Conolly (1869): D.H. Tuke, History of the Insane in the British
(1882): Wilhelm Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics
(1867). All these works are cited in Hunter and Macalpine, 'William
Battie, M.D., F.R.S.: Pioneer Psychiatrist,' The Practitioner, 1955, 174: 208-
15.
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progressiveness is not entirely a myth of arbitrary creation.
Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine have provided the hagiography
of Battie with more solid historical scholarship. They have largely adopted
the old framework, interpreted Battie as a progressive reformer and
Monro as a traditionalist: 'How strikingly Battie's teaching marked a
dividing line between the old and new approach to mental illness is shown
by the wrath it aroused in John Monro, the physician of Bethiem Hospital,
citadel of tradition.' According to Hunter and Macalpine, Battie started
everything good and new. Battie's classification of madness into 'original'
and 'consequential' represented the shift from 'madness as one uniform
disease blindly and uniformly physicked' to the disease that needs
'observation and management of individual patient'; Battie's definition of
madness as 'deluded imagination' opened the way to the psychological
understanding of madness that flourished in the next century, while
Monro's definition as 'vitiated judgment' supported the then widely-held
view that madness needed correction by violent treatment and coercive
measures, etc.6
This interpretation of the dispute, especially that of Battie's
progressiveness, has been largely adopted by the more recent historians of
psychiatry. Klaus Doerner looks at Battie from the viewpoint of sociology
of knowledge and emphasizes that Battie made psychiatry a profession:
Battie was the first to unite writing on insanity and holding an office at
mental hospital, while no other physicians to mental hospitals published
anything on madness and no other writers on madness held an office at
psychiatric hospital. Doerner argued that Battie's theory of was an
innovation. Battie's emphasis on delusive sensation was a manifestation
of a radical departure from what Doerner dubbed 'the Lockean
Enlightenment-absolutist model of the rational and coercive sequestration
of the unreason,' and it opened up a new area of Romantic psychiatry with
6. Hunter and Macalpine, 'Introduction' to Battie's Treatise and Monro's
Remarks, pp.7-21; idem, Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry, pp.402-16;
idem, 'William Battie.'
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autonomous psychic space and psychological analysis. Professionalization
of psychiatric knowledge, psychiatry with institutional basis and Romantic
understanding of the mind: Doerner has found that Battie represented the
trends to come.7
Roy Porter has taken a different view from Doerner and sees Battie
in the light of the Enlightenment rather than Romanticism, which makes
much more sense. Yet in general Porter agrees with the view that Battie
anticipated some later innovative trends. Battie held, argues Porter, the
optimistic view that madness was curable which was to dominate the
English psychiatric scene in the early nineteenth century; Battie's emphasis
on management of the insane was to be powerfully propagated during the
age of psychological or 'moral' treatment. Taking a diametrically opposite
viewpoint to Doerner's, Porter observes that Battie was influenced by
Lockean philosophy and hence formed a link with later Lockean
psychiatrists like Alexander Crichton (17631856).8
Besides Doerner and Porter, Dora Weiner has found that Battie
was one of the forerunners of Pine! (1745-1826). Stanley Jackson has
written that early nineteenth-century emphasis on moral management of
the insane had Battie as its precursors. George Rousseau has made Battie
represent the new scientific and lay views about madness in the mid-
eighteenth century, and has painted Monro as a traditionalist.9
7. Klaus Doerner, Madman and the Bourgeoisie (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1981), pp.39-46.
8. Roy Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles (London: Ath!one Press, 1987),
pp.128-29, 192-93, and 206-8. Porter, however, quite rightly reminds us of
the fact that Battie, like Monro, kept his own private madhouse,
which almost certainly made him exceptionally rich. See jjd., p.131.
9. Dora Weiner, 'The Origins of Psychiatry: Pinel or the Zeitgeist?' in
Zusammenhang Festschrift für Marielene Putscher, eds. by Otto Bauer and
Otto Glandien (Köln: Wienand Verlag, 1984), 617-31; Stanley Jackson,
'Introduction' to William Pargeter, Observations on Maniacal Disorders
(1792; rept. London: Rout!edge, 1988); George Rousseau, 'Science,' in Ih
Eighteenth Century, ed. by Pat Rogers (London: Methuen, 1978), 153-207,
esp., 182-86, see also idem, 'Psychology,' in The Ferment of Knowledge,
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b) Problems: the intellectual context of the dispute
There seems to be a tacit assumption among the interpretations
summarized above. By and large they approach Battie's Treatise with
reference to what was to come after Battie, rather than what had
happened before Battie and what was happening at his time. In other
words, the historiography of Battie has been future-oriented: Doerner
looks at Battie in the light of nineteenth-century institutional psychiatry
and Romanticism; Porter tends to associate Battie with late eighteenth and
early nineteenth-century English psychiatric writers; Weiner puts Battie in
a framework for understanding Pinel, and Jackson compared Battie with
Pargeter. Consequently, despite relatively rich studies on Battie, we do not
have a good account of his own intellectual context, e.g. who influenced
him, what kind of ideas he made use of, how much he owed to his
contemporaries, to what extent he was different from them. One aim of
this chapter is to correct the future-oriented unbalance of the present
picture of Battie.
Another assumption is that Battie was a 'psychiatrist,' and that his
book is best understood when put in the context of the history of
psychiatry. A glance at his three other medical publications shows,
however, that he was not a 'specialist' in psychiatric theory: one is a
Harveian Oration on method in medicine, one concerned with physiology
in general based on the Lumleian Lectures he gave in 1749-54, and the
other is a book on general pathology expressed in the Boerhaavian style
of aphorisms.10 It is true that his contemporaries regarded him as
eds. by G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P, 1980),
143-210.
10. William Battie, Oratio Anniversaria in Theatro Collegii Regalis
Medicorum Londinensium anno 1746 (London,: J. Whiston, 1746); idem,
De Principiis Animalibus Exersitationes in Collegio Reg. Medicorum Lond.
Habitae (London: J. Whiston, et al., 1751); idem, Aphorismi de
Cognoscendis & Curandis morbis (London: J. Whiston, et al., 1760). I
could not examine the details of these writings, which would have been
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specializing in treating the mad, and that one is able to describe Battie's
Treatise as an early attempt to make medical study of madness an
independent scientific discipline (as Doerner has suggested). But he did
not pursue the end outside the general physiology and pathology at that
time. Rather, just in the same manner to Willis, Pitcairn, Mead and many
others, he started from the fundamental physiological idea he adopted and
told a stoly on the causes of madness in accordance with his basic
assumption. Battie's 'psychiatric' project was thus a product of the
physiology which was then prevalent and which Battie was interested in.
Especially, Battie held the office of Lumleian Lecturer of physiology from
1749-54 and was very well acquainted with contemporary physiological
ideas, whose influence on Battie's Treatise is apparent. If one adheres to
synchronic understanding of Battie rather than futuristic one, mid-century
physiology seems to be more proper a framework to understand Battie
than then barely existing specialist psychiatric knowledge.
Mid-century physiology was not the sole source of influence on the
Battie-Monro dispute. Philosophy at that time was another important
background of the dispute that has largely been neglected. Although
Doerner and Porter looked at the philosophical background of the dispute
to arrive at opposite opinions, neither of them has given detailed analysis
of Battie's and Monro's texts and of relevant medical and philosophical
writings. Doerner's claim that Battie's definition of madness as 'deluded
imagination' was anti-Lockean is barely explained; Porter's claim that
Battie's theory was derived from Locke seems to be based only on Battie's
tangential and insignificant mention of Locke. 11 And the issue between
extremely fruitful to the chapter.
11. Doerner, Madness and Bourgeoisie, pp.41-42; Porter, Mind-forg'd
Manacles, p.193. The part where Battie mentioned Locke's name is
concerned about the utilitarian psychology of the pleasure and pain, which
does not seem to be the central thesis of Battie's Treatise. Battie,
Treatise, p.28. The part Battie mentioned is John Locke, An Essay
concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford
U.P., 1975), 2.21.29.
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Doerner and Porter--whether Battie's and Monro's definitions of madness
were Lockean or not--does not seem to be a sufficient framework to
understand the philosophical background of their disagreement over
definition of madness. Instead, I will look closely at the part of their
dispute in the light of eighteenth-century philosophical and medical
arguments on sense-perception (to which, of course, Locke contributed a
lot). I wish to show that not only Battie and Monro but also some other
major medical theorists shared the common ground of mid-century
epistemology when they talked about madness.
Besides establishing the context of mid-century physiology and
epistemology, I want to revise the historical location of Monro's definition
of madness. Although many historians have dismissed Monro as a
traditionalist, the dismissals are not convincing. Hunter and Macalpine's
and Doerner's view that Monro's 'vitiated judgment' supported physical
coercion and the sequestration of insanity do not make sense. 12 The
assumption that psychiatry progressed from Monro's definition to Battie's
has not been substantiated. Indeed, I would like to argue the contrary--the
reverse shift of from Battie's definition to Monro's took place in a few
decades following their debate. Although the dearth of the materials
written by Monro prevented my presenting a definitive claim over the
problem of the historical location of Monro, I want to suggest that Monro's
definition had its day in the late eighteenth century.
In the following sections I will examine the problems outlined
above. In the first section, I will discuss the physiological background of
Battie's Treatise. The second section will look at the philosophical
background of the dispute. The third and concluding section will include
the assessment of Monro's definition of madness, and a general assessment
of the dispute.
12. Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, p.412; Doerner,
Madness and Bourgeoisie, p.45.
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Bathe's Physiology of Nerves and Madness
a) The vitalist background in mid-century
The period from about 1740 to 1760 witnessed a major shift in
fundamental tenets in natural philosophy. Robert Schofield's classical
work dubbed this shift as from mechanism to materialism. By the term
Schofield means the shift in the modes of the account of natural
phenomena, from explanations with reference to sizes, shapes, and motions
of undifferentiable particles to accounts by unique substances endowed
with non-mechanical properties. 13 Although Schofield's artificial
dichotomy has been challenged, historians generally agree that former
belief in mechanical world-view was declining from mid-century, and the
search for special properties inherent in matter was gaining impetus.14
Physiology in the mid-eighteenth century seems to have reflected
the shift in attitudes in natural philosophy. 15 In France, Germany,
Scotland and England, Boerhaavian mechanical theory of living organism
was challenged and being replaced by animism or vitalism. 16 In Paris,
13. Robert Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural
Philosophy in an Age of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970), especially pp.15-16 & 91-114.
14. For criticism of Schofield's view, see P. Heimann, 'Newtonian Natural
Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution,' Hist.Sci., 1973, 11: 1-17. Simon
Schaffer, 'Natural Philosophy,' in The Ferment of Knowledge, eds. by
Rousseau and Porter, 55-9 1, represents some alternative views on natural
philosophy in the eighteenth century.
15. Theodore Brown, however, criticized Schofield's view that English
physiology made barometric shifts according to those in natural philosophy,
and specified the social circumstance of the shift in mid-century English
physiological thinking. See Theodore M. Brown, 'From Mechanism to
Vitalism in Eighteenth-Century English Physiology,' Jour.Hist.Bio., 1974,
7: 179-216.
16. A very good general survey of the transitions in the theory of living
things is given by Jacques Roger, 'The Living World,' in The Ferment of
Knowledge, eds. by Rousseau and Porter, 255-83. The shift in English
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Théophile de Bordeu (1722-76) claimed that he discovered an inherent
faculty of living tissue, which he named sensibility. 17 At Montpellier,
Boissier de Sauvages (1706-67) championed Stahlian animist theory while
engaged in the grand project of classifying diseases. 18 At the Royal
Academy of Gottingen, Albrecht von Hailer (1708-77) read the papers on
animal irritability and sensibility, which was to stimulate a host of
controversies throughout the rest of the centuiy. 19 In Edinburgh, Robert
Whytt (1714-66) (who was later involved into a series of bitter
controversies with Hailer) published An Essay on the Vital and Other
Involuntary Motions of Animals (1751), in which he discarded the
mechanical explanation of muscle contraction and attributed it to the
medicine in this period is lucidly surveyed by Brown, 'From Mechanism to
Vitalism.'
17. Elizabeth L. Haigh, 'Vitalism, the Soul, and Sensibility: the Physiology
of Théophile Bordeu,' Jpur.Hist.Med, 1976, 31: 30-41; idem, 'The Roots
of Vitalism of Xavier Bichat,' Bull.Hist.Med., 1975, 49: 72-86.
18. Roger French, 'Sickness and the Soul: Stahl, Hoffmann and Sauvages
on Pathology,' in The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century,
eds. by Andrew Cunningham and Roger French (Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 1990), 88-110; idem, 'Sauvages, Whytt and the Motion of the Heart:
Aspects of Eighteenth Century Animism,' Cli p Medica, 1972, 7: 35-54;
Julian Martin, 'Sauvages' Nosology: Medical Enlightenment in
Montpellier,' in The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century,
eds. by Cunningham and French, 111-37; Roselyne Rey, 'L'approche de la
folie chez quelques médecins vitalistes du XVIIIe siècle,' in La folie et le
corps, ed. by Jean Céard (Paris: Presses de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure,
1985), 111-40.
19. There are ever-growing studies on Hailer's life and ideas. See DSB;
Lester King, 'Introduction' to Albrecht von Hailer, First Lines of
Physiology (Edinburgh, 1786; rept., New York: Johnson Reprint
Corporations, 1966), i.x-Ixxii; Shirley A. Roe, 'Anatomia Animata: the
Newtonian Physiology of Albrecht von Hailer,' in Transformation and
Tradition in the Science: Essays in Honour of I. Bernard Cohen, ed. by
Everett Mendelsohn (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1984), 273-300; Owsei
Temkin, 'Introduction' to Albrecht von Haller, A Dissertation on the
Sensible and Irritable Parts of Animals, (Baltimore: John Hospkins Press,
1936).
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'sentient principle' of the soul.2°
England was not untouched by this shift. From the 1750s, the
waves of the reform in physiology became tangible in England, with special
attention to Hailer and Whytt. Richard Brocklesby (1722-97), exactly
following Haller's lead, published 'An Account of Some Experiments on
the Sensibiiity and Irritability of the Several Parts of Animals' in
Philosophical Transactions in 1755.21 Hailer's revision of the
Boerhaavean system made its way into both privileged and peripheral
physiological lectures in London. Battie gave the Lumleian Lectures from
1749 to 1754, which were afterward published as De Principiis Animalibus
(1757), in which he made use of Haller's ideas; Mark Akenside (1721-70),
a Guistonian lecturer in 1755, used Haller almost as an arbiter to settle his
dispute with Alexander Monro secundus (1733-1817); Malcolm Flemyng
(1702-64), one of Hailer's correspondents, modelled his private lectures on
physiology in London in 1751 after Hailer's First Lines of Physiology and
encouraged the listeners to read Hailer, as well as his opponent Wbytt;
Charles Nicholas Jenty, a self-styled 'professor of anatomy and surgery in
London,' wrote that 'ingenious Professor Haller, whose works being so well
known, need not any encomium, having been always esteemed the best
collections of physiological essays that ever has been published.'
20. R.K. French, Robert Whytt. the Soul, and Medicine, (London: The
Welicome Historical Medical Library, 1969); idem, 'Sauvages, Whytt and
the Motion of the Heart,' include a good account of Whytt's own idea and
of his controversy with Haller; Christopher Lawrence, 'Medicine as
Culture: Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment,' University College
London, Ph.D., 1984, chap.4 presents and overall view of Whytt as a
professor of medicine.
21. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism, pp.192-98; Brown, 'From
Mechanism to Vitalism.'
22. William Battie, De Principiis Animalibus. The comment that this work
owed a lot to Haller was made by Max Neuburger, The Historical
Development of Experimental Brain and Spinal Cord Physiology before
Flourens, trans. and ed. by Edwin Clarke (Baltimore and London: The
Johns Hopkins U.P. 1981) p.146. See Mark Akenside, Notes on the
Postscript to a Pamphlet Intitled "Observation Anatomical and
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Probably riding the wave, John Shebbeare (1709-88), an anti-whig political
writer with dubious medical background, founded his Practice of Physic on
the fanciful basis of 'animal flre.'
The most important focus where the Schofieldian materialist search
for unique properties in living thing was the nervous system. The
vitalistic medical writers mentioned above were all highly interested in the
functions of the nerves of living animals. Especially, Hailer's experiments
showed that living animals had sensation of pain when stimulated on their
nerves, while the other parts did not produce the same effect. This
observation lead Halier to conclude that a special property of sensibility
resides in the medullary substance of nerves, which should be
differentiated from the other insensible parts of the body. Hailer
believed that this discovery led to a crucial revision of the system of
Boerhaave, who had stated that all solids parts of human body were made
up of essentially uniform ultimate units of nervous fibres. Unlike
Boerhaave's homogeneous human body, Hailer's was heterogeneous, with
some parts provided with sensibility, some with irritability, some totally
Physiological. etc. by Alexander Monro. Junior...." (London: R. & J.
Dodsiey, 1758); Malcolm Flemyng, An Introduction to Physiology. Being
a Course of Lectures (London: J. Nourse, 1759); Charles Nicholas Jenty,
A Course of Anatomico-Phvsiological Lectures on the Human Structure
and Animal Oeconomy , 3 vols., (London: J. Rivington & James Fletcher,
1757), vol.1, vi-vii. Jenty seems to have been an associate correspondent
of Academie Royale des Sciences.
23. John Shebbeare, The Practice of Physic, 2 vols. (London: J. Hodges,
1755). Although Shebbeare claimed in the title page that he had obtained
M.D. at Paris and had been elected the fellow of Académie Royale des
sciences, DNB does not take this seriously.
24. See Neuburger, The Historical Development; Mary A.B. Brazier, A
History of Neurophysiology in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
(New York: Raven Press, 1984); Christopher Lawrence, 'The Nervous
System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment,' in Natural Order:
Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, eds. by Barry Barnes and Steven
Shapin (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), 19-40.
25. Hailer, Dissertation, p.13.
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senseless and motionless.
This categorical separation of nerves from the other parts of the
body prompted revisions of Cartesian dualism of active mind/soul and
passive body, for the body was no longer uniformly passive and senseless.
The nerves thus became the third intermediate agent with special property
to fill the gap between the mind and the body. Instead of dichotomy of
the mind-body, the trichotomy of the mind-nerves-body appeared, for
nerves were neither the mind nor the rest of the body. 27 Like the
schemes of the Pre-Cartesian animal spirits and of Willis's soul of brutes,
mid-eighteenth-century physicians said that there are three ontologically
different things in man: mind, body, and nerves as their medium. As if to
epitomize the shift, David Kinneir at Boerhaavian Edinburgh wrote in
1738 that 'the nervous fluid is mere matter, which, as such, having no claim
to sense, cannot of itself, being material, be the source of our senses,'
while the anonymous author of An Enquir y into the Nature of the Soul
(1750) maintained that 'there is something in the nature of matter
unknown, ... that can brought to that perfection in our frame, as to
occasion this connection [of mind and body], and arrive at a fitness to be
a co-partner with the mind, in all its operations.'
26. Hailer, Dissertation, p.9; as for Boerhaave's idea of fibres as ultimate
units, see Li. Rather, 'Some Relations between Eighteenth-Century Fiber
Theory and Nineteenth-Century Cell Theory,' Clio Medica, 1969, 4: 191-
202.
27. Christopher Lawrence called the Edinburgh version of this shift 'from
Cartesian dualism to monism.' I do not think the term 'monism'
represents the shift well. Neither Whytt nor Cullen denied the existence
of immaterial substance in man. See Lawrence, 'The Nervous System and
Society in the Scottish Enlightenment,' 24-25. See also Karl Figlio,
'Theories of Perception and the Physiology of Mind in the Late Eighteenth
Century,' Hist.Sci., 1975, 12: 177-2 12.
28. David Kinneir, A New Essay on the Nerves (London: W. Innyes et al.,
1738), p.11; An Enquiry into the Nature of the Soul. Its Origins.
Properties. and Faculties: considered both in regard to itself and its union
with the body (London: E. Owen, 1750), pp.45-47. The author shows
competent knowledge of physiological topics then; reproduction of polyp,
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Mid-century vitalism; Hailer's influence on the English medical
scene; sensibility of nerves; new status given to the nerves in mind-body
interaction: these were the components of the background against which
Battie composed his Treatise on Madness.
b) 'Original' and 'consequential' madness
Battie introduced his book with a section in which he lamented the
unfortunate state of knowledge about madness at his time, attributing it to
the lack of any precise definition of the disease and the confusion of its
accidental symptoms with the constant, necessary, and essential symptoms.
To rectify that miserable state, he tried to 'fix a clear and determinate
meaning to the word madness.' After finding some definitions
insufficient, Battie concluded that madness consisted in 'perception of
objects not really existing or not really corresponding to the senses,' and
this symptom 'precisely discriminates [madness] from all other animal
disorders.'3° He then proceeded to identify this erroneous or false
perception with 'deluded imagination.'
Then Battie left the domain of defining madness for a search into
its proximate cause. As the false perception was caused by 'a preternatural
state or disorder of sensation,' Battie stated that it was necessary to find
precisely where sensation resided. While searching for a real seat of
sensation, Battie refuted two Boerhaavian theories on sensation then
prevalent. One was the theory that sensation was caused by the nervous
fluid flowing the duct of hollow tubes of the nerves, secreted in the cortical
part of the brain. The other was that nervous disorders were caused by
the contraction of the legs of the decapitated frog (experiment made by
Hales, Whytt, and Alexander Stuart).
29. Battie, Treatise, pp.3-4. This effort of Battie's suggest that he was
touched by another emerging medical trend of nosology or classification
of diseases. As for eighteenth-century nosology, see chapter six below.
30. Battie, Treatise, pp.4-6.
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weakness or laxity of nerves. 31 Against the former, Battie argued on an
anatomical basis, and showed that there was no resemblance between the
cortical portion of the brain and the secretory organs of a gland. 32 The
latter was, in contrast, denied on an aprioristic ground. Battle observed
that the phrase of 'weakness of nerves' implied that 'sensation itself is
owing to the loose cohaesion of those material particles which constitute
the nervous substance,' which Battie rejected from the beginning:
By this inaccurate manner of talking, the most distinguishing
property of animal nature is in danger of being blended with
inanimate matter. For, if the case really were what there words
seem to import, all bodies whose particles do not cohaere with too
great degree of proximity would be nervous, that is endued with
sensation. But since, no portion of matter, however loosely
compacted, is nervous except it is part of an animal body, therefore
the medullary substance of a nerve is endued with sensation not
because its constituent particles are loosely united.33
Battle's assumption here is crystal-clear. The medullary substance of
nerves must be fundamentally different from the other material particles;
nerves in living things were endowed with a unique property of sensation,
which no inanimate matter was capable of; different types of languages
were needed for the studies of animate and inanimate things. Battle did
not like the term 'weak nerves' because it made it sound as if the nervous
system were an inanimate machine. Battle thus concluded that nervous
filaments were as 'distinct from every other material substance consisting
of parts extended and equally cohaering, as a man from a carcas, or an
31. Battle, Treatise, pp.13-18.
32. Battie, Treatise, p.16.
33. Battie, Treatise, p.17.
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horse from an equestrian statue.'
After a long and very careful discussion (Monro said this part was
over-logical and scholastic), Battie concluded that the ultimate cause of
sensation was the 'pressure upon the medullaiy substance contained in the
nervous filaments.' Then Battie proceeded to identify the cause of false
perception with disorder in the nervous substance:
one immediate necessary and sufficient cause of the preternatural
and false perception of objects, which either do not exist, or which
do not in this instance excite such sensation, must be some disorder
of that substance which is medullary and strictly nervous.
Battie refused to go any further than 'some new disposition of the
arrangement of the internal substance of nerves,' for Battie believed that
there was no knowing what was actually happening in the medullary
substance when a man had true or false perception: 'what passes within
[the nerves] being meer conjecture.' 37 The medullary substance of nerves
had the property to cause sensation in man, but its internal mechanism was
hidden.
Since there was no knowing the internal mechanism of the vitalistic
property of nerves, 'the immediate and internal cause of delusive sensation
is absolutely hid.' There were, however, some cases of delusive sensation
whose 'remoter and external causes discover themselves to the by-
stander.' Battie thus divided madness according to the seat of the
disorder of the nerves:
34. Battie, Treatise, p.18.
35. Battie, Treatise, pp.19-26; Monro, Remarks, pp.9-19.
36. Battie, Treatise, p.41.
37. Battie, Treatise, p.26.
38. Battie, Treatise, p.42.
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From whence we may collect that madness with respect to its
causes is distinguishable into two species. The first is solely owing
to an internal disorder of the nervous substance: the second is
likewise owing to the same nervous substance being indeed in like
maimer disordered, but disordered ab extra; and therefore is chiefly
to be attributed to some remote and accidental cause. The first
species, until a better name can be found, may be called original,
and the second may be called consequential?
Battie did not talk much about original madness, since its causes were
totally unknown. In contrast, he was eloquent about the causes of
consequential madness. Anything that could place unnatural pressure
upon the nervous substance would cause madness: 'the internal exostoses
of the cranium'; 'the induration of the sinus's and processes of the Dura
Mater'; 'a sudden inflammation arising in those membranes which
surround and therefore thus distended compress the contents of the
cranium and its nervous appendages'; and 'a gradual congestion of serum
or other fluid matter upon the same membranes which envelope the
medullary substance.'4° Original and consequential madness were,
therefore, respectively, the madness whose cause was hidden within the
nervous substance, and the madness whose causes could be discovered in
external and adjacent parts of the nerves.41
The idea of dividing nervous disorders into inside/outside disorders
was expressed in a very similar way in The Construction of the Nerves, and
the Causes of Nervous Disorders, a tract by one Christian Uvedale,
39. Battie, Treatise, pp.43-44.
40. Battie, Treatise, pp.46-48.
41. Hunter and Macalpine made an uncharacteristic misinterpretation of
Battie's distinction of original and consequential madness. Their
identification of Battie's original and consequential with 'non-organic and
organic' (Hunter and Macalpine, 'Introduction,' p.15.) is just wrong. Both
original and consequential madness are 'organic.'
236
published in the same year as Battie's Treatise.42 Uvedale observed that
when the fluid contained in the nerves was interrupted or clogged, the
nerves could not perform their offices properly and the results would be
lowness of spirits, extravagant fancies, vain terrors, unreal joys, and at last,
madness.43 This interruption could happen,, stated Uvedale, by way of
the pressure from the adjacent part to the nerves:
Any thing that comes into contact with the nerves may stop or
disorder the free course of their fluid; the flesh is everywhere in
contact with them, therefore it may disorder them throughout.
In search of causes of nervous disorders, Uvedale looked at not the
internal and hidden structure of the nerves, but at the outside,
surrounding, and more easily visible part of them. Uvedale claimed that
causation of nervous disorders by the pressure from outside is his own
discovery, and he contrasted this to already known internal disorders of
nerves:
many disorders of the nerves may be attributed to a cause not
hitherto regarded, the distemperature of the circumambient flesh.
But [nerves] have also affections of their own, and are subject to
disorders, in which the flesh has no share. This gives us a division
of the nervous disorders into two kinds, which I do not remember
to have met with in medical writers, but which is of great
importance toward their cure. When the disorders of the nerves
are owing to an unhealthy or unnatural condition of the flesh. the
42. Christian Uvedale, The Construction of the Nerves, and the Causes of
Nervous Disorders, (London: R. Baldwin, 1758). Almost nothing is known
about the author.
43. Uvedale, Construction, p.11.
44. Uvedale, Construction, p.13.
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disease can only be attacked rationally by those remedies, which
will reduce the body in general to a proper state; but when the
nerves themselves are disordered, particular remedies must be
sought for them.45
Uvedale's principle in the division of nervous disorders was almost
identical to Battie's: Uvedale's 'affections of [nerves'] own' is Battie's
'original' nervous disease, and the former's 'distemperature of the
circumambient flesh' is the latter's 'consequential' one.
There is, at present, no knowing whether Battie and Uvedale knew
each other's work, or one borrowed from the other, or they 'discovered'
the division independentiy. Whichever is the case, it seems very likely
that in dividing the causes of nervous disorders into internal and external
ones, they shared a common inspiration of Hailer's experiments on animal
sensibility.
c) The Hailerian model of madness
In 1753, Hailer's tract on animal sensibility and irritability, based on
the two papers read before the Royal Academy of Sciences of Gottingen
the year before, appeared in print. The tract had an enormous impact on
eighteenth-century physiology. On the Continent, many Stahlians such like
Le Cat (1700-1768) and Deiius (1720-1791) stood up against Haller and
accused him of separating irritability from the soul, and in Edinburgh,
Whytt opposed Halier on experimental bases and claimed that irritability
45. Uvedaie, Construction, p.13.
46. As Battie's Treatise actually appeared in December in 1757, perhaps
earlier than Uvedaie's, it is unlikely that Battie read Uvedaie's book
before he composed Treatise. Uvedale, however, made a very strong
claim of his originaiity, and his model is quite different from Battie's. I
would like to suggest that they reached the same idea independently, on
the common basis of Hailer's experiment. Uvedale explicitly mentioned
Hailer as the source of his idea of nervous fluid.
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was not independent of the sensibility and the nerves, and, ultimately, from
the soul.47 England does not seem to have produced a serious and
critical reaction equal in stature to Whytt, probably because the 1750s was
the time when physiological study in England reached 'the lowest point in
its history,' as Theodore Brown has assessed. Hailer's Dissertation was,
however, well-known in the English medical scene: English translation was
published with Tissot's preface two years after the original: Brockiesby,
Jenty, and Flemyng were disseminating Haller's ideas as I have mentioned
above.49
In that provocative tract, Hailer made a clear distinction between
sensibility, the property of nerves to cause sensation in the living animal,
and irritability, the property of muscle fibres to contract when stimulated.
I will confine my discussion here to Haller's idea on the former, as it
seems that the idea on irritability has little to do with Battie's Treatise?°
Hailer's success lay largely in that he built his argument on solid
experimental bases. His experiments were as follows:
I took living animals of different kinds, and different ages, and after
47. See Temkin, 'Introduction,' to Haller, Dissertation, p.3; Neuburger,
The Historical Development, pp.118-52; French, Robert Whytt, pp.63-76;
idem, 'Sauvages, Whytt.'
48. Theodore M. Brown, 'From Mechanism to Vitalism,' 179-81.
49. Malcolm Flemyng, The Nature of the Nervous Fluid, or Animal Spirits.
Demonstrated (London: A. Millar, 1751) was heavily dependent on Hailer,
but mainly on his argument for the existence of nervous fluid; idem, An
Introduction to Physiology contained the explanation of irritability (p.174).
As for Brocklesby's paper in Philosophical Transactions and Battie's P
Principiis Animalibus Exertationes, see Max Neuburger, The Historical
Development, p.146.
50. Hunter and Macalpine has written that Haller's idea of irritability was
one of the neuro-physiological concepts Battie applied to the account of
madness, and G.S. Rousseau repeated the statement. I would like to argue
that the idea of sensibility played far more important a role in Battie's
Treatise. Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, p.405; Rousseau,
'Science,' 182.
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having laid bare that part I wanted to examine, I waited till the
animal ceased to struggle or complain; after which I irritated the
part, by blowing, heat, spirit of wine, the scalpel, lapis infinalis, oil
of vitriol, and butter of antimony. I examined attentively, whether
upon touching, cutting, burning, or lacerating the part, the animal
seemed disquieted, made a noise, struggled, or pulled back the
wounded limb, if the part was convulsed, or if nothing of all this
happened.51
Through numerous experiments, he found that only the parts supplied with
nerves were sensible and concluded that the medullary substance of the
nerves was the sole source of sensibility.52
The influence of Haller's experiments is manifest in Battie's work.
(Battie might have attended the experiments done by Brockiesby, as Battie
was elected Fellow of the Royal Society in 1741.) On closer scrutiny,
indeed, it turned out that Battle modelled his argument on madness very
faithfully on Haller's experiment.
To start with, Battie's identification of the seat of sensibility exactly
followed the experimental pattern put forward by Haller. Battie wrote:
If a nerve in a living body be distracted by external force, there
immediately arises an exquisite sensation called pain... If to a nerve
in a living body be applied any acrimonious objects ... there
immediately arises the same painful sensation.M
51. Hailer, Dissertation, pp.9-10.
52. Hailer, Dissertation, pp.20-21, & 24.
53. As early as in 1900, Heinrich Laehr briefly pointed out Battle's
Treatise was influenced by Haller's idea. See Laehr, Die Literature der
Psychiatrie, 'Battie, W.'
54. Battie, Treatise, p.10.
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In an identical manner with Hailer, Battie went on to argue that the
nervous membranes were void of sensation, because 'upon the application
of any external objects they all discover no extraordinary signs of
sensibility.'55 Battie's conclusion on the seat of sensation is almost an
exact copy of Hailer's:
All which constant and uncontroverted observations prove, 1. That
the nervous or medullaiy substance derived from or rather
communicating with the brain is the seat or instrument of natural
sensation: 2. That no other matter, whatever, whether animated or
not, is such seat or instrument?
Hailer's influence is the most evident in the core of Battie's
Treatise, the causation of madness or false perception. Both Hailer's
experiments and Battie's explanation of madness were concerned with
causing sensation by irritating the nerves. Just as Hailer's animals have
the sensation of pain when stimulated on their nerves, Battie's madmen
have false sensation or the 'perception of things which really do not exist,'
when anything unnatural happened in their nerves. Especially, Battie's
(and Uvedale's) model of 'consequential' nervous disorder caused by the
irritation of the nerves from the adjacent parts was a faithful analogue of
Hailer's experiments. Just as Hailer's animals had sensation of pain when
given stimuli upon the nerves of animals by biowing, heat, chemicals,
Battie's and Uvedale's madmen had delusive sensation when the
surrounding parts of nerves gave unnatural irritation to the medullary
substance. The causes of consequential madness, such as the inflammation
of the tissues around the nerves, the pressure of the growing bones on the
55. Battie, Treatise, p.11. Compare with Haller, Dissertation, pp.20-2l.
56. Battie, Treatise, p.12. Compare with Hailer, Dissertation, p.24, in
which he wrote: 'Wherefore the nerves alone are sensibie for themselves,
and their whole sensibility resides in their medullary part, which is a
production of the internal substance of the brain.'
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brain, the congesting serum giving pressure upon the nerves were
pathological analogues of the simulations given to the nerves of living
animals in Hailer's experiments.
Moreover, Battie and Haller shared the same ideal about how to
achieve a successful explanation of phenomena in living body, how to
construct and limit the scope of medical discourses, and where medical
explanations should stop. As I discussed above, Battie was resolute in not
wanting to go further than the observation that pressure upon the
medullary substance would cause sensation: 'Thus far and no farther our
knowledge of these matters reaches, limited by outside of the seat of
sensation.'57 This limit was also the case with Haller, who, unlike many
of his contemporaries, made recourse neither to mechanist nor to animist
speculations about the mechanism of sensation? Medical knowledge,
stated Hailer, could never penetrate into what was happening in sensible
nerves and irritable muscle fibres:
But the theory, why some parts of the human body are endowed
with these properties, while others are not, I shall not at all meddle
with. For I am persuaded that the source of both lies concealed
beyond the reach of the knife and microscope, beyond which I do
no chuse to hazard many conjectures, as I have no desire of
teaching what I am ignorant of myself.59
Almost certainly following the example of Hailer, Battie limited his
account of the production of false sensation to the external structure of the
nerves and refrained from making conjectures into the internal mechanism
of sensation. His adoption of Hailer's experimental method as the guide
was more thorough and consistent than many English Hallerians of his
57. Battie, Treatise, p.26.
58. Temkin, 'Introduction,' p.2.
59. Haller, Dissertation, p.8.
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time, and, in a sense, even more so than Hailer himself. Hailer did not
suggest the existence of the nervous fluid in his Dissertation, but vigorously
supported the doctrine in his other works, which was followed by many
mid-century English medical writers.60 Unlike them, Battie did not adopt
Haller's tentative suggestion of the existence of nervous fluid and
constructed an account of madness that could do without the fluid.61 The
doctrine of the nervous fluid was, for Battie, a fanciful theory that
deserved no discussion.
This is why Battie spoke very little about 'original' madness and
gave it up as incurable. When the disorder lay in the hidden and unknown
internal mechanism of nerves, one could not know its cause and cure the
disease.62 In contrast to the pessimism about understanding 'original'
madness, as for 'consequential' madness there was the definite method to
tell its cause, i.e. post mortem. Like Halier's vivisected animals, the
opened bodies of madmen would tell which part was responsible for the
false sensation he had. And many of the causes of consequential madness
were expressed in a visible language of morbid signs.
Post mortem of those who died mad was, of course, not unknown
before Battie. Indeed, there seems to have taken place a new or
renewed interest in the dissection of the brain around Battie's time. On
the Continent, Gianbattista Morgagni's (1682-177 1) monumental i2
60. Richard Brocklesby, Reflections on Ancients and Modern Musick. with
the Application to the Cure of Diseases (London: M. Cooper, 1749),
pp.pp.'1S-6; Flemyng, An Introduction to Physiology, pp.156-9; Flemyng
also devoted a whole book to the issue: The Nature of the Nervous Fluid.
or Animal Spirits. Demonstrated; Jenty, A Course of Anatomico-
Physiological Lectures, vol3., pp.210-14 and pp.505-9.
61. Battie, Treatise, pp.14-16 suggested that nervous fluid is an imaginary
one. Significantly, he did not defend the 'alternative' view of elastic
threads.
62. Battie, Treatise, pp.42, 61, 70.
63. A historical study of the brain anatomy and medical account of
madness in the eighteenth century is wanting.
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Sedibus appeared in 1761 and was translated into English eight years later:
in his famous experiment before the Prussian Royal Academy in 1764, J.F.
Meckel (17 14-74) weighed cubes taken from the brains and concluded that
the brains of those who died maniacal were lighter. TM In England, J.M.
Stevens published An Essay on the Diseases of the Head and Neck in the
same year when Battie's Treatise appeared. There Stevens observed that
'on opening the bodies of those which died of [madness], nothing is found
different from the bodies of sound persons, except an induration of the
meninges of the brain, and a dryness and yellowness of its cortical
substance.' Battie's Treatise seems to have been one of the important
pieces of the trend.
Since the causes of consequential madness were within our reach
of morbid pathological observation and they were so to speak post-mortem
analogue of Hailer's experiments, there was greater prospect of curing it:
'here to our great comfort we shall find that Consequential madness is
frequently manageable by human art,' because:
Altho' delusive sensation, by whatever external accident it may be
occasioned, when considered as a distempered state of the nerves
themselves, admits of no rational or specific relief any more than
Madness which is not consequential to any known cause;
nevertheless the previous disorders and external causes of delusive
sensation are frequently within our reach.
64. Giovanni Battista Morgagni, The Seats and Causes of Diseases
Investigated by Anatomy, 3 vols, (London: Millar et al., 1769). See Hunter
and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, pp.441-44. Meckel's paper,
'recherches anatomico-physiologique sur les causes de la folie,' appeared
in Mmoire acadéniique, Berlin, 1764, 20. See a perceptive account of the
paper by Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (London: Routledge,
1973; rept. 1989), pp.12-13.
65. J.M. Stevens, An Essay on the Diseases of the Head and Neck (Bath:
J. Leake, 1758), p.37. Almost nothing is known about the author.
66. Battie, Treatise, p.72.
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Consequential madness was, unlike original madness, a proper object of
Battie's medical discourse that was limited within the visible and external
parts of the nerves. The internal part of the nerves with its unique
property remains a black box.
To sum up, Battie proposed to construct a visible, tangible, and
anatomical research programme to study madness, based on Hailer's
experimental model. Although he did not make Haiierian experiments on
the nerves of man to see whether he had a deluded imagination when
given a stimulus on the nerves, Battie tried to fashion his discourse based
on Hailer's experiments on the production of sensation. Battie, thus,
abandoned the expianatoiy models of invisible animal spirits, vibrations,
etc. He instead created an account of madness whose vital parts could be
based on visible anatomical observations, revealed at post mortem. The
greatest irony was that Hailer himself, on reading Battie's Treatise did not
recognize it as a faithful replica of his own works applied to madness: 'j'ai
commence a lire mes livres anglais. J'ai peu profite de Battie on Madness,
c'est theorie toute pure, sans ombre d'experience.'67
Imagination and Judgment: philosophical background of the dispute
a) Madness as disorder in imagination ni judgment
Battie defined madness as 'perception of objects not really existing
or not really corresponding to the senses.' He identified this with 'deluded
imagination' and 'delusive sensation,' and went on to physiological and
pathological consideration of sensation. The underlying assumption here
was that there existed an unbroken causal link from the delusive sensation
to the deluded imagination and from the deluded imagination to the false
perception. So, if one admits that madness consists in false perception, it
67. A letter of Hailer to Tissot, dated 3 Dec 1759. Albrecht von Hallers
Briefe an August Tissot (Bern: H. Huber, 1977), p.87. He again showed
dissatisfaction at Battie in a letter dated 17 Dec 1759. See j jd, p.90.
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necessarily leads to attribution of it to delusive sensation. It was to this
link that Monro launched the most substantial attack in his Remarks.
Monro was not satisfied with Battie's definition of madness as
'deluded imagination':
It is certain that the imagination may be deluded where there is not
the least suspicion of madness, as by drunkenness, or by
hypochondriacal and hysterical affections; there may be real
madness where the imagination is not affected; so that a deluded
imagination is not in my opinion the true criterion of madness. The
judgment is as much or more concerned than the imagination, and
I should rather define madness to be a vitiated judgment...69
Monro observed that the key defect lay in judgment: in some cases of
madness both judgment and imagination were hurt and in others judgment
was affected and imagination was untouched. He concluded that 'I am
pretty certain, there is no case in which the judgment is not vitiated.'7°
But what did Monro mean by rejecting deluded imagination and
proposing vitiated judgment as an alternative? This will be rendered clear
when we consult Monro's citation of 'the following remarkable sentence'
of Aretaeus:
These men [melancholiacs] are mistaken in their perception, they
see objects that are not present, as if they were present, and they
68. In general, Monro's Remarks is rather a piece-meal attack on Battie
paragraph by paragraph, and rarely contains fruitful criticisms on the
overall project of Battie (there is no visible sign that Monro understood
the Hallerian framework of Battie's argument), still more rarely presents
Monro's own alternative account of madness. The part where Monro
criticized Battie's definition of 'deluded imagination' (pp.3-9) is almost the
only exception in which Monro put down an alternative view.
69. Monro, Remarks, p.4.
70. Monro, Remarks, pp.5-6.
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fancy they see what appears to no other person: whereas, those who
are furious [maniacs], see exactly as they ought, but do not judge of
objects as they ought to judge.71
Monro argued that in melancholy, the image of things that do not exist was
presented in the mind of the patients (hence, imagination was deluded),
and they judged that they saw the things (hence, judgment was vitiated,
too). In mania, in contrast, although the image presented to the mind was
correct (hence, imagination was n deluded), the patients did not make
a proper judgment on the image (hence, Qniy judgment was vitiated). In
a word, as Monro put it, madmen 'see right, but judge wrong.'
Take, for explanation's sake, the example of a madman who thinks
that he is a king and that he holds a scepter, although, in reality, what he
holds is a mere rod. Battle's explanation runs as follows: some parts of his
medullary substance of nerves and/or brain are disordered to produce a
false sensation; accordingly, his imagination is deluded and a false image
of a scepter is presented to his mind; hence, he has a false perception of
a scepter. Monro's account differs: there's no fault in the madman's
faculty of image-making; the madman believes that he has a scepter
because he made a wrong judgment on a correct image of the rod. Monro
thus did not reject Battie's entire argument, but admitted that the belief
in things that did not exist was crucial characteristic of madness. Battie
and Monro agreed that they should characterize madness by false
perception. They, however, attributed it to the different faculties of mind.
This split between Battie and Monro had a common basis of the
then widely accepted medical idea that delirium was a disorder of both
imagination and judgment. A suitable place to look at the common basis
is Boerhaave's definition of delirium in his Aphorisms:
71. Monro, Remarks, p.4.
72. Monro, Remarks, p.4.
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A delirium is that production of ideas, which does not agree with
the external causes, but only is the effect of the internal state of the
brain, together with a judgment following from these ideas..!
The first half of this definition says that imagination is hurt in delirium.
Making an image of a thing that does not exist was considered as an
operation of imagination, and the formation of a false image was
attributed to a disorder in imagination.74 And the latter half of the
definition above says that, besides imagination deluded, false judgment is
an integral part of delirium. Note that Boerhaave did not claim that the
disorder in imagination alone sufficiently described delirium, as Battie did.
Neither did Boerhaave maintain that judgment alone is disordered, as
Monro tended to claim. Boerhaave held a twofold definition of delirium
in which both imagination and judgment were hurt.
And many eighteenth-century physicians seem to have followed the
twofold definition of delirium. An Italian physician Lucca Tozzi (1638-
1717) wrote in 1711 that delirium was a disorder 'in faculties of
imagination and judgment.' 75 David MacBride (1726-78), a physician
73. Herman Boerhaave, Aphorisms, (London: W. Innys et al., 1755), p.172.
Boerhaave's Aphorisms was published in Latin in seven countries and
English translation was published at least three times. In addition, a
voluminous (eighteen volumes) commentary on it by Gerald van Swieten,
a Viennese professor of Medicine, was translated into English twice and
abridged version (five volumes) of it were published. As for comparison
of Boerhaave's idea on melancholia with Laurentis and Willis, see T.H.
Jobe, 'Medical Theories of Melancholia in the Seventeenth and Early
Eighteenth Centuries,' Clio Medica, 1976, 11: 217-31. The philosophical
background of Boerhaave's idea on madness is perceptively discussed in
John P. Wright, 'Boerhaave on Minds, Human Beings, and Mental
Diseases,' Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 1990, 20: 289-302.
74. For Boerhaave's use of the term 'imagination,' see Herman Boerhaave,
Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures on the Theory of Physic, 6 vols.
(London: W. Innys, 1742-46), vol.4., p.257.
75. Lucca Tozzi, Opera Omnia 5 vols. (Venice: N. Pexxana, 1711), tom. 1.,
p.139. Thomas Arnold Observations on the Nature. Kinds. Causes and
Prevention of Insanity, 2nd ed. (London: Phillips, 1806), pp.3'l-4O, contains
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trained at Glasgow, regarded delirium as a disorder in which man failed
to 'judge truly of the [mental] impression,' because 'the powers of memoiy
and imagination are confused and perverted.' William Cullen defined it
as a 'false judgment, arising from perception of imagination.'76
And if one takes a longer time-span, one sees that pre-Cartesian
medical writers had been engaged in a similar twofold characterization of
madness. As I have examined in chapter one, Renaissance and Neo-
classical doctors thought that madness was the disorder in which
imagination and reasoning were hurt. There was even disagreement over
which faculty was principally affected, for Robert Burton wrote, 'many
doubts ... arise about the affection [of melancholy], whether it be
imagination or reason alone, or both.' Burton summarized the
disagreement, writing some believed that 'the sole fault is in imagination,'
some maintained that 'reason was in fault as well as imagination,' and the
majority believed that both faculties were affected, 'first in imagination,
and afterwards in reason.' Mutatis mutandis, the first reads just like
Battie's position, the second Monro's, and the third Boerhaave's.
Both before and after Battie-Monro dispute, therefore, many
physicians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries defined delirium as
a combined disorder of both the faculty of making images and that of
making judgment. In that sense, the Battie-Monro dispute over the faculty
affected in madness was a part of the long tradition of medical
more than 20 references in which madness or delirium was defined by
imagination and judgment.
76. David MacBride, A Methodical Introduction to the Theory and
Practice of Physick (London: W. Strahan et a!., 1772), pp.80-81; William
Cullen, The Works of William Cullen. M.D., 2 vols., (Edinburgh: W.
Blackwood, 1827), vol.1, pp.510-il. As for Arnold and Cullen, see next
chapter.
77. Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. and intro, by
Holbrook Jackson (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), part I, p.l7l.
78. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, part I, p.171.
249
understanding of the disease. Indeed, the source of their split was a built-
in part of the medical definition of madness as a disorder in two mental
faculties.
b) Lockean sensation and judgment: 'Molyneux's Question'
I have showed that madness at the time of Battie-Monro dispute
was principally framed around the issue of man's ability to know an
external object, in which two processes of imagination and judgment were
involved. I will argue below that the twofold characterization was also the
case with normal perception understood by eighteenth-century
philosophical writers, who were, largely following Locke's lead, keen to
distinguish two processes in the perception of external objects]
Locke is usually regarded as the first philosopher who divided the
process of man's sense-perception into what are today called sensation and
perception. Locke, however, did not use the same terminology as today:
rather, he divided the process of 'perception' (by which term, he here
meant the whole process of acquiring a piece of knowledge about external
objects) into 'sensation' and 'judgment.' 8° (Note the striking similarity
with Battie's and Monro's terminology.) To elucidate his point, Locke
gave an example: when a globe of uniform colour is perceived by us, 'the
idea thereby imprinted in our mind, is a flat circle variously shadowed.'
A grown person, however, by virtue of his/her experience, judges that what
the idea stands for is a globe of uniform colour: 'the judgment presently,
by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes.' Here
79. As for the philosophical problem of perception, see John Yolton,
Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1984); idem, "As in a Looking-Glass": Perceptual Acquaintance in
Eighteenth-Century Britain,' Jour.Hist.Ideas, 1979, 40: 207-34.
80. Locke, Essay, 2.9.8. As for a philosophical interpretations of this
passage, see Richard I. Aaron, John Locke, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971), pp.133-36; John Yolton, Locke: an Introduction (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1985), chap.5.
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Locke stated that our knowledge of external things had two things in it:
sensation and judgment.
Locke added in the second edition of his Essay the famous
'Molyneux's question,' whose vivid presentation of the problem contributed
a lot in maldng Locke's idea on the two stages of perception popular
among philosophers at that time. 81 The problem was presented as
follows:
Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch
to distinguish between a cube and a sphere ... so as to tell, when he
felt one and the other, which is the cube, which is the sphere.
Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind
man be made to see: quaere, whether by his sight, before he
touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe,
which the cube?82
Locke's tentative answer to the question was negative. Though the man
had a correct sensation, he could not make a proper judgment upon the
sensation, due to his lack of experience in sight.
This problem appeared in many of the writings of major British
philosophers in the early eighteenth century. Berkeley illustrated the same
problem by the example of the difference between seeing a portrait and
judging the sitter: David Hume made a similar observation upon sensation
81. For detailed historical study of 'Molyneux's question,' see Michel J.
Morgan, Molyneux's Ouestion: Vision. Touch. and the Philosophy of
Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1977). Ernst Cassirer, Ih
Philosophy of Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1979) has
suggested that Molyneux's question was the 'theoretical problem in which
all the threads of the study [of psychology and epistemology] unite.'
(p.108.)
82. Locke, Essay, 2.9.8.
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and judgment. Around the time of the Battie-Monro dispute, therefore,
British philosophers were well acquainted with the distinction between
sensation and perception and recognized the vital role of judgment in the
latter process. There exists even a sign that shows that Monro understood
the problem. Criticizing Battie for not using the terms precisely enough,
Monro wrote:
In one paragraph madness is called a deluded imagination, and in
the next false perception, and perception is either confounded with,
or not sufficiently distinguished from sensation; yet I cannot think
these three the same; for how close soever the connection may be
between sensation and perception, there is certainly a very wide
difference between either of them and imagination.TM
This says roughly what Locke and many others said: perception and
sensation were different. It seems likely that Monro in his Remarks had
in mind Lockean (not necessarily Locke's own) distinction between
sensation and perception and between seeing and judging.
c) Sensation and perception in	 Continental medicine
Besides being well-known among British writers, 'Molyneux's
question' crossed the Channel and enjoyed a great popularity in France.
This was mainly due to Voltaire's active introduction of Locke's philosophy
as an alternative to Descartes'. Moreover, Voltaire, during his exile in
England (1726-28), heard of the curing of a man who was born blind
performed by William Cheselden (1688-1752) in 1728, associated
83. George Berkeley, Philosophical Works, ed. and intro, by M.R. Ayers
(London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1975), p.161; David Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature, ed. by P.H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978),
p.112.
84. Monro, Remarks, p.9.
252
Cheselden's curing of a cataract with Molyneux's question, and gave an
extensive exposition of the problem in his popular Elements of the
Philosophy of Newton. Under Voltaire's lead, some eminent philosophes
such as Diderot (1713-84), Condillac, and Buffon (1707-88) were very
much interested in the problem.
Voltaire went further to combine the Molyneux's problem and the
nature of madness in the article 'madness' in his Philosophical Dictionary
(1764). He there raised the following question:
It may be asked how his spiritual, immortal soul, lodged in his
brain, receiving all ideas very clearly and distinctly through the
senses, nevertheless never judges sanely. It sees objects as the souls
of Aristotle and Plato, Locke and Newton saw them. How then,
receiving the perceptions experienced by the wisest, does it make
of them an extravagant combination, without being able to help
itself?
Here Voltaire fused Locke's theory of perception and medical
consideration of madness. Although the images held by the mad were
exactly the same as those held by the sane, the mad could not make
correct judgments about the external world: 'when the wise men saw blue,
my madman saw red; when the wise men hear music, my madman hears
the braying of a donkey; when they listen to a sermon, my madman thinks
that he is at the theatre; when they hear yes, he hears no.' This is
85. See Morgan, Molvneux's Ouestion, passim.
86. Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, ed. and trans. by Theodore
Besterman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p.210. Michel Foucault
made an excellent analysis of this article of Voltaire's in his Histoire de la
folie a l'age classique, 2nd ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp.227-31. It
seems, however, a misconception of Foucault that Voltaire's representation
of the problem within the mind-body dualism did not represent eighteenth-
century problems of madness. As I have shown in the previous chapter,
the problem of madness was strongly connected with the problem of the
existence of the soul.
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because, argued Voltaire, the madman cannot make a true judgment on
his sensation, which is exactly what Monro said.87 Just as those who has
just recovered their sight can see perfectly but can not tell a cube from a
globe, so a madman can see right, but judges wrong.
Likewise, some major Continental medical theorists were interested
in the problem of the Lockean distinction between sensation and
perception. This was the more the case because they found a support of
dualism and a counter-evidence against materialism in the distinction.
Boerhaave, Jerome Gaub and Halier were all keen to state that sensation
as a material change in the body should be distinguished from perception
as a mental state correlated to the material state. In their attempt to
reinforce the distinction between the material process and the mental one,
they reached a similar distinction to Locke's, which is exemplified in the
following passage of Hailer's comments on Boerhaave's textbook:
Suppose yourself to be born in America, and never to have heard
a word of Latin: if now you hear me speaking in that Language you
will certainly perceive no ideas from my words, notwithstanding
your ears receive the same impression with my
This is an aural version of Molyneux's blind man, so to speak.9°
87. There is no sign that Voltaire read Monro's work.
88. For Boerhaave's idea on the problem of mind-body dualism and
interaction between them, see Wright, 'Boerhaave on Minds'; B.P.M.
Schuite, 'The Concepts of Boerhaave on Psychic Function and
Psychopathology,' in Boerhaave and His Time, ed. by GA. Lindeboom
(Leiden: EJ. Briil, 1970), 93-101. As for Gaub, see L.J. Rather, Mind and
Body in Eighteenth-Century Medicine: a Study of Jerome Gaub's De
Regime Mentis (London: The Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1965).
89. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.4, p.239. The
passage cited is Hailer's comment.
90. In his First Lines of Physiology, Hailer distinguished perception from
sensation, writing that during the time of our perceptions, the mind are
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This was largely because they wanted to vindicate the existence of
the immaterial substance in man. They were all the more eager to do so,
because there actually existed some seeds of suspicion about their religious
orthodoxy: Boerhaave was in his youth associated with Spinoza (1632-77),
and La Mettrie (1709-51), bate noire materialist of the mid-century, made
use of the ideas of Hailer and Gaub in his notorious L'homme machine.91
Gaub was horrified that La Mettrie incorporated into his L'homme
machine his lecture on the mind and the body which La Mettrie attended:
Gaub wrote that 'this made me more cautious with regard to the matter
[of mind and body].' Hailer, to whom La Mettrie dedicated L'homme
machine in a scornful manner, and whose idea of animal irritability was a
vital support of La Mettrie's materialism, made public statement in Journal
des Scavants in 1749 that he had never known nor corresponded with La
Mettrie, had never been to his teacher, and shared none of his
philosophical opinions.93
Hence they expressed great anxiety against materialism, and they
used the distinction between sensation and perception as the evidence
against materialists' claim. By drawing a sharp distinction between
involved in the 'perception of the sensation.' Hailer, First Lines of
Physiology, vol.2., p.33. This passage appears only in the third Latin
edition (1767) and did not appear in earlier Latin editions in 1747 and
1751. As Tissot introduced the distinction between mere sensation and
mind perceiving it in his preface to Hailer's Dissertation in 1755, it is likely
that Hailer's adding the distinction between the fourth and fifth stages
might owe to Tissot's suggestion.
91. As for La Mettrie's materialist use of medical education (mainly
Boerhaaveian) he got, see Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie's L'homme
machine: a Study in the Origins of an Idea (Princeton: Princeton U.P.,
1960). I could not avail myself of a new book on La Mettrie by K.
Wellman.
92. Rather, Mind and Body in Eighteenth-Century Medicine, pp.115-22.
93. Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie's L'homme machine, p.201. See also
idem, Diderot and Descartes: a Study of Scientific Naturalism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953).
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sensation and perception, Boerhaave insisted that Spinoza and the
Epicureans were wrong in their blurring the distinction between the mind
and body. He wrote that every sensible natural philosopher 'except
Spinoza and the Epicureans' believed 'these changes of the sensitive organ
are ... different from the ideas which they excite.' To demonstrate the
difference more firmly would be, Boerhaave expected, a fatal blow to the
materialists: then, 'the whole definition by Spinoza must fall to the
ground.'
Samuel August Tissot (1728-97), a Swiss physician and the
translator of Hailer's Dissertation into French, too, was worried about the
association of La Mettrie's materialism and Hailer's use of animal
sensibility as the model of man's sensation.95 In his preface to the
French translation, Tissot claimed that animal's sensation must be different
from man's perception:
Sensation is produced the same way in one [brute] as in the other
[man]: but in brute the result of this sensation is confined to a
mechanical determination consequent upon it; while in man the
soul perceives that sensation, this perception from the idea, and
passage from the sensation to the idea is the essential character
which distinguishes man from brute?
Animal without the immaterial soul had mere sensation, and only man
endowed with the soul could perceive it and form the idea.
Accordingly, Boerhaave and Haller incorporated the distinction
94. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.4, pp.237-40.
95. Tissot, 'preface' to Albrecht von Haller, A Dissertation on the Sensible
and Irritable Parts of Animals (London: J. Nourse, 1755), xxix. The
English translation was, as Temkin showed, actually a translation from
Tissot's French edition, and contains a translation of Tissot's preface,
which does not appear in Temkin's edition.
96. Tissot's 'preface' to Haller, Dissertation, p.xxix.
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between sensation and perception into their account of madness or
delirium. Following the Cartesian idea of illusion caused by a mechanical
shock at the seat of the soul, Boerhaave explained the mechanism of what
he called 'primary imagination' or simple illusion as follows:
For example, I see an object existing without me, a flame; ... But
another person who press his eye with his finger, will also believe
that he sees fiery sparks, when there is no such real cause existing
without ...; and this idea is represented as strongly and clearly to
the mind when diseased as if it arose from fire existing without and
placed before the eyes.9'7
Seeing fire when struck on the eyes was, however, not sufficient to explain
madness, for 'these ideas are neither strong nor easily lead the mind into
error... [and] it will be found that the cause exciting the idea of a rainbow
is within him.' So long as the mind could tell illusion from reality, it
could not be called mad.
An optical illusion approached more closely to madness when the
false idea persuaded the mind of the existence of the external object the
idea stood for:
If now there is a strong remembrance of a similar idea excited
formerly by the action of some external object, and at the same
time the present idea arising from the internal disposition be vivid,
there follows a strong persuasion in the mind, that the cause
exciting the idea is then present without the body; and this is called
the secondary imagination?
97. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.4., p.258.
98. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerh pave's Academical Lectures, vol.4, p.258.
99. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectur, vol.4, pp.258-9. The
false image presented to the common sensory, too, will persuade the mind
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In the case of the 'secondary' imagination, argued Boerhaave, one was
obliged to believe that he or she actually saw an external object, and 'if we
believe the existence of it, then we are properly mad.' Madness, for
Boerhaave, consisted in being persuaded by a false image, not simply
having it. And when the mind that 'perceives such an idea, and believes
it to be true [my emphasis]' was determined to act at its own will, there
would follow the extravagant actions of the madman: in such an case, 'we
usually call such people raving mad."°°
Special attention should be paid here. Boerhaave and Hailer said
that madness consisted in the mind being passively persuaded by the
illusion. The crucial step from a mere illusion to madness entirely lay in
the illusion and its bodily circumstances, not in the perceiving mind itself.
Mind was persuaded, because the illusion was strong enough, because it
was provided from memory or because it took place in sensorium
commune.10'
d) Passive madness and active madness
Battie's Treatise followed quite closely to the Boerhaavian and/or
Hallerian 'epistemological' model of madness, with mind playing the
passive role. Besides his definition of madness as deluded imagination
caused by delusive sensation, which said that madness was essentially a
production of false idea due to disorders in nerves and brains, Battie's debt
to the two Continental major medical theorists is clear in his illustration
of madness:
to instance in a very common accident, the eye that is violently
into believing its reality. See jkjd, p.267.
100.Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.4, p.259.
101. Haller, too adopted the model of passive mind being persuaded into
believing the false image. See Hailer, First Lines, vol.2, pp.35-37.
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struck immediately sees flame flash before it; which idea of fire
presented to the imagination plainly shews that those material
particles of the optic nerve are affected by such blow exactly in the
same manner, as they are when real fire acts upon the eye of a man
awake and in his senses with force sufficient to provoke his
attention.102
Although this served as a prototype of madness, Battie tacitly
conceded that the simple model of an illusion or 'delusive sensation' was
not entirely identical with madness. He argued that something more must
be at work in the true cases of madness:
Suppose that the idea of flame really excited by a blow is by him
referred to an house on fire, or the idea of sound excited by the
pulsation of vessels, etc. is referred to a musical instrument, which
is not really played upon; the man who is so mistaken, and who
cannot be set right either upon his own recollection or the
information of those about him, is in the apprehension of all sober
person a Lunatic.103
In this passage Battie virtually admitted that false sensation was not in
itself madness, but erroneous reference of the illusion to an external object
was the crucial step toward the disease.
Strictly speaking, therefore, Battie's attribution of madness solely to
'delusive sensation' over-simplified his own point quoted just above, and
did not express what he wanted to say in his comparison of simple
102. Battie, Treatise., p.42. I think that Battie was very likely to have read
Boerhaave's or Haller's use of seeing fire as the model of madness.
Although, as I showed in the previous chapters, this model had a long
history from Descartes, Boyle, Hobbes, the most likely source for Battie
is Boerhaave and Hailer.
103. Battie, Treatise, p.43.
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imagination and real madness. For an illusion to become madness, Battie
himself admitted, another step was necessary, which Locke would have
called wrong judgment of the idea, and which Monro called a 'vitiated
judgment.' It turns out, then, Battie's account of madness in the passages
cited above was j very much different from Boerhaave's and Haller's,
and even Monro's. All accounts of madness included Lockean 'judgment'
as the crucial aspect of madness. In another part of his Treatise, following
perhaps Boerhaave and Hailer, Battie said that 'that man and that man
alone is properly mad, who is fully and unalterably persuaded [my
emphasis] of the existence or of the appearance of anything, which either
does not exist or does not actually appear to him.' 104 This erroneous
persuasion is hardly different from Monro's 'vitiated judgment,' for 'being
persuaded' signified the result of making judgment rather than a mere
state of having an mental image.
Here, however, the difference in terminology and in the stress was
of great importance. Note that Battie's madman was 'persuaded' and
Monro's 'judged wrong.' One is passive in his madness, the other actively
commits mistakes. This is mainly because Battie's main concern in his
Treatise was, as I have already discussed, to establish an account of
madness modelled after Haller's experiments, which were concerned with
the physiological process of sensation, rather than the mental process of
judgment. In order to base the account of madness on the physiology of
delusive sensation, it was necessary to minimize, or even ignore, the gap
between Lockean perception and sensation, between madness and illusion,
and his own 'false perception' and 'delusive sensation.' Once a delusive
sensation takes place, therefore, Battie's madman can do nothing but to be
persuaded by it.
Monro drove a sharp wedge into this narrow gap between false
perception and delusive sensation. ('How close soever the connection may
be between sensation and perception, there is certainly a very wide
104. Battie, Treatise, p.6.
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difference between either of them and imagination.') Where Battie saw
an almost automatic erroneous persuasion, Monro found that the mad
mind was actively making a wrong judgment. Monro went even further to
claim, as Voltaire was to do several years after, in some cases of madness
only judgment was vitiated with imagination and sensation unaffected.
Thus considered, it does not make sense to paint Battie's and
Monro's definitions of madness as a progressive theory versus a reactionary
one. Both Battie and Monro thought madness consisted in having
erroneous understanding about the external world; both shared the
common basis of eighteenth-century philosophical and medical account of
true and false perceptions; both showed concern in distinguishing mere
sensation from referring it to the external object. They were both thinking,
in short, within the framework where eighteenth-century Lockean
philosophy met medical accounts of sensation, perception and madness.
Conclusion: a historical assessment of Battle and Monro
a) Did Monro anticipate what was to come?
Battie was, as I have suggested, loyal to Boerhaaveian and Hallerian
models of madness. His characterization of madness with false sensation;
his use of optical illusion as an explanatory model of madness; his interest
in physiology of nerves and of sensation; and, most importantly, his
formulation of the passive mind. These show that he followed the two
major eighteenth-century medical theorists' (and, ultimately, Descartes's)
model of madness as illusion. Monro, on the other hand, seems to have
made a sort of silent departure, although not a determined one, from the
Cartesian model of madness as an illusion. Yes, says Monro, some
madness involved illusion, but what is more significant was not illusion
itself, but what the mind makes of the illusion, and indeed, some cases of
madness did not accompany illusion at all. Monro claimed that madness
consisted in something other than illusion, which was potentially a
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significant departure from the Cartesian model within which many
eighteenth-century physicians (Willis, Pitcairn, Mead, Battie, Boerhaave,
and Hailer included) were thinking.
Monro was to find an ally very soon. Four years after the dispute,
Battie published Aphorismi de Cognoscendis et Curandis Morbis, which
contained two chapters on mania and melancholia. Next year, a review of
the book which included detailed criticism of Battie's definition of madness
in the book appeared in The Gentleman's Magazine, entitled 'To Dr.
Battie' and signed 'T.I.' 1°5 Incidentally, this shows that there was a
growing interest in medico-theoretical issues on madness, probably due to
the Battie-Monro debate itself.
After criticizing what the author considered as incoherent in Battie's
account of madness in the book, the author started to reject Battie's
definition of madness and to present his own. 1°6 Summarizing that
Battie wanted to regard 'deluded imagination' ('phantasmata ficta') as
crucial to madness, the author opposed that the cause of our error must
not be sought in the disorder of the faculty of image-making. The author
argued that we made errors or mis-perception because 'we make very
erroneous judgments concerning [sensation].' 107 The cause of an error
must be in our judgment.
The author procee&to draw an analogy between an erroneous
judgment and madness, for, he said, both were concerned with our failure
105. 'To Dr. Battie,' Gentleman's Magazine, 1763, 33: 20-21. There is no
clue to the authorship of the article. Internal evidence seems to suggest
that the author is competent in philosophy, especially that of Scottish
Common Sense school.
106. Here, the author said that Battie's account of madness as pravum
judicium (which is different from one presented in his Treatise) and
another account of his, fantasmata ficta, (which, the author says, derived
from Locke's Essay, and which is much the same with Battie's earlier
definition, 'deluded imagination.') did not go together. It seems that Battie
changed his mind to incorporate Monro's 'vitiated judgment' into his new
definition of madness.
107. 'To Dr. Battie,' 20.
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in decoding signs. Madness, he argued, consists in the mis-connection of
signifiants to signifies, rather than in the disordered image:
The phenomena thus connected may be said to form a chain, the
several distinct links whereby are perceived by madmen as well as
others; but here lies the difference: madmen do not perceive their
concatenation. They see the signs, but they do not know what is
signified by them.108
While Battie characterized madness by false imagination, the reviewer
took the same position as Monro's and claimed that madmen's images
were accurate and they were mad because they could not judge them
correctly. Both the reviewer and Monro expressed discontent directly with
Battie's characterizing madness by illusion; both argued that in madness
what is vital was not the illusion, for simple illusion was not sufficient to
make madness: both believed that the crucial thing was the mind's action
on the received images, rather than the images themselves. The reviewer's
conclusion was just identical with Monro's point: 'a man is not mad for
perceiving this or that species, but for making a wrong judgment
concerning it, or, in other word, for keeping deceived by it.'109
As the century went one, it seems that Monro saw his day. The
revision of the Cartesian illusion model of madness and the recasting the
disease into more mental and psychological one became evident later in
the century, and the shift from Battie-like definitions to Monro-like ones
was the vital part of the revision. Late eighteenth-century nosologists,
some of whom I shall look at in detail in the next chapter, paid more and
108. 'To Dr. Battie,' 21. The author rendered the contrast clearer by
twisting the example of an optical illusion: 'Suppose a man, through a
disorder in the optic organs, perceiveth that phenomenon which is called
lightening; this man, if he consideres the species as connected with a
distemper in the eye, is not thought mad; but if he take it to be a sign of
thunder, rain, etc., we do not hesitate him fit for Bedlam.'
109. 'To Dr. Battie,' 21.
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more attention to the faculty of judgment in their explaining madness.
Boissier de Sauvages, William Cullen, Thomas Arnold, and many others
were departing from the Cartesian characterization of madness as illusion:
Sauvages spelled out that mania and melancholia were the diseases of
judgment; Cuilen thought that affection of judgment, rather than
hallucination, was the most important single symptom of madness; Thomas
Arnold's 'notional insanity' was saying just what Monro had said, arguing
that the species of madness involved no disorder in illusion but disorder
in judgment. 11° They were, so to speak, Monro's allies, in the sense that
they took wrong judgment as the most important symptom of madness.
The glance given above suggests that the understanding of Battie-
Monro dispute as the crash between the progressive Battie and the
reactionary Monro can be even inverted. Although it might be terribly
wrong to paint Monro as a determined critic of the Cartesian illusion
model, Monro-like understanding of madness was at the centre of the
revision of the psychiatric theories in late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. It seems safe to say that Monro anticipated the revision to come.
b) Battie's contribution
Partly because I want to counterbalance the present futuristic
understanding of Battie, I have been trying to put Battie, especially the
theoretical aspects of his Treatise, in the medical and philosophical context
of his period. In doing so, I have maintained that Boerhaave, Hailer, and
Lockean philosophy were vital keys to the book. I am, however, not
denying that Battie's Treatise as a whole was an important breakthrough
and anticipated what was to come. As Hunter and Macalpine, Doerner,
and Porter have argued, Battie started a lot of things, e.g. creating the
consciousness that treatment of the mad is an independent branch in
medicine, clinical instruction, optimism about the cure of madness.
110. See chapter six below.
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Among them, one of the most important and the most tangible in
Battie's Treatise was, as many historians have pointed out, the attempt to
frame psychiatric discourse around psychiatric institutions. Battie's
Treatise contains a chapter on 'The Regimen and Cure of Madness.'11'
There he maintained that 'management did much more than medicine' in
madness, perhaps acknowledging his debt to Richard Mead's Medical
Precepts and Cautions. 112 Mead's 'management' of the insane was, as
Jackson pointed out, based on 'six-things non-naturals' and it included such
instructions which seem to have anticipate moral management in the early
nineteenth century: 'to inculcate notions directly contrary to those with
which they were long possessed,' 'rest and intermission of labour are
proper to be ordered,' 'bodily exercise is never to be neglected,' etc."3
Battie's management is not drastically different in its content:
controlling appetite, digestion, air, and exercises, and employing the
mad.114 As the physician to St. Luke's, Battie however started a new
approach, placing management firmly and almost exclusively within an
institution especially designed to house the mad. 	 Indeed, the
111.Battie, Treatise, pp.68-77.
112.Battie, Treatise, p.68. Richard Mead, in his Medical Precepts and
Cautions, put down 'some rules for management of mad-folks, than which
nothing conduces more to their cure.' See The Medical Works of Richard
Mead, 2 vols. (London: C. Hitch, et al., 1762), vol.2, p.492. Probably
Battie had Mead's this passage in his mind when he wrote the phrase cited
above as the 'saying of very eminent practitioner.' Monro, however,
interpreted this as the word of James Monro, his father. (Remarks, p35.)
113. Mead, Works, vol.2, pp.493-94; Jackson, 'Introduction' to Pargeter,
Observations on Maniacal Disorders.
114. Battie, Treatise, p.69.
115.As for the importance of the psychiatric institutions (both public and
private) in eighteenth-century psychiatry, see Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles,
pp.169-228; idem, 'Madness and Its Institutions,' in Medicine in Society:
Historical Essays, ed. by Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.,
1992), 277-301.
265
institution itself cures madness: 'confinement alone is oftentimes sufficient,
but always so necessary, that without it every method hitherto devised for
the cure of madness would be ineffectual.' 116 The patients should be
removed from all objects that excites their mind: hence friends' visits,
servants' attendance, let alone curious visits for pastime, should be strictly
forbidden.117 For the cure of madness, claimed Battie, a well-managed
psychiatric hospital with its carefully designed apparatus was of absolute
necessity.
Here it seems that Battie formulated what was already in the air.
The stress on management was one of few points Monro agreed to:
confinement was 'certainly of the utmost service, and has restored many
without the assistance of medicine.' 118 People welcomed the idea, too:
Tobias Smollett, in the Critical Review, wrote that Battie's and Monro's
discussion on management of the insane was the most useful part of the
dispute. 9 As the century went on, the management of the insane within
institutions such as hospitals and madhouses became a fashionable topic.
With his background as a madhouse keeper, Thomas Arnold emphasized
that besides medication and regimen, curing insanity needs 'a particular
management which cannot easily be accomplished without an appropriate
apparatus, a house adapted to the purpose, and servants who have been
properly instructed.' In his Dissertation on the Influence of the Passions
(1788), William Falconer (1744-1824) pushed Battie's argument further
and proposed paying attention to the buildings of the hospital: a madman
'should be placed in a chamber of a moderate size, with the walls smooth,
uniform, and regular, and not ornamented with variety of colours or
paintings, as these are apt to distract the mind,' with minute instructions
116.Battie, Treatise, p.68.
117. Battie, Treatise, pp.68-9.
118. Monro, Remarks, p.37.
119. 'Review of Monro's Remarks,' Critical Review, 1757, 5: 224.
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about things like bed-clothes and windows. 120 His proposals were highly
regarded: Falconer earned the first Fothergillian Medal instituted by the
Medical Society of London and the work went through three editions in
next eight years.121
The minute instructions on the management of the insane in
hospitals and madhouses were probably a part of general rise of interest
in management in institutions. As Michel Foucault showed in his
Discipline and Punish, from late eighteenth centuiy, there appeared a new
configuration of the practice of punishing criminals, treating the ill,
educating the young, managing soldiers, and institutionalizing the mad.
The focus of discipline shifted into the management in institutions and the
minute rules followed there; detailed knowledge about the effect of the
institutional discipline, by which the inmates' minds were to be moulded
into a desirable subject, became a part of sciences like criminology,
medicine, educational theory, and psychiatry. 122 What happened in late
eighteenth-century psychiatric writings seems to be in accordance with the
birth of the microphysics of power described by Foucault. The discourse
upon madness from Battie's time started to encompass a new topic of
managing the mad both more efficiently and more humanely. How to
design a proper circumstance for their confinement, how to make
conversation with them, how they should be employed, what kind of
persons were suitable for a keeper, how to device a machine for their cure,
where to build the hospital--all these topics formed a vital part of the
psychiatry during the age of its making. If the marriage of the discourse
on the mental diseases and the management in the institution was the
120.Thomas Arnold, Observations, p.9; William Falconer, A Dissertation
on the Influence of the Passions upon Disorders of the Body, 2nd ed.
(London: C. Dilly, 1791), pp.71-73.
121.Hunter and Macalpine, Three Hundred Years, p.507.
122. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, trans.
by Alan Sheridan (London: Allen Lane, 1977: Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1979).
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hallmark of nineteenth-century psychiatry, one can say that Battie's
Treatise anticipated the century to come, or, it was even the first important
formulation of the basic structure of the new psychiatric knowledge
centred on the institutions for the mad.
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Chapter Six
The Birth of Psychiatzy?:
Nosology and The Natural History of the Human Mind'
Introduction
a) 'A disease everybody knows': the problem of defining madness
In the previous chapter I looked mainly at the context of the Battie-
Monro dispute over the definition of madness. In doing so, I may have
made it sound as if defining madness and drawing a clear distinction
between sanity and insanity and between madness and other diseases had
always been an integral part of the medical discourse about madness. This
was actually not the case. Physicians around Battie's time do not seem to
have been particularly interested in 'defining' madness. Many medical
writers simply repeated the centuries-old definition, 'delirium without
fever.' And the term 'delirium' almost always meant the production of a
false image that did not correspond to the external world. In his
Observations on the Nature. Kinds. Causes and Prevention of Insanity
(1782 & 86), Thomas Arnold (1742-1816) observed that physicians'
definitions of delirium had been essentially the same from the time of
Galen up to the mid-eighteenth century.1 We must not, of course, take
this assessment by Arnold uncritically, but Arnold was not exaggerating
very much. In contrast to the monotonous repetition of 'delirium without
fever' in the early- and mid-century, in the late eighteenth century a host
of physicians including Arnold were eager to probe into the problem of
1. Thomas Arnold, Observations on the Nature. Kinds. Causes and
Prevention of Insanity, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: Phillips, 1806), pp.30-43.
There Arnold counts more than twenty medical writers, Sennert,
Boerhaave and Gaub included, as those who gave very similar definition
to delirium. The first edition seems to be very rare, and I have not yet
found a copy of it.
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defining madness, coming up with its definitions, of vastly increased
complexity and diversity.
Some earlier writers even stated that a definition of madness was
useless, not because it was difficult, but because madness was too obvious
a disease to invest serious effort in defining. In his Treatise of Disease in
General (1741), Charles Perry (1698-1770) gave a brief definition to each
disease and explained its causes. When he came to explaining madness,
however, he omitted its definition and went directly to its causes, writing
madness 'is so well understood that it needs no particular description.'2
In 1769, William Buchan (1729-1805), a Scottish physician, was not
satisfied at the common definition of madness as 'delirium without fever,'
and even admitted that the definition was inaccurate, but he wrote 'there
is no great occasion to be solicitous about the definition of a disease which
every body knows'; John Trusler (1735-1820), a divine-turned-doctor,
considered it reasonable to omit writing about the symptoms of melancholy
and mania, as they are 'sufficiently known when they happen.' 3 These
remarks explain the apparent absence of physician's interest in defining
madness: what was the use of defining madness when everybody could
recognize it almost intuitively?
Here lay a great paradox. Did not many physicians confess the
enormous difficulty in, say, drawing a distinction between madness and
hysteria or between madness and simple light-headedness? Were they not
2. Charles Perry, A Treatise of Diseases in General, 2 vols. (London: T.
Woodward et al., 1741), vol.1, p.53.
3. William Buchan, Domestic Medicine: or the Family Physician
(Edinburgh: Balfour et a!., 1769), p.516; John Trusler, The Physical Friend:
Pointing Out the Symptoms of Every Distemper Incident to Man (London:
for the Author, 1776), p.51. As for Buchan, see Christopher Lawrence,
'William Buchan: Medicine Laid Open,' Med.Hist., 1975, 19: 20-35. DNB
says that Trusler, a London cleric, studied medicine under Hunter and
Fordyce and later at Leiden, apparently without taking an MD degree.
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overwhelmed at the many faces of madness?4 Nevertheless, they still
believed that everyone could tell madness when it happened and that it
was not their business to define it. Unlike the somatic etiology and
therapeutics of madness, definition of madness was not a genuine part of
the medical discourse during the early eighteenth century. It was thought
to be too obvious, although they did not know what it was actually.
Battie grasped the very problem in the structure of the psychiatric
knowledge at his time. At the very beginning of his A Treatise on
Madness, he wrote that the present miserable state of the medical
knowledge on madness was due to the absence of any satisfactory
definition of madness. To amend the disgrace, he thought it necessary to
'fix a clear and determinate meaning to the word "madness." The
definition was to follow two principles. First, it should not include any
recourse to the etiology of madness, since defining a disease by its
supposed causes was precarious. The successful definition should depend
solely on the 'essential' symptom of madness which never fails to attend
it. The tactics involved a search into the state of the mad mind, rather
than in the pathology of the body. Secondly, the definition was to
differentiate madness from every other disease that was not madness lli
generis: 'No definition of madness can be safe, which does not determine
what it is not, as well as what it is.' 5 The two principles Battie adopted
suggest that he was anticipating the project of nosology, a movement which
was soon to flourish. Although Battie spent many more pages in the
subsequent chapters explaining the Hallerian experimental physiology of
4. For the eighteenth-century protean nature of madness, see Roy Porter,
Mind-forg'd Manacles: a History of Madness in England from the
Restoration to the Regency (London: The Athione Press, 1987), pp.15-18.
5. William Battie, A Treatise on Madness (1758), with John Monro,
Remarks on Dr. Battie's Treatise on Madness (1758), introduced &
annotated by Richard Hunter and Ida MacAlpine (London: Dawsons,
1962), pp.3-4.
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nerves and sensation, he imposed upon himself the 'nosological' task of
defining madness, too.6
The status of this task was, however, still perceived as ambiguous
by Battie himself. He explained what he would do to define madness as
follows:
we must for sometime at least quit the schools of philosophy, and
content ourselves with a vulgar apprehension of things [my
emphasis].7
Battie's definition of madness still belonged to the domain of
commonplace or 'vulgar' knowledge, while the wording of the cited passage
suggests that Battie regarded the rest of the book as a more genuine part
of learned discourse ('the school of philosophy'). Although unlike Perry,
Buchan., and Trusler, Battie thought a successful psychiatric discourse
should contain a nosographical description of the crucial mental symptom
of madness as well as its somatic pathology, the former was not yet an
integral and genuine part of the learning: it was, so to speak, a digression
into 'vulgar' discourse.
Within a few decades after Battie's Treatise, the landscape of the
psychiatric discourse changed drastically, to incorporate the domain of the
definition of madness, to include a far more careful look at its mental
symptoms, to employ a new type of vocabulary to describe them, and to
transform the 'vulgar' knowledge into a learned one. The aim of the
chapter is to trace the shift and to examine the emergence of the new
pattern in the construction of psychiatric discourse.
6. There is no clue in his text about the source of Battie's nosological idea.
It is probable that Battie developed his principles in defining madness,
following Boissier de Sauvages' works. Battie and Sauvages, however,
were radically different from each other in their definitions of mental
disorders, as I will shortly see. Above all, Battie did not adopt the
botanical model of arrangement into genera and species.
7. Battie, Treatise, p.4.
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b) Problems: nosology and the philosophy of the mind
As I have just suggested, nosology was one of the new keys. The
1760s witnessed a rush of schemes of general nosology both in Britain and
on the Continent: Nosologia Methodica (1763) by Boissier de Sauvages
(1706-1767), a professor of medicine and botany at Montpellier; Genera
Morborum (1763) by Carl von Linné (1707-1778), the great Swede
botanist; Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae (1769) by William Cullen (1710-
1790), an eminent professor of medicine at Edinburgh; S ystema Morborum
Symptomaticum (1771) by John Baptist Michael von Sagar (1702-78), and
A Methodical Introduction to the Theoiy and Practice of Physick (1772)
by David MacBride (1726-78), a private lecturer of medicine in Dublin, to
name but a few.8 From a slightly later period, many medical monographs
on madness adopted the nosological method and arranged mental diseases
into various genera and species, including Observations by Thomas Arnold;
Della Pazzia in Genere. e in Specie (1793 & 94) by Vincenzo Chiarugi
(1759-1820), a physician and reformer of the asylum at Tuscany; and most
notably, Traité médico-philosophigue sur l'aliénation mentale ou la manie
(1800) by Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), who also published a general
nosology, Nosographie philosophigue (1799).	 And the pattern of
8. As for the general history of late eighteenth-century nosology, see Lester
King, The Medical World of the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp.193-226; Knud Faber, 'Nosography
in Modern Internal Medicine,' Annals of Medical History, 1922, 4: 1-63;
Esther Fischer-Homberger, 'Eighteenth-Century Nosology and Its
Survivors,' Med.Hist., 1970, 14: 397-403. The most astute, if aprioristic,
assessment of eighteenth-century nosology remains Michel Foucault, [h
Birth of the Clinic, trans. by A.M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock
Publications, 1973; rept. Routledge: 1989), pp.3-21. For historical
contexualization of Cullen's nosology, see Christopher J. Lawrence,
'Medicine as Culture: Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment,'
University College London, Ph.D., 1984, pp.352-59.
9. Arnold, Observations; Vincenzo Chiarugi, On Insanit y and Its
Classification, trans. and intro, by George Mora (Canton, Mass.: Science
History Publications, 1987); Philippe Pinel, Traité médico-philosophigue
sur l'aliénation mentale ou la manie (Paris: Richard, Caille et Ravier
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psychiatric discourse established in the works can be found in medical
writings which were not nosological in themselves, like James Makittrick
Adair's (1728-1802) A Philosophical and Medical Sketch of the Natural
History of the Human Body and Mind (1787) and Alexander Crichton's
(1763-1856) An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Mental
Derangement (1798).b0
In those works, which were more or less under the influence of late-
century nosology, a radical transformation of psychiatric discourse
occurred. The most visible and probably the most important aspect of the
recasting was the replacing of the simple and bodily Cartesian model of
madness as illusion with more complex and psychological models, in
competition with each other. Instead of the single model of madness,
physicians in the late eighteenth century started to think there were several
different species of madness, and they differed from each other. A lot of
physicians started to compare madness with moral folly, improper
behaviour, mis-association of ideas, rather than a simple hallucination. In
doing so, they did not adopt the scheme of the passive mind persuaded by
the bodily impulse, but gave the mind more active role in being mad.
Closely intertwined with the project of reforming the medical
understanding of madness, there took place the employment of the new
vocabulary to describe madness: philosophy of the human mind, more or
less in the shadow of Locke. As we have seen above, the positive
Libraires, 1801; rept. with introduction by Francois Azouvi, Genève:
Edition Slatkin, 1980), English Translation, A Treatise on Insanity, trans.
by D.D. Davis (Sheffield: W. Todd, 1806); idem, Nosographie
philosophique: ou la méthode de l'analyse appliqué a Ia médecine, 2nd ed.
(Paris: J.A. Brosson, 1802). As for the classification of madness and
nervous diseases in this period, see Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie
a l'ãge classigue (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1972), pp.193-225; W. Riese,
'History and Principles of Classification of Nervous Diseases,'
Bull.Hist.Med., 1945, 18: 465-5 12.
10. James Maldttrick Adair, A Philosophical and Medical Sketch of the
Natural History of the Human Body and Mind (Bath: R. Cruttwell, 1787);
Alexander Crichton, An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Mental
Derangement, 2 vols. (London: T. Cadell et a!., 1798).
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influence of Locke was almost absent in early-century English medical
writings on madness, and there is little room for the philosophy of the
mind per se where the role of the mind in madness was minimal. In
contrast, the influence of philosophy on the psychiatric writings in the late
eighteenth century was concrete, visible and direct. As I shall examine in
greater detail below, Boissier de Sauvages' account of madness was clearly
modelled after the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754); Cullen's was
based on David Hume's (1711-1776); Arnold adopted Locke's as the
fundamental framework of his classification of madness; Adair cited
Berkeley; and Crichton acknowledged 'much assistance' from Locke and
others.
I cannot, of course, describe the whole picture of the seemingly
European-wide transformation of the structure of the psychiatric
discourse. 11 Instead, I will be selective, and highlight two major writers,
namely, Sauvages and Cullen.
Among the general nosological schemes, that of Sauvages was the
earliest. Sauvages is the first physician who published a nosological work,
Nouvelles classes de maladies as early as the early 1730s, and his more
voluminous work, Nosologia Methodica (1763), was an enormous success
and the major inspiration to many late-century nosological writers. 12 In
the latter book, Sauvages drastically restructured medical understanding
of diseases of the mind. I will first look at the challenge of Sauvages
against the essentially Cartesian model of madness then prevalent and
against its underlying assumptions. A close examination of Sauvages' work
11. Dora Weiner has shown that in late-century England, Germany, Spain,
and France, there was a simultaneous rise of a new psychiatry, which was
to lead to Pinel. Dora B. Weiner, 'The Origins of Psychiatry: Pinel or the
Zeitgeist?' in Zusammenhang Festschrift für Marielene Putscher, eds. by
Otto Baur and Otto Glandien (Köln: Wienand Verlag, 1984), 617-31.
12. Francois Boissier de Sauvages, Nouvelles classes de maladies (Avignon:
d'Avanville, 1732[?]); idem, Nosologie méthodigue. dans laguelle les
maladies sont rangées par classes... 3 vols. (Paris: Hérissant, 1770-1771).
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will throw much light on the innovations in British medical writings on
madness in the late eighteenth century.
Then I will return to Britain to examine Cullen's understanding of
madness. Only a very cursory look at the history of psychiatry is enough
to see Cullen's influence. So many 'Pinels' had strong connections with
him or his work. Benjamin Rush (1745-1813), 'an American Pinel,'
attended 'the invaluable lectures of Dr. Cullen's' at Edinburgh; Chiarugi,
'an Italian Pine!,' made heavy use of Cullen's account of madness in his
work; and Philippe, 'the genuine' Pine!, translated Cullen's First Lines of
the Practice of Physic into French in 1785.13 One can easily suppose
Cullen's 'influence' upon psychiatry in the early nineteenth century. I
would like, however, to look at Cullen from another direction, namely in
the context of his response to Sauvages and his challenge to Boerhaavean
medicine. The context of the Scottish Enlightenment will be looked at,
too, for Cullen's fusion of medical and philosophical discourses seems to
have been a product of the Scottish attempt to forge a new type of
knowledge about the human mind.14
The third and concluding section will look briefly at the
crystallization of the new formulation of the medical discourse on madness
started by Sauvages and Cullen, in some selected English medical writings
13. For Benjamin Rush, see Hunter and MacAlpine, Three Hundred
Years, pp.662-71. Chiarugi, On Insanity and Its Classification,
'Introduction'; William Cullen, Institutions de médecine pratigue. traduites
sur la guatrième et dernière editions anglais de M. Cullen, 2 vols., trans.
by P. Pinel (Paris: Duplain, 1785).
14. The fullest account of Cullen's Scottish Enlightenment background is
Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture,' pp.312-416. See also idem, 'The Nervous
System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment,' in Natural Order:
Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, eds. by Barry Barnes and Steven
Shapin (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979), 19-40. Some
constructive criticisms against Lawrence's argument are found in John P.
Wright, 'Metaphysics and Physiology: Mind, Body, and the Animal
Economy in Eighteenth-Century Scotland,' in Studies in the Philosophy of
the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. by M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), 251-301.
276
in late eighteenth centuly, like Arnold's Observations, Adair's
Philosophical and Medical Sketch, and Crichton's Inquiry. Despite
disagreement between them (especially, Arnold and Crichton), they shared
the new pattern of psychiatric discourse pioneered by Sauvages and
Cullen. By looking at the works of those who were more or less in the
shadow of Cullen and Edinburgh medicine, I would like to assess some
aspects of the transformation of the psychiatric knowledge in the late
eighteenth century.
Boissier de Sauvages' Challenge: a Teleological Model of Madness
a) Young Sauvages and the Nouvelles classes
Boissier de Sauvages' first book (published anonymously) was
Nouvelles classes de maladies [17321. 16 It has often been described as
the first of several nosological works which followed the recommendation
of Sydenham to classify diseases 'with the same care which we see
15. Crichton's Inquiry criticized the first edition of Arnold's Observations
and the second edition of Arnold's Observations seems to contain the
defence. See Crichton, An Inquiry, vol.1, xix-xx; Arnold, Observations,
vol.1, xvii.
16. The exact publication date of this work has not yet been specified.
Fredrik Berg wrote that it was published sometime between 1731 and
1734. See Fredrik Berg, 'Linné et Sauvages: les rapports entre leurs
systèmes nosologiques,' Lychnos, 1956, 16: 3 1-54. See also Lester King,
'Boissier de Sauvages and 18th-Century Nosology,' Bull.Hist.Med., 1966,
46: 43-5 1. There is no full modern biography of Sauvages. Useful studies
include: Louis Dulieu, 'François Boissier de Sauvages (1706-1767),' Revue
d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications, 1969, 22: 303-22; Julian
Martin, 'Sauvages's Nosology: Medical Enlightenment in Montpellier,' in
The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, eds. by Andrew
Cunningham and Roger French, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1990), 111-
37.
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exhibited by botanists in their phytologies.' 17 As Julian Martin has
shown, the work was a product of the mixture of the strong botanical
tradition of Montpellier and the Baconian attempt to reform medicine
which was influential at Montpellier around Sauvages' time. 18 Sauvages
imbibed the systematical method of classifying plants of the celebrated
Joseph Tournefort (1656-1708) ij , Francois Chicoyneau (1672-1752), the
Professor of Botany at Montpellier, to whose chair Sauvages succeeded in
1741 and to whom he dedicated his Nouvelles classes.' 9 Giorgio Baglivi
(1668- 1707), to whom Sauvages expressed debt in Nouvelles classes and his
later work, Nosologia Methodica, proposed a Baconian and Sydenhamian
reformation of medicine by accumulating the 'histories' of diseases in his
De Praxi Medica (1696).20 Another complex undercurrent of the work
17. See Thomas Sydenham, 'Preface' in Observationes Medicae, translated
by R.G. Latham, in Concepts of Health and Diseases, eds. by A.L. Caplan
et al. (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1981), 145-55; Faber,
'Nosography in Modern Internal Medicine'; King, The Medical World of
the Eighteenth Century, pp. 197-98. Roger French shows that the project
to arrange medical aphorisms in the botanical manner by Johannes de
Gorter, the professor of medicine at Harderwijk, was earlier than
Sauvages' Nouvelles classes by five years or so. See Roger K. French,
'Sickness and the Soul: Stahl, Hoffmann and Sauvages on Pathology,' in
The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Centuiy, eds. by
Cunningham and French, 88-110.
18. Julian Martin, 'Sauvages's Nosology.' As for the history of the Medical
School at Montpellier, see Louis Dulieu, La Médecine a Montpellier:
L'pogue classigue. Premiere partie (Avignon: Presses Universelles, 1983);
Cohn Jones, 'Montpellier Medical Students and the Medicalization of
Eighteenth-Century France,' in Problems and Methods in the History of
Medicine, eds. by Roy Porter and Andrew Wear (London: Croom Helm,
1987), 57-80.
19. Dulieu, 'Sauvages,' 306; Martin, 'Sauvages's Nosology,' 113. As for
Tournefort and his debate with John Ray, the English botanist, see Phillip
Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray, and the Problem of the Natural System,'
Jour.Hist.Bio., 1972, 5: 1-53.
20. Martin, 'Sauvages's Nosology,' 115-18; Giorgio Baglivi, The Practice
of Physick. Reduc'd to the Ancient Way of Observations (London: A. Bell,
et a!., 1704).
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is that Sauvages tried to accommodate in the book two rival medical
schools: mechanism and animism. While admitting the benefit medical
theory enjoyed from the mechanical and mathematical medicine of
Boerhaave, Bellini, Pitcairne, and others, Sauvages admired Georg Ernst
Stahl (1659-1734) and his disciples, too, for their attempt to reform
medical practice by giving more exact histories of diseases after the model
of Hippocrates.21
In his ambitious book, Sauvages explains his method of
classification. He rejected three previous principles: alphabetical
arrangement, etiological classification, and classification by their
anatomical seats, for an alphabetical arrangement did not reflect the true
order of the nature of diseases, an etiological one was not useful as it
supposed the reader to be familiar with the system of physiology and
pathology of the author, and an anatomical one was insufficient because
some diseases changed their seats. Instead, he claimed that a satisfactory
classification should be based solely on the symptoms of diseases that
constantly accompany them.22 The symptom that always accompanies the
disease was called the 'character' (following the botanical phrase), and that
constituted the definition of the disease.
Following the rule, Sauvages divided whole of maladies into ten
classes. Class six was 'maladies spirituelles.' The uniqueness of the
21. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, u-ui. Sauvages' debt to mechanical
medicine is mentioned in Lester S. King, 'Boissier de Sauvages and 18th-
Century Nosology.' Sauvages' interest in mathematical medicine is
exemplified by his French translation of Stephen Hales' Vegetable
Statistics in 1744. As for Sauvages' animism, see Roger French, 'Sauvages,
Whytt and the Motion of the Heart: Aspects of Eighteenth Century
Animism,' Clio Medica, 1972, 7: 35-54; idem, 'Sickness and the Soul.'
22. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, ix-x. Here Sauvages listed previous
schemes in classifying diseases: Manget as a proponent of the alphabetical
one, Juncker, Boerhaave and Nenter as those of the etiological, Semiert
and Riviere as those of the anatomical.
23. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, pp.288-322.
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class was well recognized, and Sauvages acknowledged that one needed
different methods to study that class:
The character of this class is not recognized by external senses, as
those of the other classes, but by internal senses and the notion of
delirium, of disordered imagination, and of disordered appetite.
And as the notion is so common that the character of the class is
as clear as that of the other classes?
Unlike fever, cough or spasm, one could not directly see, touch, or feel the
characters of madness: to achieve a successful understanding of madness,
the nosologist's vision should penetrate into the 'notion' of the mad, to the
content of their disordered mind.
Accordingly, 'maladies spirituelies' were divided into three sections,
each of which corresponded to one of the three mental faculties, all of
which are not visible as are spasm and cough: 'deliria, in which judgment
is hurt,' 'maladies of imagination, in which imagination is hurt,' and
'maladies of desire, in which will is hurt.' Here Sauvages followed the
common medical enumeration of the faculties of the internal senses. Like
Boerhaave and many others, Sauvages thought that the mind had three
principal functions of judgment, imagination/memory, and will, and his
three sections of mental diseases corresponded to the tripartite division of
the faculties of the mind.
Each of the three sections was further divided into several genera.
To the first section belonged six genera: amentia, mania, melancholia,
24. Sauvages, Nouvelies classes, p.290.
25. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, p.289.
26. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, p.289; Herman Boerhaave, .
Boerhaave's Academical Lectures on the Theory of Physk, 6 vois.
(London: W. Innys, 1742-46), vol.4., pp.227-67. Albrecht von Hailer, First
Lines of Physiology, (Edinburgh, 1786; rept. with intro, by Lester S. King,
New York: Johnson Reprints, 1966), vol.2., pp.33-41.
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demonomania, erotomania, delirium (a short-term delirium). The second
section contained again six genera: oblivio, moron, vertigo, tinnitus,
somnambulimus, terreur panigue. The third section was divided into two
subsections, 'maladies of desire,' and 'maladies of aversion.' The former
had eight genera: rabies (desire to bite), nostalgia, polydypsia (insatiable
thirst), fames (excessive appetite for food), picca (desire to eat what is not
food), satyriasis (excessive venery in men), nymphomania (the same in
women), tarantismus (immoderate desire to dance). The latter had three
genera: antipathia, cacositia (aversion to food) and hydrophobia. Each
genus in turn contained species, the number of which varied from two to
fifteen.
This tripartite classification of the diseases of the mind was
accepted by Linné (who was a close correspondent of Sauvages') and
Sagar: the article 'maladie' in L'Encvclopédie also adopted it. 27 And
Sauvages himself kept it in his second and by far more voluminous and
influential nosological work, Nosologia Methodica published in 1763.
Class eight in the book, fQiIe, was divided into four orders, one of which
held two anomalous genera. The three main orders remains the same as
the three sections of Nouvelles classes: hallucinations (disorders of
imagination), bizarreries (disorders of will), and deliria (disorders of
judgment).
Despite their apparent similarity, the class of 'maladies spirituelles'
in Nouvelles classes and that of 'folies' in Nosologie methodigue were
framed by different principles. First, the classification of madness in the
earlier work was at odds with Sauvages' own principle. The three sections
27. Berg, 'Linné et Sauvages'; Carl von Linné, Genera Morborum (Upsala,
1763): J.B.M. Sagar, Systema Morborum Symptomaticum (Vienna, 1771);
Diderot and d'Alembert eds. L'Encvclopédie (175 1-80), article, 'maladie.'
The classificatory systems of Sauvages, Linné, Vogel, Sagar, and Cullen
were occasionally published together. See for instance, William Cullen,
Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae, 2 vols. (Venice: J.A. Pezzana, 1795).
28. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, 'Huitième classe, des folies,' vol.2,
pp.587-759.
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were put together, Sauvages explained, because they were all 'the injuries
of one of the three principal functions of the mind, directly and indirectly
resulting from indisposition of the fibres of brain.' Sauvages'
explanation by recourse to the cerebral fibres was apparently contaminated
by the anatomical and etiological considerations he himself rejected. One
of the reasons for this glaring inconsistency might be that he was here
concerned with an attempt to distinguish madness as the medical disease
from non-medical mental aberration. Madness was, Sauvages claimed, a
disorder of the mind that was accompanied by 'apparent indispositions of
the body,' while 'purely spiritual' mental disorders were not. Just after he
gave its definition to the class of 'maladies spirituelles,' he tried to
distinguish madness as a disease from 'purely spiritual' disorders of the
mind, such as 'fault in judgment, in wit and in memoly, distraction, light-
headedness,... error, heresy, strong passions.' And this boundary between
bodily-cum-mental disorders and purely mental ones was congruent with
the limit between the territory of physicians and that of metaphysicians:
the former was a proper concern of physicians and the latter should be left
to 'moralists.'30
Secondly, madness was still essentially illusion. The way in which
cerebral indisposition caused madness was explained by an iatro-
mechanical argument framed around perception of the external world.
When the fibres lost their proper tension, there would follow ideas and
judgment that did not agree with the impression of an external object.31
Understandably, this explanatory model did not explain the section of
diseases of will, and Sauvages left it rather isolated from the other two
sections. All that Sauvages did in Nouvelles classes was to attach diseases
of will to those of imagination and of judgment understood in the very
29. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, p.289.
30. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, p.289.
31. Sauvages, Nouvelles classes, p.291.
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common framework of madness as wrong perception, and to claim that all
three were caused by and seated at corporeal disorders in the brain.
This suggests that in the early 1730s young Sauvages was still
thinking about madness in terms of bodily seats and causes, largely within
the framework of the model of illusion. Although he recognized that the
special viewpoint should be employed to study madness and attempted to
look at the content of the mad mind, it seems that he could not develop
his own seminal suggestion. His attempt to impose a strict distinction
between medical/bodily madness and moral/mental aberration kept him
from consistent development of his own principle, his vocabulary on the
mental aspects of madness was scant and the section of the disordered will
was so to speak just an appendix to the commonplace model of madness
then widely held.
b) Sauvages' mature challenge: Nosologie methodique
Thirty years later, in Nosologie méthodique, Sauvages did much
more: he came up with an original understanding of madness and made
the class of vesaniae a more tight-knit unity by introducing a series of new
points.32
First, he repudiated his own former view of characterizing madness
by corporeal causes in the brain; indeed he discarded repeatedly and
vehemently the idea that insanity was caused by nothing but cerebral
disturbances. It seems that he did this for ideological rather than medical
reasons:
32. Here we need to qualify Julian Martin's claim that '[Sauvages']
subsequent works on the histories of diseases were logical extensions of his
initial labours [in Nouvelles classes.]' (Martin, 'Sauvages' nosology,' 127).
This assessment is correct at the level of the general principles of
classification, but 'maladies spirituelles' in Nouvelles classes and 'vesaniae'
in Nosologia Methodica were constructed around radically different
frameworks.
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It is materialistic to wish to deduce the madness and sane reason
of man only from the consonance and disconsonance of fibres of
the brain, without considering the power which the liberty has over
the actions proper to the soul and over the affections. If it were
possible to assign a cause purely mechanical to the errors, one
could no longer ascribe the errors to those who committed them
and the moral philosophy and justice would be annihilated.33
Sauvages' repudiation of the somatic attribution of madness was backed
by his anxiety over the danger of moral licentiousness caused by the
materialistic determinists, whom Sauvages called 'the partisans of Spinoza.'
Explaining the mental disorders only by the mechanism of the body, as he
had done in Nouvelles classes, was morally dangerous.
Following this position, Sauvages abandoned the former corporeal
basis of the three genera of mental disorders. Although he admitted that
some madness had corporeal disorders in organs and in the brain as its
primary causes, still he claimed that one could find some mental diseases
in which the soul suffered principally without organic disorders. The
'purely spiritual' mental disorders, which he had discarded as belonging to
the domain of moralists, found their place in medical discourse.
Moreover, all forms of madness involved genuinely mental aspects.
He showed the duality of madness by the example of the different results
of hallucination in a peasant and a philosopher. A peasant who had a
hallucination was easily led to believe that he really saw a fly before his
eyes because he had not cultivated his judgment, while a philosopher in
the same bodily condition could tell the error of sight and prevent himself
33. Sauvages, Nosologie methodigue, vol.2, p.592. The ideological
background of the shift in Sauvages' attitudes remains to be studied.
34. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, p.594. Here Sauvages coupled
the non-corporeal causation of madness with his criticism of materialist
medicine. 'This shows one that it isn't a corporeal vice alone that is the
principle of mental diseases, as Boerhaave believed and the partisans of
Spinoza claimed.' (J1.)
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from falling into the false belief. One needed not only a defective brain
but also a defective mind to be mad: 'madness depends on the dual
conditions of the mind and the body.' Sauvages was not satisfied with
the former model of the passive mind persuaded by the false image the
body made, because he thought it was materialistic, deterministic and left
no room for the free-will of the mind. Madness for Sauvages was not
simply the result of the disordered body, but also the result of 'the abuse
we make of our liberty.' 37 Unlike in Battie's, Boerhaave's and Haller's
schemes, the mind here is not passively persuaded by the false image due
to bodily disorder: it actively commits the mistake.
Sauvages' challenge was buttressed by his changing view of the
principal faculty of the normal mind. Many physicians had understood
sanity of the mind mainly as a proper representation of external objects.
The sane mind was, for them, first and foremost, a well-made camera
obscura which passively received images from the outer world. Sauvages,
in contrast, claimed that the mind was to be conceived as an active agent
that could direct itself and the body in which it resided, toward their
'perfection.' So, for Sauvages, the core of the faculties of mind was the
function of will, which 'made one desire the good, which makes him more
perfect.'
Sauvages not only put the faculty of will at the centre of the
operation of the mind: he also united the faculties of imagination and of
judgment with the faculty of will. Will was divided into vo1ont, or
rational appetite, and cupidité or sensitive appetite. The former was led
35. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, p.593. Likewise, a drunken
man sees two candles and believes there are two when there is actually
one, while a sober person suffering from a disorder of sight sees two but
can tell there is one.
36. Sauvages, Nosologie methodigue, vol.2, p.601.
37. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, p.593.
38. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, pp.589-91.
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by 'intellect,' the higher faculty of understanding (connoItre [sic]), whose
main function was judgment. The latter was guided by the lower knowing
faculty of 'instinct,' to which the function of imagination belonged. The
'intellect' provided the mind with clear and distinct ideas, while the
'instinct' produced confused ideas: these clear and confused ideas were the
sources of volonté and cupidité, respectively? The two faculties of
judgment and imagination were closely connected with the process of will.
Indeed, they were often understood by Sauvages as serving the function of
will; 'the higher faculty of knowing, which is called intellect, is given to a
man so that he could tell the true from the false, the truly good and the
truly bad from the apparently good and the apparently bad.'
Sauvages borrowed this complex and hierarchical framework for
understanding the functions of the mind from a German philosopher,
Christian Wolff, an ultra-influential but vastly understudied figure in the
German Enlightenment.41 The ideas of perfection, of the two grades of
39. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodique, vol.2, pp.589-90.
40. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodique, vol.2, p.590.
41. Overshadowed by his predesessor Leibniz and his successor Kant,
Wolff is one of the most unduly neglected figures in the study of the
Enlightenment, especially by English historians of ideas. Besides
exercising massive influence upon German metaphysics and natural
philosophy, Wolff had intellectual ties with the medical world. During his
professorship in Mathematics at Halle (1711-1723), he was closely
acquainted both with Stahl and Hoffmann; his correspondents included
some physicians in Germany, England and France. The secondary sources
I have consulted are: Encyclopedia of Philosophy, article, 'Wolff'; DSB,
'Wolff'; John V. Burns, Dynamism in the Cosmology of Christian Wolff:
a Study in Pre-Critical Rationalism (New York: Exposition Press, 1965);
Frederick Copleston, A Histor y of Philosophy, vol.6 (London: Burns and
Oates Ltd., 1960), pp.105-12; C.A. van Peursen, 'Christian Wolff's
Philosophy of Contingent Reality,' Jour.Hist.Phil., 1987, 25: 69-82;
Wolfram Kaiser and Anna Völker, 'Christian Wolff und die Medizinische
Fakultät Halle,' in Christian Wolff als Philosoph der Aufklãrung in
Deutschland, eds. by Hans-Martin Gerlach, et al. (Wittenberg:
Wissenschaftliche Beitrage der Martin-Luther Universität Haller, 1980),
147-54; Thomas P. Same, 'Who's Afraid of Christian Wolff?' in
Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England. France. and Germany, eds.
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the function of will, of the two grades of the knowing faculty, of the
distinction of true good and apparent good, and many others were found
in the virtually same forms in Wolff s works such as Philosophia Prima sive
Ontologia (1729), Psychologia Empirica (1732), Psychologia Rationalis
(1734), Theologia Naturalis (17389) .42 And Sauvages was not isolated
in his substantial borrowing from Wolff. In mid-century France, some
writers on natural philosophy were interested in the Woiffian system: an
abridgement of his major works was published in French in 1743, and
Madame de Châtelet (1706-49) may have been one of its readers.43
Sauvages' adoption of Wolff needs further study, but it is not surprising.
Wolff was an eminent figure. Also Wolff s teleological explanation of
living things would have naturally apealed to Sauvages' view of the mind
as active agent.
Among the many points Sauvages incorporated into his medicine
from Wolff's system, most fundamental were 'perfection' and the
teleological understanding of man and nature proceeding towards their
own perfection. Philosophy, Wolff stressed, should be concerned as much
with the study of how to promote human happiness or how to reach
'perfection' by improving our mental faculties, as with the epistemological
by Alan Charles Kors and Paul J. Korshin (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 102-33.
42. See Jean École, Introduction a l'opus metaphvsicum de Christian Wolff
(Paris: Vrin, 1985); Jean École, La metaphysigue de Christian Wolff
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990).
43. Jean des Champs, Cours abregé de la philosophie Wolffienne
(Amsterdam and Leipzig: Arkstée et Merkus, 1743). Madame de Châtelet
was one of Wolff's correspondents. See Gerlach et al. eds, Christian
Wolff, 'Appendix.'
44. As for Sauvages' animism, see French, 'Sauvages, Whytt and the
Motion of the Heart'; idem, 'Sickness and the Soul'; Dulieu, La médecine
a Montpellier, pp.250-53. As for Wolff s teleology, see the article 'Wolff
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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enquiry into the bases of human knowledge. 45 The Woiffian idea of
perfection was already present in Sauvages' Pathologia Methodica
published in 1752. Citing Wolff, Sauvages defined perfection in general
as a harmony of several parts in accord with a certain single aim.47
When understood in the medical context, harmonious perfection was a
state of health in which one could find a collaboration of several parts of
a body and the mind toward a desirable end, especially the end of self-
preservation; the state of disease was identified as a less perfect state in
which the parts did not conspire to achieve such an aim.
Sauvages put madness into this teleological characterization of
human health and disease. Madness was as a disharmony between mind
and body resulting in incapacity to pursue the proper ends. In a
harmonious and sane state, mind and body collaborated towards the end
of preservation of life and of making oneself more perfect. Imagination
could raise the ideas of the good and the bad; intellect could tell what was
really good for the body from what was not; and will could desire what
was really good and what would make one more perfect. 49 In contrast,
45. Christian Wolff, Logic. or Rational Thoughts on the Power of the
Human Understanding (London: L. Hawes et al., 1770), ii. Wolff's claim
that improving our mental faculties makes us 'perfect' touched the nerve
of the Pietist in Halle, for it implies that Wolff put reason in the place of
faith, which ended up in Wolff's being expelled from Halle in 1723. See
Copleston, A History of Philosophy, p.110. As for the German Pietist and
medicine in the period, see Johanna Geyer-Kordesch, 'Passions and the
Ghost in the Machine: or What Not to Ask about Science in Seventeenth-
and Eighteenth-Century Germany,' in The Medical Revolution of the
Seventeenth Century, eds. by Roger French and Andrew Wear
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989), 145-63.
46. I used the French translation in Sauvages, Ouvres diverses, 2 vols.
(Paris: J.P. Costard, 1776), vol.1, 'Pathologie methodique.'
47. Sauvages, Ouvres diverses, vol.1, p.12. Here he cited Wolff's
Ontologia.
48. Sauvages, Ouvres diverses, vol.1, pp.12-13.
49. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, p.665.
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in the disharmonized state of madness, mind could not judge whether a
certain thing was good for the health, neither could it desire the things
proper for one's perfection: 'in the persons attacked by madness, the mind
can't discern the truth and can't choose the good in accord with its
principal end ... reason is no longer capable of attending its end, that is the
conservation of the health.' 5° Sanity of the mind for Sauvages consisted,
in a word, in aiming at a proper end.
Disorders of will provided the clearest illustrations. Sauvages
reported a case of picca in a young girl who ate plaster or mud, hoping it
would be good for her beauty, as an example to explain madness in
general.51 Boerhaave and others would have claimed that the mad girl
was in such a delirious state that she represented the images of sugar or
chocolate instead of proper ideas of plaster or mud. For Sauvages, the
madness of the girl did not at all depend on mis-representation of external
things. The girl was mad because she could not wish the proper thing for
the preservation of her health.
Borrowing fundamental frameworks from Wolff's system, Sauvages
madness was thus tightly framed around the issue of man's ability to
pursue an end, to make one's state more perfect. Now we know what
Sauvages' re-defined madness was not: what, then, was it like?
c) 'Americans, peasants, women, and libertines'
Unlike almost all major theorists I have looked at--Descartes,
Willis, Pitcairn, Mead, Boerhaave, Hailer and Battie--, Sauvages did not
claim that madness was analogous to an illusion. This is understandable
when one considers that Sauvages (and Wolff) constructed the sane mind
as a unity every part of which was actively promoting one's happiness,
rather than as a well-made camera obscura. This led Sauvages to find a
50. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.1, p.49.
51. Sauvages, Ouvres diverses, vol.1, p.177.
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parallelism between a madman and 'Americans, peasants, women, and
libertines.'52 For they did not pursue true happiness and perfection.
They abused the liberty given to mankind, did not cultivate their intellect,
did not apply themselves to the study of the true goodness, found pleasure
only in sensual and vulgar things, and hence could neither judge nor desire
the true good. They were analogues of a nymphomaniac girl who would
give up her chastity for carnal pleasure, and of a tobacco-maniac who
insisted on having only tobacco instead of food and drink: they could not
tell a true good from an apparent good.
What was, then, the difference between being an American and
being a madman? The young Sauvages in his Nouvelles classes would
have answered the question quite easily, by looking at whether the body
is disordered or not. For Sauvages in 1730s, madness was a physical
disease and being an American was a 'purely spiritual' error. In Nosologie
méthodique, too, he again discriminated between 'physical maladies' and
'moral vices' on roughly the same criterion: physical maladies were caused
by natural and mechanical process, while moral vice resulted from misuse
of one's mind.53 This distinction, however, did not coincide with the
boundary between madness and being an American, because for the
mature Sauvages in 1760s, madness itself included both physical and
somatic maladies and mental and moral vices, as I have already discussed.
Given that madness and moral vice were fundamentally
indistinguishable, the task of moralists and the duty of physicians should
overlap with each other:
It is a duty of a philosopher to try to cure mental maladies. For
the origin of the diseases is the idea which the patient forms about
a good thing that is, in reality, not at all as good as he believes.
52. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodique, vol.2, p.601.
53. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, p.591. This distinction was,
again, borrowed from Wolff. See Jean cole, La métaphysique de
Christian Wolff, p.374.
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And it is a task of a well-educated physician to prove to the misled
person, by reasoning, that the good which he desires is nothing but
a seeming good and really a bad thing.TM
Thus the moralist should cure a madman, and the physician should instruct
Americans into aiming at happiness and perfection by instilling in them
true judgment and will. The strict boundary between physician and
moralist was discarded; the physician was to look at the moral and mental
aspects of the mad, rather than limiting his interest only to the body.55
Sauvages' shift from Nouvelles classes to Nosologia Methodica,
therefore, shows a drastic, thorough and fundamental reformulation of the
problem of madness. The Sauvages of 1731 and the Sauvages of 1763 are
almost diametrically opposed in many respects. In 1731, the young
Sauvages could afford little more than the commonplace model of madness
as the production of false images; the mind was passive and overwhelmed
by the bodily disorder when it was mad. He framed madness within the
bodily map of cerebral fibres. His distinction between madness and moral
folly was grounded on whether the disorder was caused by the body or by
the mind, and this distinction was congruent with the boundary between
the territories of physicians and moralists. His vocabulary about the
functions of the mind was scant. In all, he had little to add to the
approach of many other physicians.
54. Sauvages, Nosologie méthodigue, vol.2, p.602.
55. The problem of the similarity of madness and moral error became a
major concern of British medical writers on madness in the late century.
Cullen raised the issue of the subtle distinction, and Thomas Arnold wrote
that madness is a severe form of moral folly, almost identifying them. See
Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.145; Arnold, Observations, vol.1, viii, pp.54-77.
This shows that we need to revise the history of 'moral insanity,' first
formulated in England by James C. Prichard (1786-1848). See Hunter and
MacAlpine, Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry, pp.836-42; Eric T.
Carlson and Norman Dam, 'The Meaning of Moral Insanity,'
Bull.Hist.Med., 1962, 36: 130-40.
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In 1763, the mature Sauvages came up with totally different
formulation of the issue under the disguise of an apparently identical
classification. The Cartesian view of madness as an illusion was replaced
by the characterization of madness as a failure in promoting one's own
true happiness or perfection; one became mad when one's mind was active
in a wrong way. Madness no longer resembled an optical illusion, but
rather the state of 'the Americans, peasants, women and libertines,' who
gave up true happiness for inferior and sensual pleasure. Madness was a
mixture of bodily and moral/mental vices. Physicians and moralists now
looked at the same objects and did the same thing to correct the errors the
patients were committing. This is a formidable challenge to the scheme
of medical discourse on madness I have so far looked at in the thesis.
It seems that Sauvages could conduct the challenge mainly because
he based his account of the mind and its disease on Wolff's philosophy,
structuring his psychiatric discourse according to the philosophy of the
mind instead of the physiology of the body. As Roger French
perceptively argues, Sauvages gave up locating a disease in the
Boerhaavean 'mechanical structure-function map of the body,' which he
adopted in his account of madness in Nouvelles classes. 57 Sauvages
abandoned it in Nosologie méthodigue. The framework of the anatomy
and physiology of the body was replaced, or at least supplemented, by the
new map of Wolffian philosophy of the mind, which seems to have
uprooted the former somatic model of madness as illusion and the passive
role assigned to the mind.
56. The coupling of philosophy of the mind and medicine was not entirely
new. As we have seen, mid-century works like David Hartley's
Observations on Man (1749), Charles Bonnet's Essai de psychologie (1755)
and Essai analvtigue sur les facultés de l'ame (1760), and Antoine le
Camus's Medecine de l'esprit (1753) embodied both philosophy of the
mind and medicine. However, what is common to these works is the
attempt to underpin the operations of the mind by its supposed bodily
process. In a word, they mapped the mind on the body. Sauvages, in
contrast, created a mental map very much independent of the body.
57. French, 'Sickness and the Soul,' 103.
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Wiffiam Cullen and Madness in the Scottish Enlightenment
a) Cullen's nosölogy of mental diseases
When Sauvages was launching his radical challenge against the
former understanding of madness at Montpellier, William Cullen was
developing another new understanding of madness at Edinburgh, another
centre of medical education in Europe?8 Concerned with classifying
diseases mainly for teaching purposes, Edinburgh professors were quick to
take up Sauvages' general nosological project. John Gregory (1724-73)
classified diseases in Sauvages' manner into six classes as soon as he
started to lecture on the Practice of Physic in 1767; and Cullen showed
interest in Sauvages' nosology as soon as the latter's work appeared in
1763?
Of the two, it seems that Cullen took Sauvages' project more
seriously.60 In his clinical lecture, Cullen reiterated Sauvages' project of
nosology. A correct nosology was the culmination of medical learning for
58. See Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture.'
59. John Gregory, 'Lectures on the Practice of Physic, 1767-8,' WIHM,
Wes.Manu., 2618, pp.65-69. Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture,' pp.270-72
& 347-72.
60. Gregory invested less effort of his own in classifying mental disorders
than Cullen. In his lecture on the Practice of Medicine in 1767-8, Gregory
said that Sauvages' nosology was artificial and recommended his students
to consider it 'as a dictionary to find name [of a disease].' (Gregory,
'Lectures on the Practice of Physic,' pp.52-62 and p.67.) Nevertheless,
Gregory's 'Disorders of mind,' class five of Gregory's classification, was
very much similar to Sauvages' class of vesaniae in Nosologia Methodica,
dividing the class into four genera, 1. Disorders from diseases of organs
without the brain, 2. depraved appetite, 3. delirium, error of imagination
and judgment, idiotism, 4. anomalous disorders of mental faculties.
(Gregory, 'Lectures,' p.67). Gregory, however, changed his attitude quickly
and in 1768 praised Sauvages and in his published Elements of the
Practice of Physic wrote that Sauvages's was the best system. See
Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture,' p.271. More detailed comparison of
Gregory's and Cullen's understanding of madness will be fruitful.
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'perfect division and definition is the summit of human knowledge in every
part of science.'61 Like Sauvages, he was against classifying diseases
according to their causes in the manner of Boerhaave and Gaub. 62
 He
therefore differentiated pathology, where each disease was to be
considered in terms of its causes, from nosology, in which 'we abstract
from its cause, and consider it only as evident from certain external
appearances.' Cullen was, generally speaking, rather keen to adopt
Sauvages' principles, despite an important departure in maintaining that
the anatomical seat of the diseases revealed by post mortem dissection was
important to nosology.TM
His own arrangement and classification was, however, substantially
different from Sauvages'. Cullen published his own nosology, Synopsis
Nosologiae Methodicae (1769), subsequent editions of which seem to have
replaced Sauvages' as the common textbook of nosology. There he
drastically simplified the scheme, reduced the number of the classes,
genera, and species: Sauvages had ten classes and about 300 genera, while
Cullen had four classes and about 150 genera. Moreover, unlike Linné,
Sagar and Gregory who adopted an arrangement very similar to Sauvages',
Cullen substantially altered the arrangement of diseases. Most remarkably,
61. William Cullen, The Works of William Cullen. M.D. Containing His
Physiology. Nosology. and First Lines of the Practice of Physic, 2 vols.
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1827), vol.1, p.445. Cullen thought that
nosology had heuristic merit, too. See jjd, pp.422-23.
62. Cullen,, Works, vol.1, pp.457 & 472.
63. Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture,' pp.356-359; Cullen, The Works, vol.1,
p.472.
64. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.424
65. Sauvages' Nosologia Methodica was not published in any language
after 1791. Cullen's Synopsis appeared in original Latin, English, French,
German, etc, in several countries.
66. As for the comparison of the general structures of several schemes of
nosology, see King, The Medical World, pp.192-226.
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he created the class of 'neurosis,' in which the order of madness
('vesaniae') was included.
Cullen's order of vesaniae was differently framed. Unlike Sauvages
and many other nosologists, Cullen did not adopt Sauvages' tripartite
classification of mental disorders, but curtailed Sauvages' class of vesaniae.
He included only disorders of judgment in his order of vesaniae, omitting
disorders of imagination and of will. In the first edition of his Synopsis,
he defined the order of vesaniae as 'the functions of the mind impaired.'
In later editions, the term 'the functions of the mind' was changed to 'the
judgment,' to make it clear that he disagreed with Sauvages, Sagar and
Linné, and that he did not consider Sauvages' hallucinations and wrong
desires as belonging to madness: 'who would consider sygrimos [insatiable
thirst] or bulimia [insatiable hunger] or any other hallucinatio or morositas,
which do not depend on judgment, as a vesania?'. 67 Although Cullen
admitted that hallucinations and erroneous appetites were sometimes
combined with vesaniae, Cullen thought they were accidental symptoms of
madness and did not constitute any essential characters of the order. In
his First Lines Cullen wrote that hallucination arose 'from the same cause
as the more general affection of the judgment' and erroneous appetite is
mere 'consequence of a false judgment.'
False judgment was, therefore, essential in madness. This was
different both from Battie's (and many others') 'deluded imagination' and
Sauvages' deviation from perfection centred around the faculty of will. As
for disordered imagination (hallucination) and erroneous appetite
(morositas), Cullen thought they were local diseases: hallucinations were
disorders of the sense organs, and erroneous appetites resided in the
organs that were related to respective appetites. On the other hand,
vesaniae were diseases seated in the brain (remember anatomical site was
67. William Cullen, Nosology. or a Systematic Arrangement of Diseases
(Edinburgh: William Creech, 1800), p.130. I have not yet identified the
actual edition where Cullen first made this revision.
68. Cullen, Nosology, p.130: idem, Works, vol.2, p.509.
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taken into consideration when Cullen formed his nosology). This in turn
meant that hallucinations and erroneous appetites could be regarded as
madness when they were due to disorder in the brain. The following
remark in Cullen's First Lines confirmed this:
I omitted false perception and erroneous will, because I had
excluded both the hallucinationes and morositates from the order
of vesaniae. But I had excluded them in so far as they depend on
a fault or disease of the external organs; and I now perceive, that
I should have retained them more distinctly in so far as they
depend on the brain itself.69
In Cullen's nosology of mental diseases, therefore, there was an
undercurrent of anatomical approaches to the problem of classification.
His confessed principle was that of classification by symptoms, but the
anatomical site of the mental diseases was the crucial issue when he
formed the order of vesaniae.
The brain, the anatomical site of madness, was also the place where
the principle of life resided. Challenging Boerhaave's identification of life
with the circulation of the blood, and following Haller's and Whytt's ideas
of sensibility and irritability, Cullen maintained that the state of the brain
and the nerves was essential to life:
the nervous fluid in the brain is truly capable of different states or
degrees of mobility, which we shall call its states of excitement and
collapse ... and it is in the excited state of this that I suggest life to
69. Cullen, Works, vol.2, p.518. It seems that Cullen was influenced by
Jerome Gaub, who divided delirium in the manner of Sauvages. See
Jerome Gaub, The Institutions of Medical Pathology, trans. by Charles
Erskine (Edinburgh: for the Translator, 1778), p.271; William Cullen
'Lectures on the Comment on Gaubius' Pathology (1767),' WHIM,
Wes.Manu, 1927, p.159.
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consist, and when it is no longer excited in any degree, we call it
the state of death.7°
Life and madness, therefore, shared their seat of the brain. Accordingly,
madness was placed in the scale of different grades of vitality. A certain
sort of mania was accompanied with the greatest degree of excitement of
the brain, while 'lesser degree of excitement' meant the ordinary state of
waking men in health. 'A degree of collapse' caused natural sleep; 'a
greater degree of collapse' was the state of syncope, and 'complete and
irrecoverable collapse' was death itself. 71 Maniacs' extraordinary
strength, their vigilance, their resisting the power of drugs showed that
their brains were in an extreme state of excitement.72
Thus therapeutics of madness were framed around the issue of
excitement of the brain. The erect posture would contribute to the cure
of madness because 'a horizontal always increases the fulness and tension
of these vesels [of the brain], and may thereby increase the excitement of
the brain.' Instilling fear would cure madness, because fear is a passion
that diminishes excitement. 'The confinement of madmen should hardly
ever be in their usual habitation,' for seeing familiar objects would excite
them into wrong associations. Exposing the maniacs to an extreme
coldness was good, as it would diminish the excitement.73
70. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.129. As for Cullen's criticism on Boerhaave's
identification of life with the blood circulation, see jkj., p.135.
71. Cullen, Works, vol.1, pp.131-134.
72. Cullen, Works, vol.1, pp.131-32. Cullen wrote that the maniacs
required ten times as much emetic as the ordinary person to produce
vomitting.
73. Cullen, Works, vol.2, p.524.; 'Lectures by Dr. William Cullen on the
Practice of Physick, c.1770,' WIHM. Wes. Manu., 1968, 'Ordo IV
Vesaniae.' James Gregory, his successor of the chair of the practice of
physic, lectured that he knew the case of a madman in Petersburg, who
was cured by staying out at '59 degree below the freezing point.' James
Gregory, 'Lectures on the Practice of Physic, c. 1795,' WIHM. Wes. Manu.,
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Likewise, by dissecting the brains of those who died mad, Cullen
tried very hard to confirm his attribution of the causes of madness to the
'state of unequal excitement' of the brain. Here Cullen was rather
aprioristic. It does not seem that Cullen dissected a substantial number
of the brains of maniacs, and Morgagni's and Meckel's evidence available
to Cullen did not support Cullen's view. Nevertheless, Cullen stuck to the
view that there should be post-mortem signs of different degrees of
excitement in the brain:
I suspect the dissectors [Morgagni and Meckel] have not always
accurately inquired into this circumstances [of unequal excitement
of the brain]; but in several instances, it appears that these states
had been different in different part of the brain; and instances of
this inequality will afford a confirmation of our general doctrine.74
Cullen did not have any evidence which would have supported his
attribution of madness to the changes in the brain; he just believed it.
Thus Cullen framed the nosology, pathology and the therapeutics
of madness around the idea of cerebral excitement and collapse, the
pivotal part of his whole physiology. Just as Willis explained madness in
chemical framework, Pitcairn framed madness around the issue of
circulation of the blood and the secretion of the animal spirits, Cheyne and
others adopted Boerhaaveian fibre as the site of madness, and Battie took
up Haller's physiology of sensibility as the model to understand madness,
Cullen put madness in his scheme of physiology of excitement and
collapse.75
2606, pp.8-9.
74. Cullen, Works, vol.2, p.519.
75. During the eighteenth century, nerves largely remained the ultimate
anatomical sites that the physicians looked at when explaining madness.
See Eric T. Carlson and Meribeth M. Simpson, 'Models of Nervous System
in Eighteenth-Century Psychiatry,' Bull.Hist.Med., 1969, 42: 101-15.
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b) Cullen's Humean account of madness: association and custom
This does not mean that Cullen understood madness exclusively in
bodily and anatomical terms. Quite the reverse. Just as Sauvages
followed Wolff's philosophy of the mind, Cullen used a substantial amount
of the philosophical vocabulary of David Hume to describe the state of the
mad mind. Hume and Cullen were intellectual allies as well as close
friends since Cullen supported Hume's application for the chair of
professor of logic at the University of Glasgow, formerly occupied by
Adam Smith (1723-90) in 1751.76 As Christopher Lawrence shows,
Hume's constructive scepticism exercised great influence upon the way in
which Cullen built his theory of medicine, and Cullen's physiology followed
Hume in taking custom as the vital moulder of animal faculties: 'the action
of the brain is often determined and regulated by custom and habit; that
is, by laws established by frequent and uniform repetition.'
Hume's influence on Cullen is even more evident in the latter's
account of judgment and its disorder. Cullen explained what he meant by
judgment as follows:
simple perceptions and their relations are laid up in the mind by
associations, and it is in following these associations that the mind
brings back before it the relations which it is to judge of.78
76. John Thomson, An Account of the Life. Lectures and Writings of
William Cullen M.D. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1832), p.72. See
Hume's letters to Cullen in The Letters of David Hume, 2 vols., ed. by
J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), vol.1, p.163 and vol.2, p.449-
50. For Cullen and Hume, see Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture,' pp.312-
14.
77. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.115. As for the effect of the custom on
sensation, see jjjj., pp.43-70. This point was discussed in Lawrence,
'Medicine as Culture,' pp.325-36 and 340-47.
78. Cullen, Wo jç, vol.2, p.5 10.
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This is strikingly similar to Hume's account of our understanding of, say,
causal relations. If we have sufficient number of repeated experiences of
event B (e.g. heat) succeeding to A (e.g. flame), we come to associate the
ideas of A and B by habit, which constitutes our judgment that A causes
B, i.e., flame causes heat.79
Hume claimed that such custom and association of ideas are the
basis of all our intellectual operations: 'without the influence of custom,
we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is
immediately present to the memory and senses.' 8° An apparent echo of
this Humean idea of custom as 'the great guide of human life' is to be
found in the following remark of Cullen:
So a man in his sense runs over the associations, take up in course
the several relations, applies the same judgment as before, and acts
in consistency with his usual train.81
Cullen went so far as to say that the habit is the principle of our
judgment, as did Hume: Cullen wrote 'it is nothing but [my emphasis]
pursuing our ordinary train of associations ... that constitute what is called
a sensible man.'82 Accordingly, Cullen's madness or disordered judgment
lay in deviating from the habit: 'delirium is where we do not follow our
79. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by P.H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp.98-106, 130-42, and 155-76. See also
David Hume, An Abstract of a Book Lately Published: Entitled, a Treatise
of Human Nature (London: C. Borbet, 1740), in the above edition, pp.649-
55.
80. David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and
concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), p.45.
81. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.144.
82. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.144
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ordinary train, but, on the contrary, pursue one inconsistent with all our
former established principles or notions.'
Cullen's 'custom' meant common sense, too, for Cullen admitted
that as there was so great similarity between the operations of the human
mind, it was possible to call a considerable deviation from common sense
a disease.& Sanity of judgment for Cullen, therefore, consisted also in
the propriety of one's behaviour, hence improper behaviour deserved the
name of madness. The propriety of one's behaviour for Cullen was,
however, very much relativistic and very close to a code of politeness, so
to speak. Cullen dilated his relativistic view of propriety and madness as
its breach:
if a man comes into a company, there are certain observances
which custom has established, and his behaviour is suited according
to the company he comes into; if it is a company of his usual merry
companions, the laugh arises and the joke goes round; but it if is a
company for business that he is to take a part in, he sits down
seriously, speaks of the business in hand, and attends to what the
other persons are engaged in; but if he were to treat the last
company as he does the first, he would pass for a madman; thus too
in the first company I supposed, he may speak of his amours or of
his mistress; but if he finds the same men among a number of
ladies of honour and virtue, and he renews his discourse there, he
would be thought a madman.
83. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.144.
84. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.145.
85. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.144.
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Taste, politeness, propriety of conversation and adaptation of behaviours
to the situation constituted sanity of the mind. Sanity thus depended
on situation. Talking about one's mistress was not madness in itself: to do
it in an improper circumstance was. Compares to Sauvages' claim that
being an American is the model of madness because he chooses a sensual
pleasure instead of a real happiness, Cullen's attitude is more relativistic.
A social code of behaviour, however, was not the ultimate measure
of madness. As 'there is a certain latitude admitted in judgment,' and as
'men differ greatly from one another without any of them being reckoned
delirious,' a simple deviation from common sense did not constitute
delirium in itself.87 Instead, the ultimate criterion was the habit of one's
own: 'we must farther observe that he is deviating from his ordinary
judgment, and from his usual train of thinking.' Unlike Battie's
perception of external world and Sauvages' harmonious perfection as a
duty of man, Cullen's measure of madness was individualistic. A man was
mad, in the final analysis, when he became different from what he used to
be. Humean philosophy of association of ideas and custom was an
obvious undercurrent of Cullen's social and individualistic characterization
of madness.
c) New study of man in the Scottish Enlightenment
86. As for the problem of virtue and propriety, see Nicholas Phillipson,
'The Scottish Enlightenment,' in Enlightenment in National Context, eds.
by Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1981), 19-
40.
87. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.145.
88. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.145.
89. The individualistic understanding of madness seems to have existed
since the Classical medicine. Robert James, A Medicinal Dictionary
(London: T. Osborne, 1743-45), article 'delirium' cited the definition of
delirium by Celsus which says that 'when any thing is done by the patient
contrary to custom, and without a cause, as when he talks much or little,
contrary to his usual custome...[my emphasis]' he is mad.
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One can say, therefore, that Cullen adopted much of Humean
philosophy of mind as the framework for understanding madness. And
Cullen did not restrict his use of philosophy of the mind to nosology of
madness. Rather, it was a part of his total reform of medicine, which was
a product of the Scottish Enlightenment. I will briefly look at the new
medicine developed there.
As Christopher Lawrence and John Wright have pointed out,
Humean topics are numerous in Cullen's general physiology 90: the
distinction between impression and idea, that is, between primary sensation
and the thought of an object absent from reminiscence (although Cullen,
following Haller's terminology, chose the term 'sensation' instead of
Hume's 'impression.') 91 ; and division of sensation into sensations of
impression which 'arise from the impulse of external bodies' and sensation
of consciousness which 'arise from the mind's being conscious of its own
action, and of the motion it excites.' Cullen shows familiarity with
Locke, too: rejection of innate ideas93; the example of one hand feeling
coldness and the other heat in the same waterY'
Cullen's introduction of the Lockean and Humean philosophy of
mind into physiology was done with confidence. Cullen declared at the
90. Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture,' pp.325-36. John P. Wright,
'Metaphysics and Physiology.'
91. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.24; Hume, Treatise, p.1. Here Cullen made it
explicit that this dichotomy was borrowed from Hume.
92. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.28; Hume, Treatise, pp.7-8. This division of
Cullen sounds more similar to Locke's than Hume's. See Locke, Essay,
2.1.3-4.
93. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.49. Locke, Essay, 2.1.1-2.
94. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.35. 'Different sensations do not always imply
a different kind of action in the bodies producing them; for sometimes,
different sensations arise merely from a different degree of force in the
same kind of action; as manifest in the case of heat and cold.' Locke,
Essay, 2.8.2 1.
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beginning of his book that his physiology was different from the others' on
that point:
The doctrine which explains the condition of the body and of the
mind [my emphasis] necessary to life and health, is called
physiology: I have added here a particular in my physiology that is
not common -- 'and of the mind:'
And his lecture revealed that he was keen to defend this approach,
claiming that the states of the mind 'may produce very considerable effect
upon the bodily state.' Cullen was also aware that he had started to re-
define the scope of medical discourse. He maintained that medicine
before had improperly neglected the mind: 'I find that the conditions of
the human mind must engage our attention more than they have done
hitherto.'
This expansion of the scope of medicine does not seem to have
been accepted in toto at Edinburgh, for Cullen wrote 'some have thought
that I have gone too far in introducing a great deal of metaphysics into my
course.' And there was good reason for others to condemn Cullen. As
we have seen, the medicine of the earlier half of the century constructed
its object of study by eliminating the issues related to human mind.
Pitcairn and the iatro-mathematicians were the most radical in their
attempt to dispense with the soul. Boerhaave stated that 'the object of
physic is the human body.' Commenting on the passage, Haller wrote that
physiology should study man as the body, 'not as a metaphysical entity, not
as a mind ... for consideration of the two do not at all come under the
95. Cullen Works, vol.1, p.5.
96. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.5.
97. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.6.
98. Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.6. I have not found who actually criticized
Cullen.
304
province of the physicians.' 	 The mind, wrote Hailer, should be
excluded from the proper realm of physiology, for:
It is not the business of the physician to be acquainted with what
the mind is, how it passes from one thought to another, or how it
recollects the past ideas of things, which we call memoiy.1
It is true that Boerhaave's and Hailer's textbooks on physiology included
the explanation of what they called external senses (touch, sight, etc.) and
internal senses (imagination, memory, judgment, and will), but their
account of such topics was concerned only with what happens in the body
when one has sensation or when one thinks. The following statement of
Boerhaave's epitomizes the attitude of many contemporary medical writers:
I do not here ask what judgment is, to avoid running into a
metaphysical question: but I only enquire what condition of the
body that is from whence judgment results.101
Into the 'metaphysical question,' the realm where Boerhaave and
many others dared not tread, Cullen confidently marched. Where
Boerhaave tried to restrict his subject only to the state of the body which
accompanied a certain mental phenomenon of judgment, Cullen interwove
the two domains. In that sense, Cullen was a successor, if indirect, of
David Hartley. Cullen certainly knew Hartley's work, for Cullen
mentioned his name. Indeed, Cullen's division of the species of mania into
'mental mania, arising from affections of the mind' and 'corporeal mania,
99. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhapve's Academical Lectures, vol.1, p.53.
100. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerh ppve's Academical Lectures, vol.5, p.270.
101. Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.5, p.273.
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arising from evident corporeal causes' was probably probably drawn from
Hartley's Observations.102
The coincidence between Cullen's and Hartley's schemes is
rendered clearer when one examines what type of vocabulary about the
mind they employed. Hartley's philosophy of the human mind was based
on Locke's logic and moral philosophy, not the pneumatology about the
nature of immaterial substance which Cheyne and Robinson adopted. This
was also the case with Cullen. Answering the criticism that he introduced
'metaphysics' into medicine, Cullen replied that he only introduced 'the
history of the operation of the human minds,' which, according to Cullen,
should not be properly called 'metaphysics.' 103 This suggests that Cullen
was selective and picked up 'the history of the operation of the human
minds,' as the proper component of his physiology, instead of, for example,
Cheyne's metaphysics on the immortality of the soul, the nature of the soul
considered in its separated state from the body. And 'the natural history
of the mind' was, ultimately, Lockean domain. Locke said the aim in his
Essay was to describe the way the human mind gets knowledge and
opinion 'in plain historical method.'104
The direct source of Cullen's 'natural history of the human mind'
was almost certainly Hume. Hume claimed the study of 'the operation of
the mind' (note the phraseology almost identical to Cullen's) was the base
of all sciences, and the sciences like 'mathematics, natural philosophy,
102. Cullen, Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae, p.92. Hartley wrote: 'the
causes of mania are of two kinds, bodily and mental.' Observations on
Man (London: Leake & Frederick, 1749), vol.1, p.400. The scheme was
adopted by Arnold, Observations, vol.2, pp.5-10; Chiarugi, On Insanity;
MacBride, A Methodical Introduction, pp.182-83.
103.Cullen, Works, vol.1, p.6.
104.Locke, Essay, 1.1.2. By the term 'natural history of the human mind'
Cullen almost certainly meant the subject of logic. Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: A. Bell and C. Macfarquhar, 1797), art.
'logic' says that 'logic ... may be defined the science or history of the
human mind.'
306
natural religion,' and even more 'logic, morals, criticism and politics' were
dependent on the science of man. 105 Cullen directly echoed this claim
of Hume when he lectured that 'the history of the human mind [isj
unavoidable not only in physic, but perhaps in every science.' 106 Cullen's
challenge to the Boerhaavean restriction on the realm of physiology was
directly tied to Hume's attempt to provide all sciences with the basis of the
study of human nature.
Cullen's attempt to fuse 'history of the human minds' and
physiology was not an isolated project in Enlightened Scotland. As P.B.
Wood has shown, one major focus of Scottish Enlightenment was to
produce 'the natural history of man' that encompassed both his mind and
body. Such topics were occasionally discussed in clubs, the hotbed of the
Scottish Enlightenment, where physicians and philosophers mixed.107
Both philosophers and physicians tried to connect the two domains of the
studies of the mind and of the body. George Turnbull (d.1748), a
professor of moral philosophy at Aberdeen, wrote a parallel argument to
Hume's attempt to introduce Newtonian experimental method into the
study of the human mind: 'I was led long ago, to apply myself to the study
of the human mind in the same way as to that of the human body.'°
Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), the professor of pneumatics and moral
105.Hume, Treatise, xv-xvi. For Hume's and Cullen's distinction of two
sorts of philosophical enquiries, see Wright, 'Metaphysics and Physiology,'
251. See also Hume, Enquiry, pp.5-16.
106. 'Lectures on the Institutes of Medicine by Dr. Cullen, 1770-71,' cited
in Wright, 'Metaphysics and Physiology,' p. 251.
107. P.B. Wood, 'The Natural History of Man in the Scottish
Enlightenment,' Hist.Sci., 1989, 27: 89-123. For the Select Society, to
which Hume, Cullen and inter alia, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Lord
Kames, belonged, see Roger L. Emerson, 'The Social Composition of
Enlightened Scotland: the Select Society of Edinburgh, 1754-1764,'
Stud.Volt., 1973, 114: 29 1-329.
108.George Turnbull, Principles of Moral Philosophy (1740), cited in Jane
Rendall, The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment, (London: MacMillan,
1978), p.20.
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philosophy at Edinburgh from 1764 to 1778 and one of the central figures
of the Scottish Enlightenment, wrote that one cannot separate the study
of the body and that of the mind:
The animal nature of man is the subject of anatomy and physiology.
The intellectual nature is the proper subject of pneumatics: but
being joined, many of their functions are mixed, and pertain equally
to pneumatics and physiology.109
Some physicians, too, were keen to look at both the mind and the
body. In his enormously popular A Comparative View of the State and
Faculties of Man with Those of the Animal World, a work based on a
course of papers read at the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, John Gregory
lamented that 'those who have studied the philosophy of the human mind
have been little acquainted with the structure of the human body and
the laws of the animal oeconomy, ... and [physicians] have been so
generally inattentive to the peculiar laws of the mind and their influence
on the body.' 11° In another book, Observations on the Duties and
Offices of a Physician, he presented a rough sketch of the medical projects
on 'the laws of union between the mind and body,' which he considered of
as 'one of the most important enquiries that ever managed the attention
of mankind, and almost equally necessary in the sciences of morals and
medicine.' 111 His argument included consideration of 'the history of the
power and influence of the imagination,' 'the history of dreams,' 'the
109.Adam Ferguson, Analysis of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy for the
Use of Students in the College of Edinburgh (1766), cited in Gladys
Bryson, Man and Society: the Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century
(New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), p.33.
110.John Gregory, A Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man
with These of the Animal World, (London: J. Dodsley, 1772), pp.5-6.
111.John Gregory, Observations on the Duties and Offices of a Physician:
and on the Method of Prosecuting Enquiries in Philosophy, (London: W.
Strahan et al., 1770), pp.93-94.
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history of the power and laws of custom and habit,' etc. Andrew Duncan
(1744-1828), another medical professor at Edinburgh, lectured on diversity
of the mental powers both in a single individual at different occasions and
among different people. 112 Despite their rivalry and disagreement over
several issues, both the Edinburgh professors were keen to combat former
neglect of the mind.
Summing up, one can look at Cullen's new pattern of medical
discourse and his account of madness as one of the results of this Scottish
fusion of the two types of discourse. In his pathology and therapeutics of
madness, Cullen followed the a similar strategy to Willis, Pitcairne,
Boerhaave, Battie and many others. Cullen understood madness within
the framework of animal oeconomy, or the physiology of the body. In a
word, the common aim of those thnkiers was to describe and cure the rna^I
body. What is special about Cullen is that he added the new vocabulary
of Lockean and Humean philosophy to describe the state of the mad mind.
Although the project looks similar to Sauvages' nosological
challenge, there are some obvious differences. While Sauvages reached his
dual characterization of mental diseases from his opposition to mechanistic
determinism, Cullen's dual scheme was a product of the Scottish
Enlightenment. In fact, Cullen's view is deterministic seen from Sauvages'
point of view. 3 Where Sauvages' effort was mainly restricted in
nosology, Cullen's introduction of the Humean philosophy of the mind
extended to his reformed and expanded physiology as well. Sauvages'
112.Gregory, Observations, pp.94-5; Andrew Duncan, 'Lectures on the
Practice and Theory of Physic,' WIHM, Wes.Manu., 2238-40, vol.1, pp.386-
9. P.B. Wood points out that Gregory's interest in these topics dated from
his early student days and connected with his attempt to make a Baconian
reform in medicine. See Wood, 'The Natural History of Man,' 9 1-94.
113. CuIlen wrote: 'I shall take it for granted, as demonstrated elsewhere,
that although this disease [vesania] seems to be chiefly, and sometimes
solely an affection of the mind; yet the connection between the mind and
body in this life is such, that these affections of the mind must be
dependent upon a certain state of our corporeal part.' (Works, vol.2,
p.513.)
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mind was understood in Woiffian ontological terms while Cullen followed
British tradition of the analysis of the mental states.
I would like to emphasize that both Sauvages and Cullen, however,
added a new dimension to the medical understanding of madness. This
was the detailed observation of the symptoms of the disordered mind,
understood with reference to the contemporary philosophies of the mind.
Neither characterized all cases of madness as illusion, as Battie and others
had done. Neither dismissed the symptoms of madness as self-evident as
Perry and Buchan had done. Instead, they looked at carefully how the
mind was disordered and classified according to the way it fell mad. They
understood the symptoms of madness on the bases of available accounts
of the way how the sane mind worked, Sauvages relying on Wolff, and
Cullen on Hume. With the works of Sauvages and Cullen, the
philosophical discourse on the state of the mind per se became at last an
integral part of medical account of madness.
Conclusion: Crystallization of the Scottish Synthesis
It seems that the Scottish physicians after Cullen did not entirely
follow Cullen's new framework to understand madness, with its non-
illusion model and newly defined interest in mental state. 114 My cursory
look at the writing and lectures of James Gregory (1753-1821), the son of
John and the successor to Cullen's chair in the practice of physic shows
retrenchment. He does not seem to have followed Cullen's ambitious
programme of coupling physiology and 'the history of the operations of the
114. For the fragmentation of the former Edinburgh medical ideology after
Cullen's retirement, see Christopher Lawrence, 'The Edinburgh Medical
School and the End of the "Old Things" 1790-1830,' History of Universities,
1988, 7: 259-86. See also idem, 'Cullen, Brown and the Poverty of
Essentialism,' Med.Hist, 1988, Supplement no.8, 1-21.
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mind.'115 Despite his being a close friend of Common Sense
philosophers such as Thomas Reid (1710-96) and Dugald Stewart (1753-
1828) and an able metaphysician in his own right, philosophy of mind does
not figure prominently in his Conspectus or Brief View of the Theory of
Medicine (1790) . h16 When Gregory lectured on the Theory of Medicine,
he showed the same reluctance as Boerhaave, claiming that the internal
senses are 'a metaphysical subject.' 117 Moreover, it seems that he
returned to the characterization of madness as an illusion and refused to
take the faculty of judgment as crucial in madness:
The mind is deranged, when one confounds the objects of memory,
or imagination, with the perceptions of the external senses, and thus
ascribes existence to things which never did nor do exist; or when
one's judgment of things is perverted, and foreign from the common
sense of mankind. But this seldom or never happens. A deranged
person usually judges rationally, though from false premises.118
The third edition of Encyclopedia Britannica, whose article 'medicine' is
heavily influenced by James Gregory's Conspectus, also returned to the
model of madness as an illusion. Although the article followed Cullen's
nosology in its arrangement of diseases, the order 'vesaniae' was there
presented in the traditional illusion model. It cited Battie and wrote that
madness consists in a false perception. The article on 'delirium' says in an
exactly Boerhaavean manner that it is the state 'when the ideas excited in
115.As for the metaphysics of James Gregory, see Michael Barfoot,
'James Gregory and Scottish Scientific Metaphysics, 1750-1800,' University
of Edinburgh, Ph.D., 1983.
116.James Gregory, A Conspectus or Brief View of the Theory of
Medicine, (Edinburgh: Stirling and Slade, 1823).
117.James Gregory, 'Theory of Medicine: Notes of Lectures,' WIHM,
Wes.Manu. 2597, p.377.
118.Gregory, Conspectus, p.82.
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the mind do not correspond to the external objects, but are produced by
the change induced on the common sensory.'119
Cullen's challenge, however, was not dead. Although my
consideration of materials after about 1780 has not been systematic, there
are strong indication of the emergence of the new style in medical
discourse on madness in the late century. It seems that some graduates
from Edinburgh propagated and developed his new model of madness and
new pattern of psychiatric discourse later in the century. The new
configuration appeared especially in the monographs on the topic of
mental diseases, which became increasingly common in the late eighteenth
century.
As for the nosology of madness, Thomas Arnold's contribution was
outstanding.° He was one of the most prominent among the late
eighteenth-century madhouse keepers who launched into publishing their
observations on madness. 121 After he studied at Edinburgh and took an
MD in 1766, he inherited a madhouse in Leicester from his father.122
He published a book, Observations on the Nature. Kinds. Causes and
Prevention of Insanity (1782-6), which was mentioned by Cullen in his
lectures with greatest favour. And Cullen's influence was in turn
apparent in Arnold's book.
119. Encyclopaedia Britannica, art., 'medicine,' (vol.11, p.2&3) and art.
'delirium.'
120.Like Cullen and Sauvages, Arnold distinguished nosology and
pathology. Arnold, Observations, vol.1, lvi; nosology is discussed in vol.1,
pp.26-251 and pathology in vol.2, pp.1-320.
121.For the private madhouse keepers in the late eighteenth century, see
Roy Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, pp.136-68.
122. See Peter K. Carpenter, 'Thomas Arnold: a Provincial Psychiatrist in
Georgian England,' Med.Hist., 1989, 33: 199-216.
123. 'The ingenious Dr. Arnold has been commendably employed in
distinguishing the different species of insanity as they appear with respect
to the mind...' Cullen, Works, vol.2, p.520.
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Moreover, just as Sauvages adopted Wolff's and Cullen largely
Hume's philosophy of the mind, Arnold made it explicit that he borrowed
the basis for the classification of insanities from Locke's philosophy,
especially Locke's division of the sources of human knowledge into
sensation and reflection. Sensation involved the images of material objects
and their sensible qualities, and the representations of them were named
'ideas.' Reflection for Arnold was found in judgment: constructing the
relation between things and perceiving the operations of the mind itself,
and this composite piece of thought was named 'notion.' To these two
sources of knowledge corresponded Arnold's two genera of insanity, ideal
insanity and notional insanity. 1 Notional insanity was disorder in
judgment, rather than in imagination. While Arnold's ideal insanity was
an hallucination, or a wrong perception of external things, his notional
insanity was an active error of the mind that did not depend on the
persuasion by illusion.1
The new pattern in monographs about mental diseases is found also
in James Makittrick Adair's Philosophical and Medical Sketch of the
Natural History of the Human Body and Mind (1787). In the work, Adair
included a chapter titled 'The natural history of the human mind' (note the
identical phrase with Cullen's). 1 There he defined madness just as
Cullen had: 'Delirium is a general term, which implies an error of the
124.Arnold, Observations, vol.1, pp.47-48 and 55-57. Here Arnold cited
David Hartley as a revision to Locke's doctrine on the two sources of our
knowledge, but he wrote 'the difference between Locke and Hartley is not
very great.' Besides, he cited Ralph Cudworth and Lord Bolingbrook to
establish the point. (Ibid., vol.1, xvii.)
125.Arnold, Observations, vol.1, p.84. As for the active aspect of
reflection, see jbj, p.51.
126.James Adair Makittrick, A Philosophical and Medical Sketch, pp.54-
96. Adair was educated at Edinburgh, took an MD there in 1766. In his
Medical Cautions. for the Consideration of Invalids: Those Especially Who
Resort to Bath (Bath: R. Cruttwell, 1786), he expressed his debt to Whytt.
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judgment produced by some morbid change in the brain.' 127 In this
argument, Adair relied heavily on the 'natural history of the human mind,'
adopting the Lockean distinction of sensation and reflection, refusing
innate ideas, explaining association of ideas in a Humean fashion, citing
Berkeley's four stages of perception.
Toward the end of the century, the new configuration of psychiatric
discourse was sought after in a determined manner. An Inquiry into the
Nature and Origin of Mental Derangement (1798), by Alexander Crichton,
who had early surgical training at Edinburgh and got his MD at Leyden,
argued that philosophy was an essentially part of psychiatric discourse.1
This statement of the necessity of philosophy in treating the mad would
have infuriated Hailer, who wrote:
though all these properties of the mind are real, yet is the
knowledge of them of no use to the physician, so far as they have
no relation to the body: for allowing him to be acquainted with all
these particulars, and supposing that he endeavours to correct the
inconsistent ideas of the madman by the most authentic reasoning..;
yet with all his wisdom, he will be able to do nothing.°
In a sharp contrast to this scorn to philosophy, Crichton wrote in the
preface of his book:
127.Adair, A Philosophical and Medical Sketch, p.83.
128.Adair, An Philosophical and Medical Sketch, pp.56-66.
129. For Crichton, see the detailed study of Dora B. Weiner, 'Mind and
Body in the Clinic: Philippe Pinel, Alexander Crichton, Dominique
Esquirol, and the Birth of Psychiatry,' in The Language of Psyche: Mind
and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. by G.S. Rousseau (Los Angeles:
William Clark Memorial Library, 1990), 331-402. See also E.M. Tansey,
'The Life and Works of Sir Alexander Crichton, F.R.S. (1763-1856): a
Scottish Physician to the Imperial Russian Court,' Royal Society of
London: Records and Proceedings, 1983-84, 38: 241-59.
130.Boerhaave, Dr. Boerhaave's Academical Lectures, vol.5, p.270.
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It is evidently required that he who undertakes to examine this
branch of science [study of insanity] should be acquainted with the
human mind in its sane state.13'
To this end, Crichton acknowledged his debt to 'our British Psychologists,
such as Locke, Hartley, Reid, Priestley, Stewart, Kames.' 132 It seems
almost certain that Pine! echoed Crichton when a few years later he wrote
'I have ... felt the necessity of commencing my studies with examining the
numerous and important facts which have been discovered and detailed by
modern pneumatologists [nos psychologistes modernes]' like 'Locke,
[James] Harris, Condillac, [Adam] Smith, Stewart, etc.'133
Although one cannot assume a direct path from Cullen to Crichton
and Pine!, their attempt to fuse medicine and philosophy to create a new
language of psychiatry seems to have its prototype in Cullen's venture to
introduce Humean philosophy into medical study of man. This conflicts
with Roy Porter's view on the origin of the new psychiatric discourse.
Observing 'the division of intellectual labour between philosophers of the
mind and physicians of the body,' Porter has claimed that 'when a new
discourse about insanity emerged, it developed outside the traditions of
both regular medicine and metaphysical philosophy.' Porter's
observation fits in quite well with Boerhaave's and Haller's rather rigid
elimination of philosophy of the mind from the scope of medicine, and
131. Crichton, An Inquiry, vol.1, ix-x. Here again, the model of the study
of the human mind was 'natural history.' Crichton wrote that psychiatrist
should undertake introspection and examine his own mind 'with the
impartiality of a natural historian.'
132.Crichton, An Inquiry, xxvii. Besides, he mentioned 'German
philosophers' and Condillac. See Weiner, 'Mind and Body in the Clinic,'
esp. 364-84.
133.Pine!, A Treatise on Insanity, p.135; idem, Trait medico-
philosophique, p.136.
134. Porter, Mind-forg'd Manacles, p.205.
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with Battie's dubbing the description of the mental situation of the
disordered mind as belonging to 'a vulgar apprehension.' However Cullen
and Sauvages instead expanded the scope of medicine to incorporate the
language of the contemporary philosophers and to restructure the
psychiatric parts of their general medical schemes accordingly. It seems
that the new psychiatric discourse was emerging, therefore, not outside the
regular medicine, but within the internal attempts to reform the
configuration of medical knowledge, and the works of Arnold and Adair,
both trained at Edinburgh, exemplify the point. We should thus add the
reforms of medical knowledge and incorporation of the language of
philosophy, especially that of Cullen, to our list of the elements which
constituted the birth of psychiatry.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have examined various patterns of psychiatric
discourse from the Restoration to the 1770s. I have limited my argument
to medical and philosophical concepts of madness, leaving untouched such
problems as fictional representations of madness and social and
institutional treatment of the insane. I have also restricted my major
concern to British writings, although I have considered Continental
materials to provide context. Here I shall first summarize the points I
have made in each chapter, and then assess general features and shifts in
the period I have covered.
In Chapter one, I examined continuities and changes in psychiatry
around 1660, taking the Restoration Oxford and especially Thomas Willis
as the principal site of inquiry. I considered the question whether the
mechanical understanding of the human body and mind-body dualism
transformed psychiatric thinking at that time, using Cartesianism as the
framework to analyze the psychiatric discourse at that time.
My examination of the writings of Thomas Willis and Walter
Charleton showed that they were both anti-Cartesian in respect of mind-
body dualism. Partly following the medical tradition and partly following
Gassendi, Willis and Charleton argued that there existed three
categorically different things in man, namely, the immaterial soul, the
corporeal body, and 'the soul of brutes.' This last thing, whose existence
Descartes denied from the beginning, was an intermediary between the
soul and the body, an intellectual device to secure their interactions.
Willis' De anima brutorum was an attempt to build the physiology and
pathology of that intermediary substance. I tentatively argued that their
denial of the Cartesian dualism and their adoption of the scheme of the
dual souls in man reflected the 'duumvirate,' the political situation
witnessed during the Civil War and the Restoration.
Willis' understanding of madness represented both continuities and
changes from the earlier Renaissance and Neo-classical schemes. The
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same diagnostic categories (phrenzy, mania and melancholia) and the same
basic grid of the etiology of madness (disorder in the mind-body
intermediate agent) were employed both by Willis and by earlier medical
writers on madness. Particularly important was the rigorous pre-Cartesian
dualism which stated that the soul per se was intact in madness, and that
the body (or the material agent of the mind-body medium) was the sole
site of disorder. Christianity had been challenged at that time by the
polemic of Lucretius, and in response, many late sixteenth- and early
seventeenth-century physicians such as Timothy Bright and André du
Laurens were keen to establish the intactness of the soul in madness, to
defend the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. This pre-Cartesian
dualistic pattern of pathology was to remain a constant undercurrent of
psychiatric discourse in the period I have covered in this thesis.
Descartes transformed one important aspect of psychiatric theory
by creating a new mechanistic epistemology. Departing from the
Aristotelian epistemology of intentional species residing in the objects
perceived, Descartes argued that matter in motion alone triggered a
corresponding idea by giving a mechanical shock to the seat of the soul.
Maintaining thus that the most vital thing in perception is mechanical
shock, Descartes constructed a model of madness as an illusion triggered
by a wrong flow of the animal spirits. Adopted by Willis and Friedrich
Hoffmann and provided by them with a physiological substructure, this
Cartesian model of madness as an illusion was to be another undercurrent
of psychiatry during the eighteenth century.
The second chapter looked at the idiosyncratic research programme
of the iatro-mathematical school, which was active from around 1690 to
1720. With Archibald Pitcairn as the leading figure, physicians like
Richard Mead, George Cheyne, John Quincy and James Keill tried to
establish certain foundations of medicine. They thus redefined the scope
of medical knowledge, determining proper objects of knowledge and
excluding improper ones. Relying on the scientific methodology and the
empiricist epistemology of the time, and attacking the 'empirical' ideal of
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medicine, the iatro-mathematicians thought that certainty in medicine
could be achieved only by restricting medical knowledge to that derived
from the senses and expressed in a mathematical and demonstrative
format.
It is thus not surprising that the iatro-mathematicians avoided
anything associated with the the soul/mind (which was neither measurable
not given to the senses), and built a framework in which they could
concentrate on the hydraulics of the body. They put the role of the soul
in interactive phenomena in parentheses, and devised, so to speak, a black-
box theoiy of the soul, bracketing mental issues off from the scope of their
discourse. Accordingly, madness was for them not a problem of higher
mental faculties as it was for other medical theorists at that time. Instead,
madness was a disordered reflex motion, a disorder in which the mind
played no part. As Richard Mead put it, madness 'was not a distemper of
the mind but of the body.'
Chapter three dealt with hysteria and hypochondria, which became
a fashionable medical topic in the early eighteenth century. Under the
influence of Boerhaave, many medical writers at that time adopted the
notion of nervous fibre as one of the fundamental units of the human
body, and conceptualized hysteria and hypochondria as the disorders of
these fibres. With the revival of issues related to the mind, physicians
characterized hysteria and hypochondria as a milder analogue of mania
and melancholia involving damages of higher mental faculties, although
they laid more emphasis on the symptom of inconstant mood involved in
the former group of diseases. This complex and vague construction of the
mental symptoms of hysteria and hypochondria showed the lack of any
tight dichotomy between intellectual and emotional diseases at that time.
Despite the re-introduction of the language of mind into medical accounts
of madness, medical discourse on mind-body interaction at that time was
limited to corporeal issues.
I also highlighted some socio-ideological aspects of the medical
account of hysteria and hypochondria. Rejecting the attribution of the
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spleen to mental whims as a vulgar error, many physicians such as George
Cheyne, Richard Blackmore and Nicholas Robinson argued for the
instruction of lay people regarding the bodily interpretation of the diseases.
They also associated undesirable religious attitudes, such as enthusiasm,
religious depression and atheism, with bodily malfunctioning. The body
was regarded as not only sickening but also improving the mind: by
refining one's body, one could develop moral virtues as well as keen
intellect. This progress of natural and bodily interpretation of the mind,
however, was not in conflict with religion at that time. Indeed, the
religious profession welcomed the physicians' opinion, and allied
themselves to them in the Enlightenment cause.
Another Enlightenment trend was obvious in medical writings
dealing with the nervous diseases. Physicians maintained that the human
mind is malleable through environmental influence, encompassing natural,
social, economic, and political factors. There appeared the idea that
nervous diseases were a disease of the Enlightenment, associated with, or
even generated by, flourishing economy and culture, and a high-consuming
life style. On the other hand, the cure of the diseases also had a place in
the Enlightenment ideal, i.e., an active, social, and cheerful life.
In Chapter four, I dealt with the problem of Lockeanism in the
medical understanding of the mind and its diseases. The influence of
Locke on medical writings on the mind during the earlier half of the
eighteenth century was surprisingly small. I argued that this was mainly
because physicians at that time were primarily interested in the bodily side
of the mind-body interaction, and rejected purely mental issues as a
metaphysical topic. Locke, by comparison, limited his arguments to the
mental issues, largely keeping himself away from their bodily aspects, or
'the physical considerations.' Physicians and Locke were talking about
different planes of the human mind/soul.
Moreover, some medical writers such as Cheyne and Robinson in
the earlier half of the century were explicitly hostile to Lockeanism. The
intellectual background of the hostility was the debate over Locke's
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'thinking matter' hypothesis, which involved issues related to the problem
of the interpretation of madness. Metaphysicians at that time adopted the
same strategy as that employed in the seventeenth century, and tried to
establish a dualistic account of madness, refuting the materialists'
polemical use of the case of madness, but they approached the problem in
a different way. Instead of securing the immaterial faculty of reason, they
'proved' the intactness of the soul by arguing that original and hidden
powers of the soul did not suffer in madness. Adopting the same tactics,
physicians embraced a metaphysical and anti-Lockean approach for
understanding human mental operations. They framed their discourse on
the mind around the soul as an other-worldly substance and the body as
its prison, both of which were not Locke's major concern.
In his Observations on Man, David Hartley started a new approach.
Using Locke's theory of association of ideas and Newton's theory of
vibration as fundamental devices, Hartley bridged the gap between the
philosopher's account of mental operations and physicians' explanation of
the bodily phenomena which accompanied them. Hartley created a new
field of discourse, where physiology and Lockean psychology of the mind
(instead of the pneumatology of the other-worldly substance) were fused
together. Hartley's scheme involved a new constructive, rather than
limiting, role for the body, and a more important role of sensation in
makings of the mind.
Chapter five closely examined the dispute between William Battie
and John Monro. Instead of looking at Battie as an anticipation or
precursor of what was to come after him, I contextualized him into his own
time. I focussed on two neglected aspects of their dispute, namely mid-
century physiology of the nerves and the philosophical and medical
understanding of perception. Mid-century vitalism and the idea of nervous
sensibility cast a long shadow on Battie's theory on madness. In particular,
Battie constructed his account of madness as a faithful analogue of
Albrecht von Haller's experiments on the sensibility of the nerves of living
animals. Just as Haller's animals felt sensations of pain when touched on
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the nerves, Battie's madman had an illusion when he had a pathological
stimulation on the nerves.
Their dispute over whether madness consisted in delusive sensation
or in vitiated judgment was strongly connected with the medical and
philosophical understanding of the process of perception. Partly inspired
by 'Molyneux's question' presented by Locke, and partly in an attempt to
distinguish the bodily and mental processes of perception, mid-century
philosophers and physicians distinguished the processes of sensation and
judgment. Under their schemes, the simple sensation did not provide a
complete account of perception; the exercise of judgment on the sensation
was also essential for perception of external things. Hence madness did
not solely consist in simple illusion, but in forming a wrong judgment on
the illusion. Although Boerhaave, Hailer, and Battie himself were aware
of the problem, they laid much more emphasis on the bodily process of
illusion in madness, assigning the mind only the passive role of being
persuaded by the illusion. Monro switched the emphasis onto the process
of judgment, anticipating ideas expressed a few decades later.
The last and sixth chapter examined a new construction of
psychiatric discourse beginning in the 1760s. The shift involved there was
epitomized in the different accounts of madness in Boissier de Sauvages'
two nosological works, the first published in the early 1730s, the other
about thirty years later. Departing from the former bodily understanding
of madness, the Cartesian model of madness as illusion, and from the strict
distinction between philosophical and medical inquiries of the mind,
Sauvages' later work embraced a teleological understanding of madness
(madness as resembling being an American who could not pursue true
happiness), which encompassed both bodily and psychological aspects. I
argued that this new grid to describe madness was possible because
Sauvages adopted the philosophy of Christian Wolff, and incorporated
Wolff's language on the mind into his medical discourse.
Somewhat parallel shifts in the structure of psychiatric discourse
took place in William Cullen's medical textbooks. Cullen used a
322
substantial amount of the philosophical vocabulary of David Hume to
describe both the normal and disordered states of the mind. Relying on
Hume's idea of association and custom as the sole basis of judgment,
Cullen departed from the former model of madness as an illusion and re-
defined madness as a mis-association and an abnormal judgment, both in
social and individual terms. Cullen's defied earlier resrictions on the scope
of medical discourse, and expanded its language to include the 'natural
history of the human mind.' Cullen's work was seen more broadly in the
context of the Scottish Enlightenment, where physicians and philosophers
were collaborating, engaged in the study of man. I concluded this chapter
with the suggestion that Cullen's fusion of the language of physiology and
the language of the philosophy of human mental operations served as a
matrix from which specialized psychiatric discourse emerged in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
I will now connect the points I have made separately in the chapters
above and assess general features of the psychiatric thinking during the
period covered. I want to start by re-emphasizing that eighteenth-century
psychiatry was not a monolith. Instead of a single dominant paradigm,
there were several distinctive patterns of psychiatric discourse, often
formulated in fundamentally different ways, replacing one another
relatively quickly or existing contemporaneously with each other. It is very
hard to find an isomorphic structure between the iatro-mathematicians'
'psychiatry without mind' and Sauvages' psychological approaches based on
the heavy use of the philosophy of Wolff. A sharp contrast existed
between Cheyne's and Robinson's bodies of knowledge based on the
overtly other-worldly soul, and Hartley's system which incorporated the
Lockean language describing this-worldly operations of the mind. Despite
their embracing a parallel notion of the third intermediate matter endowed
with a special quality, Battie's Hallerian, experimental and visible model
of the etiology of madness differed greatly from Willis's accounts of
madness established on the Gassendian, hypothetical, and intangible
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corporeal soul.	 fluctuations, rather than a stable development,
characterized the psychiatric discourse in the period covered by this thesis.
Some of the most obvious factors underlying the fluctuations were
shifts in the medical/scientific paradigms. Each scheme I have examined
had a unique pathology of mental diseases. Willis's shift from the Galenic
theoiy of the humours to a chemical-corpuscular theory led him to draw
analogies between chemical substances, animal spirits, and the mental
symptoms of madness. Following Hailer's experiments, Battie constructed
the model of madness as an analogue of sensibility of vivisected animals.
Cullen's vitalist theory of nervous excitement and collapse constituted
mania as a state of over-excitement and provided a basis of the
therapeutics he recommended. These medical-scientific issues indeed had
a profound impact on the eighteenth-century understandings of mental
diseases. The most striking example may be the research programme of
the iatro-mathematicians. Their attempts to establish certain and purely
bodily medicine led them to construct a unique psychiatry which dispensed
with any mental issues.
Shifts in psychiatric discourse during the eighteenth century did not,
however, reflect solely medical and scientific theory. The field was also
open to another domain--the philosophy and the metaphysics of the
soul/mind--although to make too rigid a distinction between medical and
philosophical domains would be anachronistic. Sometimes a single source
produced dual impacts in both medical and philosophical terms. Thus
Descartes' mechanical physiology and his epistemology seem to have
transformed the medical understanding of madness at Oxford.
One common metaphysical undercurrent of contemporary
psychiatric discourse was the immortality and incorruptibility of the soul,
reflecting the religious instability of the early modern period. Alarmed at
the revival of Lucretius's use of madness and its cure as evidence against
immortality, and, more generally, anxious at religious turmoil and unbelief,
Renaissance and Neo-classical doctors such as Timothy Bright and André
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du Laurens established a rigorously dualistic account of madness, in which
only the body was disordered and the soul itself remained intact.
Propagated by Descartes and others, dualism became a built-in part of
medicine and of its account of madness in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. When the 'thinking matter' hypothesis inspired by Locke posed
a threat to the doctrine of the immortality and immateriality of the soul,
both physicians and metaphysicians joined in defence of Christianity and
reinforced the intactness of the soul in madness.
This scheme to defend the immateriality, immortality and
incorruptibility of the soul led physicians to locate madness exclusively in
the body. Within the scheme, the body was the only metaphysically correct
site of madness. The somatic understanding of madness during the period
examined was, therefore, a product of the metaphysics of the soul and of
the ideological defence of the doctrine of Christianity from atheist and
materialist attack. Although there existed a certain concern for building
'scientific' medicine by eliminating the metaphysical issues related to the
soul and by limiting the scope of medical discourse to the bodily issues
alone (best exemplified in the system of the iatro-mathematicians), to
identify the bodily accounts of madness in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as simply 'scientific' would be entirely anachronistic.
Metaphysical and ideological issues also seem to have cast a long
shadow on the therapeutics of madness during this period. When a man
became mad, to use the physicians' favourite metaphor, the skilful organist
(the soul) was still there, retaining all his superb skill, but suffering from
some defects in the instrument (the body) and hence unable to make as
good a performance as before. The physician's task was, therefore, to
rectify the organ and to remove the impediments. Overwhelming emphasis
in the cure of madness was thus placed on the medical intervention
principally aimed at the body of the mad. Even when physicians adopted
a seemingly psychological intervention, such as acting on the passions, the
rationale attached to the method was always centred around the body of
the patients. From the mid-eighteenth century, however, new techniques
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for handling the mind were coming to the fore, best exemplified in Battie's
emphasis on management. The path from bodily therapeutics to
psychological ones, and its relation to metaphysics and to the growth of
institutions, remains to be examined.
Another implication of the model of the immortality of the soul was
that a madman, however raving, was not supposed to have lost the essence
of humanity. His soul, which distinguished him from a beast and made
him a man, remained intact even in the most violent fit of madness.
Despite some bestial imagery of madness, psychiatric discourse did not at
its theoretical centre identify the madman as a soulless brute. Although
attitudes towards the mad and their treatment did not depend solely on
psychiatric theory, one can safely argue that no psychiatric theories of the
period were based on the identification of the mad and beasts.
Regarding the existence of an immaterial substance in man, there
was almost unanimous agreement among physicians (of course, with a
handful of exceptions such as La Mettrie). In other words, an
overwhelming majority of the medical accounts of madness were dualistic.
Natural philosophers, physicians and metaphysicians disagreed within the
dualistic framework, however. The most visible point of disagreement was
whether there existed a special category of matter endowed with unique
powers. Descartes and Boerhaave denied such a thing, while Willis'
'corporeal soul,' and Hailer's, Battie's and Cullen's nerves endowed with
a special property of sensibility represented the notions of sensible special
matter.
Less visible but more important was the departure from the
Cartesian 'trialism' which said that there existed two different kinds of the
operations of the mind, one being purely mental and the other interactive.
Early- and mid-century physicians such as Cheyne and Nicholas Robinson
started to understand dualism in a different way. In their dualistic scheme,
incorruptibility resided not in the actual operation of higher mental
faculties such as reasoning and reflection, but in the hidden original
powers of the soul. The Cartesian bodiless cogito was denied, and our
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mental activities were understood as products of the interaction between
the original powers of the soul and the body which impeded them.
Although in a radically different way, David Hartley also underpinned all
mental operations with corresponding bodily processes. Hartley analyzed
mental faculties into mental atoms of ideas associated with each other,
which corresponded with the bodily units of vibrations. Hartley thus
established a psychology entirely based on the body.
The new versions of dualism implied that physicians no longer had
to construct their accounts of madness solely or principally with reference
to interactive and lower mental faculties like sensation and imagination.
The rigid distinction between the interactive, lower and corruptible
faculties and the purely mental, higher and incorruptible ones disappeared.
Under the old version of dualism, physicians were largely concentrating on
the process of image-making as the key to understanding madness.
Renaissance and Neo-classical doctors blamed the faculty of the
imagination, and Descartes' new epistemology equated madness with the
production of false images by a disordered flow of the animal spirits.
Despite being aware that madness was something more than a simple
delusion, Boerhaave, Hailer, and Battie adopted the same model of
madness as an illusion and disordered imagination, assigning the mind only
the passive role of being persuaded.
In sharp contrast, late-century psychiatric discourse defied the
centrality of the faculty of the imagination and the model of madness as
illusion. Higher faculties like judgment were introduced by Monro,
Sauvages, and Cuilen as the key to the disordered mind. The field of the
mind which was thus susceptible to the bodily disorders was extended. In
the late century, psychiatric discourse started to penetrate more deeply
into the disordered mind, beyond the barriers which separated corruptible
imagination from imperishable reason, physician's domain from
philosopher's field, and the body from the mind.
Enlargement of the language of psychiatric discourse was also
prompted by physicians' adoption of new languages of the philosophy of
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the mind. Alarmed at the implications of the passive mind contained in
mechanical medicine, Sauvages embraced Wolff's philosophy of the active
mind. Defying Boerhaave's and many others' limiting of the proper
language for medicine to the body, departing from Locke's distinction
between science of the mind and 'physical considerations,' and following
the tide of the new study of man in the Scottish Enlightenment, Cullen let
the language of Locke and Hume, or the 'natural history of the human
mind,' into his medical language. Although anticipated by Hartley, the
new pattern of medical discourse on the human mind, a pattern which
encompassed both 'the physical consideration' and 'the natural history of
the human mind,' was not established firmly until Cullen.
The enormous success of Cullen's medical textbooks meant that the
new pattern of medical discourse on the mind was easily available in the
1780s and 90s, the period when psychiatry as specialized discipline was
taking a solid and visible form. 'Psychiatry' as a relatively independent
branch of medical practice, based on both public and private specialized
institutions for the mad, was emerging with Cullen's medical system as its
matrix. It is thus not surprising that Thomas Arnold adopted Lockean
philosophy as the essential framework of his classification of mental
diseases, and that Alexander Crichton and Philippe Pine! started to base
their specialized discourse on mental diseases on the philosophy of the
mind.
Detailed analysis of the works of Arnold, Crichton, Pine!, and their
contemporaries, however, lies beyond the scope of this thesis. The concern
of the thesis has been a pre-history of the 'birth of psychiatry.' With those
household names that constituted the birth of psychiatry, it seems the time
to stop. As for the process of the birth of psychiatry itself,
Forse altri cantarà con miglior plettro.
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